No. 81-314
I N T E SUPREME COURT O THE STATE O M N A A
H F F OTN
STATE O M N A A
F O T N ,
P l a i n t i f f and A p p e l l a n t ,
VS.
GERMAINE D. CONRAD and
ROBERT F. PALMER,
D e f e n d a n t s and Respondents.
Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court of t h e Fourth J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t ,
I n and f o r t h e County o f M i s s o u l a
Honorable Gordon B e n n e t t , J u d g e p r e s i d i n g .
Counsel o f Record:
For Appellant:
Hon. Mike G r e e l y , A t t o r n e y G e n e r a l , Helena, Montana
R o b e r t L. Deschamps, I11 a r g u e d , M i s s o u l a , Montana
F o r Respondents:
Moses Law Firm, B i l l i n g s , Montana
C h a r l e s F. Moses a r g u e d , B i l l i n g s , Montana
Edward A. Curnmings a r g u e d , M i s s o u l a , Montana
Submitted: O c t o b e r 1 9 , 1981
Decided: I\$R 12 1982
.APR 1 2 1 9 8
Filed.
Clerk
Mr. C h i e f J u s t i c e F r a n k I . H a s w e l l d e l i v e r e d t h e O p i n i o n o f
the Court.
T h i s i s a11 a p p e a l from an o r d e r denying the State's
motion for leave to file an information charging the
defendants with o f f i c i a l misconduct. We affirm.
The facts disclose t h a t d e f e n d a n t R o b e r t P a l m e r was
s w o r n i n a s a M i s s o u l a C o u n t y C o m m i s s i o n e r on t h e m o r n i n g o f
January 5, 1981. Defendant Germaine Conrad was already a
County Comrnissioner . The third County Commissioner was
B a r b a r a Evans. C h a r l e s B r o o k e was t h e C o ~ n m i s s i o n ' s a d m i n i s -
trative officer.
L a t e r on t h a t same d a y , a f t e r P a l m e r had b e e n sworn
in, h e and C o n r a d met t o d i s c u s s a r e o r g a n i z a t i o n p l a n f o r
s t a f f personnel. F o l l o w i n g t h e m e e t i n g , B r o o k e was d i r e c t e d
t o make up d o c u m e n t s t o o u t l i n e a n d i m p l e m e n t t h e p l a n t h a t
h a d b e e n a p p r o v e d b y C o n r a d and P a l m e r . B r o o k e was t o h a v e
the supporting documents prepared in time for t h e commis-
s i o n e r s ' meeting scheduled f o r t h e next day, J a n u a r y 6. At
t h a t t i m e t h e p l a n was t o b e p r e s e n t e d t o t h e t h i r d commis-
s i o n e r , B a r b a r a Evans. Evans d i d n o t p a r t i c i p a t e i n a n y o f
the discussions. Both respondents admit they consciously
e x c l u d e d Evans from t h e d i s c u s s i o n s and d i d n o t want h e r t o
know about them or the reorganization plan prior to the
January 6 board meeting.
Thereafter, the incident was investigated by the
Missoula County Attorney and the Attorney General. They
concluded that there was probable cause to believe that
t h e r e had been a v i o l a t i o n of Montana's open m e e t i n g law and
the official misconduct statute, section 45-7-401 (1)( e ) ,
MCA. The p e r t i n e n t open meeting s t a t u t e s and t h e o f f i c i a l
misconduct s t a t u t e a r e s e t o u t below:
"OPEN MEETINGS
"2-3-201. L e g i s l a t i v e i n t e n t - - l i b e r a l con-
s t r u c t i o n . The l e g i s l a t u r e f i n d s and d e c l a r e s
t h a t p u b l i c boards, commissions, c o u n c i l s ,
and o t h e r p u b l i c a g e n c i e s i n t h i s s t a t e e x i s t
t o a i d i n t h e c o n d u c t of t h e p e o p l e s ' b u s i -
ness. I t is t h e i n t e n t o f t h i s p a r t t h a t
a c t i o n s and d e l i b e r a t i o n s of a l l p u b l i c
a g e n c i e s s h a l l be c o n d u c t e d o p e n l y . The
p e o p l e o f t h e s t a t e do n o t w i s h t o a b d i c a t e
t h e i r s o v e r e i g n t y t o t h e a g e n c i e s which s e r v e
them. Toward t h e s e e n d s , t h e p r o v i s i o n s o f
t h e p a r t s h a l l be l i b e r a l l y c o n s t r u e d .
"2-3-202. Meeting d e f i n e d . A s used i n t h i s
part, 'meeting' means t h e c o n v e n i n g of a
quorum o f t h e c o n s t i t u e n t membership o f a
p u b l i c a g e n c y , w h e t h e r c o r p o r a l o r by means
of e l e c t r o n i c e q u i p m e n t , t o h e a r , d i s c u s s , o r
a c t upon a m a t t e r o v e r which t h e a g e n c y h a s
supervision, control, jurisdiction, or
a d v i s o r y power.
"2-3-203. Meetings of p u b l i c a g e n c i e s t o be
open t o public--exceptions. (1) A l l m e e t i n g s
of p u b l i c o r governmental bodies, boards,
b u r e a u s , c o m m i s s i o n s , a g e n c i e s of t h e s t a t e ,
o r any p o l i t i c a l s u b d i v i s i o n of t h e s t a t e o r
o r g a n i z a t i o n s o r a g e n c i e s s u p p o r t e d i n whole
o r i n p a r t by p u b l i c f u n d s o r e x p e n d i n g
p u b l i c f u n d s s h a l l be open t o t h e p u b l i c .
"45-7-401. O f f i c i a l m i s c o n d u c t . (1) A p u b l i c
s e r v a n t commits t h e o f f e n s e of o f f i c i a l
m i s c o n d u c t when i n h i s o f f i c i a l c a p a c i t y h e
commits a n y of t h e f o l l o w i n g a c t s :
" ( e ) knowingly c o n d u c t s a meeting of a p u b l i c
a g e n c y i n v i o l a t i o n o f 2-3-203."
On March 6 , 1 9 8 1 , t h e County A t t o r n e y f i l e d an a f f i -
d a v i t and m o t i o n f o r l e a v e t o f i l e an i n f o r m a t i o n c h a r g i n g
t h e d e f e n d a n t s with o f f i c i a l misconduct. The a f f i d a v i t s e t
forth facts essentially as outlined above. On A p r i l 27,
1981, the District Court denied the State's motion by an
o p i n i o n and o r d e r . This appeal followed.
The i s s u e s on a p p e a l a r e :
1. Whether t h e a l l e g a t i o n s in the a f f i d a v i t estab-
l i s h p r o b a b l e c a u s e t h a t t h e d e f e n d a n t s c o m m i t t e d t h e crime
charged.
2. W h e t h e r s e c t i o n 4 5 - 7 - 4 8 1 ( 1 ) ( e ) , MCA, is v o i d f o r
vagueness.
We affirm the trial court's decision and find the
S t a t e ' s m o t i o n f o r l e a v e t o f i l e a n i n f o r m a t i o n was p r o p e r l y
denied.
I n i t i a l l y , we f i n d t h e a f f i d a v i t e s t a b l i s h e s p r o b a b l e
cause of a violation of Montana's open meeting law. The
a l l e g a t i o n s i n t h e a f f i d a v i t must be taken as true. See,
L i t t l e v. Hhay ( 1 9 7 3 ) , 8 0 9 Wash.App. 725, 5 0 9 P.2d 92, and
S t a t e v. Wolfe ( 1 9 6 8 ) , 1 5 6 Conn. 1 9 9 , 239 A.2d 509. These
a l l e g a t i o n s d i r e c t l y a l l e g e t h a t B r o o k e ' s p l a n was a p p r o v e d
b y Palmer and Conrad on J a n u a r y 5 and t h a t " b o t h [ P a l m e r and
Conrad] admitted that t h e y c o n s c i o u s l y e x c l u d e d Evans from
t h e i r d i s c u s s i o n s a n d d i d n o t w a n t h e r t o know a b o u t t h e m o r
their reorganization plan prior to the January 6th Board
Meeting." We have previously held that a county commis-
sioners' meeting conducted between two commissioners by
t e l e p h o n e i n w h i c h t h e t h i r d c o m m i s s i o n e r h a d no n o t i c e a n d
did not participate violated Montana's open meeting law.
Board of Trustees etc. v. Board of County Co~umissioners
(1980) Mont . , 6 0 6 P.2d 1 0 6 9 , 37 S t . R e p . 175.
I n B o a r d o f T r u s t e e s , s u p r a , we h e l d :
"The r e c o r d a l s o i n d i c a t e s t h a t d u e t o t h e
f r a m e w o r k i n w h i c h t h e m e e t i n g was h e l d ,
i . e . , b y means of t e l e p h o n e c o n v e r s a t i o n , and
d u e t o t h e f a c t t h a t Commissioner McClintock
was n o t i n f o r m e d o f t h e m e e t i n g , i t was n o t
a n ' o p e n m e e t i n g ' a s r e q u i r e d i n Montana. ..
"This type of c l a n d e s t i n e meeting v i o l a t e s
t h e s p i r i t and l e t t e r o f t h e Montana Open
l q e e t i n g Law.'' 606 P.2d a t 1 0 7 3 , 37 S t . R e p .
a t 180.
Having found that probable cause existed under the
allegations of the affidavit, we next consider whether
section 45-7-401 (1)( e ) , MCA, is void for vagueness, In
d o i n g s o we n o t e t h e l e g i s l a t i v e h i s t o r y o f t h e open m e e t i n g
l a w c o n t a i n e d i n t h e D i s t r i c t J u d g e ' s s c h o l a r l y o p i n i o n and
order:
" M o n t a n a ' s ' open m e e t i n g l a w ' ( S e c t i o n s 2-3-
2 1 0 , e t s e q . ) was p a s s e d i n 1 9 6 3 ( C h a p t e r
159). Its f i r s t s e c t i o n s t a t e d :
" ' S e c t i o n 1. The l e g i s l a t u r e f i n d s a n d
d e c l a r e s t h a t public boards, commissions,
c o u n c i l s , and o t h e r p u b l i c a g e n c i e s i n t h i s
s t a t e e x i s t t o a i d i n t h e c o n d u c t of t h e
people's business. I t is t h e i n t e n t o f t h i s
a c t t h a t a c t i o n s and d e l i b e r a t i o n s o f a l l
pub1 i c a g e n c i e s s h a l l be c o n d u c t e d o p e n l y .
The p e o p l e o f t h e s t a t e do n o t w i s h t o
abdicate t h e i r sovereignty t o the agencies
which s e r v e then?. Toward t h e s e e n d s , t h e
p r o v i s i o n s o f t h e a c t s h a l l be l i b e r a l l y
construed.
T h i s s e c t i o n , h e a v i l y p l a g a r i z e d from a 1 9 5 3
a l i f o r n i a s t a t u t e ( S e c t i o n 54950) , added t o
hat statute the reference to 'delibera-
tions.' The s e c o n d s e c t i o n o f o u r s t a t u t e
(now S e c t i o n 2-3-203) provided i n p e r t i n e n t
part:
" ' A l l meetings of p u b l i c o r governmental
bodies . . . at which a n y a c t i o n i s taken
. . . s h a l l be open t o t h e p u b l i c ' (with
exceptions) .
" T h i s mandatory s e c t i o n d i d n o t d e a l w i t h
'deliberations' a t a l l . The s t a t u t e d i d n o t
d e f i n e such t h i n g s a s ' a c t i o n , ' 'delibera-
tion,' ' m e e t i n g ' o r ' o p e n ' and i t p r o v i d e d
f o r no n o t i c e r e q u i r e m e n t s . ldo s a n c t i o n s
were s u g g e s t e d ,
" S a n c t i o n s were added by t h e 1 9 7 5 l e g i s l a -
t u r e ( C h a p t e r 474) by t h e a d d i t i o n o f a s u b -
s e c t i o n ( e ) t o R.C.M. S e c t i o n 94-7-401 (now
45-7-401, t h e o f f i c i a l misconduct c r i m i n a l
s t a t u t e p a s s e d a s p a r t o f t h e 'new' c r i m i n a l
code i n 1973 ( C h a p t e r 5 1 3 ) ) , which t h e n
provided i n p e r t i n e n t p a r t :
" ' A p u b l i c s e r v a n t commits t h e o f f e n s e o f
o f f i c i a l m i s c o n d u c t when, in his official
c a p a c i t y , he . . . knowingly c o n d u c t s a
meeting of a p u b l i c agency i n v i o l a t i o n of
s e c t i o n 82-3402 [2-3-2031 .'
"Having i n 1 9 7 5 i n c o r p o r a t e d t h e m a n d a t o r y
p r o v i s i o n of t h e o p e n m e e t i n g l a w i n t h e
c r i m i n a l c o d e by s e c t i o n numbered r e f e r e n c e ,
t h e r e b y making i t s v i o l a t i o n c r i m i n a l and
providing a penalty t h e r e f o r , t h e l e g i s l a -
t u r e i n 1977 ( C h a p t e r 567) g o t t o t i n k e r i n g
w i t h t h e o p e n m e e t i n g l a w and t h e i n c o r p o r -
ated section. As to that section, they
removed t h e words ' a t which a n y a c t i o n is
t a k e n ' from t h e l a n g u a g e q u o t e d a b o v e . Thus,
while the original section required t h a t
m e e t i n g s a t which a c t i o n was t a k e n be o p e n ,
t h e s e c t i o n a s amended r e q u i r e d t h a t a l l
p u b l i c m e e t i n g s be o p e n , w h e t h e r a c t i o n was
taken or not. But i n t h e same c h a p t e r t h e
l e g i s l a t u r e provided, f o r t h e f i r s t time, a
d e f i n i t i o n of t h e term ' m e e t i n g ' i n a newly
d e s i g n a t e d and numbered R.C.M. S e c t i o n (83-
3 4 0 4 , now 2-3-202):
"'AS used i n t h i s c h a p t e r , " m e e t i n g " means
t h e c o n v e n i n g o f a quorum o f t h e c o n s t i t u e n t
inembership of a p u b l i c agency, whether
c o r p o r a l o r by means o f e l e c t r o n i c e q u i p m e n t ,
t o h e a r , d i s c u s s o r a c t upon a m a t t e r o v e r
which t h e a g e n c y h a s s u p e r v i s i o n , c o n t r o l ,
j u r i s d i c t i o n o r a d v i s o r y power,'
" I t w i l l be n o t e d , i n t e r a l i a , t h a t a quorum
was r e q u i r e d and t h a t t h e p u r p o s e o f t h e
m e e t i n g c o u l d be t o h e a r o r d i s c u s s a s w e l l
as to act, T h i s C h a p t e r a l s o made v o i d a b l e
any d i s c u s s i o n made i n v i o l a t i o n o f t h e a c t ,
I n t h i s amendment o f t h e open m e e t i n g l a w , no
r e f e r e n c e was made t o t h e c r i m i n a l c o d e ,
e i t h e r i n t h e t i t l e o r t h e body o f t h e a c t , "
I n Connally v. G e n e r a l C o n s t r u c t i o n Co. ( 1 9 2 6 ) , 269
U.S. 385, 46 S.Ct. 126, 7!3 L,Ed. 322, the United States
Supreme C o u r t e s t a b l i s h e d a s t a n d a r d for the determination
o f v a g u e n e s s which h a s b e e n f o l l o w e d t o t h i s d a y :
"That t h e t e rm s of a p e n a l s t a t u t e c r e a t i n g a
new o f f e n s e m u s t b e s u f f i c i e n t l y e x p l i c i t t o
i n f o r m t h o s e who a r e s u b j e c t t o i t what con-
d u c t on t h e i r p a r t w i l l r e n d e r them l i a b l e t o
i t s p e n a l t i e s , is a w e l l - r e c o g n i z e d r e q u i r e -
ment, consonant a l i k e with o r d i n a r y n o t i o n s
o f f a i r p l a y and t h e s e t t l e d r u l e s o f l a w , "
269 U.S, a t 391, 46 S.Ct. a t 1 2 7 , 70 L.Ed. a t
328.
The C o u r t r e i t e r a t e d t h i s s t a n d a r d i n W i n t e r s v . New
York ( 1 9 4 8 ) , 333 U.S. 5 0 7 , 68 S . C t . 6 6 5 , 92 L.Ed. 848, quot-
ing from S t a t e v . Diamond ( 1 9 2 1 ) , 27 N.M. 477, 202 P. 988,
" ' W h e r e t h e s t a t u t e u s e s w o r d s o f no d e t e r -
m i n a t i v e meaning, o r t h e l a n g u a g e is s o
g e n e r a l and i n d e f i n i t e a s t o e m b r a c e n o t o n l y
a c t s commonly r e c o g n i z e d a s r e p r e h e n s i b l e ,
b u t a l s o o t h e r s which i t is u n r e a s o n a b l e t o
presume w e r e i n t e n d e d t o b e made c r i m i n a l , i t
w i l l be d e c l a r e d v o i d f o r u n c e r t a i n t y . ' " 333
U.S. a t 5 1 6 , 6 8 S , C t . a t 670-71, 92 L.Ed. a t
850.
T h i s Court h a s e s t a b l i s h e d a s t a n d a r d s i m i l a r t o t h a t
used i n C o n n a l l y and W i n t e r s . I n S t a t e v. Perry (1979), -
Mon t . -, 590 P.2d 1 1 2 9 , 36 S t . R e p . 2 9 1 , q u o t i n g from S t a t e
ex rel. G r i f f i n v. Greene ( 1 9 3 7 ) , 1 0 4 Mont. 460, 67 P.2d
9 9 5 , we h e l d t h a t " u n l e s s [ a s t a t u t e ] is s u f f i c i e n t l y e x p l i -
c i t s o t h a t a l l t h o s e s u b j e c t t o t h e p e n a l t i e s may know w h a t
t o avoid, i t v i o l a t e s t h e e s s e n t i a l s of due p r o c e s s . " 590
I t i s a l s o c l e a r t h a t no p e r s o n s h o u l d be r e q u i r e d t o
guess at whether a contemplated action is c r i m i n a l . The
U n i t e d S t a t e s Supreme C o u r t h a s s t a t e d t h e p r i n c i p l e i n t h e
following language:
" A s a m a t t e r o f d u e p r o c e s s , ' n o o n e may b e
r e q u i r e d a t p e r i l of l i f e , l i b e r t y o r prop-
e r t y t o s p e c u l a t e a s t o t h e meaning o f p e n a l
statutes. A l l a r e e n t i t l e d t o be i n f o r m e d a s
t o what t h e S t a t e commands o r f o r b i d s . ' "
Hynes v . Mayor o f O r a d e l l ( 1 9 7 6 ) , 425 U.S.
6 1 0 , 6 2 0 , 96 S . C t . 1 7 5 5 , 1 7 6 0 , 48 L.Ed.2d
243, 253.
S i ~ n i l a r l y ,i n Connally, s u p r a , t h e Court s a i d :
"And a s t a t u t e w h i c h e i t h e r f o r b i d s o r
r e q u i r e s t h e doing of an a c t i n t e r m s s o
v a g u e t h a t men o f common i n t e l l i g e n c e m u s t
n e c e s s a r i l y g u e s s a t i t s meaning and d i f f e r
a s t o its a p p l i c a t i o n v i o l a t e s t h e f i r s t
e s s e n t i a l of due p r o c e s s of law," (Citations
omitted,) 269 U.S. a t 3 9 1 , 46 S.Ct. a t 1 2 7 ,
70 L,Ed. a t 328.
We hold that section 45-7-4161 (1)( e ) , MCk, violates
these standards.
I t is u n c l e a r whether t h e 1977 l e g i s l a t u r e , i n enact-
ing its broad d e f i n i t i o n of "meeting" t o i n c l u d e d i s c u s s i o n s
a s w e l l a s a c t i o n s ( s e c t i o n 2-3-2162, MCA), i n t e n d e d t o amend
the criminal statute under which these commissioners w e r e
charged (section 45-7-401(1) ( e ) , MCA), to encompass the
expanded scope o f t h e open meeting law. T h e r e i s no e x p r e s s
l e g i s l a t i v e i n t e n t t o do s o .
Men of common intelligence could differ in their
o p i n i o n a s t o whether t h e broad "meeting" d e f i n i t i o n e n a c t e d
in 1977 was incorporated in the 1975 amendment to the
criminal statute. The f a c t t h a t a lawsuit has arisen over
t h e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of t h i s s t a t u t e underscores t h i s differ-
b
ence of opinion. Accordingly, any a t t e m p t a t r e s o l u t i o n o f
t h i s d i f f e r e n c e o f o p i n i o n would n e c e s s a r i l y i n v o l v e g u e s s -
work and speculation, a fatal defect in any criminal
statute. It is simply not clear what constitutes the
prohibited conduct.
The State argues that section 2 - 1 0 8 2 , MCA,
d i s p o s e s of t h e problem. That s t a t u t e provides:
" ( 2 ) A s p e c i f i c o r presumed r e f e r e n c e t o a
title, chapter, part, section, or subsection
o f t h e Montana Code A n n o t a t e d i s p r e s u m e d t o
be a r e f e r e n c e t o t h a t t i t l e , c h a p t e r , p a r t ,
s e c t i o n , o r s u b s e c t i o n a s i t may b e amended
o r c h a n g e d f r o m time t o t i m e . T h i s presump-
t i o n may b e o v e r c o m e o n l y b y a c l e a r s h o w i n g
t h a t a s u b s e q u e n t amendment o r c h a n g e i n t h e
title, chapter, part, section, or subsection
is i n c o n s i s t e n t w i t h t h e c o n t i n u e d p u r p o s e o r
meaning o f t h e s e c t i o n r e f e r r i n g t o it."
The a b o v e s t a t u t e was e n a c t e d i n 1 9 7 9 and i m m e d i a t e l y
p r e c e d e s s e c t i o n 1-2-109, MCA, w h i c h s t a t e s t h a t no Montana
l a w is r e t r o a c t i v e u n l e s s e x p r e s s l y d e c l a r e d s o .
The difficulty with the S t a t e 1s argument becomes
obvious i n l i g h t of s e c t i o n 1-2-109, MCA. To a p p l y a 19 79
e n a c t m e n t t o a l a w p a s s e d i n 1977 ( t h e " m e e t i n g " d e f i n i t i o n )
would clearly be retroactive. Every reasonable doubt is
resolved a g a i n s t r e t r o a c t i v e o p e r a t i o n of a s t a t u t e . Penrod
v. H o s k i n s o n ( 1 9 7 6 ) , 1 7 0 Mont. 277, 552 P.2d 325.
For the above reasons we hold that section 45-7-
401(1) ( e ) , MCA, is void for vagueness and affirm the
D i s t r i c t C o u r t ' s d e n i a l of t h e S t a t e ' s motion f o r leave to
f i l e an i n f o r m a t i o n .
?Ad@, %
Chief J u s t i c e
&
.
\
W concur :
e
- ..
ono or able 'B. W. Thomas, D i s -
t r i c t Judge, s i t t i n g i n place
of Mr. J u s t i c e J o h n C. S h e e h y
Mr. Justice Gene B. Daly:
I concur in the result.
Justice ,