NO. 82-386
I N THE SUPREME COUET O TEE STATE OF 3IOPJTAP.IA
F
1983
STATE OF MONTANA,
P l a i n t i f f and Respondent,
-vs-
JOE SMITH,
Defendant and A p p e l l a n t .
Appeal from: D i s t r i c t C o u r t o f t h e S i x t e e n t h J u d i c i a l District,
I n a n d f o r t h e County o f Rosebud, The H o n o r a b l e
A l f r e d B. C o a t e , J u d g e p r e s i d i n g .
Counsel o f Record:
For Appellant:
G a r r y P. Bunke, F o r s y t h , Montana
For Respondent:
Hon. Mike G r e e l y , A t t o r n e y G e n e r a l , H e l e n a ,
Montana
J o h n S. F o r s y t h e , County A t t o r n e y , F o r s y t h ,
14ontana
- -
Submitted on B r i e f s : January 20, 1903
Decided: A p r i l 7 , 1983
Filed: APR 7 - 1983
C
Clerk
Mr. C h i e f J u s t i c e F r a n k I . Haswell d e l i v e r e d t h e O p i n i o n o f
the Court.
D e f e n d a n t a p p e a l s h i s c o n v i c t i o n by a Rosebud C o u n t y
j u r y f o r f e l o n y c r i m i n a l p o s s e s s i o n of dangerous d r u g s . We
a f f irm.
On December 1, 1 9 8 1 , d e f e n d a n t a p p l i e d for a $2,000
loan with t h e Cheyenne W e s t e r n Bank i n Ashland, Montana.
S m i t h t o l d bank p e r s o n n e l that t h e l o a n was t o r e p a y h i s
p a r e n t s f o r money t h e y h a d l e n t him. The l o a n w a s g r a n t e d
o n December 3 , 1 9 8 1 , a n d t h a t d a y S m i t h s e n t a W e s t e r n Union
money o r d e r i n t h e amount o f $ 3 , 9 0 0 t o h i s b r o t h e r , N a t h a n ,
i n Florida. H e p a i d a $60 f e e t o W e s t e r n Union f o r s e n d i n g
t h e money o r d e r . A bank loan o f f i c e r t e s t i f i e d t h a t even
w i t h t h e l o a n S m i t h d i d n o t h a v e s u f f i c i e n t money i n s a v i n g s
o r c h e c k i n g a c c o u n t s t o be a b l e t o amass $3,960.
On December 7 , 1 9 8 1 , a r e l i a b l e p o l i c e i n f o r m a n t t o l d
Officer Larry P r i c e t h a t d e f e n d a n t had s e n t a s u b s t a n t i a l
amount o f money o u t o f M i l e s C i t y v i a W e s t e r n Union t o buy
drugs. H e a l s o i n f o r m e d t h e o f f i c e r t h a t two o t h e r p e r s o n s
were i n v o l v e d i n t h e p l a n a n d t h a t t h e p a c k a g e o f m a r i j u a n a
was scheduled t o arrive i n Ashland, Montana, between the
1 6 t h and the 18th of December. Price contacted Western
Union a n d v e r i f i e d t h a t d e f e n d a n t h a d s e n t a money o r d e r f o r
$3,900 t o a Nathan Smith i n F o r t Myers, Florida. He then
c o n t a c t e d t h e Ashland p o s t m a s t e r and a s k e d him t o watch f o r
a package from F l o r i d a a d d r e s s e d t o Smith and t o l e t P r i c e
know when i t a r r i v e d .
P r i c e r e c e i v e d a c a l l f r o m t h e p o s t m a s t e r on December
17, 1981, and was told that it would be a good day to
conduct a c o n t r o l l e d s e a r c h of t h e p o s t o f f i c e t h a t he had
b e e n r e q u e s t i n g t o d o f o r some t i m e w i t h h i s t r a i n e d , d r u g -
s n i f f i n g dog. P r i c e took an envelope of marijuana t o t h e
p o s t o f f i c e , gave it t o a p o s t a l employee t o h i d e , and t h e n
directed t h e dog to search for it. The dog found the
envelope. I t a l s o i n d i c a t e d t h a t o n e p a c k a g e among s e v e r a l
s i t t i n g on t h e f l o o r contained drugs. I t was a d d r e s s e d to
S m i t h and had b e e n m a i l e d f r o m F l o r i d a .
Price and other members of the Rosebud County
s h e r i f f ' s o f f i c e t h e n s t a k e d o u t t h e p o s t o f f i c e and w a i t e d
f o r d e f e n d a n t t o p i c k up t h e p a c k a g e . On December 1 8 , 1 9 8 1 ,
d e f e n d a n t and h i s w i f e , Nelda, arrived a t the post office.
S m i t h w a i t e d o u t s i d e i n t h e i r p i c k u p w h i l e N e l d a p i c k e d up
t h e package. S h e p l a c e d t h e box on t h e f r o n t s e a t o f the
t r u c k and p u s h e d i t t o t h e m i d d l e o f t h e s e a t .
P r i c e t h e n approached t h e S m i t h s and a s k e d d e f e n d a n t
i f t h e box b e l o n g e d t o him. H e r e p l i e d "yeah." Price told
t h e S m i t h s a b o u t t h e c o n t r o l l e d s e a r c h h e had c o n d u c t e d and
i n f o r m e d them o f h i s s u s p i c i o n s t h a t t h e p a c k a g e c o n t a i n e d
i l l e g a l drugs.
Defendant stated that the package was supposed to
contain Christmas presents, and h e a g r e e d t o accompany t h e
o f f i c e r s t o J u s t i c e C o u r t t o o p e n t h e box. He voluntarily
carried the package to a police vehicle and placed it
inside. He then rode t o J u s t i c e Court i n the p o l i c e c a r ,
removed the package from the car and carried it inside.
Finally, Smith s i g n e d a consent to search form, and the
o f f i c e r s opened t h e box. It c o n t a i n e d s i x t e e n pounds o f
marijuana, a few p i e c e s of fruit, and a note that said
"Merry C h r i s t m a s . " J o e a n d N e l d a S m i t h were b o t h a r r e s t e d
for criminal possession of dangerous drugs. The charges
a g a i n s t Nelda were l a t e r dropped.
Further investigation revealed that the Florida ad-
dress was nonexistent. The loan to Smith is currently
unpaid. No w i t n e s s e s were c a l l e d o n b e h a l f o f d e f e n d a n t t o
e x p l a i n what happened t o t h e $3,900 h e s e n t t o F l o r i d a .
Defendant p r e s e n t s a s i n g l e i s s u e on a p p e a l : Is t h e
e v i d e n c e is s u f f i c i e n t t o e s t a b l i s h c o n s t r u c t i v e p o s s e s s i o n
of dangerous drugs? Smith argues that the evidence was
insufficient to sustain a conviction of possession of
dangerous drugs s i n c e he d i d n o t have sufficient time t o
t e r m i n a t e c o n t r o l o v e r t h e p a c k a g e d e l i v e r e d by f i r s t - c l a s s
mail. W disagree.
e
Felony criminal possession of dangerous drugs, as
defined in section 45-9-102, MCA, requires proof that a
defendant: (1) p o s s e s s e d ( 2 ) dangerous drugs. "Possession"
is d e f i n e d i n s e c t i o n 4 5 - 2 - 1 0 1 ( 5 2 ) , MCA, as: " t h e knowing
control of anything for a sufficient time to be able to
terminate control." The S t a t e , therefore, must establish
t h a t S m i t h knew o f t h e c o n t e n t s of t h e package and t h a t h e
controlled the d a n g e r o u s d r u g s f o r a s u f f i c i e n t amount o f
t i m e t o be a b l e t o t e r m i n a t e c o n t r o l .
This Court has adopted the following standard of
a p p e l l a t e review of s u f f i c i e n c y of t h e evidence: "Whether,
a f t e r viewing t h e evidence i n t h e l i g h t most f a v o r a b l e t o
t h e p r o s e c u t i o n , any r a t i o n a l t r i e r o f f a c t c o u l d h a v e f o u n d
the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable
doubt." J a c k s o n v. Virginia ( 1 9 7 9 ) , 4 4 3 U.S. 307, 319, 99
S.Ct. 2781, 6 1 L.Ed.2d 560, 573; S t a t e v. Wilson (1981),
Mon t . , 6 3 1 P.2d 1273, 1279, 38 St.Rep. 1040,
1047. I n applying t h a t standard t o t h e evidence presented
i n t h e i n s t a n t case, w e h o l d t h a t s u b s t a n t i a l e v i d e n c e sup-
ports defendant's conviction for felony criminal possession
of d a n g e r o u s d r u g s . Substantial c r e d i b l e evidence supports
f i n d i n g s t h a t S m i t h knew o f t h e c o n t e n t s o f t h e p a c k a g e and
t h a t he c o n t r o l l e d t h e c o n t e n t s f o r a s u f f i c i e n t t i m e t o b e
able t o terminate control.
The S t a t e p r o p e r l y c o n c e d e s t h a t e v i d e n c e w h i c h s i m p l y
e s t a b l i s h e s d e l i v e r y o f d r u g s by f i r s t - c l a s s m a i l i s i n s u f -
ficient to demonstrate constructive possession of drugs.
The S t a t e a l s o c o n c e d e s t h a t t h e f a c t a p e r s o n i s t h e named
a d d r e s s e e of a parcel does not c o n s t i t u t e s u f f i c i e n t evi-
d e n c e of c o n s t r u c t i v e p o s s e s s i o n . Knowledge o f t h e c o n t e n t s
must be proven. Knowledge may b e p r o v e d by d i r e c t e v i d e n c e
or by evidence of acts, declarations, or conduct of the
a c c u s e d f r o m which a j u r y may i n f e r knowledge. S t a t e v.
Anderson (1972), 1 5 9 Mont. 344, 351, 498 P.2d 295, 299.
Here, substantial evidence supports a finding of such
knowledge.
Defendant obtained a bank loan of $2,000 for the
s t a t e d purpose of repaying h i s p a r e n t s . On t h a t d a t e , h i s
own r e s o u r c e s t o g e t h e r w i t h t h e l o a n were insufficient to
a l l o w him t o a c c u m u l a t e c a s h i n t h e amount o f n e a r l y $ 4 , 0 0 0 .
Yet on that date, he wired nearly $4,000 to Florida by
W e s t e r n Union. A r e l i a b l e informant t o l d Officer P r i c e t h a t
d e f e n d a n t a n d two o t h e r i n d i v i d u a l s p l a n n e d t o s e n d money t o
Florida for a d r u g buy and t h a t t h e package of marijuana
would b e d e l i v e r e d b e t w e e n December 1 6 and 18. A package
w i t h s i x t e e n p o u n d s o f m a r i j u a n a t h e n a r r i v e d on December
17. The r e t u r n a d d r e s s on t h e box was b o g u s . The l o a n h a s
n o t been r e p a i d . No e v i d e n c e was i n t r o d u c e d t o e x p l a i n w h a t
happened t o t h e money s e n t t o F l o r i d a . Nothing i n d i c a t e d
that defendant's parents actually received any of the $2,000
that Smith borrowed. Sufficient evidence supports defen-
dant's knowledge of the package contents.
Similarly, the record sustains defendant's conviction
for knowing "control for a sufficient time to be able to
terminate control." This Court has long recognized that a
conviction for possession of dangerous drugs need not be
predicated upon a finding of actual possession. Constructive
possession may suffice. State ex rel. Galyan v. District
Court (1971), 156 Mont. 523, 480 P.2d 840 (per curiam
order). The control need not be exclusive but may extend to
situations where the contraband is "immediately and exclu-
sively accessible to the accused and is subject to his
dominion or control, or to the joint dominion and control of
the accused and another." State v. Meader (1979),
Mont . , 601 P.2d 386, 392, 36 St.Rep. 1747, 1754; State
v. Godsey (1982), Mont. , 656 P.2d 811, 815, 39
St.Rep. 2354, 2358. Constructive possession is a factual
determination to be made by the trier of fact. State ex
rel. Galyan v. District Court, 156 Mont. at 524, 480 P.2d at
840; State v. Meader, 601 P.2d at 392, 36 St.Rep. at 1755.
In a case analogous to the instant case, we recognized
constructive possession where the defendant exercised con-
trol over a baggage claim ticket for baggage which contained
marijuana. State v. Trowbridge (1971), 157 Mont. 527, 487
P.2d 530. In Trowbridge the defendant had checked baggage
containing the contraband and then boarded her flight under
an assumed name. The suitcase handle and claim check some-
how were separated from the luggage and airline employees
opened the bag to try to establish identification. They
discovered the contraband and notified law enforcement
officers. When the handle was subsequently located, the
owner and destination were determined and Missoula law
enforcement officers were informed. When the defendant's
bag did not arrive on her flight, she filled out a luggage
claim form describing the missing suitcase. She provided
the name and telephone number of a Bruce Bennett as the
place she could be reached. Bennett was notified when the
baggage arrived and picked it up for Trowbridge. Trowbridge
was arrested outside of the airport as she waited for
Bennett to deliver the suitcase.
Viewed in the light most favorable to the State, the
evidence here shows that defendant's control of the contra-
band began when he placed an order for the marijuana and
sent the money to Florida via Western Union. At that point
he began to exert control over the drugs. He could have
cancelled the order. He could have himself claimed the
package with the postal claim ticket and immediately dis-
posed of it. The fact that he sent his wife in to pick up
the box, as Carolyn Trowbridge had sent Bruce Bennett to
pick up the luggage, does not negate the control he exer-
cised over the package. Nor was defendant prevented from
deciding to simply not claim the parcel. We reject Smith's
argument that he was afforded no opportunity to terminate
control because he was immediately confronted by a police
officer . Substantial credible evidence sustains the
conviction.
Affirmed.
3 4 8gu4
Chief ~ u s t i c e
We concur: