St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance v. Cumiskey

NO. 82-279 I N THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 1983 ST. PAUL F I R E a n d MARINE INSURANCE COMPANY, a c o r p o r a t i o n , Plaintiff and Respondent, vs. KEVIN E . CUMISKEY, J O H N E . CUMISKEY, STEPHANIE S . CUMISKEY, a n d K . S . J . , INC., a Montana c o r p o r a t i o n , Defendants and Appellants, and ELIZABETH M . BRADLEY, Defendant and Cross Appellant. Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court of the Eighteenth Judicial D i s t r i c t , I n and f o r t h e County o f G a l l a t i n Honorable Joseph B. Gary, Judge p r e s i d i n g . Counsel of Record: For Appellant: L a r r y W. Moran a r g u e d , Bozeman, Montana For Cross-Appellant: L a n d o e , B r o w n , P l a n a l p , Kommers & L i n e b e r g e r , Bozeman, Montana Randy K . D i x , a r g u e d , Bozeman, Montana For Respondents: A n d e r s o n , Brown, G e r b a s e , C e b u l l & J o n e s , Billings, Montana J a m e s L. J o n e s a r g u e d , B i l l i n g s , M o n t a n a Submitted: March 1, 1983 Decided: J u n e 10, 1983 ~ i l e d : JUN 1 0 1983 Clerk Mr. Chief Justice Frank I. Haswell delivered the Opinion of the Court. Cumiskeys and Bradley appeal a judgment upon a Gallatin County jury verdict which set the cost of repairs of fire damaged property, which determined the parties' liabilities to one another and which awarded and set attorney fees. We affirm in part and reverse in part. In early 1978, Kevin Cumiskey contacted Elizabeth Bradley in order to lease West Yellowstone property owned by Bradley as the site of a Mexican restaurant. They entered into a lease agreement prepared by Cumiskey's attorney which required that Cumiskey insure the property to protect Bradley's interest and which specified that fixtures and alterations added by Cumiskey would remain his property. Kevin opened the restaurant, "Chiripa's," for a short 1978 tourist season, closed it for the winter, and then reopened it for summer 1979. From September 1978 to September 1979, the property was insured in the name of Kevin Cumiskey, d/b/a "Chiripa's." During that period, Kevin improved the premises with funds borrowed from his father, John Cumiskey. At no time was Bradley's interest insured. From September 1979 to June 1980, the property was not insured at all. In 1979 the restaurant business was incorporated as K.S.J., Inc. (for Kevin, Stephanie, and John Cumiskey), and the lease was assigned to the corporation. Kevin and his mother, Stephanie, each owned 49 percent of the stock. John owned 2 percent. Kevin is president, John is vice president and Stephanie is secretary. Kevin decided to stay in New York to work for the sum- mer of 1980, so John and Stephanie Cumiskey agreed to spend the summer in West Yellowstone operating the restaurant. Upon their arrival, the Cumiskeys contacted a Bozeman insurance agency to arrange for reissuance of the prior insurance coverage. Again, the insured on the policy was listed as Kevin Cumiskey, d/b/a "Chiripass." John and Stephanie ran the restaurant, which had consistently lost money since its opening, until, on August 10, 1980, a series of explosions accompanied by fire damaged the premises. The fire investigation revealed that the blazes had been intentionally set. Extensive circumstantial evidence focused on John Curniskey as the alleged arsonist. That evidence included serious burns sustained by Cumiskey, a series of inconsistent and uncorroborated stories told by Cumiskey to explain his burns and his actions after the fire, and the fact that his keys to the restaurant and other objects owned by Cumiskey were found in the street outside Chiripass after the explosions. Once the investigation established that the fire had been intentionally set, St. Paul requested that Cumiskeys produce the financial records of the business. John Cumiskey refused to do so for some sixteen months af ter the August 1980 fire. In October 1980, Kevin Cumiskey filed a claim with St. Paul seeking recovery under the policy. St. Paul was told both that the destroyed property belonged to Kevin Cumiskey and that it was the property of K.S. J., Inc. St. Paul also became aware of the Bradley lease, which required that Bradley's interest be insured. John Cumiskey was charged with arson and criminal mischief in connection with the fire and was tried in November 1980. The business records were not a part of the criminal trial. Cumiskey's defense was that he was a w e a l t h y man, t h a t t h e b u s i n e s s was p r o f i t a b l e , and t h a t h e had no m o t i v e s f o r a r s o n . H e was a c q u i t t e d o f b o t h c h a r g e s . Two months a f t e r J o h n C u m i s k e y ' s a c q u i t t a l , St. Paul filed this action for d e c l a r a t o r y judgment. In i t s com- plaint, S t . P a u l a s k e d t h e c o u r t t o d e c l a r e Kevin Cumiskey the proper recipient of any p o l i c y p r o c e e d s , t o determine t h e r i g h t s and o t h e r l e g a l r e l a t i o n s h i p s o f t h e p a r t i e s , to determine the specific amount of recovery t o which Kevin Cumiskey was e n t i t l e d , and t o r e q u i r e t h a t J o h n E . Cumiskey s u b r o g a t e any c l a i m p a i d by S t . Paul. K.S.J., Inc., was l a t e r a d d e d t o t h e a c t i o n by s t i p u l a t i o n o f t h e p a r t i e s . Bradley cross-claimed against Kevin Cumiskey and M.S.J., Inc., for failure to insure her interest in the building. She also brought a tort claim against John Cumiskey for deliberate destruction of the property. Cumiskeys and K.S.J., Inc., brought counterclaims against St. Paul for the company's breach of both statutory and common-law duties to settle the insurance claims i n good f a i t h and f o r l i b e l and s l a n d e r . A number of i s s u e s r a i s e d w e r e d i s p o s e d of b e f o r e t h e c a s e was g i v e n to the jury. Before trial, the District C o u r t e n t e r e d summary judgment i n f a v o r of B r a d l e y on t h e issue of Kevin Cumiskey's failure to insure Bradley's i n t e r e s t i n t h e premises. K.S.J., Inc., dropped its c l a i m t o t h e i n s u r a n c e p r o c e e d s on t h e d a y b e f o r e t r i a l . At the outset of trial, the District Court dismissed Cumiskeys' s t a t u t o r y counterclaim f o r f a i l u r e t o s t a t e a proper claim. It a l s o dismissed Cumiskeys' c l a i m of libel and slander, which was b a s e d upon S t . P a u l ' s f i l i n g of this action for d e c l a r a t o r y judgment. At t h e c l o s e of e v i d e n c e , the t r i a l court entered a directed verdict in favor of St. Paul on Cumiskeys' common-law c o u n t e r c l a i m f o r bad f a i t h . The j u r y r e t u r n e d a s p e c i a l . v e r d i c t which d e t e r m i n e d : (1) S t . P a u l and B r a d l e y had p r o v e d by a p r e p o n d e r a n c e o f t h e e v i d e n c e t h a t J o h n E. Cumiskey c a u s e d t h e f i r e ; (2) the cost t o repair t h e main b u i l d i n g o f t h e r e s t a u r a n t was s e t at $12,300.00; (3) that Kevin Cumiskey was entitled to r e c o v e r $19,910.00 under the policy; and, ( 4 ) t h a t Bradley was e n t i t l e d t o r e c o v e r $ 2 5 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 i n p u n i t i v e damages f r o m J o h n E. Cumiskey. The p a r t i e s stipulated in the pretrial order t h a t t h e f i r e had been s e t intentionally. The j u r y was so informed and was instructed that if it f o u n d that John E. Cumiskey set the fire, St. Paul was entitled to recover from him t h e amount i t m u s t p a y t o Kevin Cumiskey under t h e p o l i c y . Cumiskeys and K . S . J . , Inc., moved f o r a judgment n o t - withstanding the verdict or in the alternative for a new trial. The m o t i o n s w e r e d e n i e d . C u m i s k e y s now a p p e a l a n d Bradley cross-appeals. Appellants, in their shotgun approach, barrage this Court with issues. We will address only two of those issues. W w i l l also address cross-appellant's e claim. We h a v e c o n s i d e r e d t h e o t h e r e r r o r s a d v a n c e d by a p p e l l a n t s and f i n d them t o be w i t h o u t m e r i t . W e w i l l n o t c o n c e r n o u r s e l v e s w i t h t h e s e arguments s i n c e t h e y w i l l n o t change t h e outcome of t h i s appeal. W also note e i n passing that appellants' briefs, which c o n t a i n more v i t r i o l t h a n s u b s t a n c e , fail to substantiate their claims with references to the record p u r s u a n t t o R u l e 2 3 ( a ) and ( e ) , f4.R.App.Civ.P. The i s s u e s w e a d d r e s s a r e : I. Whether the District Court properly directed a v e r d i c t on C u m i s k e y s ' c o u n t e r c l a i m s f o r bad f a i t h ; 2. Whether the District Court properly granted summary judgment i n f a v o r o f B r a d l e y ; a n d , 3. Whether t h e D i s t r i c t Court correctly calculated t h e a t t o r n e y f e e s awarded t o B r a d l e y . Kevin Cumiskey f i r s t c h a l l e n g e s d i s m i s s a l o f h i s bad f a i t h counterclaims against St. Paul. H e contends t h a t S t . P a u l v i o l a t e d b o t h s t a t u t o r y and common-law duties t o settle t h e i n s u r a n c e c l a i m s i n good f a i t h . The s t a t u t o r y c l a i m i s b a s e d upon s e c t i o n 3 3 - 1 8 - 2 0 1 ( 6 ) and ( 1 3 ) , MCA, o f t h e U n f a i r T r a d e P r a c t i c e C h a p t e r o f t h e I n s u r a n c e Code. I t provides: "Unfair claim s e t t l e m e n t p r a c t i c e s prohi- - b i t e d . No p e r s o n may, w i t h s u c h f r e q u e n c y a s t o indicate a general business prac- t i c e , do a n y of t h e f o l l o w i n g : " ( 6 ) n e g l e c t t o a t t e m p t i n good f a i t h t o e f f e c t u a t e p r o m p t , f a i r , and e q u i t a b l e s e t t l e m e n t s o f c l a i m s i n which l i a b i l i t y h a s become r e a s o n a b l y c l e a r ; " ( 1 3 ) f a i l t o promptly s e t t l e claims, i f l i a b i l i t y h a s become r e a s o n a b l y c l e a r , under one p o r t i o n of t h e i n s u r a n c e p o l i c y coverage i n order t o i n f l u e n c e s e t t l e - ments under o t h e r p o r t i o n s of t h e i n s u r - ance p o l i c y coverage;" (Emphasis added.) The s t a t u t o r y c l a i m was s t r u c k by t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t prior to trial on the basis that Kevin Cumiskey had not p l e a d e d a n d was n o t g o i n g t o p r e s e n t e v i d e n c e t h a t S t . P a u l f a i l e d t o s e t t l e claims "with such frequency t o i n d i c a t e a general business practice." Dismissal of the statutory c l a i m on that b a s i s was p r o p e r . Klaudt v. Flink (1983), Mont . , 658 P.2d 1 0 6 5 , 40 S t . R e p . 64; H a r r i s v. American G e n e r a l L i f e I n s u r a n c e Company o f D e l a w a r e ( 1 9 8 3 ) , The common-law bad f a i t h c l a i m was d i s p o s e d o f w i t h a d i r e c t e d v e r d i c t a t the c l o s e of evidence. W f i r s t recog- e nized t h a t a n i n s u r a n c e company h a s a d u t y i n d e p e n d e n t o f s t a t u t e or of i n s u r a n c e c o n t r a c t t o s e t t l e c l a i m s i n good f a i t h w i t h i t s i n s u r e d s i n L i p i n k s i v. The T i t l e I n s u r a n c e Company ( 1 9 8 2 ) , Mon t . , 655 P.2d 970, 39 S t . R e p . 2283. The District Court here properly allowed Kevin Cumiskey t o p r e s e n t e v i d e n c e i n s u p p o r t o f h i s claim t h a t St. P a u l a c t e d i n bad f a i t h and b r e a c h e d t h a t d u t y . Con- f l i c t i n g e v i d e n c e was i n t r o d u c e d on w h e t h e r a g e n t s of St. Paul had represented that the insurer would settle the claim. Kevin p r i m a r i l y b a s e d h i s c l a i m on the assertion t h a t t h e f i l i n g of t h e d e c l a r a t o r y judgment a c t i o n was in bad f a i t h s i n c e t h e c l a i m s h o u l d h a v e b e e n p a i d and s i n c e the action served to destroy the business relationship between Cumiskeys and Bradley. A t the close of the e v i d e n c e , however, the court dismissed t h a t claim with t h e following statement: " I ' m going t o r e v e r s e myself. I am g o i n g t o g r a n t t h e motion f o r a d i r e c t e d ver- d i c t on t h e q u e s t i o n o f p u n i t i v e damages t o t h e i n s u r a n c e company on t h e i r coun- t e r c l a i m and l e t you g o on y o u r a c t u a l damages . . . T h e r e was a l e g i t i m a t e q u e s t i o n i n t h i s c a s e on t h e b a s i s of who s e t t h e f i r e , how t h e f i r e was s e t , who t h e c l a i m was i n , and t h e i n s u r a n c e com- pany came i n and a s k e d f o r a d e c l a r a t o r y j u d g m e n t , and t h e o n l y a l t e r n a t i v e i s t o make t h e i n s u r a n c e company p a y i n a n y r e s p e c t , and t h e n a t t e m p t t o g e t i t b a c k , and t h e y u s e d t h e p r o c e s s o f t h e c o u r t s and w i t h i n r e a s o n a b l e t i m e , and s o you a r e , h o w e v e r , e n t i t l e d t o g o on y o u r a c t u a l damages on y o u r c l a i m . " The D i s t r i c t C o u r t p r o p e r l y g r a n t e d a d i r e c t e d v e r d i c t i n favor of St. Paul on t h o s e grounds. The c o u r t s h o u l d vlew a motion for a directed verdict in the light most f a v o r a b l e t o t h e p a r t y a g a i n s t whom t h e m o t i o n i s d i r e c t e d . Dleruf v. Gollaher (1971), 156 Mont. 440, 481 P.2d 322. Here, even viewed in the light most favorable to Kevin Cumiskey, t h e c o u r t found t h a t S t . P a u l ' s d e c i s i o n t o b r i n g this action for d e c l a r a t o r y j u d g m e n t was a p p r o p r i a t e . We agree. An a c t i o n f o r d e c l a r a t o r y j u d g m e n t may b e b r o u g h t f o r the purpose of s e t t l i n g and a f f o r d i n g " r e l i e f from uncer- t a i n t y and insecurity with respect to rights, status, and other legal relations." S e c t i o n 27-8-101 e t seq., MCA. The action, in order to terminate the controversy as to all parties, should i n c l u d e a s p a r t i e s a l l p e r s o n s who h a v e o r c l a i m any i n t e r e s t t h a t would b e a f f e c t e d by t h e d e c l a r a - tion. Empire F i r e & Marine I n s . Co. v . Goodman ( 1 9 6 6 ) , 1 4 7 Mont. 3 9 6 , 412 P.2d 569. If otherwise appropriate, an action for declaratory judgment is n o t p r e c l u d e d by t h e e x i s t e n c e of a n o t h e r a d e - q u a t e remedy. Rule 57, I4.R.Civ.P. In a proper case, an i n s u r e r may u s e t h i s p r o c e d u r a l d e v i c e i n o r d e r t o o b t a i n a d e t e r m i n a t i o n of the validity, continuance, or coverage of an insurance policy; a determination of the extent of l i a b i l i t y ; o r a d e t e r m i n a t i o n of t h e i n s u r e r ' s d u t i e s under the policy. 6A M o o r e ' s Federal Practice, l(57.19 a t 57-195 through 57-198. We hold that in this case, St. Paul p r o p e r l y f i l e d an a c t i o n f o r d e c l a r a t o r y judgment. W h i l e Kevin Cumiskey f i l e d a c l a i m f o r p r o c e e d s a s t h e named insured, a potential for l i a b i l i t y t o other parties also existed. Bradley's i n t e r e s t should have been insured p u r s u a n t t o t h e l e a s e a g r e e m e n t and was n o t . T h e r e was t h e p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t s h e would a t t e m p t t o c l a i m a l l o r p a r t o f t h e insurance proceeds. K.S.J., Inc., i n s i s t e d t h r o u g h o u t m o s t of t h e l a w s u i t that it was t h e named insured since St. P a u l ' s a g e n t s had been informed of the incorporation of the business. Not until the day b e f o r e trial was that c l a i m dropped. John Cumiskey's p o s s i b l e c u l p a b i l i t y i n r e g a r d t o t h e f i r e a l s o raised questions on the insurer's liability. Where an officer , director, stockholder, and managing agent of a c o r p o r a t i o n is r e s p o n s i b l e f o r i n t e n t i o n a l l y s e t t i n g a f i r e , the insurer has a v a l i d defense t o t h e claim. 1 8 Couch o n Insurance, 2d, S 74:671; 5 Appleman Insurance Law and Practice, S 3113 ( 1 9 7 0 ) . St. P a u l had a sufficient basis b e f o r e t h e f i l i n g of t h i s a c t i o n t o r a i s e t h a t d e f e n s e . John Cumiskey argues that section 33-24-102, MCA, r e q u i r e s payment o f t h e p o l i c y l i m i t where t h e p r o p e r t y i s considered a total loss and where no criminal fault is established on the part of the insured or his assigns. Therefore, h e c o n t e n d s t h a t h i s a c q u i t t a l on t h e a r s o n and criminal mischief charges required the insurer t o pay the policy l i m i t s rather than bringing t h i s action. He ignores t h e c o m p l e t e c o n t r a d i c t i o n i n h i s s t a n c e on t h e i s s u e o f t h e amount o f t h e l o s s . Cumiskeys t e s t i f i e d at trial that St. Paul's agents had s t a t e d t h a t t h e b u i l d i n g was a t o t a l l o s s and t h e c l a i m would be p a i d i n f u l l . The a g e n t d e n i e d making t h a t s t a t e - ment. No o t h e r e v i d e n c e i n d i c a t e d t h a t t h e b u i l d i n g was a total loss. I n f a c t , w h i l e B r a d l e y ' s e s t i m a t e on r e p a i r s t o the b u i l d i n g set t h e c o s t a t approximately $12,500, Cumis- Keys p r e s e n t e d t h e a f f i d a v i t o f t h e i r c o n t r a c t o r a n d a b r i e f i n o p p o s i t i o n t o B r a d l e y ' s m o t i o n f o r summary judgment t h a t set t h e r e p a i r c o s t s a t $8,500. At no t i m e t h r o u g h o u t t h e course of this action did Cumiskeys agree to settle B r a d l e y ' s c l a i m i n a n amount t h a t would r e p a y h e r f o r t o t a l l o s s of t h e b u i l d i n g . Nor d i d Cumiskeys introduce evidence t o demonstrate the loss to the business itself. The jury relied upon evldence introduced by St. Paul: the business income tax r e t u r n s and e x p e r t t e s t i m o n y by t h e b u s i n e s s ' s accountant. No e v i d e n c e was p r e s e n t e d t h a t s u g g e s t e d t h e b u s i n e s s was a total loss other than John Cumiskey's statement that an a d j u s t o r had s t a t e d : "Well, a s f a r a s I can see, it's a total loss." St. P a u l a l s o f a c e d a q u e s t i o n on t h e e x t e n t i t was liable to Kevin Cumiskey as the named insured since the property insured i n h i s name had b e e n a s s i g n e d t o K.S.J., Inc. T h i s c r e a t e s a n i s s u e on t h e e x t e n t o f K e v i n ' s r i g h t t o recover a s stockholder. See, 3 Couch on I n s u r a n c e , S 24:92; Annot., 39 ALR2d 714; 4 Appleman on Insurance, S 2145. The f a c t s o f t h i s c a s e p r e s e n t e d a j u s t i c i a b l e con- troversy, e x i s t i n g and g e n u i n e . The a c t i o n f o r d e c l a r a t o r y judgment was a p p r o p r i a t e l y b r o u g h t t o determine t h e legal r i g h t s and r e l a t i o n s h i p s o f t h e p a r t i e s . The D i s t r i c t C o u r t p r o p e r l y d i r e c t e d a v e r d i c t on t h e i s s u e o f bad f a i t h . Cumiskeys n e x t a r g u e t h a t t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t e r r e d i n g r a n t l n g summary judgment i n f a v o r o f B r a d l e y on t h e i s s u e ot b r e a c h of the l e a s e agreement. They c o n t e n d t h a t t h e p r o v i s i o n s o f t h e l e a s e a l l o w e d C u m i s k e y s and K.S.J., Inc., t o r e t a i n any f i x t u r e s o r o t h e r improvements added t o t h e property. Therefore, B r a d l e y was n o t e n t i t l e d t o summary judgment on t h e i s s u e of liability for failure to insure b e c a u s e B r a d l e y ' s l o s s was u n c l e a r . W e disagree. Bradley's motion for partial summary judgment requested the D i s t r i c t Court t o find l i a b i l i t y for Bradley's damages o r l o s s on t h e b a s i s of t h e f a i l u r e t o i n s u r e . The amount of damages were u n d e t e r m i n e d and w e r e t o b e i n c l u d e d a s an i s s u e a t t r i a l . Cumiskeys and K . S . J . , Inc., argued that t h e y had made e x t e n s i v e improvements t o the property which, under the terms of the contract, remained their property. Therefore, their contract l i a b i l i t y t o Bradley u n d e r t h e t e r m s o f the a g r e e m e n t was u n c l e a r and s h o u l d b e left for a jury determination. T h i s argument is w i t h o u t merit. The lease agreement clearly required that Kevin Cumiskey o r h i s a s s i g n s i n s u r e B r a d l e y ' s i n t e r e s t . They d i d not. The D i s t r i c t C o u r t p r o p e r l y f o u n d t h a t t h e t e r m s on i m p r o v e m e n t s w e r e a m b i g u o u s and u s e d a n a p p r o p r i a t e r u l e o f construction t o i n t e r p r e t those clauses. The l e a s e p r o v i d e d t h a t "ALTERATIONS" w e r e t o r e m a i n t h e p r o p e r t y of t h e l e s s e e s : "The Lessees w i l l b e e n t i t l e d t o make, o r w i l l s u f f e r t o be made, a n y a l t e r a t i o n s which t h e y i n t h e i r s o l e d i s c r e t i o n deem necessary. Any a d d i t i o n s t o , o r a l t e r a - tions of, attached t o the said leased p r o p e r t y s h a l l n o t become p a r t o f t h e r e a l t y b u t w i l l remain t h e s o l e and s e p a r a t e p r o p e r t y of t h e Lessees. The Lessees a g r e e t o a d v i s e L e s s o r s i n w r i t - i n g o f t h e d a t e upon w h i c h s u c h a l t e r a - t i o n s w i l l commence i n o r d e r t o p e r m i t t h e L e s s o r s t o p o s t n o t i c e of nonrespon- sibility. The L e s s e e s s h a l l k e e p t h e d e m i s e d p r e m i s e s f r e e f r o m a n y and a l l l i e n s a r i s i n g o u t o f a n y work p e r f o r m e d , materials furnished, or other obligations i n c u r r e d by t h e L e s s e e s . " It a l s o provided that "FIXTURES1' were t o r e m a i n the p r o p e r t y of t h e lessees: " I t is h e r e b y e x p r e s s l y a g r e e d between the p a r t i e s t o t h i s Lease t h a t any c o u n t e r s , t a b l e s , c h a i r s , s t o v e s , ovens, g r i l l s , i c e machines, s i n k s , o r any o t h e r p e r s o n a l p r o p e r t y b e l o n g i n g t o t h e Les- sees which is b r o u g h t upon t h e d e m i s e d p r e m i s e s and a t t a c h e d t h e r e t o , s h a l l n o t become a f i x t u r e and p a r t o f t h e r e a l t y . The L e s s o r h e r e b y e x p r e s s l y g r a n t s p e r - m i s s i o n t o t h e L e s s e e s t o remove a n y and a l l p e r s o n a l p r o p e r t y which t h e y b r i n g upon s a i d d e m i s e d p r e m i s e s . L e s s e e s a g r e e t o r e p a i r a n y damage t o t h e p r e m i s e s which is c a u s e d by r e m o v a l o f s a i d p e r - sonal property. " The D i s t r i c t C o u r t f o u n d t h a t t h e p r o v i s i o n on a l t e r a - t i o n s was u n c l e a r i n t h a t i t d i d n o t s p e c i f y what t y p e o f a 1t e r a t i o n s w e r e i n c l u d e d . The c o u r t t h e r e f o r e f o u n d t h a t the specific "FIXTURES" clause controlled the general "ALTERATIONS" c l a u s e and t h a t s u c h a n i n t e r p r e t a t i o n was i n conformance w i t h t h e g e n e r a l p r a c t i c e o f Montana l a n d l o r d s and t e n a n t s and w i t h Montana s t a t u t e s . W e agree. Where a d d i t i o n s a r e b u i l t o r a f f i x e d t o p r o p e r t y by a tenant without a n a g r e e m e n t t o a l l o w him to remove those additions or fixtures, they may not be removed if their r e m o v a l w i l l damage t h e p r e m i s e s . S e c t i o n 70-18-102, MCA; S a n d e r s v. B u t t e Motor Co. ( 1 9 6 3 ) , 1 4 2 Mont. 524, 385 P.2d 263. Here, a n a g r e e m e n t e x i s t s t o a l l o w r e m o v a l o f f i x t u r e s and a l t e r a t i o n s . I t is u n c l e a r w h a t was c o n t e m p l a t e d by i t s t e r m s , however. The c o n t r a c t was p r e p a r e d by a n a t t o r n e y on b e h a l f o f K e v i n Cumiskey. Kevin p r e s e n t e d i t t o B r a d l e y f o r signature. She d i d not take part in preparation of the terms. The r e c o r d a l s o d e m o n s t r a t e s K e v i n C u m i s k e y ' s i n t e n - t i o n t o use these clauses t o coerce Bradley i n t o renewing t h e l e a s e or s e l l i n g her property. B r a d l e y t e s t i f i e d t h a t s h e had t o l d K e v i n Cumiskey on s e v e r a l o c c a s i o n s t h a t s h e was n o t i n t e r e s t e d i n s e l l i n g t h e p r o p e r t y and had no i n t e n t i o n of d o i n g s o . He testified at h i s d e p o s i t i o n t h a t B r a d l e y had a g r e e d t o a l l o w him t o b u i l d a d d i t i o n s on s k i d s s o t h a t h e c o u l d " p i c k them up and c a r r y them away." H e was then asked about t h i n g s t h a t could n o t be c a r r i e d away: "Q. T h o s e t h i n g s you c o u l d n o t p i c k up and c a r r y away I assume you w e r e g o i n g t o l e a v e on t h e p r e m i s e s . A. No, I was n o t . "Q. What w e r e you g o i n g t o d o w i t h t h e t h i n g s you c o u l d n ' t p i c k up a n d move away? A. I was g o i n g t o u s e them a s a l e v e r f o r a new l e a s e . "Q. C o u l d you e x p l a i n w h a t you mean b y that? A. W e l l , i n my l e a s e , a l l t h e improvements a r e mine, a n d i f Mrs. B r a d l e y d i d n ' t want t o i s s u e m e a new l e a s e or give me a f i x t u r e s fee, then I would t a k e them o u t . " I t was c l e a r f r o m K e v i n ' s d e p o s i t i o n t e s t i m o n y t h a t i f Kevin " c o u l d b u i l d i n a 'manner where w e c o u l d p i c k i t up and c a r r y i t away, ' i t was f i n e w i t h [ B r a d l e y ] ." The D i s t r i c t C o u r t f o u n d a m b i g u i t y a n d c o n f l i c t i n t h e lease provisions and ruled that those items s p e c i f i c a l l y nained in the "FIXTURES" clause (the counters, tables, chairs, etc. ) belonged to Cumiskeys and everything else belonged to Bradley. Kevin Cumiskey argued that any improvements o r a l t e r a t i o n s , including wiring i n the roof, s h o u l d b e l o n g t o him u n d e r t h e "ALTERATIONS" c l a u s e . He has failed to demonstrate that the parties intended such an interpretation o f t h e c l a u s e s o r t h a t an agreement a c t u a l l y existed t h a t would a l l o w damage t o t h e p r o p e r t y t o remove those alterations. The specific "FIXTURES" clause clearly i n d i c a t e d t h a t a n y damage t o t h e p r e m i s e s c a u s e d by r e m o v a l o f f i x t u r e s would be r e p a i r e d . T h e r e is no i n d i c a t i o n t h a t t h e p a r r l e s concernplated a l l o w i n g a r e m o v a l of a 1t e r a t i o n s t h a t m i g h t r e s u l t i n damage t o t h e p r e m i s e s . Where a n a m b i g u o u s term i s u s e d , the parties' intent w i l l g o v e r n i t s c o n s t r u c t i o n and e x t r i n s i c e v i d e n c e c a n b e used t o d i s c o v e r t h a t i n t e n t . Adams v. C h i l c o t t ( 1 9 7 9 ) , 1 8 2 Mont. 5 1 1 , 5 1 7 , 597 P.2d 1140, 1144. A c o u r t should look t o t h e w h o l e c o n t r a c t and its purpose i n determining intent and is not bound by any single provision or expression. Gropp v . Lotton ( 1 9 7 2 ) , 1 6 0 Mont. 415, 421, 503 P.2d 661, 664-665. Repugnant p r o v i s i o n s s h o u l d be interpreted in a way t o give them some e f f e c t , subordinate to the general intent and purpose of the entire contract. Riis v. Day (1980)I Mon t . , 613 P.2d 6 9 6 , 6 9 8 , 37 S t . R e p . 1093, 1096. Where u n c e r t a i n t y i n a w r i t t e n i n s t r u m e n t e x i s t s , t h e provisions should p r o p e r l y be construed against the party causing the uncertainty. P a r k h i l l v. Fuselier (1981), Mon t . , 632 P.2d 1 1 3 2 , 1 1 3 5 , 38 S t . R e p . 1424, 1427. Here, the parties' intent was unclear. It is n o t certain that Bradley intended to allow Kevin Cumiskey to damage the premises in removing alterations. Cumiskey prepared t h e l e a s e a g r e e m e n t and was responsibile for the ambiguity t h a t existed. The D i s t r i c t C o u r t p r o p e r l y i n t e r - preted the provisions t o give some e f f e c t t o each and to conform w i t h g e n e r a l l a n d l o r d t e n a n t p r a c t i c e s . Cumiskeys t h e n had t h e o p p o r t u n i t y t o p r e s e n t e v i d e n c e o t t h e i r l o s s of b u s i n e s s f i x t u r e s and t o d i s p u t e B r a d l e y ' s c l a i m f o r t h e c o s t of repairs. They f a i l e d t o d o s o . They may n o t now a r g u e t h a t t h e j u r y may h a v e l i m i t e d a n award t o K e v i n Cumiskey t o t h e amount o f Bradley's c o s t of repairs. It is a p p a r e n t t h a t the jury did not. K e v i n Cumiskey w a s awarded 519,910, while the cost to repair the building was set at only $12,300. Further, the lease agreement remained in effect until the end of its term in April 1983. At that time, the build- ing was to be returned to Bradley in its original condition. The effect of the District Court's ruling was simply to remove from the jury an issue not properly before it at that time. Attorney fees were awarded pursuant to the terms of the lease agreement. Cross-appellant challenges the calcu- lation of those fees. Bradley's attorneys filed affidavits in support of awarding attorney fees that computed time expended: (1) solely relating to pretrial matters concerning Bradley's claims against Kevin Cumiskey and K.S.J., Inc., and excluding all time spent in preparation of the tort claim against John Cumiskey (39.4 hours at $60 = $2,364); (2) for the entire six days of trial time actually expended (6 days at $750 per day = $4,500); and, (3) for services rendered in connection with the preparation, briefing and attendance at the hearing on the claim for attorney fees ($348). The aggregate amount requested was $7,212. The District Court granted attorney fees for the pretrial preparation, for the work in preparing for the hearing on attorney fees and for one-third of the trial time. In its supporting memorandum, the District Court noted that possibly less than one-third of trial time was actually occupled with Bradley's claim against Kevin Cumiskey and that most of her effort was against John Cumiskey f o r w r o n g f u l s e t t i n g o f t h e f i r e and d e s t r u c t i o n o f t h e premises. W e hold t h a t the D i s t r i c t Court e r r e d i n both t h e c a l c u l a t i o n o f t h e a t t o r n e y f e e s and i n t h e r e d u c t i o n o f f e e s for t r i a l t i m e t o one-third of t h e r e q u e s t . In its order, the District Court awarded $2,636, "which r e p r e s e n t s o n e - t h i r d ( 1 / 3 ) of t h e a t t o r n e y s ' fees for t h e e n t i r e t r i a l " and awarded $348 f o r p r e s e n t a t i o n o f the h e a r i n g on a t t o r n e y f e e s p l u s an a d d i t i o n a l b r i e f . The sum of $6,864 d o e s n o t r e p r e s e n t t h e f e e s f o r t h e e n t i r e t r i a l . That figure i s t h e t o t a l of both the pretrial preparation work d i r e c t l y r e l a t i n g t o t h e c l a i m a g a i n s t Kevin Cumiskey and t h e s i x f u l l d a y s of t r i a l . The D i s t r i c t C o u r t e r r e d i n r e d u c i n g b o t h f i g u r e s by t w o - t h i r d s w h e r e t h e p r e t r i a l work a l l r e l a t e d s p e c i f i c a l l y t o t h e K e v i n Cumiskey c l a i m . At a minimum, t h e award s h o u l d h a v e i n c l u d e d $ 2 , 3 6 4 f o r t h e p r e - trial work, $1,500 f o r two d a y s o f trial, and $348 f o r t h e attorney fees hearing, for a t o t a l of $4,212. We further hold, however, that it e r r e d i n reducing f e e s awarded for t h e t r i a l t i m e by t w o - t h i r d s . B r a d l e y was f o r c e d t o pursue her c l a i m a g a i n s t Kevin Cu~niskey through the trial. She a t t e m p t e d t o r e s o l v e the damages issue stemming from Kevin's breach of the lease agreement through a motion for summary judgment. Kevin Cumiskey s u c c e s s f u l l y r e s i s t e d t h a t m o t i o n on t h e b a s i s o f an a f f i d a v i t provided by h i s c o n t r a c t o r t h a t disputed the Bradley repair estimates. Bradley and her counsel were therefore forced t o a t t e n d a six-day trial. She p r e s e n t e d damages t e s t i m o n y t h a t went unchallenged. Kevin Cumiskey i n t r o d u c e d no e v i d e n c e w h a t s o e v e r i n d i s p u t e o f h e r c l a i m . Here, the record reveals that the trial schedule r e q u i r e d t h a t counsel f o r Bradley be p r e s e n t throughout t h e six days in order to pursue the claim against Kevin Cumiskey. The e n t i r e f i r s t d a y o f t r i a l was s p e n t i n j u r y selection. On the morning of the second day of trial, B r a d l e y ' s counsel gave h i s opening statement. On t h e f o u r t h day, a witness offered by Cumiskeys required extensive c r o s s - e x a m i n a t i o n on B r a d l e y ' s b e h a l f t o e s t a b l i s h t h a t e v e n Cumiskey's evidence supported the amount of damages she claimed. On t h e f l f t h d a y , c o u n s e l was r e q u i r e d t o object to Kevin Cumiskey's attempt to testify to the building's condition prior to acquisition of the lease. Kevin attempted to introduce t h i s matter i n s p i t e of a pretrial r u l i n g t h a t t h e e v i d e n c e was i m p r o p e r . Much o f t h e l a s t d a y of t r i a l was s p e n t i n s e t t l e m e n t o f i n s t r u c t i o n s , p r e s e n t a - t l o n of B r a d l e y ' s c a s e - i n - c h i e f , and c l o s i n g a r g u m e n t s . I n t h i s i n s t a n c e it is n o t p o s s i b l e t o c l e a r l y s e g r e - g a t e t h e t r i a l t i m e d u r i n g which B r a d l e y p u r s u e d h e r c l a i m s a g a i n s t Kevin Cumiskey i n t o o n e - t h i r d of t h e t i m e expended. W r e v e r s e t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t ' s o r d e r on a t t o r n e y f e e s d a t e d e March 18, 1982, and hold that Bradley is entitled to a t t o r n e y f e e s i n t h e amount o f $ 7 , 2 1 2 i n c o n n e c t i o n w i t h t h e proceedings below and a n a d d i t i o n a l $ 1 , 5 0 0 for the efforts e x p e n d e d on a p p e a l . W remand t h i s m a t t e r t o t h e D i s t r i c t e Court for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. A f f i r m e d i n p a r t and r e v e r s e d i n p a r t . 7 4 4 4 ,c ; b Q e Chief J u s t i c e W concur: e Mr. Justice John C. Sheehy, concurring in part and dissenting in part: I dissent from that portion of the foregoing opinion which affirms the District Court's dismissal of Kevin Cumiskey's bad-faith action against St. Paul Fire and Marine Insurance Company. Under our recent spate of decisions on the point of bad faith, Kevin's cause of action should have been submitted to the jury. See Klaudt v. Flink, 658 P.2d 1065 40 St.Rep. 64; Lipinski v. The Title Insurance Company (1982) Montana , 655 P.2d 970, 39 St.Rep. 2283. I am also of the opinion that the District Court should have submitted the question of total loss to the jury to determine if the valued policy law, Section 33-24-102, MCA, was applicable to Kevin's claim against St. Paul. The District Court's interpretation of the valued policy law was disadvantageous to Kevin, and would make no difference to St. Paul, since it, under the verdict, would be subrogated for anything it paid to Kevin from John Cumiskey. Otherwise, I concur in the judgment entered in the District Court.