State v. Musgrove

No. 82-101

I N THE SUPREL?IE COURT O THE STATE OF MONTANA
F

1983

STATE OF MONTANA,

P l a i n t i f f and Cross-Appellant,

VS .
TIIURl4AN J. M S R V , D e f e n a a n t ,
UG O E

VS .
INTERNATIONAL FIDELITY INSURANCE COMPANY,

A p p e l l a n t and Cross-Respondent.

Appeal f r o n : U i s t r i c t Court of t h e Fourth J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t ,
I n and f o r t h e County o f N i n e r a i , The H o n o r a b l e
Douglas H a r k i n , J u d g e p r e s i d i n g .

For A p p e i l a n t and Cross-Respondent:

a e x t e r L. D e l a n e y ; Mulroney, D e l a n e y , Dalby a n d
Mudd, M i s s o u l a , Montana

E'or P l a l n t l f f a n d C r o s s - A p p e l l a n t :

Hon. Mike G r e e l y , A t t o r n e y G e n e r a l , Helella, Xontana
M. Shaun Donovan, County A t t o r n e y , S u p e r i o r , ? ~ I o n t a n a

Submitted: J a n u a r y 1 2 , 1983

Decided: F e b r u a r y 24, 1983
M r . J u s t i c e John Conway H a r r i s o n delivered t h e Opinion of the
Court.

This case involves a n o r d e r by the District Court, of the

Fourth Judicial District, County of Mineral , requiring

I n t e r n a t i o n a l F i d e l i t y to f o r f e i t $ 5 , 0 0 0 o f a $ 5 0 , 0 0 0 b a i l b o n d .

Musgrove was convicted of mitigated d e l i b e r a t e homicide on

February 7 , 1977. H e a p p e a l e d to t h i s C o u r t . A t t h a t t i m e the

District Court required the defendant to secure an additional

$50,000 bail. International Fidelity provided the additional

bond. This Court reversed the conviction and ordered a new

trial. S t a t e v. Musgrove ( 1 9 7 8 ) r 1 7 8 Mont. 1 6 2 , 528 P.2d 1246.

A s e c o n d t r i a l was commenced i n J a n u a r y 1979; d e f e n d a n t being

at liberty. H e a t t e n d e d a l l p r o c e e d i n g s t h r o u g h t h e close o f t h e

evidence on Friday, January 26, 1979. The D i s t r i c t C o u r t had

s c h e d u l e d c l o s i n g a r g u m e n t s f o r t h e f o l l o w i n g Monday, J a n u a r y 2 9 .

However, o n Monday m o r n i n g t h e d e f e n d a n t f a i l e d t o a p p e a r . The

D i s t r i c t C o u r t t h e n o r d e r e d t o t a l f o r f e i t u r e of t h e $ 5 0 , 0 0 0 b o n d ,

i s s u e d a bench w a r r a n t f o r d e f e n d a n t ' s a r r e s t , and r e c e s s e d t h e
t r i a l f o r t e n d a y s , u n t i l Wednesday, F e b r u a r y 7 , 1 9 7 9 .

Defendant failed to appear because he was in Texas.

According to his testimony, he was suffering from emotional

b r e a k d o w n and w a n t e d t o r e t u r n t o T e x a s to c o m m i t s u i c i d e . While

i n T e x a s , he a d m i t t e d h i m s e l f t o V i l l a Rosa H o s p i t a l and s h o r t l y

t h e r e a f t e r was i n c o n t a c t w i t h a r e p r e s e n t a t i v e of I n t e r n a t i o n a l

Fidelity. I n t e r n a t i o n a l F i d e l i t y was a b l e t o p e r s u a d e Musgrove

t o r e t u r n to Montana. They p r o v i d e d t r a n s p o r t a t i o n and Musgrove

w a s b a c k i n Montana b e f o r e t h e e x p i r a t i o n of t h e ten-day recess.

Due to Musgrove's absence, the county incurred expenses in the

amount of $1,000.

On February 6, final arguments were heard and the jury

returned a v e r d i c t of guilty. Musgrove was s e n t e n c e d to t w e n t y

y e a r s i m p r i s o n m e n t on F e b r u a r y 2 1 , 1 9 7 9 . On t h a t same d a y a b a i l

d i s c h a r g e h e a r i n g was h e l d . The D i s t r i c t C o u r t o r d e r e d t h a t t h e

f o r f e i t u r e of the $ 5 0 , 0 0 0 bond be discharged in the amount of
$25,000. International Fidelity appealed to this Court

challenging the amount of forfeiture. This Court remanded

because " [ o l u r r e v i e w of the record leaves no d o u b t that the

$25,000 bond forfeiture was imposed as a p e n a l t y . " S t a t e v.

Musgrove (1980), Mont . - I - 6 1 0 P.2d 7 1 0 , 7 1 3 , 37
St.Rep. 755, 759. Another b a i l discharge hearing was h e l d o n

December 1, 1 9 8 1 , and j u d g m e n t was e n t e r e d o n J a n u a r y 11, 1 9 8 2 .

This time the District Court discharged all but $5,000.

I n t e r n a t i o n a l F i d e l i t y was s t i l l d i s s a t i s f i e d and t h e i r a p p e a l i s

again before t h i s Court.

Two i s s u e s a r e r a i s e d b y t h e p a r t i e s : (1) w h e t h e r or n o t t h e

D i s t r i c t C o u r t had j u r i s d i c t i o n to d i s c h a r g e a n y p a r t of t h e bond

forfeiture; and, ( 2 ) i f t h e c o u r t d i d have j u r i s d i c t i o n , whether

t h e o r d e r e d f o r f e i t u r e o f $ 5 , 0 0 0 was e r r o r ?

The S t a t e a r g u e s t h a t t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t d i d n o t h a v e j u r i s -

d i c t i o n t o d i s c h a r g e a n y o f t h e f o r f e i t e d bond w i t h o u t a f i n d i n g

o f " s a t i s f a c t o r y e x c u s e " as r e q u i r e d by s e c t i o n 46-9-503 ( 3 ) , MCA.

I n o t h e r w o r d s , t h e S t a t e m a i n t a i n s t h a t " s a t i s f a c t o r y e x c u s e " is

a necessary prerequisite to d i s c h a r g e of any p a r t of the for-

feiture. The S t a t e c i t e s s e v e r a l non-Montana cases which h o l d
t h a t v o l u n t a r y a b s e n c e from a j u r i s d i c t i o n is n o t "satisfactory

excuse;" also, "Musgrove's failure to appear on the basis of

p s y c h o l o g i c a l p r o b l e m s is n o t c r e d i b l e . " I n connection with the

above jurisdictional argument, the State maintains that this

Court's prior opinion did not alter the necessity for finding

"satisfactory excuse ." International Fidelity argues in its
reply brief that the S t a t e has missed the crucial issue. The

q u e s t i o n is n o t w h e t h e r t h e r e was " s a t i s f a c t o r y e x c u s e ," rather,

t h e i s s u e is t h e amount o f d i s c h a r g e .

S e c t i o n 46-9-503(3), MCA, states:

" I f a t a n y time w i t h i n 30 d a y s a f t e r t h e f o r -
f e i t u r e t h e d e f e n d a n t o r h i s b a i l a p p e a r and
satisfactorily excuse his negligence or
f a i l u r e t o comply w i t h t h e c o n d i t i o n s of t h e
b a i l , t h e c o u r t , i n i t s d i s c r e t i o n , may d i r e c t
t h e f o r f e i t u r e o f t h e b a i l t o be d i s c h a r g e d
upon s u c h terms as may be j u s t . "
 The S t a t e is c o r r e c t i n p o i n t i n g o u t t h e o b v i o u s p r e r e q u i s i t e
finding of "satisfactory excuse" before any discharge may be
ordered. However, we do n o t a g r e e t h a t t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t was

without jurisdiction t o o r d e r d i s c h a r g e "upon s u c h terms as may
be j u s t . "
Concerning the reasons Musgrove left Montana, the Court

found :
"The D e f e n d a n t ' s d e c i s i o n t o l e a v e Montana was
t h e r e s u l t o f h i s b e l i e f t h a t he was b e i n g
r a i l r o a d e d a t t h e t r i a l , he would be c o n v i c t e d
a n d h e would r e c e i v e a s e n t e n c e of t w e n t y ( 2 0 )
y e a r s imprisonment.

"The D e f e n d a n t c l a i m e d t h a t a t t h e t i m e h e
l e f t Montana h e s u f f e r e d a ' t o t a l e m o t i o n a l
b r e a k d o w n ' and d i d n ' t t h i n k he knew w h a t he
was d o i n g .

" W h i l e i n T e x a s , t h e D e f e n d a n t was i n t e r v i e w e d
b y a S a n A n t o n i o P s y c h i a t r i s t who d i a g n o s e d
t h e Defendant a s s u f f e r i n g from p s y c h o t i c
d e p r e s s i o n -- s u i c i d e .

The Court also made the following conclusions of law:
"The D e f e n d a n t l e f t t h e S t a t e of Montana w h i l e
u n d e r g r e a t e m o t i o n a l stress r e s u l t i n g from
h i s t r i a l and p e r s o n a l p r o b l e m s .

"The D e f e n d a n t ' s m e n t a l s t a t e a t t h e t i m e he
l e f t Montana o p e r a t e s a s a p a r t i a l e x c u s e f o r
h i s unauthorized absence ." (~mphasis-added. )
Although the a b o v e f i n d i n g s and c o n c l u s i o n s are not statu-

torily phrased , we hold that the Court found "satisfactory
excuse." "Sickness . . . which makes t h e p r i n c i p a l unable to
a p p e a r a t t h e t i m e s e t is o r d i n a r i l y h e l d t o be . . . ground suf-
f i c i e n t f o r t h e v a c a t i o n of a f o r f e i t u r e ." 8 Am.Jr.2d Bail and
R e c o g n i z a n c e S 184 ( 1 9 8 0 ) .
The S t a t e p l a c e s s i g n i f i c a n c e on t h e p h r a s e " p a r t i a l e x c u s e "

found in the court's conclusions. In o t h e r words, the State

m a i n t a i n s t h a t a l t h o u g h M u s g r o v e ' s a b s e n c e was p a r t i a l l y e x c u s e d ,
i t d o e s n o t f o l l o w t h a t h i s a b s e n c e was s a t i s f a c t o r i l y e x c u s e d .

The State would have us believe that the statute requires a
c o m p l e t e e x c u s e as o p p o s e d t o a p a r t i a l e x c u s e . This distinction
i s n o t i n t h e s t a t u t e and w e w i l l n o t r e a d it i n t o t h e s t a t u t e .

S i n c e w e h o l d t h a t t h e c o u r t d i d h a v e j u r i s d i c t i o n to o r d e r a

d i s c h a r g e , w e m u s t now c o n s i d e r w h e t h e r or n o t t h e c o u r t e r r e d i n
d i s c h a r g i n g $45,000, r e q u i r i n g a f o r f e i t u r e of $ 5 , 0 0 0 , -- o r the

i s s u e may be s t a t e d i n s t a t u t o r y terms -- d i d t h e c o u r t " i n its

discretion . . . direct the forfeiture of the bail to be

d i s c h a r g e d upon s u c h terms as may be j u s t ? "
Initially, we note t h a t the s t a t u t e e x p l i c i t l y d i r e c t s the

c o u r t to u s e its " d i s c r e t i o n [ t o d i s c h a r g e ] u p o n s u c h terms as
may be j u s t . " T h u s , t h e g e n e r a l r u l e c o n c e r n i n g s c o p e of r e v i e w

is a p p l i c a b l e . " T h i s C o u r t w i l l n o t d i s t u r b t h e d e c i s i o n of t h e

trial court absent a clear abuse of discretion. (Citation
omitted.) The t e s t f o r a b u s e o f d i s c r e t i o n is w h e t h e r t h e t r i a l

court acted arbitrarily without the employment of conscious

j u d g m e n t o r e x c e e d e d t h e b o u n d s of r e a s o n . (Citations omitted. ) "
Krum v . Krum ( 1 9 8 0 ) , - .- Mont . -- -- I - , 6 1 4 P.2d 5 2 5 , 5 2 7 , 37

St.Rep. 1291, 1295.

The f o c u s o f appellant's a r g u m e n t is t h a t s i n c e t h e c o u n t y
i n c u r r e d o n l y $1,000 i n out-of-pocket e x p e n s e s d u e to M u s g r o v e l s
absence, and since there is no other evidence in the record

showing damage, a n y f o r f e i t u r e a b o v e $ 1 , 0 0 0 m u s t be r e g a r d e d as
e i t h e r a penalty o r revenue. A p p e l l a n t is c o r r e c t i n pointing

o u t f a c t o r s t h a t may n o t be c o n s i d e r e d . In our f i r s t opinion i n

t h i s d i s p u t e we d i r e c t e d the District Court to r e c o n s i d e r the
amount o f discharge, and any judgment was not to "consider as
f a c t o r s e i t h e r a p e n a l t y to t h e d e f e n d a n t or t h e i n s u r a n c e com-
p a n y or r e v e n u e t o t h e s t a t e ." Musgrove , -- -- Mont. a t - , 610
P.2d a t 7 1 3 , 37 S t . R e p . a t 759. However, a p p e l l a n t is m i s t a k e n
i n c l a i m i n g t h a t t h e r e c o r d l a c k s e v i d e n c e to s u p p o r t t h e c o u r t ' s

order.

I n m a k i n g i t s a r g u m e n t , t h a t t h e r e is no e v i d e n c e to s u p p o r t
a f o r f e i t u r e beyond $ 1 , 0 0 0 , a p p e l l a n t makes a f a u l t y a s s u m p t i o n .

This f a u l t y assumption is e v i d e n t i n t h e following quote from
the i n i t i a l brief: " i t is r e s p e c t f u l l y s u b m i t t e d t h a t t h e ...
judgment of f o r f e i t u r e . . . should be v a c a t e d b e c a u s e t h e r e was

n o e v i d e n c e b e f o r e t h e C o u r t t o d e m o n s t r a t e t h a t t h e m e a s u r e of

damage t o t h e p u b l i c a u t h o r i t y e x c e e d s . . . $1,000." Appellant
a s s u m e s t h a t a n o r d e r of f o r f e i t u r e c a n o n l y be s u p p o r t e d by e v i -

d e n c e r e l a t i n g t o damage. T h i s is n o t s o .

The s t a t u t e d i r e c t s t h e c o u r t to o r d e r d i s c h a r g e "upon s u c h
terms a s may be j u s t . " I n making t h i s d e t e r m i n a t i o n t h e c o u r t

s h o u l d c o n s i d e r n o t o n l y e v i d e n c e r e l a t i n g to damage b u t a l s o t h e

o t h e r f a c t o r s and c i r c u m s t a n c e s p e c u l i a r to e a c h c a s e . A s one

court stated:
" [ n ] o c l e a r r u l e c a n be s e t down which w i l l
guide the t r i a l court in every case since the
f a c t s and c i r c u m s t a n c e s o f e a c h i n d i v i d u a l
c a s e m u s t be c o n s i d e r e d i n t h e i r t o t a l i t y . N o
o n e f a c t o r w i l l be d e t e r m i n a t i v e i n a l l
cases." Owens v . P e o p l e ( 1 9 7 7 ) r 1 9 4 Colo.
3 8 9 , 572 P.2d 8 3 7 , 8 3 8 .
Here, the court's f i n d i n g s of fact and conclusions of law
a d e q u a t e l y c o n s i d e r a l l of the pertinent factors. Accordingly,

w e must a f f i r m .

We concur:

\
Chief ~ u s t i , d

Justices
Mr. Justice John C. Sheehy, dissenting:

When this cause was before us in 1979, we remanded the
problem of discharging the forfeiture of defendant's bail to
the District Court with the admonition that "[alny judgment
reached shall not consider as factors either a penalty to the
defendant or the insurance company or revenue to the state."
State v. Musgrove v. International Fidelity Insurance Company

(1980), - Mont . ,
- 610 P.2d 710, 713, 37 St.Rep. 755.
That admonition to the District Court became the law of

the case. Nevertheless, on remand, the District Court found:
"The bond forfeiture of Fifty Thousand Dollars
($50,000.00) is excused except for the sum of Five
Thousand Dollars ($5,000.00). Such sum is
negligible, if any, revenue to the State, in view
of the overall expense resulting from the
Defendant's departure, and does not operate as a
pena.lty to International after balancing their
negligent supervision of the Defendant against
their diligent and successful efforts to return him
to Montana in time for completion of the trial."
When the case was before us in 1979, and when it comes
to us again here, it appears that the only costs that have
been reported to the District Court in connection with the
return of the defendant for trial is the sum of $1,000. The
d.ifference, therefore, between $1,000 and $5,000 is $4,000 of
revenue, which the District Court terms "negligible". It is
also apparent from the conclusion of the District Court that
it is imposing a penalty against the bail bond insurer for
their "negligent supervision of the Defendant." There is no
power or authority in the District Court, particularly under
the law of the case which has been established here for
either revenue or penalty assessed for negligence. The
amount of forfeiture, therefore, should not exceed the sum of
$1,000.
 The county attorney argued in the first case that
Mineral County had been put to a good deal of expense in the
three trials which ha.ve occurred with respect to this
defendant. On oral argument before us in this last case, the

county attorney continues to insist that it has cost the
county approximately $22,000 to try the defendant and it is

on this ground that the county attorney, and apparently the
District Court, are striving to make some recoupment from the
bail bond. That position ignores the position of the
forfeiture statute, which provides as follows:
"46-9-503. Cond-itions not performed--forfeiture
...
" (3) If at any time within 30 days after the
forfeiture the defendant or his bail appear and
satisfactorily excuse his negligence or failure to
comply with the conditions of the bail, the court,
in its discretion, may direct the forfeiture of the
bail to be discharged upon such terms as may be
just."
We have held, and it is now the law of the case that such
"terms as may be just" cannot be composed of either a
penalty, or of revenue to the State. The terms may logically

include the costs incurred by the county in returning the
defendant to the court of justice and no more. This position
is consonant with the remainder of the statute where the
defendant or his bail has shown circumstances which
"satisfactorily excuse his negligence or failure to comply
with the conditions of the bail." If the defendant does not
satisfactorily excuse his negligence or failure to comply, it
is the duty of the District Court to forfeit the whole bond,
without regard to any partial discharge of the surety. But
when the court finds a satisfactory excuse, as It must have
here in order to reduce the forfeiture, then the District
Court must apply, in the law which we have set forth, the
rule that it will not exact a penalty or revenue in
determining the amount of the forfeiture.
I know of no statute or legal principle in Montana under
which a bail bondsman is under duty to the state to
"supervise" the defendant for which it posts bail, and for a
breach of which it might become liable to the State for
"negligent supervision." It is far stretch of law for the
District Court to require, or this Court to tolerate, that a
bail bondsman becomes a babysitter for the court.
I would reverse and remand this case, since satisfactory
excuse has been found by the District Court, with
instructions to discharge the forfeiture of bail except for
the sum of $1,000 to be paid to the county treasurer of
Mineral County.

; Justice u
Mr. Justice Daniel J. Shea, dissenting:

In the first case involving the bonding company and the
State, we held that whatever the District Court orders, it
cannot be done as a source of revenue or as a penalty. State
v. Musgrove (1980), Mont. , 610 P.2d 710, 713, 37
St.Rep. 755. The hearing after our remand produced no -
new
evidence as to what costs the State incurred, or what factors
should be considered in determining the amount. Here the
trial court ordered the bonding company to pay $5,000,
without ever stating how or why this figure was chosen. It

clearly could have been one picked out of the air. This, in
my judgment, constitutes an abuse of discretion.
The State had its opportunity to present evidence, - -
or to
present factors - - trial court - considering the amount
to the in
which should - forfeited.
be It did neither. I would,
therefore, order that the State must be confined to its out
of pocket expenses in this case--$1,000.