Davis v. Jones

                                             NO.        82-387

                    I N T H E S U P R E M E C O U R T O F T H E S T A T E O F MONTANA

                                                        1983




JOHN A . D A V I S ( F A T A L )
V I V I A N MARIE DAVIS,

                                           C l a i m a n t s and R e s p o n d e n t s ,




G E O R G E W. J O N E S , E m p l o y e r a n d
M O U N T A I N W E S T FARM BUREAU MUTUAL
I N S U R A N C E COMPANY,

                                           Defendants              and A p p e l l a n t s .



Appeal     from:       Workers' Compensation C o u r t
                       H o n o r a b l e ~ i R e a r d o n , Judge p r e s i d i n g .
                                             m

C o u n s e l of   Record:

           For A p p e l l a n t s :

                   Utick,     G r o s f i e l d    &    Uda,     Helena,       Montana

           For R e s p o n d e n t s :

                   Joseph C .      Engel          111, B u t t e ,      Montana




                                                       S u b m i t t e d on b r i e f s :   February       3,   1983

                                                                           Decided:            A p r i l 1 4 , 1983

Filed:
            AP K .i$ , 8
                      93
Mr.    J u s t i c e L . C. G u l b r a n d s o n d e l i v e r e d t h e O p i n i o n of t h e C o u r t .

       The     insurer         appeals        from     an    order       issued        by    the    Workers'
C o m p e n s a t i o n C o u r t g r a n t i n g c l a i m a n t a w a i v e r of t h e t w e l v e - m o n t h
f i l i n g r e q u i r e m e n t i n s e c t i o n 39-71-601(1)               MCA.

       On F e b r u a r y 1 5 , 1 9 8 0 , t h e c l a i m a n t ' s h u s b a n d , a r a n c h h a n d ,

became       unconscious             while      chopping         a   hole       in     some     ice.        His

employer,         George J o n e s ,         s u g g e s t e d t h a t t h e h u s b a n d go home and

see a d o c t o r .          The h u s b a n d w e n t to see some f r i e n d s and r e t u r n e d
home a t a b o u t 9 30 p.m.               t h a t evening.          H e l a t e r d i e d a t home of a

heart attack.

       On F e b r u a r y 1 7 , 1 9 8 0 , t h e c l a i m a n t went to t h e e m p l o y e r f o r
h e r husband's             l a s t paycheck.         The e m p l o y e r g a v e t h e c l a i m a n t h e r
h u s b a n d ' s l a s t c h e c k p l u s a two h u n d r e d d o l l a r b o n u s .           While t h e y

were     discussing possible                    insurance coverage,                  the    employer      told
c l a i m a n t t h a t he had no r e s p o n s i b i l i t y b e c a u s e             t h e husband      had
d i e d a t home.

       Claimant did             n o t become         a w a r e of    p o s s i b l e w o r k e r s 1 compen-
s a t i o n coverage u n t i l one y e a r l a t e r , February 1 7 , 1981, while
t a l k i n g w i t h h e r a t t o r n e y on a s e p a r a t e matter.                On F e b r u a r y 2 0 ,

h e r a t t o r n e y s e n t a l e t t e r t o t h e Workers1 Compensation D i v i s i o n
( D i v i s i o n ) , s t a t i n g t h e f a c t s s u r r o u n d i n g h e r h u s b a n d ' s d e a t h and
seeking a settlement.                     On A p r i l 1, 1 9 8 1 , a b o u t o n e y e a r and s i x

w e e k s a f t e r h e r h u s b a n d ' s d e a t h , c l a i m a n t f i l e d a claim w i t h t h e
Division.
       After       a    hearing,          the      hearing        examiner            for   the     Division

c o n c l u d e d t h a t t h e i n s u r e r and e m p l o y e r were e q u i t a b l y e s t o p p e d
from      asserting            the     one-year         filing        requirement             because       the
e m p l o y e r had d e n i e d a n y r e s p o n s i b i l i t y and b e c a u s e          c l a i m a n t had
d e t r i m e n t a l l y r e l i e d on h i s r e p r e s e n t a t i o n .      The case was t h e n
h e a r d b e f o r e t h e D i v i s i o n which r e v e r s e d         the hearing examiner's

c o n c l u s i o n , and b a r r e d c l a i m a n t from a s s e r t i n g h e r claim b e c a u s e
of h e r f a i l u r e t o f i l e w i t h i n one y e a r .            The D i v i s i o n s t a t e d t h a t
the claimant I          s    own t e s t i m o n y s u p p o r t e d n e i t h e r e q u i t a b l e e s t o p -
pel,     nor the conclusion t h a t the employer prevented t h e claimant
from f i l i n g i n a t i m e l y manner.

       The     Workers      '    Compensation             Court      reversed            the     Division's

conclusion.             The C o u r t l o o k e d      to t h e s i x e l e m e n t s of          equitable

estoppel        and     concluded         that      the Division             had    made       a n e r r o r of

law.       C l a i m a n t was t h e n g r a n t e d a w a i v e r of             the one-year         filing

requirement.

       The s o l e i s s u e on a p p e a l is w h e t h e r t h e d o c t r i n e of e q u i t a b l e

e s t o p p e l s h o u l d be a p p l i e d t o e s t o p t h e i n s u r e r and e m p l o y e r from

a s s e r t i n g a s t a t u t e of l i m i t a t i o n s d e f e n s e .

       S e c t i o n 39-71-601(1),           MCA,     r e q u i r e s t h e f i l i n g of       a workersf

compensation           claim within             one       year    from       the    happening         of    the

accident.            The d o c t r i n e o f     e q u i t a b l e e s t o p p e l a p p l i e s where       an

e m p l o y e r or i n s u r e r h a s t a k e n some p o s i t i v e a c t i o n which e i t h e r

p r e v e n t s c l a i m a n t f r o m f i l i n g a t i m e l y claim or l e a d s him r e a s o n -

a b l y t o b e l i e v e he need n o t f i l e s u c h a claim.                         Ricks v.      Teslow

Consolidated            (1973),       1 6 2 Mont.         469,    512        P.2d    1304.        Equitable

e s t o p p e l is a f l e x i b l e p r i n c i p l e which s h o u l d be a p p l i e d when a n

employer        or     insurer       misleads         a    claimant          by     foisting       onto     the

claimant        a misinterpretation                 of     t h e Workers            Compensation           Act.

Levo     v.    General-Shea-Morrison                   (1955)    ,   128 Mont        .    570,     280     P.2d



       Six    essential          elements         make      up    the        doctrine      of     equitable

estoppel :

               " G e n e r a l l y s p e a k i n g , t h e f o l l o w i n g are t h e
               e s s e n t i a l e l e m e n t s which m u s t e n t e r i n t o and
               f o r m a p a r t of a n e q u i t a b l e e s t o p p e l i n a l l of
               its applications:                   '1. T h e r e m u s t be c o n d u c t
               -- a c t s , l a n g u a g e , o r s i l e n c e -- a m o u n t i n g to
               a r e p r e s e n t a t i o n or a c o n c e a l m e n t of m a t e r i a l
               facts.          2.      T h e s e f a c t s m u s t be known to t h e
               p a r t y e s t o p p e d a t t h e t i m e o f h i s s a i d con-
               d u c t , o r a t l e a s t t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s m u s t be
               s u c h t h a t k n o w l e d g e o f them is n e c e s s a r i l y
               imputed            t o him.         3.     The     truth     concerning
               t h e s e f a c t s m u s t be unknown t o t h e o t h e r p a r t y
               c l a i m i n g t h e b e n e f i t of t h e e s t o p p e l , a t t h e
               t i m e when i t was a c t e d upon by him.                     4.    The
               c o n d u c t m u s t be d o n e w i t h t h e i n t e n t i o n , o r a t
               l e a s t w i t h t h e e x p e c t a t i o n , t h a t it w i l l be
               a c t e d upon by t h e o t h e r p a r t y , or u n d e r s u c h
               c i r c u m s t a n c e s t h a t i t i s b o t h n a t u r a l and
               p r o b a b l e t h a t i t w i l l be so a c t e d u p o n .
               * * * 5 . The c o n d u c t m u s t be r e l i e d upon by
               t h e o t h e r p a r t y , a n d , t h u s r e l y i n g , he m u s t be
               l e d t o a c t upon i t . 6.                 H e must i n f a c t act
                upon i t i n s u c h a manner a s t o c h a n g e h i s
                p o s i t i o n f o r t h e worse              i n o t h e r words, he
                m u s t s o a c t t h a t he would s u f f e r a l o s s i f he
                were c o m p e l l e d t o s u r r e n d e r o r f o r e g o or a l t e r
                w h a t he h a s d o n e by r e a s o n of t h e f i r s t p a r t y
                b e i n g p e r m i t t e d t o r e p u d i a t e h i s c o n d u c t and
                t o a s s e r t r i g h t s i n c o n s i s t e n t with it.          1 II             ..
Lindblom v. Employers                          L i a b i l i t y Assurance Corp.                        ( 1930 )    ,   8 8 Mont        .
4 8 8 , 4 9 4 , 295 P. 1 0 0 7 , 1 0 0 9 , c i t e d w i t h a p p r o v a l i n --..- i c k s ,s u p r a ,
                                                                                  ~

F r o s t v.     Anaconda Co.                  ( 1 9 8 2 ) , -.           Mont     . -.---         , 6 4 5 P.2d 4 1 9 , 39
St.Rep.        879,      and        Devlin           v.     Galusha,              Higgins          &    Galusha           (1982),

 ----    Mont    .       - , 6 5 5 P.2d 9 7 9 , 39 S t . R e p .                        2378.
        The     Workers       l     Compensation                   Court          carefully              considered             and

a p p l i e d e a c h one of t h e above e l e m e n t s .                           The C o u r t found t h a t t h e

e m p l o y e r had m i s r e p r e s e n t e d a m a t e r i a l f a c t , i . e . ,                        t h a t the place

of      t h e husband     I   s    death precluded                      h i s r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r payment

of      compensation              insurance benefits.                        Knowledge of                    t h e f a c t s were

imputed         to     the        employer,               because         the      employer              was        held       to       a

higher         standard            of        knowledge             than        the       employee.                  See    -,
                                                                                                                           Levo

supra.         The c l a i m a n t d i d n o t know t h e m i s r e p r e s e n t a t i o n was n o t

true.          The      surrounding                   circumstances                  were          such        that       it    was
n a t u r a l and p r o b a b l e             f o r claimant              t o a c t upon                the misrepresen-

tation.              Claimant           relied            to      her     detriment                on    the        employerls

r e p r e s e n t a t i o n by n o t making f u r t h e r i n q u i r i e s and b y f a i l i n g to

f i l e h e r claim w i t h i n o n e y e a r .

        We     agree          with           the       above            conclusions                of         the       Workers1

Compensation C o u r t .                 The e m p l o y e r ' s m i s r e p r e s e n t a t i o n c r e a t e d t h e

reasonable            belief            in     the        claimant          that         the        employer            was     not

responsible            f o r any             insurance compensation b e n e f i t s .                                Equitable

estoppel         was     therefore                 properly             used       to        bar       the     employer         and

i n s u r e r f r o m a s s e r t i n g a s t a t u t e of l i m i t a t i o n s d e f e n s e .

        The o r d e r o f t h e W o r k e r s ' C o m p e n s a t i o n C o u r t is a f f i r m e d .



                                                                                                                           1        .
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                                                                    J u s t ice'

                                                                            I;"
                                                                               /
We concur: