NO. 82-491
I N THE SUPREME COURT OF T H E STATE OF MONTANA
1983
LEILA HENDRICKSON,
Plaintiff and A p p e l l a n t ,
VS.
PAUL A . N E I M A N a n d HAVRE
DISTRIBUTORS, I N C . ,
Defendants and Respondents.
Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court of t h e Twelfth J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t ,
I n and f o r t h e County o f H i l l
H o n o r a b l e B . W . Thomas, J u d g e p r e s i d i n g .
Counsel of Record:
For Appellant:
Howard F . Strause, Great F a l l s , Montana
For Respondents:
A l e x a n d e r & B a u c u s , G r e a t F a l l s , Montana
Bosch, Kuhr, Dugdale, Warner & Kaze, H a v r e , Montana
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S u b m i t t e d on b r i e f s : February 17, 1983
Decided: June 10, 1983
Clerk
Mr. Chief Justice Frank I. Haswell delivered the Opinion of
the Court.
On November 29, 1982, the District Court of Hill
County entered a final order granting summary judgment in
favor of defendant Havre Distributors, Inc., pursuant to
Rule 5 4 ( b ) , M.R.Civ.P. Plaintiff appeals. We vacate the
order and remand.
At approximately 3:00 p.m. on Friday, May 1, 1981,
Leila Hendrickson finished working her shift at the Iron
Horse Pancake House in Havre, Montana, and attempted to
cross First Street at Fourth Avenue in front of the Park
Hotel. The hotel sits on the northwest corner of the inter-
section. We include the following diagram for clarification:
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---------a
- - - - - - -
. - - - -I
. " - 4 - - .
STREET
- ~IKST
- . --
H e n d r i c k s o n was c r o s s i n g f r o m t h e n o r t h s i d e of the
s t r e e t t o t h e s o u t h s i d e of t h e s t r e e t and was on t h e w e s t
s i d e of t h e i n t e r s e c t i o n . F i r s t S t r e e t i s a two-way street
with a parking l a n e on e a c h s i d e of the s t r e e t and four
l a n e s of traffic (two l a n e s f o r westbound t r a f f i c and two
l a n e s f o r eastbound t r a f f i c ) .
As she s t a r t e d t o c r o s s t h e street i n f r o n t of the
h o t e l , Hendrickson e n t e r e d a p e d e s t r i a n crosswalk b u t found
it at least partially blocked by a beer delivery truck
belonging t o d e f e n d a n t Havre D i s t r i b u t o r s , Inc. The r e a r
wheels of t h e v e h i c l e extended i n t o t h e crosswalk from t h e
west, and t h e t r u c k e x t e n d e d e v e n f u r t h e r i n t o t h e c r o s s -
walk. I t was a l s o p a r k e d o n e - t o - t w o f e e t from t h e c u r b .
P l a i n t i f f walked o u t of t h e c r o s s w a l k around t h e back
of t h e truck and then reentered t h e crosswalk. No o t h e r
vehicles were parked between the delivery truck and the
intersection. Before proceeding across F i r s t Street, she
checked in both directions for traffic. Hendrickson
continued walking across the street through the outside
westbound lane. A vehicle i n t h e o u t s i d e westbound lane
stopped to wait for her. As she entererd the inside
westbound lane, she was struck by a vehicle driven by
d e f e n d a n t Neiman a n d was t h r o w n o n t o t h e hood o f h i s c a r .
B o t h of H e n d r i c k s o n ' s l e g s w e r e b r o k e n by t h e i m p a c t ,
and d u e t o c o m p l i c a t i o n s s h e h a s b e e n u n a b l e t o r e t u r n t o
work. Neiman t e s t i f i e d i n h i s deposition t h a t he thought
the vehicle stopped in the outside lane of traffic was
waiting for a break in traffic to proceed around the
d e l i v e r y t r u c k , which e x t e n d e d i n t o t h e o u t e r t r a f f i c l a n e .
He did not see p l a i n t i f f u n t i l he s t r u c k h e r . H i s vehicle
d i d n o t come t o a s t o p f o r s i x t y - t h r e e feet. Neiman was
c i t e d f o r and p l e a d e d g u i l t y t o r e c k l e s s d r i v i n g and o p e r a -
t i o n of an unsafe v e h i c l e .
Plaintiff brought suit against Neiman and against
Havre D i s t r i b u t o r s , I n c . S h e a l l e g e d n e g l i g e n c e on t h e p a r t
of Bavre D i s t r i b u t o r s , I n c . , for parking so a s t o p a r t i a l l y
p r o t r u d e i n t o t h e o u t s i d e d r i v i n g l a n e and s o a s t o b l o c k
t h e crosswalk. She a l s o a l l e g e d t h a t Neiman o p e r a t e d h i s
vehicle carelessly and recklessly and failed to keep a
proper lookout. After considering t h e pleadings, answers t o
i n t e r r o g a t o r i e s , d e p o s i t i o n s and a f f i d a v i t s on f i l e , a n d t h e
b r i e f s and a r g u m e n t s o f c o u n s e l , t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t g r a n t e d
summary judgment t o H a v r e D i s t r i b u t o r s , Inc. Summary j u d g -
ment was g r a n t e d on the basis that t h e r e was no g e n u i n e
i s s u e a s t o any m a t e r i a l f a c t , t h a t any n e g l i g e n c e on t h e
part of Havre Distributors, Inc., was not the proximate
cause of Hendrickson's injuries and that "plaintiff was
injured a s the result of the independent, intervening
n e g l i g e n t a c t o f d e f e n d a n t P a u l A. Neiman."
P l a i n t i f f p r e s e n t s a s i n g l e i s s u e on a p p e a l : Did t h e
District Court e r r i n g r a n t i n g summary judgment t o Havre
D i s t r i b u t o r s , Inc.?
Summary j u d g m e n t may b e g r a n t e d p u r s u a n t t o R u l e 5 6 ,
M.R.Civ.P., when t h e r e i s no g e n u i n e d i s p u t e o v e r m a t e r i a l
f a c t s and t h e moving p a r t y i s e n t i t l e d t o a judgment as a
matter of law. The i n i t i a l b u r d e n of proof i s upon the
p a r t y moving f o r summary j u d g m e n t . The moving p a r t y m u s t
d e m o n s t r a t e t h a t no g e n u i n e i s s u e o f m a t e r i a l f a c t e x i s t s .
Then, t h e p a r t y o p p o s i n g t h e m o t i o n m u s t come f o r w a r d w i t h
s u b s t a n t i a l evidence t h a t r a i s e s a genuine i s s u e of m a t e r i a l
fact. All-State L e a s i n g Co. v . Top H a t L o u n g e , I n c . (1982),
Mont . , 649 P.2d 1250, 1251-1252, 39 S t . R e p . 425,
428.
Havre D i s t r i b u t o r s , Inc., argues t h a t the positioning
of the delivery truck could not have contributed to the
accident. Rather, t h e company a r g u e s t h a t t h e a c c i d e n t was
c a u s e d by N e i m a n ' s independent, intervening acts. Hendrick-
s o n a n d Neiman b o t h a r g u e t h a t s u b s t a n t i a l e v i d e n c e e s t a b -
l i s h e s negligence on t h e p a r t of Havre D i s t r i b u t o r s , Inc.
They a r g u e t h a t H a v r e D i s t r i b u t o r s , Inc., owed a s t a t u t o r y
d u t y of care t o p l a i n t i f f w h i c h was b r e a c h e d when t h e t r u c k
w a s p a r k e d more t h a n e i g h t e e n i n c h e s f r o m t h e c u r b a n d i n a
crosswalk. S e c t i o n s 61-8-354 a n d -355, MCA. Further, plain-
tiff a r g u e s t h a t s h e f a l l s w i t h i n t h e class i n t e n d e d t o be
p r o t e c t e d and t h a t H a v r e D i s t r i b u t o r s , Inc., i s a member o f
t h e c l a s s a g a i n s t whom a d u t y was i m p o s e d . W e agree.
We disagree, however, with p l a i n t i f f ' s r e l i a n c e upon
Azure v. City of Billings ( 1 9 7 9 ) , 1 8 2 Mont. 234, 240-241,
596 P.2d 460, 464, for t h e p r o p o s i t i o n t h a t s u c h a demon-
s t r a t i o n is a l l that is necessary i n order t o h o l d Havre
Distributors, Inc., n e g l i g e n t p e r se. I t is a x i o m a t i c t h a t
i n o r d e r t o hold a p a r t y n e g l i g e n t p e r se f o r a v i o l a t i o n o f
statute, a plaintiff must demonstrate that such v i o l a t i o n
c o n s t i t u t e d t h e proximate cause of t h e i n j u r y r e c e i v e d and
the r e s u l t i n g damages. See, Azure, 1 8 2 Mont. a t 240, 596
P.2d a t 464; Kudrna v . Comet C o r p . ( 1 9 7 7 ) , 1 7 5 Mont. 2 9 , 3 9 ,
572 P.2d 183, 189.
P l a i n t i f f argues t h a t the i l l e g a l parking of the truck
c o u l d have been a p r o x i m a t e c a u s e of t h e a c c i d e n t s i n c e s h e
may h a v e a l r e a d y b e e n a c r o s s t h e i n t e r s e c t i o n had she not
been r e q u i r e d t o d e t o u r around t h e v e h i c l e . Alternatively,
she contends t h a t t h e jury could reasonably conclude t h a t i f
t h e beer t r u c k was n o t p r o t r u d i n g into the outer driving
l a n e , Neiman would h a v e r e c o g n i z e d t h a t t h e v e h i c l e i n t h e
r i g h t hand l a n e was s t o p p e d f o r some o t h e r p u r p o s e , such a s
a pedestrian. T h e r e is c o n f l i c t i n g e v i d e n c e i n t h e r e c o r d
a s t o w h e r e t h e d e l i v e r y t r u c k was p a r k e d , how f a r i n t o t h e
t r a f f i c l a n e and i n t o t h e c r o s s w a l k i t e x t e n d e d , and a s t o
whether the truck's position could have been a proximate
c a u s e of the accident. A genuine i s s u e of m a t e r i a l f a c t
e x i s t s here.
Ordinarily, i s s u e s of negligence a r e not susceptible
to summary judgment and are better determined at trial.
Brown v . M e r r i l l Lynch, P i e r c e , F e n n e r & Smith, Inc. (1982),
Mont. , 640 P.2d 453, 458, 39 S t . R e p . 305, 310.
L i a b i l i t y s h o u l d n o t b e a d j u d i c a t e d upon a m o t i o n f o r sum-
mary j u d g m e n t w h e r e f a c t u a l i s s u e s c o n c e r n i n g n e g l i g e n c e a n d
causation a r e presented. Duchesneau v. S i l v e r Bow C o u n t y
( 1 9 7 1 ) , 1 5 8 Mont. 369, 377, 492 P.2d 926, 931. Further,
where, a s here, two d e f e n d a n t s a r e i n v o l v e d , summary judg-
ment g r a n t e d i n f a v o r o f o n e a l l o w s t h e r e m a i n i n g d e f e n d a n t
to introduce evidence that tends to shift blame for the
a c c i d e n t t o o n e no l o n g e r a p a r t y t o t h e a c t i o n .
The summary judgment i s v a c a t e d and t h e c a u s e remanded
t o the D i s t r i c t Court f o r f u r t h e r proceedings.
~dd,i;bhd
Chief J u s t i c e
W e concur:
b Justices &,
\
i /j r 4.
'
.,
Mr. Justice Frank B. Morrison, Jr. specially concurs as
follows:
I concur in the result but not in all that is said in
the majority opinion.
Specifically, I take issue with that portion of the
majority opinion wherein it is stated:
"Further, where, as here, two defendants are
involved, summary judgment granted in favor of one
allows the remaining defendant to introduce
evidence that tends to shift blame for the
accident to one no longer a party to the action."
This is no reason to refuse summary judgment against the
defendant not at fault.
The majority opinion seems to take the position that
summary judgment will never be granted in favor of one
defendant, where there are multiple defendants, for the
reason that the remaining defendants can shift the blame for
the accident to one who is no longer a party to the action.
Of course, if those defendants remaining in the case
attempted to shift blame to a defendant in favor of whom
summary judgment had been entered, the plaintiff could then
reply by showing that the court had absolved the absent
defendant. Nevertheless, the trial strategy of the parties
is not relevant to a determination of whether there is a
genuine issue of material fact foreclosing the entry of
summary judgment. The only determination in this case is
whether a jury issue exists with respect to the defendant.
If no jury issue exists then summary judgment should be
granted irrespective of what the remaining defendant argues
at trial.
Here there is a genuine issue of material fact on
negligence and causation which forecloses the granting of
summary judgment. Therefore, the case is properly remanded
for trial.
Mr. J u s t i c e D a n i e l J . Shea:
I j o i n i n t h e s p e c i a l c o n c u r r e n c e of J u s t i c e Morrison.