No. 81-237
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
HARRY G. and LILLIAN MARTZ,
husband and wife, et al.,
Plaintiffs and Respondents,
BUTTE-SILVER BOW GOVERNMENT,
STATE OF MONTANA, et al.,
Defendants and Appellants.
Appeal from: District Court of the Second Judicial District,
In and for the County of Silver Bow
Honorable Arnold Olsen, Judge presiding.
Counsel of Record:
For Appellants:
Robert M. McCarthy argued, County Attorney, Butte, Montana
For Respondents:
Cannon, Parish and Sheehy, Helena, Montana
Ross W. Cannon argued and Edmund F. Sheehy argued,
Helena, Montana
Submitted: October 27, 1981
Decided: January 26, 1982
Filed:
JAN 2 6 2522
Mr.J u s t i c e Fred J . Weber d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion of t h e
Court .
Defendant a p p e a l s from summary judgment i n t h e D i s t r i c t
C o u r t o f B u t t e - S i l v e r Bow i n which B u t t e - S i l v e r Bow Ordinance
No. 53 was found t o be (1) i n v a l i d b e c a u s e i t was e n a c t e d i n
v i o l a t i o n of Montana laws g o v e r n i n g z o n i n g , and ( 2 ) u n c o n s t i -
t u t i o n a l l y e x c l u s i v e b e c a u s e it r e s t r i c t e d m o b i l e homes and
m o b i l e home p a r k s t o a n i m p e r m i s s i b l y s m a l l p e r c e n t a g e of
t h e a r e a zoned. W v a c a t e t h e summary judgment and remand
e
t o t h e D i s t r i c t Court f o r f u r t h e r proceedings.
The f o l l o w i n g i s s u e s a r e p r e s e n t e d t o t h i s C o u r t f o r
review:
(1) Did t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t e r r i n c o n c l u d i n g t h a t
Ordinance No. 53 w a s n o t e n a c t e d i n a c c o r d a n c e w i t h Montana
law g o v e r n i n g p l a n n i n g and zoning?
(2) Did t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t err i n h o l d i n g Ordinance
No. 53 u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l b e c a u s e of i t s e x c l u s i o n a r y e f f e c t
on m o b i l e homes and m o b i l e home p a r k s ?
(3) Did t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t err when it g r a n t e d p l a i n t i f f s '
amended motion f o r summary judgment?
On March 1 4 , 1972, t h e B u t t e - S i l v e r Bow City-County
P l a n n i n g Board a d o p t e d a comprehensive m a s t e r p l a n f o r t h e
C i t y of B u t t e and p o r t i o n s o f S i l v e r Bow County. The m a s t e r
p l a n covered t h e e n t i r e j u r i s d i c t i o n a l a r e a of t h a t P l a n n i n g
Board and was a c c e p t e d by b o t h t h e c i t y government and t h e
c o u n t y government w i t h i n a few months.
I n May of 1977, t h e C i t y of B u t t e and t h e County of
S i l v e r Bow c o n s o l i d a t e d i n t o a s i n g l e p o l i t i c a l e n t i t y known
a s " B u t t e - S i l v e r Bow," t h e j u r i s d i c t i o n a l a r e a of which was
a l l of S i l v e r Bow County e x c e p t W a l k e r v i l l e .
In August of 1978, the government of Butte-Silver Bow
approved and enacted Ordinance No. 53, which had been recommended
to them in January of 1978 by the old City-County Planning
Board, acting as the Zoning Commission. Ordinance No. 53
covered the entire jurisdictional area of the old City-
County Planning Board, but no more. At the time it was
enacted, the new government of Butte-Silver Bow had no
planning board and no comprehensive plan for its total
jurisdictional area.
Ordinance No. 53 zones an area of 44,134.3 acres comprising
the City of Butte and land within four-and-one-half miles of
the Butte city limits prior to consolidation. Ordinance
No. 53 permits mobile homes on private lots in areas zoned
R-4 and R-4s but permits mobile home parks only in areas
zoned R-4. The minimum lot size in areas zoned R-4s is one
acre. 95% of the total area zoned is zoned residential, but
only 2.2% is zoned R-4 and 4.5% zoned R-4s. The percentage
of vacant land in the R-4 and R-4s areas amounts, respectively,
to .9% and 4.2% of the total area zoned.
The parties agree that there is a shortage of adequate
on-site conventional housing in the Butte-Silver Bow area,
and that, by 1990, some 2,250 new homes will be needed
(4,440 considering displacement and replacement of existing
housing).
On April 4, 1979, plaintiffs Martz requested permission
of the Butte-Silver Bow office of Building and Code Enforcement
to place a mobile home upon their land on Eagle Street in
Butte, in an area zoned R-2. Their request was denied, but
the Martzes commenced installing a mobile home anyway. On
April 16, 1979, Butte-Silver Bow served plaintiff Great
Western Trailer Sales with a compliance order to stop installing
t h e Martz m o b i l e home. The n e x t d a y , a B u i l d i n g and Code
Enforcement o f f i c e r informed t h e Martzes t h a t t h e y would
have t o remove t h e i r m o b i l e home from t h e E a g l e S t r e e t l o t .
P l a i n t i f f s f i l e d t h e i r c o m p l a i n t on A p r i l 23, 1979, and
o b t a i n e d a temporary r e s t r a i n i n g o r d e r , which, by s t i p u l a t i o n ,
became an i n j u n c t i o n p e n d e n t e l i t e . On March 31, 1981, t h e
D i s t r i c t C o u r t g r a n t e d p l a i n t i f f s ' amended motion f o r summary
judgment, h o l d i n g t h a t :
(1) T h e r e were no g e n u i n e i s s u e s of m a t e r i a l f a c t ;
(2) Ordinance No. 53 was i n v a l i d b e c a u s e it w a s n o t
e n a c t e d i n a c c o r d a n c e w i t h Montana law g o v e r n i n g p l a n n i n g
and zoning; and
(3) Ordinance No. 53 was u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l b e c a u s e of
i t s e x c l u s i o n a r y e f f e c t upon m o b i l e homes and m o b i l e home
parks.
Defendants a p p e a l . E x e c u t i o n of t h e o r d e r permanently
e n j o i n i n g enforcement of Ordinance No. 53 h a s been s t a y e d
pending a p p e a l .
I.
I n d e c i d i n g t h a t Ordinance No. 53 was n o t e n a c t e d i n
a c c o r d a n c e w i t h Montana l a w , t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t r e l i e d upon
s e c t i o n s 76-1-601 and 76-2-304, MCA, which s t a t e , r e s p e c t i v e l y ,
i n pertinent part:
"The p l a n n i n g board s h a l l p r e p a r e and p r o p o s e
a master plan f o r t h e j u r i s d i c t i o n a l area. . ."
and
"Such [ m u n i c i p a l zoning] r e g u l a t i o n s s h a l l
be made i n a c c o r d a n c e w i t h a comprehensive
plan . . ."
The D i s t r i c t C o u r t concluded t h a t t h e s e s t a t u t e s r e q u i r e a
m a s t e r p l a n embracing t h e j u r i s d i c t i o n a l a r e a of t h e p l a n n i n g
board f o r t h e new, c o n s o l i d a t e d e n t i t y ( B u t t e - S i l v e r Bow)
b e f o r e t h e g o v e r n i n g body of t h a t e n t i t y may e n a c t zoning
regulations.
The D i s t r i c t C o u r t a l s o r e l i e d upon t h i s C o u r t ' s d e c i s i o n
i n A l l e n v . F l a t h e a d County ( 1 9 7 9 ) , Mont. , 601
P.2d 399, 36 St.Rep. 1839, wherein w e h e l d c e r t a i n zoning
r e g u l a t i o n s i n F l a t h e a d County t o be i n v a l i d . A planning
board f o r t h e whole of F l a t h e a d County w a s c r e a t e d i n 1972.
S e v e r a l y e a r s l a t e r , t h e F l a t h e a d County Commissioners
c r e a t e d a s e p a r a t e , s m a l l e r zoning d i s t r i c t w i t h i n F l a t h e a d
County and a d o p t e d r e g u l a t i o n s p u r s u a n t t o a 1974 zoning
plan f o r t h a t smaller d i s t r i c t . W e held a s follows:
". . . [ T l h e c l e a r and unambiguous l a n g u a g e of
s e c t i o n 76-2-201, MCA, r e q u i r e s t h a t a c o u n t y
a d o p t a comprehensive development p l a n f o r a n
e n t i r e j u r i s d i c t i o n a l area. Only a f t e r t h e
a d o p t i o n o f s u c h a p l a n may a c o u n t y a d o p t
zoning r e g u l a t i o n s . " Allen v. Flathead
County, Mont. , 601 P.2d a t 402, 36
St.Rep. a t 1842.
The D i s t r i c t C o u r t concluded t h a t A l l e n , l i k e t h e above
s t a t u t e s , r e q u i r e d a comprehensive m a s t e r p l a n f o r a l l of
B u t t e - S i l v e r Bow b e f o r e v a l i d zoning r e g u l a t i o n s c o u l d be
enacted.
S e c t i o n 76-2-201, MCA, r e q u i r e s "- comprehensive
a
development -- j u r i s d i c t i o n a l a r e a s p u r s u a n t - c h a p t e r
plan f o r to
-" b e f o r e c o u n t y commissioners a r e a u t h o r i z e d t o e n a c t
1
zoning r e g u l a t i o n s . Chapter 1 ( P a r t 5 - Jurisdictional
Area) i s q u i t e c l e a r t h a t t h e j u r i s d i c t i o n a l a r e a s c o n t e m p l a t e d
a r e t h o s e of t h e p l a n n i n g b o a r d s , n o t t h e g o v e r n i n g e n t i t i e s .
I n Allen, supra, Mont. a t , 601 P.2d a t 400, 36
St.Rep. a t 1840, t h e p a r t i e s s t i p u l a t e d t h a t t h e j u r i s d i c t i o n a l
a r e a - -e p l a n n i n g b o a r d was a l l of F l a t h e a d County ( e x c e p t
of t h
Columbia F a l l s ) . The MCA s e c t i o n s on p l a n n i n g and zoning
( T i t l e 76, C h a p t e r 2 ) i n d i c a t e t h e need f o r a m a s t e r p l a n
f o r t h e j u r i s d i c t i o n a l a r e a , b u t d o n o t s p e c i f y whether t h e
area referred to is that of the planning board or that of
the governing body. In light of section 76-2-201, MCA,
above, we find that the jurisdictional area referred to in
these sections is that of the planning board.
In most cases, as in Allen, supra, the jurisdictional
area of the planning board will be identical to that of the
governing body. In fact, that is now the case in Butte-
Silver Bow, where, in December of 1978, some months after
the effective date of Ordinance No. 53, the Council of
Commissioners created a Butte-Silver Bow Planning Board.
But at the time Ordinance No. 53 was enacted, the Butte-
Silver Bow Planning Board did not exist. The Council of
Commissioners, in enacting Ordinance No. 53, relied upon a
properly-enacted comprehensive plan for the entire jurisdictional
area of the planning board which developed that plan. Under
the circumstances, that is sufficient.
Plaintiffs do not argue that the comprehensive plan
adopted by the city-county authorities in 1972, prior to
consolidation, was improperly enacted. They do question
whether the extension of jurisdictional area pursuant to
section 76-1-505, MCA, to four-and-one-half miles beyond the
Butte city limits conflicts with section 76-2-310(2), MCA,
limiting extension of municipal zoning to three miles beyond
the city limits of larger cities such as Butte. We need
only point out that section 76-1-505. MCA, explicitly addresses
the extension of boundaries of city-county planning board
jurisdictional area and is controlling in this case.
We are aware that this interpretation of Montana's
zoning statutes could encourage newly-consolidated governing
bodies to delay creating their own planning boards in order
to quickly enact zoning regulations in accordance with pre-
existing properly adopted master plans for smaller areas
within t h e consolidated area. That i s , n e v e r t h e l e s s , p r e f e r a b l e
t o mandating a p e r i o d of i n a c t i v i t y from t h e t i m e of c o n s o l i d a -
t i o n t o t h e t i m e t h e new government can c r e a t e a p l a n n i n g
board and t h a t board c a n d e v e l o p a comprehensive p l a n f o r
t h e j u r i s d i c t i o n a l a r e a of t h e c o n s o l i d a t e d government.
I t i s t r u e , a s t h i s Court noted i n Allen, supra, t h a t ,
when a m a s t e r p l a n i s i n t h e works, a c o u n t y government may
a d o p t i n t e r i m zoning a s a n emergency measure, which zoning
c a n n o t c o n t i n u e e f f e c t i v e f o r more t h a n two y e a r s . Section
76-2-206, MCA. B u t , i n t h i s c a s e , t h e new government had
n e i t h e r p l a n n i n g board n o r comprehensive p l a n ; n o r was t h e
development of a comprehensive p l a n c o n t e m p l a t e d u n t i l w e l l
a f t e r t h e i n f o r m a t i o n r e l a t i n g t o p o p u l a t i o n d e n s i t i e s and
l a n d u s e became a v a i l a b l e t h r o u g h t h e 1980 United S t a t e s
Census. W e cannot say t h a t t h e circumstances h e r e supported
i n t e r i m zoning.
W e f i n d t h a t Butte-Silver Bow Ordinance No. 53 w a s
e n a c t e d i n a c c o r d a n c e w i t h Montana law.
11.
The second i s s u e r a i s e d by a p p e l l a n t s i s whether t h e
D i s t r i c t C o u r t e r r e d i n c o n c l u d i n g t h a t Ordinance No. 53 had
an u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y e x c l u s i o n a r y e f f e c t upon m o b i l e homes
and m o b i l e home p a r k s . The ~ i s t r i c C o u r t r e l i e d upon
t
d e f e n d a n t s ' answers t o i n t e r r o g a t o r i e s , which s t a t e d t h a t
(1) o n l y . 9 % of t h e t o t a l a r e a zoned was v a c a n t l a n d zoned
R-4 ( m o b i l e homes and m o b i l e home p a r k s p e r m i t t e d ) and o n l y
4.2% was zoned R - 4 s (mobile homes p e r m i t t e d -- one a c r e
minimum l o t s i z e ) ; and ( 2 ) by 1990, 2,550 new d w e l l i n g u n i t s
would be r e q u i r e d ( 4 , 4 4 0 , c o n s i d e r i n g r e p l a c e m e n t ) t o
s a t i s f y t h e s h o r t a g e of s a t i s f a c t o r y o n - s i t e c o n v e n t i o n a l
housing.
The D i s t r i c t C o u r t concluded t h a t a m u n i c i p a l i t y must
i n s u r e t h a t a f a i r s h a r e of housing i s w i t h i n t h e r e a c h of
p e r s o n s of low and moderate incomes; where a zoning o r d i n a n c e
l i m i t s m o b i l e home p a r k s t o less t h a n 1% f t h e l a n d zoned,
o
t h e zoning i s tantamount t o an e x c l u s i o n a r y ban on m o b i l e
home p a r k s and i s u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l ; and p o i n t e d o u t t h a t a
zoning o r d i n a n c e which p e r m i t s m o b i l e homes on l o t s h a v i n g a
l a r g e minimum s i z e may be e x c l u s i o n a r y . With r e g a r d t o t h i s
zoning o r d i n a n c e , t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t f u r t h e r concluded i n
part:
"The minimum l o t s i z e i n an R - 4 s zone, a s shown
i n F i n d i n g of F a c t No. V I , i s e x c l u s i o n a r y s i n c e
m o b i l e homes a r e p e r m i t t e d on s m a l l e r l o t s o n l y
i n R-4 zones which comprise 2.2% of t h e t o t a l
l a n d a r e a zoned as s e t o u t i n F i n d i n g of F a c t
No. X. [ 9 % of v a c a n t R-4 zoned l a n d . ]
"The p r a c t i c a l e f f e c t of a l l o w i n g m o b i l e homes
i n R - 4 s zones where t h e minimum l o t s i z e i s one
a c r e i s t o e x c l u d e low and moderate income
f a m i l i e s d e s i r i n g t o l i v e i n m o b i l e homes from
l o c a t i n g them i n t h e B u t t e - S i l v e r Bow a r e a . It
i s e s p e c i a l l y s o s i n c e m o b i l e homes p r o v i d e t h e
o n l y a v a i l a b l e , d e c e n t and s u i t a b l e form of low
c o s t housing. & O F o r e s t Mobile -- -
Home P a r k , I n c .
v . C i t y of Oak F o r e s t , 27 I l l . App. 3d 303, 326
.E.N 2d373975).
". . . [ T l h e amount of l a n d made a v a i l a b l e f o r
m o b i l e home u s e under Ordinance No. 53, i s d e
f a c t o e x c l u s i o n a r y and u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l b e c a u s e
it h a s t h e p r a c t i c a l e f f e c t of banning a d d i t i o n -
a l m o b i l e homes from B u t t e - S i l v e r Bow. Mobile
homes and m o b i l e home p a r k s a r e l e g i t i m a t e l a n d
u s e s and may n o t be banned from a community.
C o l o n i a l --r Mobile Homes, - c- v- N e w
~a;k fo In . .
B r i t a i n Township, 4 0 8 A.2d 1160 (Pa. 1 9 7 9 ) . "
Defendants concede t h a t it would be a n improper e x c l u s i o n a r y
d e v i c e t o p r o h i b i t m o b i l e homes o r t o c o n f i n e them o n l y t o
m o b i l e home p a r k s . Defendants a r g u e t h a t t h e o r d i n a n c e does
p r o v i d e e x t e n s i v e a r e a o u t s i d e of m o b i l e home p a r k s f o r
mobile homes which - - t meet t h e Uniform B u i l d i n g Codes
do n o
(UBC) s t a n d a r d s . O f p a r t i c u l a r significance is t h e contention
of d e f e n d a n t s t h a t m o b i l e homes which meet UBC s t a n d a r d s a r e
- e x c l u d e d from R - 1 ,
not R-2 o r R-3 zones. Defendants p o i n t
o u t t h a t under t h e o r d i n a n c e , i f m o b i l e homes meet UBC
r e q u i r e m e n t s , t h e y c a n be l o c a t e d i n any r e s i d e n t i a l zone.
Defendants f u r t h e r a r g u e t h a t m o b i l e homes which f a l l below
UBC s t a n d a r d s may p o s e a r e a l and s u b s t a n t i a l t h r e a t t o
h e a l t h and w e l f a r e .
From t h e d e f i n i t i o n s c o n t a i n e d i n Ordinance No. 53, we
a r e n o t a b l e t o d e t e r m i n e i f a m o b i l e home meeting UBC
s t a n d a r d s c o u l d be c l a s s e d a s a "modular d w e l l i n g " o r a
" r e s i d e n c e , " a s contended by d e f e n d a n t s . The r e c o r d f a i l s
t o show i f a m o b i l e home c a n be made t o conform t o UBC
s t a n d a r d s , and t h e r e b y become a c c e p t a b l e a s a r e s i d e n c e i n
zones R - 1 , R-2 and R-3. The r e c o r d d o e s n o t show any comparison
of t h e s t a n d a r d s r e q u i r e d under t h e UBC and t h e U n i t e d
S t a t e s Department of Housing and Urban Development ( H U D ) . 1
The d e f e n d a n t s ' answer t o a n i n t e r r o g a t o r y e s t a b l i s h e d t h a t
t h e r e i s a d i s t i n c t d i f f e r e n c e between t h e UBC and t h e HUD
standards:
" I n addressing t h e i s s u e r e l a t i n g s p e c i f i c a l l y
t o t h e q u a l i t y of i n d i v i d u a l h o u s i n g u n i t s i n
B u t t e - S i l v e r Bow, t h e C o u n c i l of Commissioners
a d o p t e d t h e Uniform B u i l d i n g Codes a s a minimum
community s t a n d a r d f o r h o u s i n g development.
Mobile Homes, however, a r e c o n s t r u c t e d under
a n e n t i r e l y d i f f e r e n t s e t of c o d e s which were
developed by t h e United S t a t e s Department of
Housing and Urban Development. The two codes
t a k e a d i s t i n c t l y d i f f e r e n t approach toward
housing construction."
If a m o b i l e home m e e t i n g HUD s t a n d a r d s c a n be made t o conform
t o UBC s t a n d a r d s w i t h o u t u n r e a s o n a b l e e x p e n s e , and i f such
c o n f o r m i t y r e n d e r s a m o b i l e home a c c e p t a b l e i n a l l r e s i d e n t i a l
zones, t h e r e i s no b a s i s t o c l a i m a n e x c l u s i o n . However, i f
UBC s t a n d a r d s a r e n o t a t t a i n a b l e by most m o b i l e homes, a s
s u g g e s t e d by c o u n s e l i n t h e c o u r s e of o r a l arguments, t h e n
'~11m o b i l e homes manufactured a f t e r J u n e 1 5 , 1976,
must conform t o HUD s t a n d a r d s . ( D e f e n d a n t s ' Admission
No. 9 , d a t e d J u l y 8 , 1980.)
mobile homes could be effectively banned from residential
zones R - 1 , R-2 and R-3 under the zoning ordinance, raising
the question of an unconstitutional exclusion. The record
before us therefore discloses a critical issue of material
fact. This Court has held that the question to be determined
on a motion for summary judgment is whether there exists a
genuine dispute of material facts, stating in Byrd v. Bennett
(1981), Mont. P . 2d , 38 St.Rep. 1083,
1084, as follows:
"In a summary judgment proceeding, the formal
issues presented by the pleadings are not
controlling. The question to be decided in a
motion for summary judgment is whether there
exists a genuine dispute over material facts.
The party moving for summary judgment has the
burden of showing the complete absence of
material factual questions. The proof prof-
fered by the movant is closely scrutinized.
The party opposing the motion may block sum-
mary judgment by offering proof that a dis-
pute exists regarding facts material to the
claim for relief."
This Court has held that summary judgment is appropriate when
the movant shows a complete absence of genuine issues of
material fact and the defendants fail to present evidence of
such an issue. Willson v. Taylor (1981), Mont. I
P. 2d , 38 St.Rep. 1606, 1611. The presence of the
above described issues of material fact which are critical
to the determination of this case makes a summary judgment
decision not appropriate. Without additional information in
the record before it, the District Court is unable to determine
if the UBC standards referred to in the zoning ordinance
effectively exclude mobile homes from certain areas.
We reverse the lower court and remand with instructions
to enter a judgment finding that Butte-Silver Bow Ordinance
No. 53 was properly enacted in accordance with Montana law;
and with instructions to the District Court to conduct such
f u r t h e r p r o c e e d i n g s a s t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t f i n d s t o be n e c e s s a r y
i n o r d e r t o d e t e r m i n e t h e f a c t s r e g a r d i n g t h e s t a n d a r d s of
c o n s t r u c t i o n r e q u i r e d f o r t h e c o n s t r u c t i o n of m o b i l e homes
under t h e UBC s t a n d a r d s and t h e HUD s t a n d a r d s , and t h e r e a f t e r
a g a i n c o n s i d e r t h e c l a i m of t h e p l a i n t i f f s .
W Concur:
e