No. 84-203
IN THE SUPRE143 COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
1984
STATE OF MONTANA,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
-vs-
RONALD LEE RONNINGEN,
Defendant and Respondent.
APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Thirteenth Judicial District,
In and for the County of Yellowstone,
The Honorable Robert Holmstrom, Judge presiding.
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For Appellant:
Hon. Mike Greely, Attorney General, Helena, Montana
Harold F. Hanser, County Attorney, Billings,
Montana
For Respondent :
Law Offices of Russell K. Fillner, Billings,
Montana
Submitted on Briefs: August 2, 1904
Decided: November 2 0 , 1984
Clerk
Mr. Justice Daniel J. Shea delivered the Opini-on of the
Court.
The State of Montana appeals from an order of the
Yel-lowstone County District Court dismissing a misdemeanor
charge filed against the defendant, Ronald Lee Ronningen,
because of the State's failure to bring the matter tc trial
within the statutorily mandated six -month period for all
mi-sdemeanors. The trial. court ruled that the sole question
under the statute is whether the State demonstrated "good
cause" for the delay, and that the State did not do so. We
affirm.
The State argues first that the trial court erred
because it did not consider, in addition to the "good cause"
requirement of the sta.tute, other factors that may bear on
delay attributable to the State. Second, the State argues
that it did establish "good cause" for the delay beyond the
six-month deadline of the statute. The statute applies only
to misdemeanors. Section. 46-13-201(2), MCA, provides:
"The court, unless cause - - contrary is
to the
shown, must order the prosecution - - dismissed
to be
if a defendant whose trial has not been postponed
upon his application is not brought to trial within
6 months after entry of plea upon a complaint,
information, or indictment charging a. misdemeanor."
(Emphasis added.)
This st.atute manda.tes dismissal of a misdemeanor charge
if not brought to trial within six months if defendant has
not asked for the postponement and if the State has not shown
good cause for the delay. The State effectively concedes and
the record shows that defendant did not ask for a
postponement. The record is just as clear that the State had
several chances to ha-ve the trial set within the statutory
deadline, hut failed to do so.
On October 12, 1983, the State filed a misdemeanor
information in Yelloczrstone County District Court charging
defendant with violating section 61-7-103, MCA, a charge that
he failed to remain at the scene of a personal injury
accident. On the same day, the defendant appeared and pled
not guilty and the court set trial for February 28, 1984,
well within the six-month statutory deadline. However, on
January 15, 1984, the judge who was to preside over the
February 28 trial announced his resignation effective on
February 3. Despite this announcement the State did nothing
to assure that the February 28 trial date was still on. The
State neither moved for another judge to preside over the
trial nor that another trial date be set before another judge
that would be within the six-month statutory deadline.
After the resignation became effective on February 3,
the chief district judge issued an order on February 6
declaring that during the vacancy created by the judge's
resignation, counsel who had pending criminal matters before
the retired judge that required attention, could have a
temporary judge assigned upon request. The State failed to
ask that a temporary judge be assigned so that the case would
be heard on February 28 or on any other date within the
statutory deadline.
On February 16, the chief district judge issued a
memorandum stating that all hearings, pretrials and trials
that had been set for hearing before March 16 by the judge
who had retired, would be vacated and reset at a later time.
The State knew that the February 28 trial setting was off but
that it would have to be reset and tried before the statutory
deadline. However, the State did nothing until after the new
judge had been sworn in on March 16, a month after the State
was notified that the February 28 trial setting was vacated.
On March 23, counsel for the State met wit.h the new
judge and asked that trial be set for defendant. The Court
set April 3 0 as the trial date and March 3 0 as the omnibus
hearing for all motions to be considered. The State's
counsel did not inform the judge that the trial setting was
beyond the statutory six-month deadline, and clearly
consented t.o the setting.
On March 30, counsel for the State and counsel for
defen2ant met with the trial court for an omnibus hearing to
dispose of any pretrial matters. Even then the State did not
suggest to the court that a problem existed with relation to
the April 3 0 trial setting, and that it shou1.d be either
moved up or that the defendant could waive his right to the
benefit of the statute. Again, the State did nothing.
On April 12, 1984, the precise date on which six months
had expired from the time defendant had entered his plea to
the misdemeanor charge, defense counsel moved to dismiss the
complaint because defendant had not been tried within the
required six months. On April 24, the trial court dismissed
the complaint. The State's appeal followed.
We have set forth in the procedural history several
instances in which the State had the opportunity to request
another trial setting, but failed to do so. The State in
effect concedes and the record shows that defendant did not
request a postponement. The question is one then of
determining whether the State demonstrated "good cause"
within the meaning of section 46-13-201 ( 2 ) , MCA, for the
delay of trial beyond the six-month deadline. The trial
court held the State did not demonstrate qood cause and we
also hold that the State did not demonstrate good cause.
The State would have this Court impose a speedy trial
constitutional analysis in determining whether "good cause"
was met based on the six-month statutory deadline. The
speedy trial tests, however, apply only in the case of
felonies, and we would be inclined to apply them to
misdemeanors only if a statute did not exist that was even
more restrictive than the speedy trial tests. Here the
statutory deadline set forth in section 46-13-201(2), is more
strict than any constitutional analysis would he required to
be a i we simply use the statute as containing the sole
rd
standard of whether "good cause" for the delay has been
shown.
The State also argues that defendant must be held
responsible for the delay because defense counsel, in signing
off the check list at the omnibus hearing, did not indicate
that a problem of speedy trial loomed. on the horizon. But
the statute is clear and the facts are clear. If the
defendant requests the postponement the six-month trial
deadline does not apply. But if this is not so, then the
State must prove the existence of good cause for the delay.
Here the delay, occasioned in part by the resiqnation of
a judge and the appointment of a successor, is not the only
institutional delay that inheres in the process given these
circumstances. Rather, the State contributed to this delay
by its failure to take any action when it had knowledge that
the retiring judge would not be presiding over the trial on
February 28. The State did nothing until it met with the new
judge on March 23 and then the State acquiesced in the trial
settina for April 30, set at least two weeks past the
statutory deadline. Neither defendant nor h i s counsel w e r e
present at this hearing, and they can hardly be held
responsible f o r the t r i a l setting.
The District Court order dismissing the misdemeanor
c h a r g e s f o r f a i l u r e t o comply w i t h t h e six-month statutory
d e a d l i n e , i s a££irmed.
W e Concur:
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Chief ~ u s f i c e