NO. 81-413
I N T H E SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF M O N T A N A
1983
COLLEEN N . BAGNELL,
Plaintiff and A p p e l l a n t ,
VS.
CHARLES J . LEMERY,
DANIEL LEMERY e t a l . ,
D e f e n d a n t s and Respondents.
Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court of t h e Fourth J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t ,
I n and f o r t h e County o f Lake
H o n o r a b l e J a c k L. G r e e n , J u d g e p r e s i d i n g .
Counsel of Record:
For Appellant:
Morales, Volinkaty and H a r r , Missoula, Montana
For Respondents:
Turnage & McNeil, Polson, Montana
S u b m i t t e d on b r i e f s : December 11, 1 9 8 1
~ ~ ~ i January : 7 , 1 9 8 3
d ~ d 2
Filed:
J N 2 7 1983
A
M r . J u s t i c e John Conway H a r r i s o n d e l i v e r e d t h e O p i n i o n of the
Court.
P l a i n t i f £/appellant initiated t h i s a c t i o n s e e k i n g to e n j o i n
defendant/respondent from interfering with the water flow in
A s h l e y C r e e k i n L a k e C o u n t y , Montana, and t o a d j u d i c a t e t h e water
r i g h t s of t h e p a r t i e s . The D i s t r i c t C o u r t of t h e F o u r t h J u d i c i a l
D i s t r i c t i n and f o r t h e C o u n t y of L a k e , found d e f e n d a n t s to h a v e
a s e n i o r water r i g h t o f 1 7 8 acre f e e t per y e a r and a priority
d a t e o f 1 9 1 7 and p l a i n t i f f t o h a v e a j u n i o r w a t e r r i g h t l i m i t e d
to defendants1 surplus. P l a i n t i f f appeals.
Defendants are owners of real property situated in Lake
County, north of St. Ignatius, Montana, described as the ~ ~ 4 4 ,
S e c t i o n 31, Township 1 9 N o r t h , Range 1 9 West, M.P.M. Plaintiff
i s t h e owner of real p r o p e r t y a d j a c e n t t o d e f e n d a n t s 1 n o r t h w e s t
b o u n d a r y l i n e d e s c r i b e d a s t h e ~ ~ 4 SE44 , S e c t i o n 2 5 , Township 1 9
4 ,
North, Range 20 West, M.P.M. This case involves water from
natural springs located west of defendants' property on land
owned b y T h e r i n Mahle. The water from t h e Mahle S p r i n g s f l o w s
through defendants1 land and i n t o A s h l e y C r e e k and t h e n Ashley
Creek flows from defendants' land onto plaintiff's land.
Defendants' predecessors i n i n t e r e s t began using t h e water
f r o m t h e Mahle S p r i n g s i n 1 9 1 7 a s d o m e s t i c water f o r t h e f a m i l y
home, water f o r a " d u c k pond" u s e d i n r a i s i n g d o m e s t i c f o w l f o r
commercial purposes, s t o c k water f o r r a i s i n g c a t t l e , h o r s e s and
pigs, and for i r r i g a t i o n of their 160 acre tract. Defendant
Lemery t e s t i f i e d t h e r e had b e e n a c o n t i n u o u s b e n e f i c i a l u s e of
water on the defendants' land i n t h e amount of 110 g a l l o n s p e r
m i n u t e or 1 7 8 a c r e f e e t p e r y e a r s i n c e 1 9 1 7 . I n 1956 d e f e n d a n t s
b e g a n c o n s t r u c t i o n of a n ASC a p p r o v e d dam t o impound t h e s p r i n g
water. The dam was c o m p l e t e d i n 1958. The p u r p o s e o f t h e dam
was t o s t a b i l i z e d e f e n d a n t s ' w a t e r s u p p l y and d e f e n d a n t s claim n o
i n c r e a s e i n t h e amount o f t h e i r water r i g h t v i a t h e c o n s t r u c t i o n
of t h e dam. The water impounded b y t h e dam h a s b e e n used for
flood irrigating approximately 60 acres of defendants' land,
sprinkler irrigating the full 160 a c r e s of defendants' land,
stock water for cattle, and a commercial fish operation. On
April 3, 1 9 7 3 , d e f e n d a n t Lemery f i l e d a n o t i c e of c o m p l e t i o n of
g r o u n d w a t e r a p p r o p r i a t i o n w i t h o u t w e l l , c l a i m i n g 1 1 0 g a l l o n s per
minute. Defendant e s t i m a t e d 110 g a l l o n s p e r minute equaled 15
a c r e f e e t of w a t e r used p e r y e a r . P l a i n t i f f ' s p r e d e c e s s o r began
using water from Ashley Creek in 1957 for stock water.
P l a i n t i f f 's predecessor tes t i £ied that at times Ashley Creek
would become completely dry and she would approach defendant
Lemery and aslc him t o r e l e a s e w a t e r from h i s dam which he would
do. Plaintiff purchased her property i n 1 9 7 4 and on May 1 7 ,
1978, plaintiff obtained a water use permit for Ashley Creek
from the Montana Department of Natural Resources. The permit
states plaintiff I s u s e is s u b j e c t to a l l p r i o r a p p r o p r i a t i o n s .
I n 1 9 7 8 , d e f e n d a n t Lemery r e f u s e d t o r e l e a s e a d d i t i o n a l w a t e r
to plaintiff. P l a i n t i f f then i n i t i a t e d t h i s a c t i o n i n the Fourth
Judicial District, Lake C o u n t y , to a d j u d i c a t e t h e p a r t i e s ' w a t e r
r i g h t s and t o e n j o i n d e f e n d a n t s from i n t e r f e r i n g w i t h t h e t r i b u -
t a r y w a t e r s of Ashley Creek. On J u l y 1, 1 9 8 1 , t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t
filed its findings of fact, conclusions of law, judgment and
decree nunc p r o tunc. The D i s t r i c t Court found defendants to
h a v e a s u p e r i o r w a t e r r i g h t of 1 1 0 g a l l o n s p e r m i n u t e o r 1 5 a c r e
f e e t per year. The D i s t r i c t Court further found p l a i n t i f f is
only entitled to any s u r p l u s w a t e r over and above defendants'
rights. Plaintiff appealed. On April 1, 1982, this Court
remanded the c a s e back to t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t f o r f u r t h e r f i n d -
ings. On J u l y 7 , 1982, t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t f i l e d s e c o n d amended
f i n d i n g s of fact, c o n c l u s i o n s of l a w , j u d g m e n t and d e c r e e . The
District Court found d e f e n d a n t s to h a v e a r i g h t t o 1 1 0 g a l l o n s
p e r m i n u t e which a c t u a l l y e q u a l s 178 a c r e f e e t p e r y e a r w i t h a
p r i o r i t y d a t e of 1917 and found p l a i n t i f f ' s r i g h t s l i m i t e d to a n y
available water in Ashley Creek or any surplus water from
d e f e n d a n t s ' dam. P l a i n t i f f appeals.
The i s s u e s r a i s e d on a p p e a l a r e a s f o l l o w s :
1. Whether the District Court failed t o comply w i t h this
C o u r t ' s remand f o r f u r t h e r f i n d i n g s .
2. Whether the District Court erred in holding that
d e f e n d a n t s 1 water rights are superior and prior in time to
plaintiff I s .
3. W h e t h e r t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t e r r e d by g r a n t i n g d e f e n d a n t a n
e x c e s s i v e a p p r o p r i a t i o n of water.
4. W h e t h e r t h e t r a d i t i o n a l p o l i c y c o n s i d e r a t i o n s of Montana
water law justify t h e f i n d i n g t h a t d e f e n d a n t s have b e n e f i c i a l l y
applied t h e i r appropriation.
On A p r i l 1, 1 9 8 2 , t h i s C o u r t remanded t h i s case f o r f u r t h e r
findings t o d e t e r m i n e t h e amount o f t h e 1 9 1 7 water r i g h t , the
e x t e n t t o w h i c h t h e w a t e r r i g h t was c h a n g e d b y v i r t u e of t h e 1 9 5 6
dam c o n s t r u c t i o n , and t h e f u r t h e r e x t e n t , i f a n y , of a c h a n g e as
a r e s u l t of a usage s i n c e 1961. I n t h e District C o u r t ' s second
amended findings of fact, conclusions of law, judgment and
decree, the District C o u r t made findings that: d e f e n d a n t had
made c o n t i n u o u s b e n e f i c i a l u s e of t h e water from t h e s p r i n g s i n
t h e amount o f 1 1 0 g a l l o n s p e r m i n u t e or 1 7 8 a c r e f e e t per y e a r ;
t h e d e f e n d a n t s c l a i m no i n c r e a s e i n t h e q u a n t u m of t h e i r p r e s e n t
water r i g h t by r e a s o n o f t h e c o m p l e t i o n o f t h e i r ASC a p p r o v e d dam
i n 1 9 5 8 a b o v e t h e 1 9 1 7 w a t e r r i g h t ; and t h e c o m m e r c i a l f i s h f a r m
c r e a t e d an a d d i t i o n a l b e n e f i c i a l use s i n c e 1961, b u t r e q u i r e d no
i n c r e a s e i n t h e i r water r i g h t s .
Plaintiff c o n t e n d s t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t f a i l e d to c o m p l y w i t h
o u r remand for further findings. However, the District Court
addressed each f a c t u a l determination requested i n t h i s Court I s
o r d e r of A p r i l 1, 1 9 8 2 . T h i s Court has s t a t e d several times:
"Our f u n c t i o n on a p p e a l i n r e v i e w i n g f i n d i n g s of f a c t is n o t to
substitute our judgment for that of the District Court, but
r a t h e r t o d e t e r m i n e w h e t h e r t h e r e is s u b s t a n t i a l e v i d e n c e to sup-
p o r t t h e lower c o u r t ' s findings." Shanahan v. U n i v e r s a l Tavern
C o r p o r a t i o n ( 1 9 7 8 ) , 1 7 9 Mont. 3 6 , 5 8 5 P.2d 1314, 1316. We find
t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t s f i n d i n g s were s u p p o r t e d by s u b s t a n t i a l e v i -
d e n c e w h i c h w a s p r e s e n t e d a t t h e h e a r i n g o f J u n e 1 6 and 1 7 , 1 9 8 2 .
Plaintiff has not presented sufficient evidence found in the
r e c o r d w h i c h would p r e p o n d e r a t e a g a i n s t t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t I s fin-
dings. We, therefore, find t h e D i s t r i c t Court d i d comply w i t h
t h i s C o u r t ' s remand f o r f u r t h e r f i n d i n g s .
Prior to t h e 1 9 7 3 Water Use A c t o n e c o u l d a c q u i r e a water
r i g h t by c o m p l y i n g w i t h t h e a p p l i c a b l e s t a t u t e s a t t h e t i m e or by
simply putting the water to a beneficial use. T h i s was the
r e s u l t of t h i s Court's holding i n Murray v . T i n g l e y ( 1 8 9 7 ) , 20
Mont. 260, 50 P. 723. I n Bailey v. T i n t i n g e r ( 1 9 1 2 ) , 4 5 Mont.
154, 122 P. 575, this Court commented upon Murray, supra,
stating:
" I n Murray v. T i n g l e y , 20 Mont. 2 6 0 , 50 P a c .
7 2 3 , t h i s c o u r t had b e f o r e i t t h e s i n g l e
q u e s t ion: Can a person make a valid
a p p r o p r i a t i o n o f water a f t e r t h e s t a t u t e of
1885 went i n t o e f f e c t , w i t h o u t complying w i t h
the statute? A f t e r c i t i n g D e Necochea v .--
C-u r t i s and W e l l s v . M a n t e s , ayd o t l n g the
.--
-
l a n g u a g e f ram'-the-former o p i n i o n which w e
reproduce above, t h i s c o u r t s a i d : 'We t h i n k
t h e c o n s t r u c t i o n of t h e s t a t u t e by t h e s u p r e m e
c o u r t o f C a l i f o r n i a i s l o g i c a l and c o r r e c t ,
a n d a r e o f t h e o p i n i o n t h a t t h e Montana A c t
[ o f 18851 s h o u l d be c o n s t r u e d i n t h e same
manner. T h a t t h e c o n c l u s i o n r e a c h e d by t h e
C a l i f o r n i a c o u r t i n e a c h o f t h o s e c a s e s , as
w e l l as t h e c o n c l u s i o n of t h i s c o u r t i n Murray
- -i n g l e y , is c o r r e c t , d o e s n o t a d m i t o f
v. T
a r g u m e n t . S e c t i o n 1 4 1 9 , C a l i f o r n i a C i v i l Code
( M o n t . Rev. C o d e s , sec. 4 8 4 9 ) , c l e a r l y r e c o g -
n i z e s a r i g h t which o n e may a c q u i r e t o t h e u s e
o f w a t e r w i t h o u t complying w i t h t h e s t a t u t e ,
a n d t h a t s u c h r i g h t s h a l l be good as a g a i n s t
e v e r y o n e e x c e p t a n a p p r o p r i a t o r who c o m p l i e s
with the s t a t u t e before the f i r s t claimant has
a c t u a l l y c o m p l e t e d h i s work and a p p l i e d t h e
water to a b e n e f i c i a l u s e ." 45 Mont. a t 1 6 8 .
Plaintiff a r g u e s i n t h e p r e s e n t case b o t h p a r t i e s f a i l e d to
comply w i t h section 89-810, R.C.M. 1947, thus, her right is
p r i o r t o d e f e n d a n t s ' b e c a u s e h e r p r e d e c e s s o r b e g a n u s i n g water i n
A s h l e y C r e e k i n 1 9 5 7 a n d d e f e n d a n t s d i d n o t c o m p l e t e t h e i r dam o f
t h e Mahle S p r i n g water u n t i l 1 9 5 8 . P l a i n t i f f c o n t e n d s had d e f e n -
d a n t s c o m p l i e d w i t h t h e n o t i c e r e q u i r e m e n t s , t h e y would h a v e b e e n
able to o b t a i n a p r i o r i t y d a t e of 1956 v i a the R e l a t i o n Back
D o c t r i n e d e f i n e d i n s e c t i o n 89-812, R.C.M. 1947, the applicable
s t a t u t e a t t h a t time.
However, t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t f o u n d d e f e n d a n t s had made a con-
tinuous beneficial use of the Mahle S p r i n g water s i n c e 1917.
Defendants do not contend their water right increased by the
c o n s t r u c t i o n of t h e dam b e t w e e n 1 9 5 6 t o 1 9 5 8 , b u t r a t h e r , they
claim t h e dam m e r e l y s t a b i l i z e d d e f e n d a n t s f water and made it
a v a i l a b l e a t l a t e r and d r i e r times o f t h e y e a r . Thus, d e f e n d a n t s
have a p r i o r i t y d a t e of 1917 which is when t h e i r p r e d e c e s s o r s
first began to make a beneficial use of the spring water.
Plaintiff f u r t h e r c o n t e n d s t h e d o c t r i n e s of e q u i t a b l e e s t o p -
pel and laches bar defendants from a s s e r t i n g a s u p e r i o r water
right. The e l e m e n t s n e c e s s a r y to e s t a b l i s h e s t o p p e l i n a water
r i g h t s case were d e f i n e d i n S m i t h v. Krutar ( 1 9 6 9 ) r 1 5 3 Mont.
325, 457 P.2d 459. However, t h i s Court has ruled previously,
estoppel arises when a party by his acts, conduct or
acquiescence, has caused another in good faith to change his
p o s i t i o n f o r t h e worse. S m i t h v. K r u t a r , s u p r a ; Hustad v . Reed
( 1 9 5 8 ) , 1 3 3 Mont. 2 1 1 , 2 2 3 , 3 2 1 P.2d 1083. Here, d e f e n d a n t s d i d
n o t c a u s e p l a i n t i f f ' s p r e d e c e s s o r to c h a n g e h e r p o s i t i o n f o r t h e
worse as d e f e n d a n t s had a l r e a d y e s t a b l i s h e d a v a l i d u s e r i g h t to
t h e s p r i n g water. A s s t a t e d above, d e f e n d a n t s 1 u s e began i n 1917
and did not increase af ter the construction of the dam, thus
p l a i n t i f f would n o t h a v e o b t a i n e d a r i g h t s u p e r i o r to d e f e n d a n t s '
had she sought adjudication in 1957 o r any time thereafter.
Defendants' a c t i o n t o release w a t e r o u t of t h e dam was e i t h e r a
mere gratuity or transfer of surplus water. In either case
plaintiff's predecessor could have done n o t h i n g to improve h e r
pos i t i o n .
Plaintiff also claims the doctrine of laches should be
a p p l i e d to e s t a b l i s h p l a i n t i f f ' s s u p e r i o r r i g h t . I n Montgomery
v . Bank o f D i l l o n ( 1 9 4 3 ) , 1 1 4 Mont. 3 9 5 , 1 3 6 P.2d 7 6 0 , t h i s C o u r t
stated: " L a c h e s means t h e n e g l i g e n c e or o m i s s i o n t o s e a s o n a b l y
assert a r i g h t ... and it e x i s t s when t h e r e is a n u n e x p l a i n e d
d e l a y o f s u c h d u r a t i o n or s u c h c h a r a c t e r as to r e n d e r e n f o r c e m e n t
of an a s s e r t e d r i g h t i n e q u i t a b l e . " 1 3 6 P.2d a t 766. Plaintiff
claims d e f e n d a n t s ' r e l e a s e o f t h e dam w a t e r c o n s t i t u t e d n e g l i g e n t
d i s r e g a r d f o r t h e i r own p r o p e r t y . However, t h e r e were no f i n d -
i n g s n o r was t h e r e a n y e v i d e n c e a t t r i a l w h i c h would show t h e
release was not simply a release of s u r p l u s water. In the
a b s e n c e o f e v i d e n c e , t h i s C o u r t c a n n o t a p p l y l a c h e s i n t h i s case.
Plaintiff n e x t a r g u e s t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t awarded d e f e n d a n t s
a n e x c e s s i v e a p p r o p r i a t i o n o f water b e c a u s e t h e award is g r e a t e r
t h a n t h e c a p a c i t y of d e f e n d a n t s ' r e s e r v o i r . P l a i n t i f f r e l i e s on
Whitcomb v . H e l e n a Water Works C o . ( 1 9 6 9 ) , 1 5 1 Mont. 443, 444
P.2d 301. However, Whitcomb is d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e from t h e case a t
hand. I n Whitcomb, t h e c i t y of H e l e n a had first right to 5 5 0
m i n e r ' s i n c h e s o f water from Ten Mile C r e e k . The c i t y ' s p i p e l i n e
was only able t o c a r r y 225 m i n e r ' s inches at the t i m e of the
original decree i n 1903. After the original decree the city
b u i l t a s y s t e m of s t o r a g e r e s e r v o i r s . During t h e d r y s e a s o n t h e
c i t y would d i v e r t water from t h e t r i b u t a r i e s to make up f o r l o s s
and e v a p o r a t i o n and to keep a certain amount of water moving
through the reservoir. The c i t y ' s a c t i o n worked to d e p r i v e p r i o r
d o w n s t r e a m a p p r o p r i a t o r s o f t h e f u l l o r e v e n p a r t i a l u s e of t h e i r
decreed r i g h t s . This Court held the c i t y could not continue t o
s t o r e water when it would cut off other users who had prior
rights.
In the present case a different situation develops.
D e f e n d a n t s b u i l t and m a i n t a i n e d a r e s e r v o i r to s t a b i l i z e t h e i r
water s u p p l y and t o o p e r a t e a c o m m e r c i a l f i s h f a r m . The r e c o r d
s h o w s t h e r e s e r v o i r is f i l l e d i n t h e s p r i n g when r u n o f f is a t i t s
peak. T h i s p r a c t i c e w a s p r a i s e d by t h i s C o u r t i n F e d e r a l Land
Bank v . Morris ( 1 9 4 1 ) , 1 1 2 Mont. 445, 1 1 6 P.2d 1 0 0 7 ; " I t comes
back to nothing else b u t t h a t o l d p r i n c i p a l t h a t ' h e who s a v e s
something t h a t would o t h e r w i s e be lost is n o t o n l y to be p r o -
tected i n w h a t h e h a s s a v e d , b u t commended f o r so d o i n g . "' It
a p p e a r s t h a t d e f e n d a n t s u s e t h e water i n t h e r e s e r v o i r as a f o c a l
p o i n t of t h e i r i r r i g a t i o n s y s t e m as w e l l as f o r t h e i r c o m m e r c i a l
f i s h farm. The D i s t r i c t C o u r t d e c r e e d t h a t d e f e n d a n t s s h a l l h a v e
t h e r i g h t t o u s e t h e water from t h e Mahle S p r i n g s a t t h e r a t e of
110 gallons per minute. Plaintiff contends this rate is
e x c e s s i v e i n t h a t it allows d e f e n d a n t s m u l t i p l e f i l l i n g s o f t h e i r
reservoir. We disagree. The d e f e n d a n t s h a v e shown t h e p r u d e n c e
t o c a t c h t h e s p r i n g run-off to f i l l t h e i r r e s e r v o i r . After the
reservoir has been filled in the spring, defendants have a
d e c r e e d r i g h t t o r e t a i n t h e i n c o m i n g s p r i n g water a t t h e r a t e of
110 gallons per minute. This does not constitute a double
f i l l i n g of t h e r e s e r v o i r . Any e x c e s s o v e r 1 1 0 g a l l o n s per m i n u t e
must be allowed to pass through the reservoir and onto
plaintiff's property. This is the essence of the District
Court's decree and we find no error in such a ruling.
L a s t l y , p l a i n t i f f claims t r a d i t i o n a l p o l i c y c o n s i d e r a t i o n s d o
not justify the finding that defendants have applied their
a p p r o p r i a t i o n to a b e n e f i c i a l u s e . P l a i n t i f f contends the f a c t
t h a t defendants released water t o p l a i n t i f f ' s p r e d e c e s s o r when
requested is e v i d e n c e of t h e f a c t t h a t d e f e n d a n t s had more water
than they could b e n e f i c i a l l y use. However, the District Court
made s p e c i f i c f i n d i n g s as to t h e u s e s w h i c h d e f e n d a n t s made of
t h e s p r i n g water: flood irrigation, sprinkler irrigation, com-
mercial fish farm, s t o c k water and domestic use. This Court
g e n e r a l l y allows o n e m i n e r ' s i n c h to i r r i g a t e e a c h acre of land
unless "evidence discloses t h a t a g r e a t e r or lesser amount is
required." Conrow v . H u f f i n e ( 1 9 1 4 ) , 48 Mont. 4 3 7 , 1 3 8 P. 1 0 9 4 .
The D i s t r i c t C o u r t awarded d e f e n d a n t s 1 1 0 g a l l o n s p e r m i n u t e to
i r r i g a t e 160 acres. Even t w e l v e m i n e r ' s inches (134 g a l l o n s p e r
m i n u t e ) , t h e amount o f water f o r i r r i g a t i n g t w e l v e a c r e s , e x c e e d s
t h e amount d e c r e e d b y t h e t r i a l c o u r t . (One m i n e r ' s inch e q u a l s
1 1 . 2 3 g a l l o n s p e r m i n u t e .) Thus, a l l t h e e v i d e n c e i n d i c a t e s 110
g a l l o n s p e r m i n u t e is c l e a r l y j u s t i f i e d .
J u d g m e n t is a f f i r m e d .
We concur: