NO. 81-380
I N THE SUPREFIE COURT O THE STATE OF M N A A
F O T N
1981
THE STATE OF MONTANA,
P l a i n t i f f and Respondent,
-vs-
WAYNE JOHNSON,
Defendant and A p p e l l a n t .
Appeal from: District Court of t h e Eighteenth J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t ,
I n and f o r t h e County o f G a l l a t i n , The H o n o r a b l e
J o s e p h B. Gary, J u d g e p r e s i d i n g .
C o u n s e l o f Record:
For Appellant:
A. M i c h a e l S a l v a g n i , Bozeman, Montana
F o r Respondent :
Hon. Mike G r e e l y , A t t o r n e y G e n e r a l , H e l e n a , Montana
Donald W h i t e , County A t t o r n e y , Bozeman, Montana
S u b m i t t e d on B r i e f s : December 11, 1 9 8 1
Decided: 6EB 2 5 @N%
Filed:
Nr. J u s t i c e Gene B. Daly d e l i v e r e d t h e 3 p i n i o n of t h e C o u r t .
On December 1, 1980, the defendant was charged by
i n f o r m a t i o n w i t h c r i m i n a l m i s c h i e f a n d a r s o n , s e c t i o n s 45-6-
1 0 1 (1)( c ) a n d 4 5 - 6 - 1 0 3 ( a ) , MCA, r e s p e c t i v e l y , both f e l o n i e s ,
i n t h e District Court of t h e Eighteenth J u d i c i a l District of
the S t a t e of Montana, in and for the County of Gallatin.
The d e f e n d a n t p l e a d e d n o t g u i l t y t o b o t h c h a r g e s a n d a j u r y
t r i a l was h e l d on A p r i l 2 1 , 22 a n d 2 3 , 1 9 8 1 . The j u r y f o u n d
t h e defendant g u i l t y of each offense. The H o n o r a b l e J o s e p h
B. G a r y s e n t e n c e d t h e d e f e n d a n t t o t h e Montana S t a t e P r i s o n
for ten years for criminal mischief and fifteen years for
a r s o n , b u t s u s p e n d e d a l l b u t two y e a r s o f t h e s e n t e n c e . The
d e f e n d a n t a p p e a l s t h e c o n v i c t i o n on b o t h c o u n t s .
D e f e n d a n t owned a n d o p e r a t e d t h e C o r a l Reef P e t S h o p
in Bozeman, Montana, from 1975 to May 30, 1980. The
defendant leased the premises f rom Lovelace Realty until
October 1979 when the building was converted into a
condominium. Defendant did not purchase his unit. The
owner of the business located next to defendant purchased
the unit occupied by the pet s t o r e and assumed the lease
between d e f e n d a n t and Lovelace R e a l t y .
Sometime between 7:00 and 7:30 p.m. on May 2 2 , 1980,
a f i r e was d i s c o v e r e d in defendant's pet store. Investi-
g a t o r s of t h e f i r e determined i t t o have been i n t e n t i o n a l l y
set. Two Coleman f u e l c a n s were f o u n d i n s i d e , n e a r t h e r e a r
door of the pet store. I t was d e t e r m i n e d t h a t t h e f i r e had
been i n d e p e n d e n t l y s e t i n t h r e e s e p a r a t e a r e a s of the store
by the use of a petroleum product similar to, if not
identical with, the Coleman fuel. Also, there was no
evidence of a burglary o r a break-in.
Defendant was seen by the owner of the business
located next door, R i c h a r d Wike, a t a b o u t 5:30 p.m. on May
22, 1980. Wike testified that the defendant partially
emerged from the back door, stopped and then went back
inside. Another witness, Wayne P e d e r s o n , who lived in an
a p a r t m e n t o v e r t h e p e t s t o r e , t e s t i f i e d t h a t h e saw a man i n
t h e p e t s t o r e w a t c h i n g t e l e v i s i o n b e t w e e n 6:00 and 6 : 3 8 p.m.
S g t . Green o f t h e Bozeman P o l i c e D e p a r t m e n t t e s t i f i e d
t h a t t h e d e f e n d a n t had i n f o r m e d him t h a t h e and h i s w i f e had
t h e only keys t o t h e p e t s t o r e . However, at trial i t was
d i s c o v e r e d t h a t a n e m p l o y e e , Norrna Blossom, a l s o had a k e y ,
b u t s h e had n o t worked i n o r been t o t h e s t o r e f o r s e v e r a l
months.
F u r t h e r t e s t i m o n y r e v e a l e d t h a t t h e morning a f t e r t h e
f i r e , w h i l e f i r e m e n were i n s p e c t i n g t h e damage a t t h e s t o r e ,
the defendant appeared and asked if he could retrieve
certain business records from h i s d e s k i n t h e f r o n t o f the
store. He was allowed to do so. He later told police,
however, that his business records had been stored on a
s h e l f i n t h e r e a r of t h e s t o r e and had b e e n d e s t r o y e d by t h e
fire. The d e f e n d a n t d i d not p r o d u c e any r e c o r d s a t t r i a l
and an i n s p e c t i o n o f t h e back of the s t o r e did not reveal
any e v i d e n c e t h a t r e c o r d s had been s t o r e d t h e r e .
Wike testified that the defendant informed hirn the
morning a f t e r t h e f i r e t h a t t h e l e a s e was ended and d i d n o t
mention any p l a n s to reopen. Testimony revealed that the
defendant, after he had arrived at the scene, made no
i n q u i r y a b o u t t h e a n i m a l s t h a t had been in the store, nor
d i d he s e a r c h f o r s u r v i v o r s o r r e q u e s t t h a t a r r a n g e m e n t s b e
rnade f o r t h e i r r e m a i n s . However, Sgt. Green t e s t i f i e d t h a t
the defendant did talk quite a lot about insurance and
inventory.
E v i d e n c e was i n t r o d u c e d a t t r i a l that the defendant
had d o u b l e d h i s i n s u r a n c e c o v e r a g e o n i n v e n t o r y and f i x t u r e s
from $25,000 t o $50,000 i n October 1979, A f t e r t h e f i r e , he
f i l e d a claim with h i s i n s u r a n c e company f o r $ 4 5 , 6 0 3 . 2 7 in
a l l e g e d i n v e n t o r y and f i x t u r e l o s s ,
There was substantial testimony that defendant's
i n v e n t o r y l e v e l was q u i t e l o w a t t h e time o f t h e f i r e . This
t e s t i m o n y was r e c e i v e d from a s a l e s r e p r e s e n t a t i v e f o r one
of the defendant's suppliers, a truckdriver who delivered
s u p p l i e s t o t h e p e t s t o r e a n d a n o t h e r s u p p l i e r who v i s i t e d
t h e s t o r e i n t h e s p r i n g of 1980. One w i t n e s s t e s t i f i e d t h a t
he thought the defendant was g o i n g out of business. The
o n l y t e s t i m o n y t o t h e c o n t r a r y came f r o m a c o u p l e who h a d
purchased f i s h f i v e days b e f o r e t h e f i r e ,
The e v i d e n c e f u r t h e r r e v e a l e d t h a t t h e d e f e n d a n t was
burdened b y b u s i n e s s and p e r s o n a l d e b t s . He was p u t o n a
C.O.D. b a s i s by o n e o f h i s s u p p l i e r s i n t h e f a l l o f 1 9 7 9 . A
judgment was obtained against the defendant by another
s u p p l i e r i n A p r i l 1980 f o r $1,985.23. Also, a t t h e time of
the fire, defendant owed a third supplier $967.37 for
m e r c h a n d i s e a c q u i r e d i n December 1 9 7 9 . In addition, i t was
shown t h a t t h e d e f e n d a n t owed Montana Power $ 1 9 0 . 3 8 ; $414.45
f o r r e n t o n a h o u s e i n Bozeman; $95.18 f o r r e n t on a house
i n Belgrade; $325 f o r r e n t t o a f o r m e r l a n d l a d y i n B e l g r a d e ;
$800 f o r a t e l e v i s i o n s e t h e p u r c h a s e d for the store; $259
i n b a c k w a g e s t o a f o r m e r e m p l o y e e ; a s u b s t a n t i a l sum t o t h e
Bozeman c l i n i c ; $545 t o a l o c a l f u r n i t u r e s t o r e ; and h e had
a $14,000 unpaid bank d e b t .
It was b r o u g h t out at trial that the defendant had
m i s r e p r e s e n t e d and s u p p r e s s e d c e r t a i n i n f o r m a t i o n d u r i n g t h e
official investigation. He had represented t o Sgt. Green,
who was i n c h a r g e o f t h e i n v e s t i g a t i o n , t h a t h e was i n d e b t e d
o n l y t o W e s t e r n Bank and P e n d e l t o n E n t e r p r i s e s , an i n v e n t o r y
supplier from S a l t Lake. Further, the defendant informed
Syt. Green that he had only two business suppliers. At
trial, under c r o s s - e x a m i n a t i o n , the defendant admitted t h a t
n e i t h e r r e p r e s e n t a t i o n was i n f a c t t r u e .
Two i s s u e s a r e p r e s e n t e d f o r r e v i e w :
1. Were there sufficient facts presented in the
affidavit to allow the District Court to conclude that
probable cause e x i s t e d t o charge t h e defendant with c r i m i n a l
m i s c h i e f and a r s o n ?
2. Was t h e e v i d e n c e s u f f i c i e n t t o s u p p o r t t h e g u i l t y
v e r d i c t s f o r c r i m i n a l m i s c h i e f and a r s o n ?
Defendant contends t h a t t h e a f f i d a v i t of the deputy
county attorney did not contain sufficient facts for a
showing o f p r o b a b l e c a u s e t h a t h e , the defendant, committed
e i t h e r t h e o f f e n s e of c r i m i n a l m i s c h i e f o r a r s o n . Defendant
c i t e s S t a t e v . Hallam ( 1 9 7 8 ) , 1 7 5 Mont. 492, 575 P.2d 55, a s
authority for this contention. The specific section of
H a l l a m r e l i e d upon s t a t e s :
" O b t a i n i n g l e a v e t o f i l e a n i n f o r m a t i o n is
n o t a mere p e r f u n c t o r y m a t t e r b u t r e s t s i n
t h e sound d i s c r e t i o n o f t h e d i s t r i c t j u d g e ,
The a p p l i c a t i o n m u s t be c o m p l e t e i n i t s e l f ,
and c o n t a i n s u c h s a l i e n t f a c t s a s w i l l a l l o w
t h e d i s t r i c t j u d g e t o make a n i n d e p e n d e n t
d e t e r m i n a t i o n t h a t an o f f e n s e h a s been com-
mitted," 575 P.2d a t 59,
While the defendant is indeed partially correct in citing
Hallam as authority for h i s position, he fails to present
t h e r e q u i s i t e a u t h o r i t y t h a t completely d e f i n e s t h i s a r e a of
t h e law.
T h i s C o u r t h a s a d d r e s s e d t h e c o n t e n t i o n p r e s e n t e d by
the defendant in several previous cases, I n S t a t e v. Dunn
( 1 9 7 0 ) , 1 5 5 Mont. 319, 472 P.2d 288, 292, t h i s Court held
that, "[i] f the evidence contained in the affidavit is
s u f f i c i e n t t o s a t i s f y t h e d i s t r i c t judge t h a t probable cause
exists, nothing further is required." Further, i n State v.
M i n e r ( 1 9 7 6 ) , 1 6 9 Mont. 2 6 0 , 546 P.2d 252, t h i s Court h e l d :
" I n determining t h e p r o b a b i l i t y t h a t defen-
d a n t committed an o f f e n s e , t h e g u i d e l i n e s
s u g g e s t e d i n S p i n e l l i v. United S t a t e s , 393
U.S. 4 1 8 , 8 9 S e c t . 5 8 4 , 2 1 L.Ed.2d 6 3 7 , h a v e
been noted w i t h a p p r o v a l by t h i s Court. See:
S t a t e v . T r o g l i a , 1 5 7 Mont, 2 2 , 482 P , 2 d 1 4 3 .
G e n e r a l l y , t h o s e g u i d e l i n e s s t a t e t h a t a mere
p r o b a b i l i t y is s u f f i c i e n t f o r p r o b a b l e c a u s e ,
a prima f a c i e showing n o t b e i n g n e c e s s a r y .
Also a f f i d a v i t s of probable cause a r e s u b j e c t
t o much l e s s r i g o r o u s s t a n d a r d s t h a n t h e
a d m i s s i b i l i t y of evidence, F i n a l l y , judges
reviewing such a f f i d a v i t s should use t h e i r
cominon s e n s e i n d e t e r m i n i n g w h e t h e r p r o b a b l e
cause exists." 546 P.2d a t 254-255. (Empha-
sis added.)
See: State v. Hamilton (1980), - Mont. , 605 P.2d
1121, 1127, 37 S t . R e p . 78, 75, for a reaffirmation of the
h o l d i n g i n Miner.
W have reviewed
e t h e a f f i d a v i t of the deputy county
attorney. The a f f i d a v i t contained a large array of facts
that presented sufficient probable cause to warrrant the
district judge to believe that the offenses of criminal
m i s c h i e f and a r s o n were committed by t h e d e f e n d a n t .
The second issue presented for review is t h e a l l e -
gation that the evidence, because of its circumstantial
n a t u r e , was i n s u f f i c i e n t t o s u p p o r t t h e v e r d i c t s . Defendant
argues that under the standard set out in State v. Cor
( 1 9 6 4 ) , 1 4 4 Mont. 3 2 3 , 396 P.2d 8 6 , and S t a t e v . Fitzpatrick
(1973), 1 6 3 Mont. 220, 516 P.2d 605, the State failed to
meet i t s burden of proof. The " s t a n d a r d , " a s a l l e g e d b y t h e
defendant is, " t h a t to justify a c o n v i c t i o n on c i r c u m s t a n -
t i a l e v i d e n c e , t h e f a c t s and c i r c u m s t a n c e s must n o t o n l y be
entirely consistent with the theory of g u i l t , b u t rnust b e
inconsistent with any other rational ( e . reasonable)
conclusion." Fitzpatrick, 516 P.2d at 609. Again, the
defendant has only presented part of the legal analysis t h a t
is required when a substantial evidence question h a s been
raised.
T h i s Court h e l d i n S t a t e v. Wilson ( 1 9 8 1 ) , - Mont.
6 3 1 P.2d 1273, 38 St.Rep. 1840, 1047:
"The c o r r e c t t e s t i s w h e t h e r t h e r e i s s u b -
s t a n t i a l evidence supporting t h e conviction,
viewed i n t h e l i g h t most f a v o r a b l e t o t h e
State. S t a t e v . B r u b a k e r ( 1 9 8 1 ) , - Mont.
- , 6 2 5 P.2d 7 8 , 8 1 , 38 S t . R e p . 4 3 2 , 436;
S t a t e v . A z u r e ( 1 9 7 9 ) , - Mont. - 5 9 1 ,
P.2d 1 1 2 5 , 1 1 3 1 , 36 S t . R e p . 5 1 4 , 5 2 8 . 'Sub-
s t a n t i a l evidence' is such r e l e v a n t evidence
a s a r e a s o n a b l e mind m i g h t a c c e p t a s a d e q u a t e
t o support a conclusion. S t a t e v. Graves
( 1 9 8 1 ) - Mont. , 622 P.2d 2 0 3 , 2 0 8 , 3 8
S t . R e p . 9 , 1 4 ; state v . M e r s e a l ( 1 9 7 5 ) , 1 6 7
filont. 4 1 2 , 4 1 6 , 5 3 8 P.2d 1 3 6 6 , 1 3 6 8 . " 631
P.2d a t 1 2 7 8 .
T h i s C o u r t must b e g i n a r e v i e w o f t h e evidence with
the above principles of law i n mind. The fact that the
defendant was convicted by the use of circumstantial
evidence rather than direct evidence does not alter the
process of review. S t a t e v. Cor ( 1 9 6 4 ) , 1 4 4 Mont. 323, 396
P.2d 86; S t a t e v. Stoddard ( 1 9 6 6 ) , 1 4 7 Mont. 402, 408, 412
P.2d 827, 831. W h i l e a c o n v i c t i o n b a s e d upon c i r c u m s t a n t i a l
e v i d e n c e may require a greater degree of s c r u t i n y by this
Court, circumstantial evidence does not require a separate
or unique t e s t a s t h e defendant contends t h a t it does.
T h e s t a n d a r d t h a t was c i t e d b y t h e d e f e n d a n t f r o m -
Cor
a n d F i t z ~ a t r i c k was n o t t h e f u l l s t a n d a r d o f r e v i e w t h a t i s
t o be a p p l i e d t o v e r d i c t s b a s e d p r i m a r i l y upon c i r c u m s t a n -
t i a l evidence. I n - 396 P.2d
Cor, a t 88-89, t h i s Court held:
"Circumstantial evidence is n o t always
i n f e r i o r i n q u a l i t y nor is it n e c e s s a r i l y
r e l e g a t e d t o a 'second c l a s s s t a t u s ' i n t h e
c o n s i d e r a t i o n t o be g i v e n i t . The v e r y f a c t
it is c i r c u m s t a n t i a l is n o t a s u f f i c i e n t
a l l e g a t i o n t o j u s t i f y a reversal of t h e
judgment f o r s u c h e v i d e n c e may be and f r e -
q u e n t l y i s , most c o n v i n c i n g and s a t i s f a c t o r y .
I n any c r i m i n a l c a s e , evidence t h a t is
m a t e r i a l , r e l e v a n t and c o m p e t e n t w i l l b e ad-
m i t t e d . ' n o t h i n a more and n o t h i n q l e s s , ' The
t e s t i s w h e t h e ; t h e f a c t s and c i r c u m s t a n c e s
a r e of such a q u a l i t y and q u a n t i t y a s t o
l e g a l l y j u s t i f y a j u r y i n determining g u i l t
bevond a r e a s o n a T l e d o u b t . I f s u c h be t h e
c a s e , t h e n t h e c o u r t should n o t , indeed
....................................
c a n n o t . s e t a s i d e t h e solemn f i n d i n a s o f t h e
d
t r i e r of t h e f a c t s . S t a t e v. E s p e l i n , 106
Mont. 231, 76 P,2d 629; S t a t e v , DeTonancour,
112 Mont, 9 4 , 1 1 2 P.2d 1 0 6 5 , " (Emphasis
added. )
See: S t a t e v. Shurtliff ( 1 9 8 1 ) , - Mont, -, 635 P.2d
1 2 9 4 , 38 S t . R e p . 1798; S t a t e v. S t o d d a r d , s u p r a , 412 P,2d a t
Further, in State v. Seitzinger (1979), - Ploi-lt.
,
- 589 P.2d 655, 36 S t . R e p . 1 2 2 , we s t a t e d :
"Given t h e f i r s t e x p l a n a t i o n , d e f e n d a n t c i t e s
S t a t e v . F i t z p a t r i c k ( 1 9 7 3 ) , 1 6 3 Mont. 2 2 0 ,
516 P.2d 6 0 5 , a s h o l d i n g t h a t t o s u p p o r t a
c r i m i n a l c o n v i c t i o n t h e e v i d e n c e must n o t
o n l y be c o n s i s t e n t w i t h d e f e n d a n t ' s g u i l t b u t
also inconsistent with his innocence,
D e f e n d a n t ' s r e a d i n g o f t h e c a s e is n o t q u i t e
complete. I n F i t z p a t r i c k , t h e C o u r t went on
t o s a y t h a t t h e j u r y i s t h e f a c t - f i n d i n g body
i n o u r l e g a l s y s t e m and i s f r e e t o p i c k and
choose t h e evidence it wishes t o b e l i e v e .
S t a t e v . F i t z p a t r i c k , s u p r a a t 226, 516 P.2d
a t 609." 589 P.2d a t 658.
Here, the jury determined from all the evidence
presented, c i r c u m s t a n t i a l t h o u g h i t may h a v e b e e n , that the
d e f e n d a n t was g u i l t y o f criminal mischief and arson. The
a r g u m e n t by d e f e n d a n t t h a t t h e r e were o t h e r " r a t i o n a l ( i . e . ,
reasonable) " e x p l a n a t i o n s of t h e evidence presented is
w i t h o u t merit. The j u r y d i d n o t c o n c l u d e f r o m t h e e v i d e n c e
that there was any other reasonable explanation for the
e v i d e n c e , and we w i l l n o t second g u e s s t h e j u r y .
I n t h e p a s t t h i s C o u r t r e v i e w e d t h e e v i d e n c e frorn a n
a r s o n c a s e , S t a t e v. Murdock ( 1 9 7 2 ) , 1 6 0 Mont. 95, 500 P.2d
387, that was q u i t e similar to that presented here. When
r e v i e w i n g t h e e v i d e n c e , we s t a t e d :
"To b e s u r e t h e e v i d e n c e i s c i r c u m s t a n t i a l ,
a s i n most a r s o n c a s e s . Nobody s a w d e f e n d a n t
s t a r t t h e f i r e o r saw him p r e p a r e t h e
premises f o r t h e f i r e t h a t resulted. But t h e
e v i d e n c e d o e s show t h a t : d e f e n d a n t was t h e
s o l e o c c u p a n t o f t h e h o u s e ; h e had t h e o n l y
k e y s t o t h e h o u s e ; t h e r e were no s i g n s o f
f o r c e d e n t r y i n t o t h e h o u s e ; t h e h o u s e was
p r e p a r e d f o r a f i r e b y jamming t h e s a f e t y
d e v i c e s and e l e c t r i c a l c i r c u i t i n t h e f u r n a c e
with o i l y rages leading t o containers f i l l e d
w i t h v o l a t i l e l i q u i d s ; g a s o l i n e , p r o p a n e , and
o t h e r flammable m a t e r i a l s were p l a c e d on t h e
floor d i r e c t l y above t h e furnace; the
t h e r m o s t a t was s e t t o f i r e t h e f u r n a c e i n t h e
e a r l y m o r n i n g h o u r s when t h e t e m p e r a t u r e o n
t h e i n s i d e of t h e house f e l l below 75
d e g r e e s ; t h e r u g s i n t h e house were soaked
w i t h o i l ; t h e f u r n a c e had manually been
tampered w i t h t o c a u s e it t o m a l f u n c t i o n and
e m i t a c o n t i n u o u s f l o w o f o i l when i t t u r n e d
o n ; and d e f e n d a n t , t o t h e e x c l u s i o n o f anyone
e l s e , had b o t h t h e m o t i v e and o p p o r t u n i t y t o
b u r n t h e h o u s e down. Such c i r c u m s t a n t i a l
e v i d e n c e is s u f f i c i e n t t o e s t a b l i s h t h a t
defendant caused t h e f i r e . " 500 P.2d a t 392.
A review of the evidence in this case parallels
q u i t e closely with the evidence i n Murdock. Here, as in
Murdock, the defendant was not seen starting the fire.
H o w e v e r , a s i n Murdock, t h e defendant c o n t r o l l e d t h e keys t o
the premises; t h e r e w e r e no s i g n s o f f o r c e d e n t r y ; fiammable
m a t e r i a l s were p l a c e d on t h e floor; and the defendant, to
t h e e x c l u s i o n of anyone e l s e , had b o t h t h e m o t i v e and oppor-
tunity to burn the store. In addition to the above
evidence, there was further evidence presented to support
the jury's findings. This evidence includes the f a c t t h a t
defendant had doubled his insurance s i x months before the
f i r e a n d a t t h e same time r e d u c e d h i s i n v e n t o r y ; h e was s e e n
at the pet store shortly before the fire; he was heavily
indebted and h i s b u s i n e s s showed s i g n s of severe financial
stress; and, there were a number of untruths told by
defendant t o the investigating officers.
The j u d g m e n t o f t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t is a f f i r m e d .
W concur:
e
Chief J u s t i c e