NO. 02-165
I N THE SUPREME COURT O F THE S T A T E O F XONTANA
1983
STATE O F MONTANA, ex r e l . , LLOYD SCOTT
MAIER, a M i n o r , and ROBERT P . MORIN,
his atty.,
Petitioners,
THE C I T Y COURT O F B I L L I N G S , COUNTY O F
YELLO'CQSTONE, HON. DONALD E . BJERTNESS,
a J u d g e thereof,
Respondents.
O R I G I N A L PROCEEDING:
C o u n s e l of R e c o r d :
For P e t i t i o n e r s :
B e r g e r Law F i r m ; R o b e r t P. I/lorin, RilLings, Montana
Fro R e s p o n d e n t s :
Peterson, S c h o f i e l d and L e c k i e , B i l l i n g s , X o n t a n a
Submitted: January 2 6 , 1 9 8 3
Decided: April 14, 1983
Mr. Justice John C. Sheehy delivered the Opinion of the
Court.
On August 20, 1982, we held that petitioner Lloyd Scott
Maier, a minor, was not entitled to an order from us allowing
him to withdraw his guilty plea in the city court Billings,
Montana, in answer to a charge of a traffic violation,
(1982)1
- Mont . PI - P.2d -, 39 St.Rep. 1560.
The sole issue presented to this Court by the
petitioners in the 1982 case was whether Maier, as a minor,
was incompetent to appear in the city court on the traffic
charge without a parent, guardian, or attorney and there
enter a plea of guilty. It was contended that the city judge
was required to follow the mandates of the Youth Court Act,
specifically section 41-5-511, MCA, under our decision of
Edward v. Collings (1981), - Mont. , 632 P.2d 325, 38
St.Rep. 1240.
We held in the earlier case involving these petitioners
that the minor was in city court, that the Youth Court Act
did not apply, and that the minor was not deprived of a right
to counsel since he had opportunity between the time of the
issuance of the traffic ticket against him and the hearing on
which to consult with his parents or to obtain counsel.
Following our decision, the petitioners requested
reconsideration or rehearing upon the ground that the minor
was deprived of equal protection und-er the law because if he
had been charged in youth court as a minor, he would have
been entitled to an appointment of counsel for him, but
because he was in the Billings City Court, he could not claim
appointment of counsel as a statutory right. Therefore,
petitioners contended in their request for rehearing that the
law officers are given a choice in traffic cases, either to
bring the minor to District Court, where he has a right to
counsel, or to a municipal court, where he does not have such
a right.
We granted the petition for reconsideration and
rehearing, solicited briefs from the parties on the equal
protection questions, and ordered that the rehearing be
submitted to this Court en banc. The petition for rehearing
has been considered by us, and the supporting briefs, and on
rehearing, we deny any further relief to the petitioners.
A consideration of the applicable statutes is necessary
to demonstrate that the minor misapprehends the courts which
have jurisdiction of traffic offenses.
In the statutes which relate to the operation of motor
vehicles, section 61-12-601, MCA, provides for the
jurisdiction of courts where a minor is charged with unlawful
operation of a motor vehicle. Subsection (1) of that statute
provides :
"District courts and the justice courts of the
state and the municipal and city courts of cities
and towns shall have concurrent original
jurisdiction in all proceedings concerning the
unlawful operation of motor vehicles by children
under the age of 18 years."
It is to be noted that the youth courts of the state are
not granted jurisdiction under section 61-12-601 of traffic
offenses by minors. Although district judges sit as a youth
court, it is nonetheless true that youth courts are courts of
special jurisdiction and a.re separate and apart from the
district courts. Indeed, in multi-judge judicial districts
in this state, by court order, the judges appoint but one of
their number to act as a youth court judge in each county of
the judicial district for a fixed period of time. Section
41-5-201(2) , MCA. The jurisdiction of youth courts is
specifically defined in section 41-5-203, MCA, and the
jurisdiction of a youth court is not co-extensive with the
jurisdiction of a district court. When therefore, section
61-1.2-601(1), quoted above, provides for the jurisdiction of
traffic offenses concerning minors in "the district courts"
the statute is not thereby fixing jurisdiction of such
offenses in the youth court.
When the youth court jurisdiction statute was originally
enacted, section 41-5-203 was broad enough that it appeared
therefrom that the youth court had exclusive jurisdiction of
all proceedings against youths charged with violating laws of
the state or ordinances of a city or town. The legislature,
however, amended the statute referring to the jurisdiction of
the youth court so as to exclude traffic and fish and game
offenses. Section 41-5-203, now reads as follows:
"41-5-203. Jurisdiction - - court. (1) Except
of the
as provided in subsection - - court has
- (2) the
exclusive original jurisdiction of all proceedings
under the Montana Youth Court Act in which a youth
is alleged to be a delinquent youth, a youth in
need of supervision, or a youth in need of care or
concerning any person under 21 years of age charged
with having violated any law of the state or
ordinance of any city or town other - - a traffic
than
or - - and game - prior to having become 18
- fish law
years years of age.
" (2) Justice, municipal and city courts have
concurrent jurisdiction with the youth court over
all alcoholic beverage violations alleged to have
been committed by a youth. " (Underlined material
reflects 1979 amendment.)
Under the statutory scheme the youth court has
concurrent jurisdiction with justice, municipal and city
courts for alcoholic beverage violations committed by youths,
but does not have any jurisdiction of offenses involving
traffic law violations by minors.
The provisions of section 61-12-601, MCA, are therefore
exclusive as to jurisdiction of traffic offenses involving
minors, and youth courts in this state are granted no
jurisdiction of such traffic law violations.
We agree that all person must be treated alike under
like circumstances and conditions, both in privileges
conferred and in liabilities imposed. 1972 Mont. Const.,
Art. 11, S 4. There is not a violation of that
constitutional clause in the situation presented here. The
legislature, in amending section 41-5-203, MCA (the Youth
Court Act) removed traffic violations from the jurisdiction
of the youth court. It is only when a charge is brought in
youth court that a youth has the right to waive his
constitutional rights either consulting with his parents, or
with the advice of counsel. Section 41-5-303, MCA. In
matters of traffic violations, all minors are treated alike
in this state, regardless of the court in which the charge is
filed.
Since a minor may not be held in any detention facility
or jail by reason of a traffic violation, nor for nonpayment
of a fine resulting therefrom, the minor is not entitled to
counsel as a fundamental right. Even as an indigent, his
right to appointment of counsel exists only where the
defendant may lose his physical liberty if he loses the
litigation, it being the defendant's interest in personal
freedom, and not simply the special Sixth and Fourteenth
Amendments of right to counsel in criminal cases, which
triggers the right to appointed counsel. Lassiter v.
Department of Social Services (1981), 452 U.S. 18, 101 S.Ct.
2153, 68 L.Ed.2d 640.
The minor in this case filed his petition in this Court
on the basis of his Fourteenth Amendment rights, but
concentrated his argument on the equal protection clause of
that amendment. Not raised in the briefs or a.s an issue in
the case is the possible query under the federal Fourteenth
Amendment due process clause, and the state due process
clause (1972 Mont. Const., Art. 11, § 17) as to the
impoundment of the motor vehicle belonging to the parents for
the nonpayment by the minor of the $45 fine assessed against
him. The provisions of section 61.-12-601(3), MCA, providing
for the impoundment of a vehicle owned by another but driven
by a minor upon nonpayment of a fine by a minor, may present
a due process problem in a proper case, but that issue is not
raised in this case, nor are the proper parties before us.
Therefore, on rehearing, we again deny the petition for
writ of supervisory control to permit the minor to withdraw
his plea of guilty to the traffic violation.
Justice
We Concur:
- -
Chief Justice