State v. Johnson

NO. 81-380 I N THE SUPREFIE COURT O THE STATE OF M N A A F O T N 1981 THE STATE OF MONTANA, P l a i n t i f f and Respondent, -vs- WAYNE JOHNSON, Defendant and A p p e l l a n t . Appeal from: District Court of t h e Eighteenth J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , I n and f o r t h e County o f G a l l a t i n , The H o n o r a b l e J o s e p h B. Gary, J u d g e p r e s i d i n g . C o u n s e l o f Record: For Appellant: A. M i c h a e l S a l v a g n i , Bozeman, Montana F o r Respondent : Hon. Mike G r e e l y , A t t o r n e y G e n e r a l , H e l e n a , Montana Donald W h i t e , County A t t o r n e y , Bozeman, Montana S u b m i t t e d on B r i e f s : December 11, 1 9 8 1 Decided: 6EB 2 5 @N% Filed: Nr. J u s t i c e Gene B. Daly d e l i v e r e d t h e 3 p i n i o n of t h e C o u r t . On December 1, 1980, the defendant was charged by i n f o r m a t i o n w i t h c r i m i n a l m i s c h i e f a n d a r s o n , s e c t i o n s 45-6- 1 0 1 (1)( c ) a n d 4 5 - 6 - 1 0 3 ( a ) , MCA, r e s p e c t i v e l y , both f e l o n i e s , i n t h e District Court of t h e Eighteenth J u d i c i a l District of the S t a t e of Montana, in and for the County of Gallatin. The d e f e n d a n t p l e a d e d n o t g u i l t y t o b o t h c h a r g e s a n d a j u r y t r i a l was h e l d on A p r i l 2 1 , 22 a n d 2 3 , 1 9 8 1 . The j u r y f o u n d t h e defendant g u i l t y of each offense. The H o n o r a b l e J o s e p h B. G a r y s e n t e n c e d t h e d e f e n d a n t t o t h e Montana S t a t e P r i s o n for ten years for criminal mischief and fifteen years for a r s o n , b u t s u s p e n d e d a l l b u t two y e a r s o f t h e s e n t e n c e . The d e f e n d a n t a p p e a l s t h e c o n v i c t i o n on b o t h c o u n t s . D e f e n d a n t owned a n d o p e r a t e d t h e C o r a l Reef P e t S h o p in Bozeman, Montana, from 1975 to May 30, 1980. The defendant leased the premises f rom Lovelace Realty until October 1979 when the building was converted into a condominium. Defendant did not purchase his unit. The owner of the business located next to defendant purchased the unit occupied by the pet s t o r e and assumed the lease between d e f e n d a n t and Lovelace R e a l t y . Sometime between 7:00 and 7:30 p.m. on May 2 2 , 1980, a f i r e was d i s c o v e r e d in defendant's pet store. Investi- g a t o r s of t h e f i r e determined i t t o have been i n t e n t i o n a l l y set. Two Coleman f u e l c a n s were f o u n d i n s i d e , n e a r t h e r e a r door of the pet store. I t was d e t e r m i n e d t h a t t h e f i r e had been i n d e p e n d e n t l y s e t i n t h r e e s e p a r a t e a r e a s of the store by the use of a petroleum product similar to, if not identical with, the Coleman fuel. Also, there was no evidence of a burglary o r a break-in. Defendant was seen by the owner of the business located next door, R i c h a r d Wike, a t a b o u t 5:30 p.m. on May 22, 1980. Wike testified that the defendant partially emerged from the back door, stopped and then went back inside. Another witness, Wayne P e d e r s o n , who lived in an a p a r t m e n t o v e r t h e p e t s t o r e , t e s t i f i e d t h a t h e saw a man i n t h e p e t s t o r e w a t c h i n g t e l e v i s i o n b e t w e e n 6:00 and 6 : 3 8 p.m. S g t . Green o f t h e Bozeman P o l i c e D e p a r t m e n t t e s t i f i e d t h a t t h e d e f e n d a n t had i n f o r m e d him t h a t h e and h i s w i f e had t h e only keys t o t h e p e t s t o r e . However, at trial i t was d i s c o v e r e d t h a t a n e m p l o y e e , Norrna Blossom, a l s o had a k e y , b u t s h e had n o t worked i n o r been t o t h e s t o r e f o r s e v e r a l months. F u r t h e r t e s t i m o n y r e v e a l e d t h a t t h e morning a f t e r t h e f i r e , w h i l e f i r e m e n were i n s p e c t i n g t h e damage a t t h e s t o r e , the defendant appeared and asked if he could retrieve certain business records from h i s d e s k i n t h e f r o n t o f the store. He was allowed to do so. He later told police, however, that his business records had been stored on a s h e l f i n t h e r e a r of t h e s t o r e and had b e e n d e s t r o y e d by t h e fire. The d e f e n d a n t d i d not p r o d u c e any r e c o r d s a t t r i a l and an i n s p e c t i o n o f t h e back of the s t o r e did not reveal any e v i d e n c e t h a t r e c o r d s had been s t o r e d t h e r e . Wike testified that the defendant informed hirn the morning a f t e r t h e f i r e t h a t t h e l e a s e was ended and d i d n o t mention any p l a n s to reopen. Testimony revealed that the defendant, after he had arrived at the scene, made no i n q u i r y a b o u t t h e a n i m a l s t h a t had been in the store, nor d i d he s e a r c h f o r s u r v i v o r s o r r e q u e s t t h a t a r r a n g e m e n t s b e rnade f o r t h e i r r e m a i n s . However, Sgt. Green t e s t i f i e d t h a t the defendant did talk quite a lot about insurance and inventory. E v i d e n c e was i n t r o d u c e d a t t r i a l that the defendant had d o u b l e d h i s i n s u r a n c e c o v e r a g e o n i n v e n t o r y and f i x t u r e s from $25,000 t o $50,000 i n October 1979, A f t e r t h e f i r e , he f i l e d a claim with h i s i n s u r a n c e company f o r $ 4 5 , 6 0 3 . 2 7 in a l l e g e d i n v e n t o r y and f i x t u r e l o s s , There was substantial testimony that defendant's i n v e n t o r y l e v e l was q u i t e l o w a t t h e time o f t h e f i r e . This t e s t i m o n y was r e c e i v e d from a s a l e s r e p r e s e n t a t i v e f o r one of the defendant's suppliers, a truckdriver who delivered s u p p l i e s t o t h e p e t s t o r e a n d a n o t h e r s u p p l i e r who v i s i t e d t h e s t o r e i n t h e s p r i n g of 1980. One w i t n e s s t e s t i f i e d t h a t he thought the defendant was g o i n g out of business. The o n l y t e s t i m o n y t o t h e c o n t r a r y came f r o m a c o u p l e who h a d purchased f i s h f i v e days b e f o r e t h e f i r e , The e v i d e n c e f u r t h e r r e v e a l e d t h a t t h e d e f e n d a n t was burdened b y b u s i n e s s and p e r s o n a l d e b t s . He was p u t o n a C.O.D. b a s i s by o n e o f h i s s u p p l i e r s i n t h e f a l l o f 1 9 7 9 . A judgment was obtained against the defendant by another s u p p l i e r i n A p r i l 1980 f o r $1,985.23. Also, a t t h e time of the fire, defendant owed a third supplier $967.37 for m e r c h a n d i s e a c q u i r e d i n December 1 9 7 9 . In addition, i t was shown t h a t t h e d e f e n d a n t owed Montana Power $ 1 9 0 . 3 8 ; $414.45 f o r r e n t o n a h o u s e i n Bozeman; $95.18 f o r r e n t on a house i n Belgrade; $325 f o r r e n t t o a f o r m e r l a n d l a d y i n B e l g r a d e ; $800 f o r a t e l e v i s i o n s e t h e p u r c h a s e d for the store; $259 i n b a c k w a g e s t o a f o r m e r e m p l o y e e ; a s u b s t a n t i a l sum t o t h e Bozeman c l i n i c ; $545 t o a l o c a l f u r n i t u r e s t o r e ; and h e had a $14,000 unpaid bank d e b t . It was b r o u g h t out at trial that the defendant had m i s r e p r e s e n t e d and s u p p r e s s e d c e r t a i n i n f o r m a t i o n d u r i n g t h e official investigation. He had represented t o Sgt. Green, who was i n c h a r g e o f t h e i n v e s t i g a t i o n , t h a t h e was i n d e b t e d o n l y t o W e s t e r n Bank and P e n d e l t o n E n t e r p r i s e s , an i n v e n t o r y supplier from S a l t Lake. Further, the defendant informed Syt. Green that he had only two business suppliers. At trial, under c r o s s - e x a m i n a t i o n , the defendant admitted t h a t n e i t h e r r e p r e s e n t a t i o n was i n f a c t t r u e . Two i s s u e s a r e p r e s e n t e d f o r r e v i e w : 1. Were there sufficient facts presented in the affidavit to allow the District Court to conclude that probable cause e x i s t e d t o charge t h e defendant with c r i m i n a l m i s c h i e f and a r s o n ? 2. Was t h e e v i d e n c e s u f f i c i e n t t o s u p p o r t t h e g u i l t y v e r d i c t s f o r c r i m i n a l m i s c h i e f and a r s o n ? Defendant contends t h a t t h e a f f i d a v i t of the deputy county attorney did not contain sufficient facts for a showing o f p r o b a b l e c a u s e t h a t h e , the defendant, committed e i t h e r t h e o f f e n s e of c r i m i n a l m i s c h i e f o r a r s o n . Defendant c i t e s S t a t e v . Hallam ( 1 9 7 8 ) , 1 7 5 Mont. 492, 575 P.2d 55, a s authority for this contention. The specific section of H a l l a m r e l i e d upon s t a t e s : " O b t a i n i n g l e a v e t o f i l e a n i n f o r m a t i o n is n o t a mere p e r f u n c t o r y m a t t e r b u t r e s t s i n t h e sound d i s c r e t i o n o f t h e d i s t r i c t j u d g e , The a p p l i c a t i o n m u s t be c o m p l e t e i n i t s e l f , and c o n t a i n s u c h s a l i e n t f a c t s a s w i l l a l l o w t h e d i s t r i c t j u d g e t o make a n i n d e p e n d e n t d e t e r m i n a t i o n t h a t an o f f e n s e h a s been com- mitted," 575 P.2d a t 59, While the defendant is indeed partially correct in citing Hallam as authority for h i s position, he fails to present t h e r e q u i s i t e a u t h o r i t y t h a t completely d e f i n e s t h i s a r e a of t h e law. T h i s C o u r t h a s a d d r e s s e d t h e c o n t e n t i o n p r e s e n t e d by the defendant in several previous cases, I n S t a t e v. Dunn ( 1 9 7 0 ) , 1 5 5 Mont. 319, 472 P.2d 288, 292, t h i s Court held that, "[i] f the evidence contained in the affidavit is s u f f i c i e n t t o s a t i s f y t h e d i s t r i c t judge t h a t probable cause exists, nothing further is required." Further, i n State v. M i n e r ( 1 9 7 6 ) , 1 6 9 Mont. 2 6 0 , 546 P.2d 252, t h i s Court h e l d : " I n determining t h e p r o b a b i l i t y t h a t defen- d a n t committed an o f f e n s e , t h e g u i d e l i n e s s u g g e s t e d i n S p i n e l l i v. United S t a t e s , 393 U.S. 4 1 8 , 8 9 S e c t . 5 8 4 , 2 1 L.Ed.2d 6 3 7 , h a v e been noted w i t h a p p r o v a l by t h i s Court. See: S t a t e v . T r o g l i a , 1 5 7 Mont, 2 2 , 482 P , 2 d 1 4 3 . G e n e r a l l y , t h o s e g u i d e l i n e s s t a t e t h a t a mere p r o b a b i l i t y is s u f f i c i e n t f o r p r o b a b l e c a u s e , a prima f a c i e showing n o t b e i n g n e c e s s a r y . Also a f f i d a v i t s of probable cause a r e s u b j e c t t o much l e s s r i g o r o u s s t a n d a r d s t h a n t h e a d m i s s i b i l i t y of evidence, F i n a l l y , judges reviewing such a f f i d a v i t s should use t h e i r cominon s e n s e i n d e t e r m i n i n g w h e t h e r p r o b a b l e cause exists." 546 P.2d a t 254-255. (Empha- sis added.) See: State v. Hamilton (1980), - Mont. , 605 P.2d 1121, 1127, 37 S t . R e p . 78, 75, for a reaffirmation of the h o l d i n g i n Miner. W have reviewed e t h e a f f i d a v i t of the deputy county attorney. The a f f i d a v i t contained a large array of facts that presented sufficient probable cause to warrrant the district judge to believe that the offenses of criminal m i s c h i e f and a r s o n were committed by t h e d e f e n d a n t . The second issue presented for review is t h e a l l e - gation that the evidence, because of its circumstantial n a t u r e , was i n s u f f i c i e n t t o s u p p o r t t h e v e r d i c t s . Defendant argues that under the standard set out in State v. Cor ( 1 9 6 4 ) , 1 4 4 Mont. 3 2 3 , 396 P.2d 8 6 , and S t a t e v . Fitzpatrick (1973), 1 6 3 Mont. 220, 516 P.2d 605, the State failed to meet i t s burden of proof. The " s t a n d a r d , " a s a l l e g e d b y t h e defendant is, " t h a t to justify a c o n v i c t i o n on c i r c u m s t a n - t i a l e v i d e n c e , t h e f a c t s and c i r c u m s t a n c e s must n o t o n l y be entirely consistent with the theory of g u i l t , b u t rnust b e inconsistent with any other rational ( e . reasonable) conclusion." Fitzpatrick, 516 P.2d at 609. Again, the defendant has only presented part of the legal analysis t h a t is required when a substantial evidence question h a s been raised. T h i s Court h e l d i n S t a t e v. Wilson ( 1 9 8 1 ) , - Mont. 6 3 1 P.2d 1273, 38 St.Rep. 1840, 1047: "The c o r r e c t t e s t i s w h e t h e r t h e r e i s s u b - s t a n t i a l evidence supporting t h e conviction, viewed i n t h e l i g h t most f a v o r a b l e t o t h e State. S t a t e v . B r u b a k e r ( 1 9 8 1 ) , - Mont. - , 6 2 5 P.2d 7 8 , 8 1 , 38 S t . R e p . 4 3 2 , 436; S t a t e v . A z u r e ( 1 9 7 9 ) , - Mont. - 5 9 1 , P.2d 1 1 2 5 , 1 1 3 1 , 36 S t . R e p . 5 1 4 , 5 2 8 . 'Sub- s t a n t i a l evidence' is such r e l e v a n t evidence a s a r e a s o n a b l e mind m i g h t a c c e p t a s a d e q u a t e t o support a conclusion. S t a t e v. Graves ( 1 9 8 1 ) - Mont. , 622 P.2d 2 0 3 , 2 0 8 , 3 8 S t . R e p . 9 , 1 4 ; state v . M e r s e a l ( 1 9 7 5 ) , 1 6 7 filont. 4 1 2 , 4 1 6 , 5 3 8 P.2d 1 3 6 6 , 1 3 6 8 . " 631 P.2d a t 1 2 7 8 . T h i s C o u r t must b e g i n a r e v i e w o f t h e evidence with the above principles of law i n mind. The fact that the defendant was convicted by the use of circumstantial evidence rather than direct evidence does not alter the process of review. S t a t e v. Cor ( 1 9 6 4 ) , 1 4 4 Mont. 323, 396 P.2d 86; S t a t e v. Stoddard ( 1 9 6 6 ) , 1 4 7 Mont. 402, 408, 412 P.2d 827, 831. W h i l e a c o n v i c t i o n b a s e d upon c i r c u m s t a n t i a l e v i d e n c e may require a greater degree of s c r u t i n y by this Court, circumstantial evidence does not require a separate or unique t e s t a s t h e defendant contends t h a t it does. T h e s t a n d a r d t h a t was c i t e d b y t h e d e f e n d a n t f r o m - Cor a n d F i t z ~ a t r i c k was n o t t h e f u l l s t a n d a r d o f r e v i e w t h a t i s t o be a p p l i e d t o v e r d i c t s b a s e d p r i m a r i l y upon c i r c u m s t a n - t i a l evidence. I n - 396 P.2d Cor, a t 88-89, t h i s Court held: "Circumstantial evidence is n o t always i n f e r i o r i n q u a l i t y nor is it n e c e s s a r i l y r e l e g a t e d t o a 'second c l a s s s t a t u s ' i n t h e c o n s i d e r a t i o n t o be g i v e n i t . The v e r y f a c t it is c i r c u m s t a n t i a l is n o t a s u f f i c i e n t a l l e g a t i o n t o j u s t i f y a reversal of t h e judgment f o r s u c h e v i d e n c e may be and f r e - q u e n t l y i s , most c o n v i n c i n g and s a t i s f a c t o r y . I n any c r i m i n a l c a s e , evidence t h a t is m a t e r i a l , r e l e v a n t and c o m p e t e n t w i l l b e ad- m i t t e d . ' n o t h i n a more and n o t h i n q l e s s , ' The t e s t i s w h e t h e ; t h e f a c t s and c i r c u m s t a n c e s a r e of such a q u a l i t y and q u a n t i t y a s t o l e g a l l y j u s t i f y a j u r y i n determining g u i l t bevond a r e a s o n a T l e d o u b t . I f s u c h be t h e c a s e , t h e n t h e c o u r t should n o t , indeed .................................... c a n n o t . s e t a s i d e t h e solemn f i n d i n a s o f t h e d t r i e r of t h e f a c t s . S t a t e v. E s p e l i n , 106 Mont. 231, 76 P,2d 629; S t a t e v , DeTonancour, 112 Mont, 9 4 , 1 1 2 P.2d 1 0 6 5 , " (Emphasis added. ) See: S t a t e v. Shurtliff ( 1 9 8 1 ) , - Mont, -, 635 P.2d 1 2 9 4 , 38 S t . R e p . 1798; S t a t e v. S t o d d a r d , s u p r a , 412 P,2d a t Further, in State v. Seitzinger (1979), - Ploi-lt. , - 589 P.2d 655, 36 S t . R e p . 1 2 2 , we s t a t e d : "Given t h e f i r s t e x p l a n a t i o n , d e f e n d a n t c i t e s S t a t e v . F i t z p a t r i c k ( 1 9 7 3 ) , 1 6 3 Mont. 2 2 0 , 516 P.2d 6 0 5 , a s h o l d i n g t h a t t o s u p p o r t a c r i m i n a l c o n v i c t i o n t h e e v i d e n c e must n o t o n l y be c o n s i s t e n t w i t h d e f e n d a n t ' s g u i l t b u t also inconsistent with his innocence, D e f e n d a n t ' s r e a d i n g o f t h e c a s e is n o t q u i t e complete. I n F i t z p a t r i c k , t h e C o u r t went on t o s a y t h a t t h e j u r y i s t h e f a c t - f i n d i n g body i n o u r l e g a l s y s t e m and i s f r e e t o p i c k and choose t h e evidence it wishes t o b e l i e v e . S t a t e v . F i t z p a t r i c k , s u p r a a t 226, 516 P.2d a t 609." 589 P.2d a t 658. Here, the jury determined from all the evidence presented, c i r c u m s t a n t i a l t h o u g h i t may h a v e b e e n , that the d e f e n d a n t was g u i l t y o f criminal mischief and arson. The a r g u m e n t by d e f e n d a n t t h a t t h e r e were o t h e r " r a t i o n a l ( i . e . , reasonable) " e x p l a n a t i o n s of t h e evidence presented is w i t h o u t merit. The j u r y d i d n o t c o n c l u d e f r o m t h e e v i d e n c e that there was any other reasonable explanation for the e v i d e n c e , and we w i l l n o t second g u e s s t h e j u r y . I n t h e p a s t t h i s C o u r t r e v i e w e d t h e e v i d e n c e frorn a n a r s o n c a s e , S t a t e v. Murdock ( 1 9 7 2 ) , 1 6 0 Mont. 95, 500 P.2d 387, that was q u i t e similar to that presented here. When r e v i e w i n g t h e e v i d e n c e , we s t a t e d : "To b e s u r e t h e e v i d e n c e i s c i r c u m s t a n t i a l , a s i n most a r s o n c a s e s . Nobody s a w d e f e n d a n t s t a r t t h e f i r e o r saw him p r e p a r e t h e premises f o r t h e f i r e t h a t resulted. But t h e e v i d e n c e d o e s show t h a t : d e f e n d a n t was t h e s o l e o c c u p a n t o f t h e h o u s e ; h e had t h e o n l y k e y s t o t h e h o u s e ; t h e r e were no s i g n s o f f o r c e d e n t r y i n t o t h e h o u s e ; t h e h o u s e was p r e p a r e d f o r a f i r e b y jamming t h e s a f e t y d e v i c e s and e l e c t r i c a l c i r c u i t i n t h e f u r n a c e with o i l y rages leading t o containers f i l l e d w i t h v o l a t i l e l i q u i d s ; g a s o l i n e , p r o p a n e , and o t h e r flammable m a t e r i a l s were p l a c e d on t h e floor d i r e c t l y above t h e furnace; the t h e r m o s t a t was s e t t o f i r e t h e f u r n a c e i n t h e e a r l y m o r n i n g h o u r s when t h e t e m p e r a t u r e o n t h e i n s i d e of t h e house f e l l below 75 d e g r e e s ; t h e r u g s i n t h e house were soaked w i t h o i l ; t h e f u r n a c e had manually been tampered w i t h t o c a u s e it t o m a l f u n c t i o n and e m i t a c o n t i n u o u s f l o w o f o i l when i t t u r n e d o n ; and d e f e n d a n t , t o t h e e x c l u s i o n o f anyone e l s e , had b o t h t h e m o t i v e and o p p o r t u n i t y t o b u r n t h e h o u s e down. Such c i r c u m s t a n t i a l e v i d e n c e is s u f f i c i e n t t o e s t a b l i s h t h a t defendant caused t h e f i r e . " 500 P.2d a t 392. A review of the evidence in this case parallels q u i t e closely with the evidence i n Murdock. Here, as in Murdock, the defendant was not seen starting the fire. H o w e v e r , a s i n Murdock, t h e defendant c o n t r o l l e d t h e keys t o the premises; t h e r e w e r e no s i g n s o f f o r c e d e n t r y ; fiammable m a t e r i a l s were p l a c e d on t h e floor; and the defendant, to t h e e x c l u s i o n of anyone e l s e , had b o t h t h e m o t i v e and oppor- tunity to burn the store. In addition to the above evidence, there was further evidence presented to support the jury's findings. This evidence includes the f a c t t h a t defendant had doubled his insurance s i x months before the f i r e a n d a t t h e same time r e d u c e d h i s i n v e n t o r y ; h e was s e e n at the pet store shortly before the fire; he was heavily indebted and h i s b u s i n e s s showed s i g n s of severe financial stress; and, there were a number of untruths told by defendant t o the investigating officers. The j u d g m e n t o f t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t is a f f i r m e d . W concur: e Chief J u s t i c e