IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
No. 84-102
JIMMY RAY HEIDEMA,
Personal Representative of
the Estate of Louis Heidema,
Jr., Deceased, AGNES HEIDEMA,
LOUIS J. HEIDEMA, JUDITH
GAIL HEIDEMA, JIMMY RAY
HEIDEMA, individually, and
LEILA MAY HEIDEMA, d/b/a
Heidema Partnership,
Defendants and Appellants,
FIRST BANK (N.A.)-BILLINGS,
Plaintiff and Respondent.
ORDER OF DISMISSAL
AND OPINION
The Heidemas appeal from an order of the District
Court of the Thirteenth Judicial District, Yellowstone
County, sustaining plaintiff First Bank's objections to
defendants' request for a jury trial. For the reasons
stated below, we dismiss the appeal as premature.
Plaintiff First Bank filed suit against the Heidemas
in June, 1982, to recover monies due on two promissory
notes. The Heidemas retained counsel, who filed a series of
motions, including a motion to dismiss, before being removed
and replaced by another attorney in September, 1982. An
answer to the original complaint was filed shortly
thereafter, but the answer did not contain a demand for jury
trial. A pretrial conference was held in June, 1983, with a
non-jury trial scheduled for later that month. Three days
before trial, defendants sought and obtained a continuance,
after which time defendants' attorney withdrew as counsel of
record.
In October, defendants, acting pro se, filed an
amended answer with a request for jury trial. The amended
answer is more detailed than the original answer, and sets
forth several affirmative defenses and counterclaims against
First Bank. However, it appears that both the original and
the amended answer relate to the same conduct, transaction
or occurrence in dispute.
First Bank filed objections to the late request for
jury trial. Upon examination of the pleadings, the District
Court sustained the objections and denied defendants' demand
for jury trial. Defendants appeal from this denial.
We dismiss this appeal as premature. Denial of a
timely - belated request for a jury trial is not a final
or
judgment appealable under Rule l(a), M.R.App.Civ.P. The
denial is in the nature of an interlocutory order, and can
only be made appealable by specific rule or statute.
Neither Rules l(b) or l(c), M.R.App.Civ.P., which enumerate
certain orders that fall short of final judgment but which
are appealable, provide for immediate appeal of a denial of
demand for jury trial. Any improprieties involved in the
denial are reversible only upon appeal from the final
judgment in the case.
IT IS ORDERED:
1. The appeal is dismissed as premature.
2. The Clerk is directed to mail a true copy of this
Order to the defendants and counsel for plaintiff.
DATED this 3& day of July, 1984.
Justices
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