In Re the Marriage of Good

No. 83-454
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
1984

IN RE THE MARRIAGE OF
JEANNE M. GOOD, n/k/a JEANNE
M. HARGETT,

Plaintiff, Respondent and
Cross-appellant,
and
GOOD,
Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Eleventh Judicial District,
In and for the County of Flathead,
The Honorable J.M. Salansky, Judge presiding.

COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For Appellant :

Garlington, Lohn & Robinson; E. Craig Daue, Missoula,
Montana

For Respondent :
Hash, Jellison, O'Brien & Bartlett; James C. Bartlett,
Kalispell, Montana

--
Submitted on Briefs: June 7, 1984
Decided: November 15, 1984

Clerk
Mr. J u s t i c e *John Conway H a r r i s o n d e l i v e r e d t h e O p i n i o n o f
t h e Court.

Appellant, Orville K. Good, filed a motion in the

Eleventh J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , County of Flathead, seeking t o

have t h e D i s t r i c t Court d e c l a r e h i s c h i l d s u p p o r t o b l i g a t i o n

f u l l y paid through t h e d a t e of t h e motion. The H o n o r a b l e

James M. Salansky conducted an evidentiary hearing and

entered an order in favor of appellant's wife for child

support arrearage in the amount o f $8,264.06. From that

o r d e r Mr. Good a p p e a l s and h i s e x - w i f e cross appeals. We

a ££ i r m .

Issues

(1) Whether an obligor husband may be given credit

against his child support obligation for payments made

outside the a m b i t of t h e d i v o r c e d e c r e e when the obligee

wife has o r a l l y agreed t o such c r e d i t .

( 2 ) When a n o b l i g e e w i f e who h a s a s s i g n e d h e r child

s u p p o r t r i g h t s u n d e r a Montana d e c r e e t o a n o t h e r s t a t e and

t h a t s t a t e a g r e e s w i t h t h e o b l i g o r husband d u r i n g t h e term

of t h e assignment t o a reduction i n h i s o b l i g a t i o n , is t h e

w i f e l a t e r e n t i t l e d t o judgment a g a i n s t t h e h u s b a n d f o r : a.

t h e amount of t h e r e d u c t i o n ; b. a n y o t h e r p a r t of t h e c h i l d

support assigned?

( 3 ) Did t h e t r i a l c o u r t make a m a t h e m a t i c a l e r r o r in

c o m p u t i n g t h e amount of c h i l d s u p p o r t a c c r u e d ?

Facts

By d e c r e e d a t e d J u n e 1 0 , 1970, t h e m a r r i a g e between

appellant and respondent was terminated, the four minor
children were placed in the custody of their mother and

appellant was ordered t o pay f i f t y d o l l a r s per child per

month c h i l d s u p p o r t . The d e c r e e was i s s u e d by t h e E l e v e n t h

J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t i n and f o r t h e C o u n t y o f F l a t h e a d .

R e s p o n d e n t h a s l i v e d i n t h e S t a t e of W a s h i n g t o n s i n c e

b e f o r e t h e d i v o r c e i n 1970. A p p e l l a n t h a s c o n s e q u e n t l y made

h i s c h i l d s u p p o r t payments t o t h e Washington Department of

S o c i a l and H e a l t h S e r v i c e s (WDSHS) and i n J u l y 1970 WDSHS

r e d u c e d a p p e l l a n t ' s s u p p o r t p a y m e n t s t o a t o t a l o f $150 p e r

month. WDSHS was t h e p a y e e of a p p e l l a n t ' s s u p p o r t p a y m e n t s

throu g h September of 1979. From t i m e t o time between t h e

date of the divorce and September of 1979, respondent

r e c e i v e d p u b l i c a s s i s t a n c e from WDSHS a n d a s a c o n d i t i o n t o

receiving such assistance assigned her support rights to

t h a t agency. The last time s u c h an a s s i g n m e n t was made,

June 6, 1 9 7 9 , r e s p o n d e n t a s s i g n e d t o WDSHS a l l u n p a i d c h i l d

s u p p o r t a c c r u e d t o t h a t d a t e u n d e r t h e Montana d e c r e e .

Appellant and respondent agreed orally between

themselves that appellant would pay certain of the

c h i l d r e n ' s m e d i c a l and d e n t a l b i l l s and i n r e t u r n r e s p o n d e n t

would g i v e him c r e d i t a g a i n s t h i s c h i l d s u p p o r t o b l i g a t i o n .

The p a r t i e s f u r t h e r agreed i n f o r m a l l y t h a t a p p e l l a n t would

n o t be o b l i g a t e d t o respondent f o r s u p p o r t of a c h i l d w h i l e

t h a t c h i l d l i v e d w i t h him.

Each o f t h e f o u r c h i l d r e n h a s l i v e d w i t h a p p e l l a n t f o r

certain periods of time since the date of the divorce.

Appellant has a l s o paid c e r t a i n medical and d e n t a l bills

i n c u r r e d by t h e c h i l d r e n . In each i n s t a n c e a p p e l l a n t h a s

taken c r e d i t a g a i n s t h i s support o b l i g a t i o n by n o t making

c e r t a i n payments t o re sp o n d e n t .
 Through correspondence with appellant during 1982,
WDSHS agreed to accept $3,000 as full payment of support
obligation from the date of the divorce through September of
1979.
By motion dated November 10, 1982, appellant sought an
order of the District Court declaring his child support
obligation fully paid through that date. At no time prior
to that motion did respondent seek to enforce her child
support rights other than through the WDSHS.

Discussion

I.

Appellant's first issue on appeal and respondent's
lone cross-appeal issue is whether it is proper to allow a
non-custodial parent credit against child support arrearage
for sums he paid to physicians and dentists in reliance upon
an oral promise of credit by the custodial parent.
Based upon substantial evidence presented at the
evidentiary hearing, the District Court Judge held there was
a proper agreement between the parents regarding credit for
payment of medical and dental bills and accordingly awarded
appellant more than $1,600 credit against his support
obligation. Respondent argues the District Court erred in

so holding because such a ruling essentially permits the
non-custodial parent to substitute his own judgment for that
of the custodial parent as to how child support monies are
to be spent. This argument is misplaced. The District
Court did not rule on whether the father's judgment was
being substituted for the mother's but rather ruled on
whether there was an agreement between the two parents on
this issue. The District Court found such an agreement
between the parties and we see no error in that finding.
The wife asked the husband to pay bills in lieu of
support payments and he did so, relying on her judgment.
Clearly, there was no substitution of judgment involved.
Respondent further argues the dissolution decree
cannot be modified to reduce or cancel past due and unpaid
child support and then cites six cases to buttress the
point. In one of those cases, Williams v. Budke (1980), 186
Mont. 71, 506 P.2d 515, this Court spelled out the correct
approach to this issue (an approach evidently overlooked by
respondent):
"Two Montana decisions have addressed the
issue of whether a parent upon whom a
child support obligation rests should be
granted credit for voluntary expenditures
made in a manner other than that
specified in the support order or
dissolution decree. Haaby v. Haaby
(1974), 165 Mont. 475, 529 P.2d 1387;
Weber v. Weber (1978), Mont., 576 P.2d
1102, 35 St.Rep. 309. However, af ter
examining the case law of this and other
jurisdictions we have found the basic
question addressed by the courts is
whether there has been substantial
compliance, in whole or in part, with the
child support order. Was the spirit and
purpose of the support order accomplished
without violating any other provision of
the dissolution decree? We believe this
is the correct approach to the issue."
In the instant case, we find no violation of the spirit and
purpose of the support order by granting appellant credit
for payments made to medical institutions. This is true
particularly since respondent asked appellant to do so. It
was nothing more than a streamlining of a payment process;
husband paid the doctors directly rather than going through
the wife as an intermediary. The dissolution decree was
left unscathed by the transaction and we will not agree with
respondent's contention that the District Court modified the
divorce decree.

11.
Next, appellant asserts as error the District Court's
ruling that respondent was entitled to a judgment against
him for the amount of the reduction in support payments
granted by the WDSHS and for any part of the child support
assigned by respondent to the WDSHS.

In order to receive public assistance from the State
of Washington, respondent assigned all of her unpaid child

support accrued through September 30, 1979 to the WDSHS.
During the term of the assignment the WDSHS agreed to a
reduction in support and to a compromise of the arrearage
with appellant. Appellant accepted, and made reduced

payment to WDSHS.
The court's findings of fact no. 7 and no. 8 were as
follows :
"7. That through January, 1983, and
considering the dates three of the
children obtained the age of majority,
the total obligation of $50.00 per month
per child is $25,000.00. The records
maintained by the State of Washinqton
through September 18, 1975, show payments
of $7,057.50. In addition, Plaintiff has
acknowledged payments totaling $5,000.00
through January 1983. In addition, a
recent payment made by attachment to
Defendant's IRS check in the sum of
$698.96 should be credited.
"8. That the total amount of arrearage
due is calculated as follows:
Total per Decree $25,000.00
Less records by State of
Washington -$7,057.50
Less payment acknowledged -$5,000.00
Less IRS payment -$ 698.96
 Less c r e d i t s f o r s t a y
Less c r e d i t s f o r medical,
d e n t a l and o r t h o d o n t a l
payments -$1,629.48
TOTAL DUE t h r o u q h J a n . 1 9 8 3

Thereafter, t h e c o u r t made t h e following conclusions

o f l a w and o r d e r :

"1. P u r s u a n t t o 40-4-208, MCA, t h e C o u r t
may m o d i f y c h i l d s u p p o r t o n l y a s t o
installments accruing subsequent t o t h e
t i m e a motion f o r m o d i f i c a t i o n is f i l e d .
No m o t i o n f o r m o d i f i c a t i o n was s u b m i t t e d
and t h e o b l i g a t i o n t o p a y c h i l d s u p p o r t
a t $50.00 p e r month p e r c h i l d r e m a i n s
unchanged. T h a t t h e C o u r t f i n d s no
a g r e e m e n t on t h e p a r t o f P l a i n t i f f t o
r e d u c e t h e $50.00 sum t o $37.50.

" 2 . T h a t D e f e n d a n t s h o u l d be g i v e n c r e d i t
f o r p a y m e n t s on b e h a l f o f t h e c h i l d r e n
made i n t h e p a s t f o r m e d i c a l , d e n t a l o r
o r t h o d o n t a l expenses.

"3. That t h e d i v o r c e d e c r e e provided f o r
no c e s s a t i o n o f s u p p o r t payinents d u r i n g
the summer visitation periods and
D e f e n d a n t s h o u l d be g i v e n no c r e d i t f o r
same other than those amounts
hereinbefore given.

" 4 . D e f e n d a n t had t h e b u r d e n o f p r o o f of
showing payment o f h i s s u p p o r t o b l i g a t i o n
and t h a t b u r d e n h a s n o t b e e n m e t .

" 5 . The C o u r t h a s j u r i s d i c t i o n o v e r t h i s
m a t t e r and h a s the r i g h t t o p r o t e c t t h e
p a r t i e s by making t h e o b l i g a t i o n f o r
arrearage payable j o i n t l y t o P l a i n t i f f
and t h e S t a t e o f W a s h i n g t o n , W e l f a r e
Department.

ORDER
"1. T h a t t h e P l a i n t i f f s h a l l r e c o v e r o f
t h e D e f e n d a n t t h e sum o f $ 8 , 2 6 4 . 0 6 , and
c o s t s of s u i t ;

" 2 . T h a t t h e v o l u n t a r y payment o f s a i d
sum by O r v i l l e K . Good s h a l l b e made b y
c h e c k o r money o r d e r made p a y a b l e t o
J e a n n e M. H a r g e t t and t h e S t a t e o f
Washington, Welfare Department;

"3. T h a t i n t h e e v e n t t h e sum i s
c o l l e c t e d i n v o l u n t a r i l y by e x e c u t i o n ,
J e a n n e PI. H a r g e t t s h a l l r e p o r t t h e amount
r e c e i v e d t o t h e Washington Department of
 Welfare;

" 4 . T h a t t h e r e q u e s t o f J e a n n e M. H a r g e t t
t o h a v e h e r t r a v e l e x p e n s e s p a i d and t o
have a t t o r n e y ' s f e e s a s s e s s e d , t o g e t h e r
with her motion f o r increased c h i l d
s u p p o r t w i l l b e h e a r d by t h e C o u r t on t h e
1 9 t h day of August, 1983, a t 9:30
o ' c l o c k , a.m.; and t h e D e f e n d a n t s h a l l
h a v e h i s a f f i d a v i t of f i n a n c i a l s t a t e m e n t
f i l e d ten (10) days before said hearing.
Defendant s h a l l produce f o r examination
b y P l a i n t i f f ' s c o u n s e l h i s 1980 and 1 9 8 1
income t a x r e t u r n a s w e l l a s wage
s t a t e m e n t s f o r 1982 t e n ( 1 0 ) d a y s b e f o r e
said hearing " .
The a p p e l l a n t argues that due to the fact his wife

r e c e i v e d p u b l i c a s s i s t a n c e from t h e S t a t e o f W a s h i n g t o n and

assigned all of her unpaid child support accrued through

September 30, 1979 to the WDSHS, he has no further

o b l i g a t i o n t o p a y t h e amount s e t f o r t h i n t h e d e c r e e . He

a r g u e s t h e WDSHS h a s t h e s t a t u t o r y a u t h o r i t y t o compromise

o r c h a r g e o f f a n y s u p p o r t a r r e a r a g e s a s s i g n e d t o i t and t h a t

during the term of t h e a s s i g n m e n t t h e WDSHS a g r e e d t o t h e

r e d u c t i o n of the support. He f u r t h e r argues t h a t because

h i s wife acquiesced i n t h e a c t i o n s t a k e n by t h e a p p e l l a n t
with the WDSHS for a period of thirteen years, she is

c i r c u m v e n t i n g t h e e f f e c t of h e r u n c o n d i t i o n a l a s s i g n m e n t o f

s u p p o r t t o t h e WDSHS and t h e r e s u l t i n g compromise made w i t h

t h a t agency. H e f u r t h e r argues t h e w i f e ' s assignment of h e r

c h i l d s u p p o r t r i g h t s u n d e r t h e Montana d e c r e e i s v a l i d . He

c i t e s t h e d i v o r c e d e c r e e h e r e i n i s a judgment u n d e r Montana

law. R u l e 5 4 ( A ) Montana R u l e s o f C i v i l P r o c e d u r e . "There

can be no question that a judgment is assignable."
G i n s b e r g e r v. Adams ( 1 9 2 2 ) , 62 Mont. 4 3 0 , 205 P . 658.

W e d o n o t f i n d t h e above c i t a t i o n a p p l i c a b l e t o t h i s

case. There is no question the effect of the wife's

i n t e r e s t i n t h e a c c r u e d s u p p o r t payments t o t h e s t a t e c a n be
a s s i g n e d and a l l o w s t h e s t a t e t o s t e p i n t o t h e s h o e s of the

wife. However, t h e w i f e does n o t have t h e r i g h t t o modify

t h e d i v o r c e d e c r e e f o r t h e a c c r u e d c h i l d s u p p o r t payments.

Nor d o e s e n t e r i n g i n t o an a s s i g n m e n t t o r e c e i v e w e l f a r e i n

a n y way a f f e c t t h e judgment of a c o u r t o f t h i s s t a t e . See,

In re the Marriage of Linda Williams and Larry Williams

(Mont. 1980), 612 P.2d 212, 37 St.Rep. 974; Williams v.
Budke (1980), 186 Mont. 71, 606 P.2d 515; Dahl v. Dahl

( 1 9 7 8 ) 1 7 6 Mont. 3 0 7 , 577 P.2d 1230. The appellant relies

on a W a s h i n g t o n compromise statute for his assertion that

t h e d i s s o l u t i o n d e c r e e c a n be m o d i f i e d a s t o a c c r u e d c h i l d

support. This compromise s t a t u t e provides in part: "The

Department may accept offers of compromise of disputed

c l a i m s from a p a r t i a l o r t o t a l c h a r g e - o f f of support a r r e a r s

owed to the Department to the total amount of public

a s s i s t a n c e paid t o or for the b e n e f i t of p e r s o n s f o r whom

the support obligation is incurred." See R.C.W. 75.20

A.220. I t s h o u l d be n o t e d t h a t t h e s t a t u t e r e f e r r e d t o and

relied upon, reveals that the state may only compromise

a r r e a r s owed t o t h e s t a t e . The s t a t u t e d o e s n o t p e r t a i n t o

support arrears due a parent. Clearly the state is n o t

subrogated t o a n y t h i n g i n e x c e s s of t h e amount awarded in

the o r i g i n a l decree. A s n o t e d i n Moore v . Yoore (Wash. App.

1 9 7 8 ) , 583 P.2d 1 2 4 9 , t h e W a s h i n g t o n c o u r t f o l l o w e d i t s own

court decision and held that its subrogation r i g h t s only
a p p l y t o t h e amount of the court ordered support, and d o e s

n o t a p p l y t o t h e f u l l amount t h a t was p a i d by t h e S t a t e o f

Washington t o the respondent i n t h i s case during t h e t i m e

s h e was on w e l f a r e .
 111.

Appellant finally asserts as error the District

Court's mathematical computation in adding a disallowed

c r e d i t t o t h e t o t a l amount o f s u p p o r t a c c r u e d . W e need c i t e

no authority to settle a question of simple mathematics.

A p p e l l a n t owes X amount of arrearage. From t h a t t o t a l he

c l a i m s Y amount o f credits. The D i s t r i c t C o u r t c a n n o t d o

more t h a n d i s a l l o w t h e c l a i m e d c r e d i t s t o t h e t o t a l amount

of arrearage, t o do s o would b e t o c h a r g e a p p e l l a n t twice

for an indebtedness--the mathematical e q u i v a l e n t of double

jeopardy.

Summary

Our h o l d i n g t o d a y i s d e s i g n e d t o e n f o r c e t h e t e r m s o f

s u p p o r t a s s p e c i f i e d by t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t d e c r e e ; not t o

enforce an extrajudicial modification by the WDSHS.

However, s i n c e t h e WDSHS i s a n a s s i g n e e i t h a s t h e r i g h t t o

proceed against the husband for any a r r e a r a g e s under its
a g r e e m e n t w i t h him. " T h i s s h o u l d n o t p r e c l u d e t h e w i f e from

proceeding i n her own r i g h t . " Moore v. Moore (Wash. App.

1 9 7 8 ) , 583 P.2d 1249, 1252. I n Moore t h e w i f e had a s s i g n e d

h e r s u p p o r t p a y m e n t s t o t h e WDSHS i n o r d e r t o r e c e i v e p u b l i c

assistance. The h u s b a n d had f a l l e n b e h i n d i n h i s payments

sometime during the assignment and continued to be

d e l i n q u e n t e v e n a f t e r t h e a s s i g n m e n t had b e e n d i s c o n t i n u e d .

The w i f e t h e n s t a r t e d a show-cause proceeding t o determine

t h e amount of d e l i n q u e n t c h i l d s u p p o r t . The c o u r t e n t e r e d

an o r d e r f i x i n g t h e amount o f d e l i n q u e n t s u p p o r t and a month

later t h e h u s b a n d moved t o join t h e WDSHS a s a necessary

party. The c o u r t d e n i e d t h e m o t i o n b u t amended t h e amount
o f d e l i n q u e n t s u p p o r t s e g r e g a t i n g w h a t was owed t h e w i f e and
what was owed t h e h u s b a n d .

The h u s b a n d a p p e a l e d c o n t e n d i n g h i s e x - w i f e "was n o t
e n t i t l e d t o a judgment f o r any c h i l d s u p p o r t d u r i n g t h e 4 0
m o n t h s i n which s h e was p a i d p u b l i c a s s i s t a n c e b e c a u s e s h e

had a s s i g n e d a l l h e r right, t i t l e and interest t o support
payments t o t h e s t a t e . " Moore, a t p. 1.251. The C o u r t o f

A p p e a l s of W a s h i n g t o n a f f i r m e d t h e w i f e ' s r i g h t t o proceed
i n h e r own r i g h t a g a i n s t t h e h u s b a n d e v e n f o r t h e p e r i o d s h e

had assigned her s u p p o r t r i g h t s t o t h e ImSHS. The c o u r t
reasoned t h e i n t e n t of t h e l e g i s l a t u r e when i t e n a c t e d t h e
s t a . t u t e r e q u i r i n g t h e payee of p u b l i c a s s i s t a n c e t o a s s i g n
a l l s u p p o r t r i g h t s is t o recoup p u b l i c monies. Therefore

t h e WDSHS h a s a right to subrogation against the wife's
judgment . However, t h e c o u r t s t a t e d :

"A b e t t e r p r o c e d u r e m i g h t h a v e been t o
s e r v e a c o p y o f t h e m o t i o n t o show c a u s e
on t h e s t a t e s o t h a t i t would h a v e b e e n
aware of t h e p r o c e e d i n g s e a r l i e r i n o r d e r
t o g i v e t h e d e p a r t m e n t an o p p o r t u n i t y t o
intervene. However, under these
c i r c u m s t a n c e s , s h e should n o t be estopped
t o p r o c e e d by t h e s t a t e ' s f a i l u r e t o
prosecute." Moore a t p. 1252.
I n o t h e r words, s i m p l y b e c a u s e t h e WDSHS had allowed the
husband to fall into arrears on his support during the
p e r i o d o f a s s i g n m e n t t h e w i f e was n o t p r e c l u d e d f r o m s e e k i n g

t o c o l l e c t those arrears.
I n t h e i n s t a n t c a s e w e s i m i l a r l y h o l d t h e w i f e may s u e

to recover any arrearages under the Montana decree, the
a g r e e m e n t b e t w e e n t h e h u s b a n d and t h e WDSHS n o t w i t h s t a n d i n g .
This holding today is n o t t o be construed to subject the
husband t o a d o u b l e c o l l e c t i o n b u t r a t h e r t o a l l o w t h e w i f e

t o p r o c e e d on h e r own r i g h t w h i l e a l l o w i n g t h e WDSHS ( o r a n y
o t h e r p u b l i c a s s i s t a n c e agency of any o t h e r s t a t e s i m i l a r l y
situated) the right of subrogation against a recovery by
her.

W e hold t h a t n e i t h e r Washington nor Montana case or
statutory law permits the modification of a dissolution
d e c r e e t o reduce or c a n c e l p a s t due o r unpaid c h i l d s u p p o r t

p a y m e n t s and t h a t t h e t r i a l c o u r t d i d n o t e r r i n g r a n t i n g
t h e r e s p o n d e n t , w i f e , a judgment f o r c h i l d s u p p o r t p u r s u a n t
to the dissolution decree, including the amount of the
public assistance received during t h a t t i m e .

The t h e D i s t r i c t Court is a f f i r m e d , e x c e p t
II
discusse
\aebii g)
&
i n i s u e 111. We

r e t u r n t o t h e D i s t r i c t Court with i n s t r u c t i o n s t o change its
o r d e r t o comply w i t h t h i s o p i n i o n .

W e concur: