No. 83-298
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
1984
I N THE MATTER OF
C.S., a Youth.
APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Tenth Judicial District,
In and for the County of Fergus,
The Honorable Peter Rapkoch, Judge presiding.
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For Appellant:
Thomas Meissner argued, Lewistown, Montana
For Respondent:
Eon. Mike Greely, Attorney General, Helena, Montana
Jim Scheier argued, Asst. Atty. General, Helena
John Paulson, Deputy County Attorney, Lewistown,
Montana
Submitted: February 29, 1934
Decided: May 24, 1984
Filed:
I ' '984
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Clerk
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Mr. Justice John Conway Harrison delivered the Opinion of
the Court.
This case arose out of a series of incidents which led
to appellant being adjudged a delinquent youth. From an
order of commitment placing her in the custody of the
Montana Department of Institutions, this appeal is taken.
On March 31, 1983, the Fergus County Attorney filed a
petition for a Youth Hearing in the District Court of the
Tenth Judicial District of the State of Montana, requesting
that appellant be adjudged a delinquent youth. At the time,
she was fifteen years of age. The petition alleged that
during the month of March, 1983, appellant committed the
offense of violation of privacy in communication, a
misdemeanor as provided in Section 45-8-213, MCA. The facts
underlying the offense were that on three separate
occasions, appellant and several minor friends made numerous
telephone calls to a Lewistown, Montana residence. The
purpose and effect of these calls was to harrass a woman
living there. On April 6, 1983, an evidentiary hearing was
held, at which the District Court found the allegations of
the petition to be true.
The dispositional hearing was held on April 13, 1983,
and appellant was ordered committed to the Department of
Institutions until she reaches the age of twenty-one, unless
the Department deems an earlier release appropriate. She
was placed in the Mountain View School for Girls in Helena.
A notice of appeal was filed with this Court on May 17,
1983, however, jurisdiction was returned to the District
Court to allow entry of findings. After the findings were
properly entered, this Court resumed jurisdiction for the
purpose of this appeal.
The sole issue raised on appeal is whether appellant's
constitutional right to equal protection has been denied
because her term of commitment is potentially longer than
the maximum sentence which could have been imposed had the
same offense been committed by an adult. The maximum amount
of time appellant could spend in the custody of the
Department of Institutions is six years, which is much more
than the maximum sentence for adults who have committed the
offense of violation of privacy in communications. Section
45-8-213, MCA, provides for a fine of $500 or imprisonment
of up to six months or both had the same offense been
prosecuted in a criminal action.
The initial inquiry in any equal protection analysis
is whether the identified groups or classes are similarly
situated with respect to the challenged statute, ruling or
governmental action. Montana Land Title Association v.
First American Title (1975), 167 Mont. 471, 539 P.2d 711.
We find that adults and minors are not similarly situated
with respect to Montana's sentencing laws for three reasons.
First, as the State points out, appellant was not
convicted of a crime but committed after being found a
delinquent youth under Section 41-5-403, MCA. While it is
true that both commitment and sentencing are deprivations of
physical liberty, the cause and desired result of each is
different. A sentence of imprisonment following a criminal
conviction is imposed because a particular crime was
committed, and its purpose is both retributional and
rehabilitational. Though a juvenile commitment is usually
triggered by a crime, the commitment is strictly for
rehabilitation, not retribution. The purpose of the Youth
Court Act is to, ". . . [Plrovide for the care, protection,
and wholesome mental and physical development," of youths
falling under its jurisdiction, and ". . . [T]o remove from
youth committing violations of the law the element of
retribution and to substitute therefore a program of
supervision, care [and] rehabilitation. . . " Section
41-5-102, MCA. There is more than an artificial distinction
between commitment under the Youth Court Act and sentencing
under the Montana Criminal Code. Thus an adult sentenced
for a crime and a juvenile committed to the youth
authorities are not similarly situated with respect to the
purpose of their detention.
Second, the physical liberty interests of minors and
adults are qualitatively different. The liberty interest of
a minor is subject to reasonable regulation by the state, to
an extent not permissible with adults. Planned Parenthood
of Central Missouri v. Danforth (1976), 428 U.S. 52, 96
S.Ct. 2831, 49 L.Ed.2d 788 and Carey v. Population Services
International (1977) 431 U.S. 678, 97 S.Ct. 2010, 52 L.Ed.2d
675. Danforth, Carey and the cases cited therein make it
clear that, contrary to appellant's claim, the doctrine of
parens patriae is very viable today.
Finally, we have examined those cases cited from other
jurisdictions which have addressed this question, and found
persuasive those which concluded that adults and juveniles
are not similarly situated in these circumstances. cf. In
Re Eric J. (Cal. 1980), 601 P.2d 549. Those cases have
relied on the reasoning outlined above in upholding
commitments similar to appellant's here. Though each
s t a t e ' s j u v e n i l e c o r r e c t i o n s a c t is arguably d i f f e r e n t , t h e
purpose of each is t h e same; t o provide a mechanism through
which t h e s t a t e can a c t a s t h e parens p a t r i a e of i t s youth.
Affirmed.
W concur:
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Chief J u s t i c ' e \