Northwest Land & Development of Montana, Inc. v. State Tax Appeal Board

I N THE S U P R E M E C O U R T O F T H E S T A T E O F MONTANA N O R T H W E S T L A N D AND D E V E L O P M E N T O F MONTANA, I N C , . P l a i n t i f f and A p p e l l a n t , VS. S T A T E T A X A P P E A L B O A R D , MONTANA D E P A R T M E N T O F R E V E N U E , a n d MAY J E N K I N S , T R E A S U R E R , YELLOWSTONE COUNTY, D e f e n d a n t s and R e s p o n d e n t s . Appeal from: D i s t r i c t C o u r t of t h e T h i r t e e n t h J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , I n and f o r t h e C o u n t y of Y e l l o w s t o n e H o n o r a b l e D i a n e B a r z , Judge presiding. C o u n s e l of Record: F o r Appellant: Jones, Jones and W o r k , B i l l i n g s , M o n t a n a F r e d E. W o r k Jr., argued, B i l l i n g s , M o n t a n a F o r Respondents: H a r o l d F. H a n s e r , C o u n t y A t t o r n e y , B i l l i n g s , Montana L a r r y G . S c h u s t e r a r g u e d , D e p t . of Revenue, Helena, Montana Submitted: March 7 , 1 9 8 3 Decided: A p r i l 7 , 1983 F i l e d : C l e r k Mr. Justice John Conway H a r r i s o n d e l i v e r e d t h e O p i n i o n of the Court. T h i s a p p e a l comes f r o m t h e T h i r t e e n t h J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t in and for the County of Yellowstone: t h e District Court having upheld a d e c i s i o n by t h e S t a t e Tax A p p e a l B o a r d , save a minor m a t h e m a t i c a l a d j u s t m e n t o f t h e Board ' s r u l i n g . The a p p e l l a n t is t h e o w n e r o f p r o p e r t y l o c a t e d i n B i l l i n g s , Montana. I n 1969, t h e a p p e l l a n t e n t e r e d i n t o a twenty-two y e a r lease w i t h t h e S.S. K r e s g e Company. S.S. K r e s g e , commonly known as K-Mart, l e a s e d t h e a p p e l l a n t ' s b u i l d i n g and l a n d f o r a n a n n u a l r e n t a l of $1.80 per square foot. Additionally, the appellant would receive a percentage of yearly gross s a l e s beyond 7.56 million. In 1980, the appellant's property was appraised at $2,732,920; $1,306,800 representing the land and $1,426, 120 representing the improvements. The Department made the a s s e s s m e n t based upon the cost a p p r o a c h to p r o p e r t y v a l u a t i o n . The D e p a r t m e n t r e p r e s e n t a t i v e t e s t i f i e d t h a t t h i s method was used because it is more s t a b l e and p r o v i d e s b e t t e r e q u a l i z a t i o n of v a l u a t i o n among t a x p a y e r s . The f o c u s o f t h i s method i s on re- p l a c e m e n t c o s t less d e p r e c i a t i o n . The c r u x o f a p p e l l a n t ' s a r g u - ment is t h a t t h e cost approach to p r o p e r t y v a l u a t i o n d o e s not adequately consider the long-term lease, consequently, the a p p r a i s e d v a l u e is d i s t o r t e d . The a p p e l l a n t f i l e d a n a p p e a l w i t h t h e Y e l l o w s t o n e C o u n t y Tax Appeal Board. The Board denied relief, s t a t i n g only t h a t the values placed on the land and buildings by t h e D e p a r t m e n t of Revenue a r e f a i r and j u s t . The appellant then took his case to the S t a t e Tax Appeal Board. A h e a r i n g was h e l d o n March 1 8 , 1981. The Board u p h e l d the land appraisal at $1,306, 800, but reduced the building a p p r a i s a l to $833,564 from t h e o r i g i n a l a p p r a i s a l of $1,426,120. The Board found t h a t t h e income a p p r o a c h to v a l u a t i o n was p e r - t i n e n t because of t h e e x i s t e n c e of t h e long-term lease, something a prudent i n v e s t o r would consider i n determining market value. When a p p e l l a n t ' s p r o p e r t y was l e a s e d , the surrounding area was u n d e v e l o p e d . Presently, t h e Rimrock Mall is n e a r t h e s i t e and r e n t a l r a t e s h a v e i n c r e a s e d m a r k e d l y . The a p p e l l a n t r e c e i v e s s u b s t a n t i a l l y lower r e n t p e r s q u a r e f o o t t h a n a d j o i n i n g p r o p e r t y owners. Appellant's rental is $1.80 per square f o o t whereas a d j o i n i n g p r o p e r t y owners r e c e i v e from $ 6 . 5 0 t o $30 p e r s q u a r e foot. Unfortunately, appellant is locked into the lower r a t e d u r i n g t h e term o f t h e l e a s e , o v e r t w e n t y y e a r s . Thus, a p p e l l a n t a r g u e s t h a t t h e p r o p e r t y is o f lower v a l u e t h a n o n e m i g h t e x p e c t since i n v e s t o r s would not be w i l l i n g to p u r c h a s e the property because of its lower rental returns. In view of these cir- c u m s t a n c e s t h e S t a t e Tax A p p e a l Board r e a d j u s t e d t h e v a l u e of t h e improvements. They t o o k $1.80 and d i v i d e d i t by $ 6 . 5 0 t o g e t a 28 p e r c e n t f a c t o r ; t h i s f a c t o r was u s e d t o e q u a l i z e r e n t a l income value between appellant s property and comparable p r o p e r t ies. T h e n , t h e o r i g i n a l a p p r a i s a l o f t h e i m p r o v e m e n t s d e r i v e d from t h e c o s t a p p r o a c h , $ 1 , 4 2 6 , 1 2 0 , was m u l t i p l i e d by .28 t o g e t $ 3 9 9 , 3 1 4 . To t h i s p r o d u c t was a d d e d the capitalized value of the lease o v e r r i d e , s i n c e sums would be r e c e i v e d as r e n t a l when g r o s s s a l e s exceed 7.56 million. The Board I s re-evaluation yielded the improvements v a l u e a t $833,564. The a p p e l l a n t t h e n s o u g h t f u r t h e r r e d u c t i o n i n t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t , however, t h e C o u r t a £ f irmed t h e d e c i s i o n o f t h e S t a t e Tax A p p e a l B o a r d w i t h a p r o v i s i o n t h a t a m i n o r m a t h e m a t i c a l e r r o r be corrected. I n c o m p u t i n g t h e v a l u e o f t h e i m p r o v e m e n t s t h e Board u s e d a 28 p e r c e n t f a c t o r when it s h o u l d h a v e used a 27.69 p e r c e n t factor. I n e f f e c t , t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t ' s c a l c u l a t i o n s were mathe- matically precise. Apparently, t h e S t a t e Board r o u n d e d t h e fac- t o r t o a w h o l e number. T h i s a d j u s t m e n t c h a n g e d t h e b a s e v a l u e of the improvements to $394,892, from the Board's figure of $399,314. On a p p e a l t o t h i s C o u r t t h e a p p e l l a n t claims t h a t : (1) t h e d e c i s i o n b e l o w was c l e a r l y e r r o n e o u s i n v i e w of t h e e v i d e n c e ; (2) t h a t the valuation m e t h o d s c h o s e n by t h e S t a t e Tax A p p e a l Board a n d a f f i r m e d by t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t were a r b i t r a r y and c a p r i c i o u s o r c h a r a c t e r i z e d b y a n a b u s e of d i s c r e t i o n o r u n w a r r a n t e d e x e r - c i s e o f d i s c r e t i o n ; and ( 3 ) t h a t t h e d e c i s i o n b e l o w d o e s n o t t a k e into consideration the f a i r market value of the property. We find no merit in any of the appellant's contentions and we a c c o r d i n g l y uphold t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t 's judgment. I n r e l a t i o n to t h e f i r s t i s s u e , a p p e l l a n t c i t e s t h e s i x - p a r t test to be used i n d e t e r m i n i n g w h e t h e r or n o t a taxpayer has c a r r i e d h i s b u r d e n when he claims h i s p r o p e r t y w a s a s s e s s e d i n - equitably. I n such a s i t u a t i o n : " ' [ I l t is e s s e n t i a l t h a t t h e taxpayer prove (1) t h a t t h e r e are s e v e r a l o t h e r p r o p e r t i e s w i t h i n a r e a s o n a b l e area s i m i l a r and com- parable to h i s ; (2) t h e amount o f the a s s e s s m e n t s on t h e s e p r o p e r t i e s ; ( 3 ) the a c t u a l v a l u e of t h e comparable p r o p e r t i e s ; ( 4 ) t h e a c t u a l v a l u e of h i s p r o p e r t y ; ( 5 ) t h e a s s e s s m e n t c o m p l a i n e d o f ; ( 6 ) t h a t by a com- p a r i s o n h i s p r o p e r t y is a s s e s s e d a t a h i g h e r p r o p o r t i o n of i t s a c t u a l v a l u e t h a n t h e r a t i o e x i s t i n g between t h e a s s e s s e d and a c t u a l v a l u a t i o n s o f t h e s i m i l a r and c o m p a r a b l e p r o - perties, thus creating discriminations. '" D e p a r t m e n t o f Revenue v . S t a t e Tax A p p e a l Board ( 1 9 8 0 ) 1 6911 694-6951- Mon t . I , 6 1 3 P.2d 33 s ~ . R & P . - 1 0 6 3 , 1066-67; ( q u o t i n g Maxwell v. S h i v e r s ( 1 9 6 5 ) , 257 Iowa 5 7 5 , 1 3 3 N.W.2d 7 0 9 , 7 1 1 ) . Upon thorough r e v i e w of the record it is o b v i o u s t h a t the a p p e l l a n t d i d n o t meet i t s b u r d e n . The t e s t is m e a n t to r e q u i r e at least comparative valuation and assessment information; something that the appellant failed to show. The m o s t that appellant showed was that comparable properties were also a s s e s s e d b y u s i n g t h e cost a p p r o a c h to v a l u a t i o n . This tends to show equality among taxpayers, not inequality . The District C o u r t w a s c o r r e c t i n u p h o l d i n g t h e d e c i s i o n of t h e S t a t e Board. Next, appellant challenges the c h o i c e of v a l u a t i o n methods u s e d b y t h e S t a t e Tax A p p e a l Board and a f f i r m e d by t h e D i s t r i c t Court. S p e c i f i c a l l y , a p p e l l a n t c h a l l e n g e s t h e u s e of $ 6 . 5 0 a s a comparative rental rate used to find the 28 percent factor. Appellant contends that the figure of $7.50 should have been used, the square foot rental c h a r g e of the Rimrock M i n i - M a l l ; which a p p e l l a n t c l a i m s is more c o m p a r a b l e t o t h e K - M a r t property. A p p e l l a n t a l s o d i s p u t e s t h e method used t o d e t e r m i n e t h e p e r c e n - tage lease override. The S t a t e Board used t h e mortgage e q u i t y approach. A p p e l l a n t a r g u e s t h a t o t h e r methods c o u l d have been used. In appellant's view, the choice of these methods was arbitrary and capricious or characterized by an abuse or unwarranted e x e r c i s e of d i s c r e t i o n . We find sufficient evidence in the record to justify the B o a r d ' s c h o i c e of $6.50 a s a c o m p a r a t i v e r e n t a l f i g u r e . W e agree with the District Court when it said: " [ i ]t is w i t h i n the Board I s province as fact-£ inder to give c e r t a i n evidence more weight than other evidence. The Board's choice of the lower amount was w i t h i n i t s power and s i n c e t h e r e is e v i d e n c e i n the record to s u p p o r t such f i n d i n g it must s t a n d . " Concerning the u s e o f t h e m o r t g a g e e q u i t y a p p r o a c h ; a p p e l l a n t h a s n o t shown how i t is u n a c c e p t a b l e or a r b i t r a r y , r a t h e r he h a s shown o n l y t h a t i t i s n o t a d v a n t a g e o u s when a p p l i e d to him. I t is n o t a j u d i c i a l f u n c t i o n t o a c t a s a n a u t h o r i t y on t a x a - tion matters. W w i l l n o t e v a l u a t e t h e a d v a n t a g e s and d i s a d v a n - e t a g e s o f a p a r t i c u l a r a s s e s s m e n t method as a p p l i e d to a t a x p a y e r . "Tax a p p e a l b o a r d s a r e p a r t i c u l a r l y s u i t e d f o r s e t t l i n g d i s p u t e s o v e r t h e a p p r o p r i a t e v a l u a t i o n of a g i v e n p i e c e of p r o p e r t y o r a p a r t i c u l a r i m p r o v e m e n t , and t h e j u d i c i a r y c a n n o t p r o p e r l y i n t e r - fere with that function." Larson v. Department of Revenue ( 1 9 7 5 ) , 1 6 6 Mont. 4 4 9 , 4 5 7 , 534 P.2d 854, 858; ( c i t i n g B l a i r v. P o t t e r ( 1 9 5 7 ) , 1 3 2 Mont. 1 7 6 , 315 P.2d 177). Assessment formula- tions are within the expertise of the S t a t e Tax A p p e a l Board and w e w i l l n o t o v e r t u r n t h e i r d e c i s i o n s u n l e s s t h e r e is a c l e a r showing of an abuse of discretion. Additionally, we n o t e t h a t t h e S t a t e B o a r d ' s f i n d i n g o f f a c t number V I e n u m e r a t e d f i v e d i f - f e r e n t methods of v a l u a t i o n ; c e r t a i n l y an i n d i c a t i o n t h a t those c h o s e n were n o t d o n e so a r b i t r a r i l y . Finally, a p p e l l a n t a r g u e s t h a t t h e S t a t e Tax A p p e a l B o a r d ' s d e c i s i o n does not t a k e i n t o c o n s i d e r a t i o n t h e f a i r market value of the property. This issue strikes us as b e i n g frivolous. Indeed, t h e e n t i r e p u r p o s e o f a s s e s s m e n t is to e s t a b l i s h a f a i r market value. The s t a n d a r d is c l e a r : " [a111 taxable property m u s t be assessed a t 100% o f its market v a l u e . . ." Section 15-8-111(1) MCA. " M a r k e t v a l u e is t h e v a l u e a t which p r o p e r t y would c h a n g e h a n d s b e t w e e n a w i l l i n g b u y e r and a w i l l i n g s e l l e r , n e i t h e r being u n d e r a n y c o m p u l s i o n t o buy or to s e l l and b o t h having reasonable knowledge of relevant facts." Section 1-8-1112)(a) , MCA. The Board was c l e a r l y cognizant of the market value standard. I n i t s f i n d i n g s o f f a c t t h e Board s t a t e d : " [ i ] t is Montana law t h a t p r o p e r t y s h o u l d be t a x e d a t i t s m a r k e t value. " A p p e l l a n t r e l i e s h e a v i l y on s t a t e m e n t s made by i t s w i t n e s s e s t o t h e e f f e c t t h a t a b u y e r would n o t p u r c h a s e t h e p r o p e r t y a t i t s assessed value. In other words, appellant claims that the a s s e s s e d value exceeds the market value. The term m a r k e t v a l u e is elusive, especially when considering the sort of property i n v o l v e d i n t h i s case. What t h i s C o u r t s a i d many y e a r s a g o s t i l l a p p l i e s today: " [ t l h e v a l u e of p r o p e r t y i s a matter of o p i n i o n , . . . Courts c a n n o t be c a l l e d u p o n , i n e v e r y i n s t a n c e , to s e t t l e differences of opinion in this regard between the assessing o f f i c e r and t h e p r o p e r t y o w n e r . O t h e r w i s e , c o u r t s would be con- verted into assessing boards . . ." Danforth v. Livingston ( 1 9 0 0 ) , 23 Mont. 558, 563, 5 9 P. 916, 917; see a l s o , S t a t e ex r e l . Snidow v . Board o f E q u a l i z a t i o n ( 1 9 3 2 ) , 9 3 Mont. 1 9 , 4 5 , 1 7 P.2d 68, 76. A b s e n t a c l e a r showing o f a n a b u s e of d i s c r e t i o n , t h e Board I s d e c i s i o n must s t a n d . Based upon the foregoing, we affirm the judgment of the District Court. H W e Concur: Chief J u s t i c e \