State v. Holmes

NO. 83-197
IN THE SUPRE143 COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
1983

STATE OF MONTANA,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
-vs-
JAMES D. HOLMES,
Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Seventeenth Judicial District,
In and for the County of Valley,
The Honorable M. James Sorte, Judge presiding.

COUNSEL OF TXCORD :
For Appellant:
Moses Law Firm; Stephen Moses argued, Billings,
Montana

For Respondent:

Won. Mike Greely, Attorney General, Helena, Montana
Judy Browning argued, Asst. Atty, General, Helena
David Nielsen, County Attorney, Glasgow, Montana

Submitted: September 12, 1983

Decided: December 13, 1983

-- -- -. -.
.
Clerk
Mr. J u s t i c e J o h n Conway H a r r i s o n d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion of
the Court.

This is an appeal from certain denied motions,

c o n v i c t i o n s and t h e s e n t e n c i n g o f a p p e l l a n t J a m e s D. Holmes
o n two c o u n t s of f e l o n y t h e f t f r o m t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t o f t h e

S e v e n t e e n t h J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , V a l l e y C o u n t y , Montana.
The facts in this case are set forth as follows.
J a m e s D. Holmes served a s president of Valley Industrial
Park Inc. (VIP.) , a nonprofit corporation set up to

o p e r a t e and m a i n t a i n t h e f o r m e r Glasgow A i r F o r c e B a s e . On
A p r i l 9 , 1 9 8 1 , Holmes t r a v e l e d w i t h B r e n d a H i l l by c h a r t e r

airplane to Great Falls. In Great Falls, at Eklund's
A p p l i a n c e and T . V . , Holmes n e g o t i a t i e d w i t h H a r v e y B a r v y o , a

salesman, to obtain 37, 19-inch t e l e v i s i o n s e t s f o r V.I.P.
I n c l u d e d i n t h i s p u r c h a s e , b u t n o t r e f l e c t e d on t h e i n v o i c e ,
was a "Sony" large screen television. The purchase
r e f l e c t e d a higher average p r i c e f o r each i n d i v i d u a l set s o
a s t o d i s g u i s e t h e p r e s e n c e o f t h e "Sony."
On A p r i l 10, 1981, Holmes w e n t t o Big Sky T.V. in

Glasgow, Montana, and p u r c h a s e d more t e l e v i s i o n s e t s . He

included in this purchase a trash compactor and a
dishwasher.
The l a r g e s c r e e n "Sony" t e l e v i s i o n was s h i p p e d w i t h

l a b e l i n g i n d i c a t i n g i t was t o b e p i c k e d up by Holmes, a n d i n
f a c t Mrs. Holmes r e c e i v e d t h e t e l e v i s i o n . Holmes o r d e r e d t h e

t r a s h c o m p a c t o r and d i s h w a s h e r t o b e d e l i v e r e d t o a v a c a n t
h o u s e n e x t t o t h e Holmes' house. Holmes a s s e r t s t h a t t h e
"Sony" t e l e v i s i o n and a p p l i a n c e s p u r c h a s e d i n A p r i l were f o r
a n e x e c u t i v e home ( t h e vacant house) located next to the
Holmes ' h o u s e .
 I n J u l y of 1 9 8 1 , V.I.P. t e r m i n a t e d Holmesl employment.

I-Ie t h e n went on v a c a t i o n and r e t u r n e d o n l y v e r y b r i e f l y t o

h i s residence i n Glasgow. He l e f t t h e d e t a i l s of packing

and moving to his wife. On August 18, 1981, a moving

company transported the Holmes' personal possessions from

t h e Glasgow residence to a s t o r a g e warehouse in Billings.

Testimony indicates Mrs. Holmes directed the mover to

include the items i n q u e s t i o n with t h e i r personal p r o p e r t y ,

t h e r e b y co-mingling. These i t e m s ended up in storage in

B i l l i n g s w i t h t h e r e s t of t h e Holmes' p r o p e r t y . The Holmes'

then t r a v e l e d t o Georgia t o l i v e .

I n September, authorities initiated an investigation

and d i s c o v e r e d t h i s V.I.P. p r o p e r t y w i t h Holmesl p r o p e r t y i n

Billings. A special investigator, Tom Adams, traveled to

Georgia and interviewed Holmes at his living quarters.

F o l l o w i n g t h e i n t e r v i e w , Holmes c l a i m e d h e f i r s t d i s c o v e r e d

t h e V.I.P. p r o p e r t y co-mingled w i t h h i s by e x a m i n i n g a b i l l

of lading prepared by t h e movers and s i g n e d by h i s w i f e .

The V a l l e y County A t t o r n e y ' s o f f i c e t h e n c h a r g e d Holmes w i t h

f o u r c o u n t s of f e l o n y t h e f t . The c o u r t l a t e r d i s m i s s e d two

of t h e c o u n t s .

D u r i n g t h e p e r i o d l e a d i n g up t o Holmes' d i s m i s s a l f r o m

V.I.P., much publicity centered around Holmes and the

a c t i v i t i e s a t V.I.P. Around t h a t t i m e , g o v e r n m e n t o f f i c i a l s

considered using V.I.P. for a Cuban refugee camp. This

created a great c o n t r o v e r s y i n Glasgow and made Holmes a

very controversial figure. Many n e w s p a p e r s c a r r i e d r e l a t e d

stories, and e v e r y j u r o r d u r i n g v o i r d i r e s t a t e d t h e y knew

of V . 1 . P and Holmes.

A t the t r i a l following voir d i r e , one of t h e s e l e c t e d
jurors heard a radio news account of the case and then
conversed with t h e newscaster a t a l o c a l s t o r e . Following
testimony by the juror and the newscaster, the court
d i s m i s s e d h e r from t h e j u r y . T h e r e a f t e r , t h e r e remained no
a l t e r n a t e juror.

Then, a t t h e end of t h e t r i a l , b e f o r e t h e j u r y r e a c h e d
a verdict, a third person told the jury while t h e y were
seated for lunch, "I don't care what you think, he's

guilty." The p e r s o n was c h a r g e d w i t h i m p r o p e r i n f l u e n c e o n
a n o f f i c i a l and f o r f e i t e d bond. Due t o t h i s i n c i d e n t , the

court polled t h e j u r y p r i o r t o announcing t h e v e r d i c t , to
d e t e r m i n e w h e t h e r t h e y made t h e i r d e c i s i o n w i t h o u t e x t e r n a l

pressures or influences. They a n s w e r e d a f f i r m a t i v e l y .
A p p e l l a n t p r e s e n t s many i s s u e s f o r r e v i e w :

(1) Did t h e c o u r t e r r i n d e n y i n g d e f e n d a n t ' s m o t i o n
f o r a c h a n g e of v e n u e ?
(2) Did t h e c o u r t e r r i n d e n y i n g a new t r i a l o n t h e
grounds of j u r y tampering?
(3) Can t h e c o u r t p r o p e r l y s e n t e n c e on t h e two c o u n t s

of f e l o n y t h e f t ?

(4) Was there sufficient evidence to support the
conviction?
(5) Did t h e c o u r t e r r i n d e n y i n g m o t i o n s t o d i s m i s s ,
b a s e d on i m p r o p e r i n f o r m a t i o n ?
(6) Did t h e c o u r t e r r i n g i v i n g a n d o m i t t i n g c e r t a i n

jury instructions?
(7) Did the court err by refusing to disqualify
i t s e l f for sentencing?
(8) Did t h e c o u r t v i o l a t e r u l e s o f evidence of the
sentencing hearing?
 (9) Was t h e s e n t e n c e e x c e s s i v e ?

(10) Did the court err in not suppressing the

defendant's statement t o an i n v e s t i g a t i n g s p e c i a l d e t e c t i v e

d u e t o t h e l a c k of a Miranda warning?

Appellant f i r s t contends t h e c o u r t e r r e d i n denying a

change of venue. T h i s C o u r t i n S t a t e v. L i n k (Mont. 1 9 8 1 ) ,

640 P.2d 4 3 6 , 38 S t . R e p . 982, s t a t e s :

" [ T l h e r u l e is t h a t a n accused is
e n t i t l e d t o a c h a n g e o f v e n u e when i t
appears t h e r e a r e reasonable grounds t o
believe that the prejudice alleged
a c t u a l l y e x i s t s a n d t h a t by r e a s o n o f t h e
prejudice there is a reasonable
apprehension t h a t the accused cannot
r e c e i v e a f a i r and i m p a r t i a l t r i a l .
P e o p l e v. B e r r y ( 1 9 6 7 ) , 37 I 1 1 . 2 d 3 2 9 ,
226 N.E.2d 5 9 1 , 592-593."

I n S t a t e v. Paisley (Mont. 1 9 8 3 ) , 663 P.2d 322, 324,

40 S t . R e p . 763, 765, w e s t a t e d :

"Absent abuse of d i s c r e t i o n , t h e D i s t r i c t
C o u r t ' s r u l i n g on a m o t i o n f o r c h a n g e o f
venue w i l l be a f f i r m e d . S t a t e ex r e l .
Coburn v . B e n n e t t ( 1 9 8 2 ) , Mont. I

, 6 5 5 P.2d 5 0 2 , 5 0 6 , 39 S t . R e p . 2 3 0 0 ,
2306.

"When p r e j u d i c i a l p r e t r i a l p u b l i c i t y i s
alleged, the publicity must be
inflammatory and c r e a t e a r e a s o n a b l e
apprehension t h a t a f a i r t r i a l is n o t
p o s s i b l e before t h e motion w i l l be
aranted. S t a t e v. R i c h a r d s o n (1982) ,
2

Mont - 1 . ,
- 647 P.2d 8 3 0 , 8 3 2 ,
39 S t . R e p . 1 2 0 1 , 1203-04."

A p p e l l a n t s p o i n t t o some n e w s p a p e r a r t i c l e s t h a t t h e y

c o n s i d e r i n f l a m m a t o r y and p r e j u d i c i a l . The a r t i c l e s f o c u s e d

on the attempt to bring Cuban refugees to the area, and

m e n t i o n c r i t i c i s m o f Holmes, b u t none r e g a r d i n g t h e a l l e g e d

criminal activities. Because of h i s p o s i t i o n , h e became a

notorious and controversial figure. Though prejudice and

inflammation could arise from incidents and transactions
concerning an accused u n r e l a t e d t o t h e charges a t hand, such

is n o t t h e c a s e h e r e .

During e x t e n s i v e v o i r dire, all the jurors claimed

t h e y had h e a r d of Holmes, b u t o n l y two p e o p l e w e r e removed

because they expressed prejudice against him. The court

removed o n e more j u r o r a f t e r e m p a n e l m e n t , b u t n o t d u e t o a n y

preconceived prejudice acquired p r i o r t o t r i a l . W e f i n d no

abuse of court's discretion in this case. Transcripts

i n d i c a t e t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t u s e d many p r e c a u t i o n s t o i n s u r e

fairness and therefore properly denied appellant's motion

f o r a change of venue.

Appellant's second issue involves the incident that

occurred while t h e j u r y was a t l u n c h . Appellant contends

that the comment made by a third party to the jury

c o n s t i t u t e d j u r y tampering. W disagree.
e

A p p e l l a n t c i t e s Mattox v. U.S. ( 1 8 9 2 ) , 1 4 6 U.S. 140,

36 L.Ed 917, 13 S.Ct. 50. Even through jurors signed

affidavits stating they were not influenced, the U.S.

Supreme C o u r t found jury tampering e x i s t e d when a b a i l i f f

made s t a t e m e n t s t o t h e j u r o r s i n d i c a t i n g t h e d e f e n d a n t was

guilty. The jury also obtained newspaper articles

expressing the defendant was guilty. That Court held,

"Private communications, possibly prejudicial, between

jurors and third person, or witnesses, or the officer in

c h a r g e , are a b s o l u t e l y f o r b i d d e n and i n v a l i d a t e t h e v e r d i c t ,

a t l e a s t u n l e s s t h e i r h a r m l e s s n e s s i s made t o a p p e a r . "

I n P a r k e r v. G l a d d e n ( 1 9 6 6 ) , 385 U.S. 3 6 3 , 1 7 L.Ed.2d

420, 87 S . C t . 4 6 8 , a n d S h e p p a r d v . Maxwell ( 1 9 6 6 ) , 384 U.S.

333, 1 6 L.Ed.2d 6 0 0 , 86 S . C t . 1 5 0 7 , c i t e d by a p p e l l a n t , t h e

U.S. Supreme C o u r t a l s o found jury tampering. Common to
these c a s e s was the fact that the bailiff made improper

comments t o t h e j u r y r e g a r d i n g t h e g u i l t o f t h e d e f e n d a n t .

T h i s Court addressed t h i s problem i n S t a t e v. Eagen

( 1 9 7 8 ) , 1 7 8 Mont. 67, 582 P.2d 1195. In t h a t case a juror

a p p r o a c h e d a t h i r d p a r t y i n a b a r and e x p r e s s e d h i s o p i n i o n

that the defendant was guilty and half the jurors were

f r i e n d s of the victim. W stated the rule,
e "that if jury

inisconduct is shown tending to injure the defendant,

prejudice to the defendant is presumed; however, the

p r e s u m p t i o n i s n o t a b s o l u t e and may be r e b u t t e d by t h e u s e

of t h e j u r o r s t o show f a c t s which p r o v e t h a t p r e j u d i c e d i d

n o t or could n o t e x i s t . .. ( c i t a t i o n s omitted) In State

v . Baugh ( 1 9 7 7 ) , 174 Mont. 456, 5 7 1 P.2d 7 7 9 , a j u r o r v i e w e d

a video-tape of t h e exhumation of the victim's body. The

c o u r t d i s m i s s e d h e r from t h e j u r y and p o l l e d t h e r e m a i n i n g

jurors r e g a r d i n g a n y comments s h e may h a v e made t h a t m i g h t

h a v e p r e j u d i c e d them. T h i s C o u r t f o u n d no r e v e r s i b l e e r r o r

p r e j u d i c i n g of the jury. These c a s e s s u g g e s t t h a t w h i l e a

presumption of prejudice exists when something improper

occurs with a jury, t h e c o u r t c a n r e b u t . t h e p r e s u m p t i o n by

t a k i n g c o r r e c t i v e s t e p s and p o l l i n g t h e j u r y a s t o whether

they were influenced by anything other than the evidence

introduced at trial. That is not to say that this is

sufficient in all cases to rebut' the presumption. The

improper a c t i v i t y must be h a r m l e s s o r r e n d e r e d h a r m l e s s i n

order t o provide the defendant a f a i r t r i a l .

In instant case, a t least two jurors overheard

comments made by a t h i r d party while they s a t a t a t a b l e

during a lunch break. The t h i r d p a r t y made a comment, "I

d o n ' t c a r e what you t h i n k , h e ' s g u i l t y . " He was coming o u t
o f a b a r and was j o k i n g when he made t h e comment. The c o u r t

polled the jury prior to their announcing the verdict if

t h e y w e r e i n f l u e n c e d by a n y t h i n g o t h e r t h a n t h e e v i d e n c e i n

reaching t h e i r decision. Each j u r o r a n s w e r e d t h a t h e o r s h e

made h i s o r h e r d e c i s i o n s o l e l y on t h e e v i d e n c e p r e s e n t e d i n

court and was not influenced by anything outside of the

proceedings. We therefore find no prejudice occurred

s u f f i c i e n t t o be c a u s e f o r a new t r i a l .

Appellant next contends the court erred in not

g r a n t i n g a m o t i o n t o d i s m i s s o n e c o u n t b a s e d upon d u p l i c i t y

of the information. Appellant contends the information

stated only one offense except they mentioned different

items i n the t h e f t . Therefore, t h e i n f o r m a t i o n should have

been consolidated and only one count of theft charged,

b e c a u s e t h e two c o u n t s i n v o l v e d o n l y o n e t r a n s a c t i o n .

S e c t i o n 46-11-404(1), MCA, permits the court t o join

charges. S e c t i o n 46-11-502, MCA, p e r m i t s p r o s e c u t i o n when

conduct constitutes more than one offense, but requires

c o n v i c t i o n o f no more t h a n o n e o f f e n s e i f :

"(1) one offense is included in the
other;
(2) one o f f e n s e c o n s i s t s o n l y of a
c o n s p i r a c y o r o t h e r form of p r e p a r a t i o n
t o commit t h e o t h e r ;
(3) i n c o n s i s t e n t f i n d i n g s of f a c t a r e
r e q u i r e d t o e s t a b l i s h t h e commission of
the offenses;
( 4 ) t h e o f f e n s e s d i f f e r o n l y i n t h a t one
is d e f i n e d t o p r o h i b i t a d e s i g n a t e d k i n d
of c o n d u c t g e n e r a l l y and t h e o t h e r t o
p r o h i b i t a s p e c i f i c i n s t a n c e of such
conduct; o r
( 5 ) the offense is defined t o p r o h i b i t a
c o n t i n u i n g c o u r s e of c o n d u c t and t h e
defendant's course of conduct was
i n t e r r u p t e d , u n l e s s t h e law p r o v i d e s t h a t
t h e s p e c i f i c p e r i o d s of such conduct
constitute separate offenses."

In Parker v. Crist (Mont. 1980), 6 2 1 P.2d 484, 37
St.Rep. 2048, t h i s Court, c i t i n g above s t a t u t e s , expressly

permitted charging s e v e n c o u n t s of robbery a r i s i n g o u t of

t h e same i n c i d e n t .

In the instant case, the state prosecuted the

d e f e n d a n t on two c o u n t s of theft. The f i r s t count arose

over the taking of a big-screen T.V., the second count

occurred when the defendant took control over a few

appliances. While all of these items were loaded on a

moving v a n , a t t h e same t i m e t o c o m p l e t e t h e e x e c u t i o n o f

u n a u t h o r i z e d c o n t r o l o v e r them, t h e y were a c q u i r e d through

d i f f e r e n t schemes and t h e r e b y c o n s t i t u t e d d i f f e r e n t crimes.

W t h e r e f o r e f i n d t h e c o u r t p r o p e r l y found a p p e l l a n t g u i l t y
e

and s e n t e n c e d him f o r two c o u n t s o f t h e f t .

Appellant claims t h e S t a t e f a i l e d t o prove i t s case.

S p e c i f i c a l l y t h e S t a t e f a i l e d t o i n t r o d u c e any evidence t h a t

defendant o r h i s wife exerted unauthorized c o n t r o l over t h e

property. Further, a f a t a l v a r i a n c e e x i s t e d between what

t h e S t a t e c h a r g e d and w h a t t h e y p r o v e d , and t h e i n f o r m a t i o n

l a c k e d s u f f i c i e n t f a c t s r e g a r d i n g t h e t i m e and p l a c e o f t h e

crime.

In State v. Godsey (Mont. 1982), 656 P.2d 811, 39

St.Rep. 2354, we reiterate the s t a n d a r d of review t o be,

" a f t e r viewing t h e e v i d e n c e i n t h e l i g h t most f a v o r a b l e t o

p r o s e c u t i o n , any r a t i o n a l t r i e r o f f a c t c o u l d h a v e f o u n d t h e

e s s e n t i a l e l e m e n t s o f t h e c r i m e beyond a r e a s o n a b l e d o u b t . "

W e find s u f f i c i e n t evidence t o support t h i s verdict.

Evidence demonstrated that appellant, by virtue of

his position, could disguise t h e purchase of a big-screen

T.V. and other appliances. He controlled the V.I.P.

o p e r a t i o n which e n a b l e d him t o s h u f f l e t h e p r o p e r t y a r o u n d ,
until i t was f i n a l l y l o a d e d i n t o a moving van w i t h a l l of

h i s other property. He p r e c l u d e d V . I . P . from knowing o f t h e

e x i s t e n c e o r whereabouts of t h e p r o p e r t y he ordered it t o

purchase. W therefore find s u f f i c i e n t evidence t o support
e

the verdict.

A p p e l l a n t a r g u e s t h e r e e x i s t s a f a t a l v a r i a n c e between

what he was c h a r g e d w i t h a n d what t h e S t a t e p r e s e n t e d . The

i n f o r m a t i o n s t a t e d t h e t h e f t o c c u r r e d on o r a b o u t A u g u s t 1 8 ,

1981, y e t t h e S t a t e ' s c a s e a l s o involved t r a n s a c t i o n s t h a t

occurred in April of 1981. We find the appellant was

c o n v i c t e d upon p r o p e r i n f o r m a t i o n .

S e c t i o n 4 6 - 1 1 - 4 0 1 ( l ) ( c ) ( i v ) , MCA, provides the charge

shall state the time and place of the offense as can be

done. I n S t a t e v. Dunn ( 1 9 7 0 ) , 1 5 5 Mont. 3 1 9 , 3 2 7 , 472 P.2d

288, 294, we stated the test of the sufficiency of the

language t o be, " I s t h e d e f e n d a n t a p p r i s e d of the charges

b r o u g h t a g a i n s t him s o a s t o p r e v e n t s u r p r i s e ? . . . We see

no reason why the contents of the supporting affidavits

filed i n t h e c a s e i n t h e p r e s e n c e of t h e d e f e n d a n t and h i s

counsel . . . c a n n o t be u s e d i n d e t e r m i n i n g t h e meaning o f

the language contained i n t h e information."

The S t a t e c o n t e n d e d t h a t on o r a b o u t A u g u s t 1 8 , 1 9 8 1 ,

t h e d e f e n d a n t committed t h e f t . In the attached affidavit,

the State alleged that the appellant set i n t o motion the

p r o c e s s of exerting unauthorized c o n t r o l over t h e p r o p e r t y

i n A p r i l of 1981; however, t h e a c t was n o t c o m p l e t e d u n t i l

August of 1981. C l e a r l y t h e S t a t e a p p r i s e d t h e d e f e n d a n t o f

t h e c h a r g e s and f a c t s t h e y would p r o v e a t t r i a l . W e f i n d no

d e f e c t i n t h e i n f o r m a t i o n o r a n y v a r i a n c e b e t w e e n w h a t was

c h a r g e d and what t h e S t a t e p r e s e n t e d a t t r i a l .
 Appellant next objects t o the giving and d e n y i n g of

certain jury instructions.

"On a p p e a l , w e r e v i e w t h e i n s t r u c t i o n s a s
a whole. S t a t e v. F a r n e s ( 1 9 7 6 ) , 1 7 1
Mont. 368, 558 P.2d 472. It is
i m p o s s i b l e t o d e l i v e r t h e whole of t h e
law i n a n y o n e i n s t r u c t i o n , a n d f o r t h a t
reason, a l l i n s t r u c t i o n s a r e considered
a s a whole and i f t h e y f a i r l y t e n d e r t h e
case t o a jury, t h e f a c t t h a t one
i n s t r u c t i o n s t a n d i n g a l o n e is n o t a s f u l l
o r a c c u r a t e a s it might be is n o t
reversible error. S t a t e v. C a r y l ( 1 9 7 5 ) ,
168 Mont. 414, 543 P.2d 389."

S t a t e v. Coleman ( 1 9 7 9 ) , 1 8 5 Mont. 2 9 9 , 3 9 7 , 605 P.2d 1000,

In instant case the instructions delivered fairly

tendered the case to the jury, we therefore find no

p r e j u d i c i a l e r r o r occurred i n the jury instructions.

The n e x t i s s u e w e w i l l c o n s i d e r i s , d i d t h e c o u r t e r r

in refusing to disqualify itself in the sentencing

proceeding? Appellant moved to disqualify Judge Sorte

because he signed orders for investigative subpoenas and

orders for seizure during the period of presentence

investigation. 9 e made t h o s e o r d e r s f o l l o w i n g a r e v i e w o f

a £f i d a v i t s submitted by the Valley County attorney. The

county attorney was investigating another criminal case

i n v o l v i n g a p p e l l a n t and s o u g h t t h e n e c e s s a r y o r d e r s .

In instant case, nothing suggests that Judge Sorte

sought additional information or the State sought to

influence his sentencing determination by presenting

affidavits i n s u p p o r t of orders i n order t o f a c i l i t a t e an

investigation. Nothing i n d i c a t e s t h e c o u r t r e l i e d on t h i s

material to influence its decision. In fact the court

specifically stated i t would not consider any information

received connected with the other investigation for
sentencing purposes. I n S t a t e v. Olson (Mont. 1 9 8 0 ) , 514

P.2d 1061, 37 St.Rep. 1313, this Court found proper

s e n t e n c i n g when t h e c o u r t was exposed to improper matters

b u t r e f u s e d t o c o n s i d e r them.

In instant case, we find no prejudiced error in

s e n t e n c i n g when the court refused to consider matters

i n v o l v i n g i n v e s t i g a t i o n s i n t o o t h e r a l l e g e d crimes c o m m i t t e d

by a p p e l l a n t .

Appellant a s s e r t s t h e c o u r t improperly conducted t h e

s e n t e n c i n g h e a r i n g by p e r m i t t i n g r e l a x e d r u l e s o f e v i d e n c e .

In S t a t e v. Lamere (Mont. 1983), 658 P.2d 376, 40

St.Rep. 1 1 0 , w e s t a t e d t h a t t h e Montana R u l e s of E v i d e n c e d o

not apply to sentencing hearings, Rule 101(c)(3),

Mont.R.Evid. W find
e in instant case the court correctly

used r e l a x e d r u l e s of evidence f o r s e n t e n c i n g purposes.

Appellant claims the court imposed an excessive

sentence. A p p e l l a n t l e g a l l y f a i l s t o show a n y c l e a r a b u s e

of d i s c r e t i o n . H e m e r e l y a r g u e s o n e q u i t a b l e terms t h a t t h e

s e n t e n c e is u n f a i r . This matter should be brought b e f o r e

the S e n t e n c e Review Board and not this Court. S t a t e v.

Hubbard (Mont. 1 9 8 2 ) , 649 P.2d 1 3 3 1 , 39 S t . R e p . 1608.

Appellant finally argues that the testimony of Tom

Adams s h o u l d have b e e n s u p p r e s s e d . He c l a i m s Adams f a i l e d

t o g i v e him Miranda w a r n i n g s . T h i s p r e c l u d e s any s t a t e m e n t s

made by him to Adams to be admitted into evidence. We

disagree.

P.ppellant relies on Niranda v. Arizona (1966), 384

U.S. 436, 16 L.Ed.2d 6 9 4 , 86 S . C t . 1602, f o r t h e p r o p o s i t i o n

that statements made, while a person is in custody or

"otherwise deprived of his f r e e d o m by authorities in any
significant way," are inadmissible unless warnings are
given. Orozco v. Texas (1969), 394 U.S. 324, 22 L.Ed.2d
311, 89 S.Ct. 1095, the Supreme Court held that four
officers who surrounded and questioned a defendant at his
home constituted sufficient impairment of freedom and
thereby suppressed statements made without Miranda warnings.
The U.S. Supreme Court in Brewer v. Williams (1977), 430

U.S. 387, 51 L.Ed.2d 424, 97 S.Ct. 1232, stated that when a
person is in custody and they request an attorney, further
questioning must stop until an attorney is present.
Appellant contends the language in State v. Blakney (1979),
185 Mont. 470, 605 P.2d 1095, "maybe I should have an
attorney" requires questioning to cease.

In State v. Ryan (1979), 182 Mont. 130, 135, 595 P.2d
1146, 1143, we stated:
" [MI iranda warnings are required only
where there has been such a restriction
on a person's freedom as to render him
in custody. ' It was that sort of
coercive environment to which Mir anda by
its terms was made applicable, and to
which it is limited. [Oregon v.
Mathiason (1977)], 429 U.S. at 495, 97
S.Ct. at 714, 50 L.Ed.2d at 719."
In instant case, the appellant invited Tom Adams and a
Georgia officer into the residence where he was staying, and
during a cup of coffee, discussed the whereabouts of the
missing V.I.P. property. Appellant requested an attorney if
their conversation was taped. Thereafter Adams did not use
a tape recorder and sought to hear appellant's side of the
story. Adams neither sought a confession nor even suggested
he would be under arrest.

Appellant was never in custody, nor was his freedom
restricted in any way. He requested an attorney only if a
tape recorder was used. He made no incriminating

statements.

We therefore hold the court properly admitted Tom

Adams' testimony. A p p e l l a n t made h i s s t a t e m e n t s t o Adams

v o l u n t a r i l y and f u r t h e r , b e c a u s e h e was n o t i n a c u s t o d i a l

s e t t i n g or had h i s f r e e d o m impaired i n any manner, Miranda
w a r n i n g s were u n n e c e s s a r y .

W e a f f i r m t h e D i s t r i c t Court.

W e concur:

c,
a& t9.&md
Chief J u s t i c e

s i t t i n g i n p l a c e o f Mr. ~ u s t i c e
F r a n k B. M o r r i s o n J r .