No. 85-422
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
1985
IN THE MATTER OF THE MENTAL
HEALTH OF D. B.
APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Seventh Judicial District,
In and for the County of Richland,
The Honorable Nat Allen, Judge presiding.
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For Appellant:
Larry D. Mansch, Glendive, Montana
For Respondent :
Phillip N. Carter, Deputy County Attorney, Sidney,
Montana
Submitted on Briefs: Oct. 25, 1985
Decided: November 27, 1985
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Clerk
Mr. Justice Frank B. Morrison, Jr. delivered the Opinion of
the Court.
Respondent D.R. appeals from a commitment order entered
in the Seventh Judicial District Court, County of Richland.
We affirm the order.
On June 14, 1985, the Richland County Deputy Attorney,
at the request of D.B. 's mother, filed a petition seeking to
commit D.B. The petition alleged four grounds for
commitment:
A. That on June 12, 1985, at approximately 1:30
a.m., the respondent woke his mother, [J.B.] , and
accused her of cutting up his pork chops.
B. That on June 12, 1.985, at approximately 2:00
o'clock a.m., the respondent went to his sister's
house and demanded that that [sic] she return his
car to him. The car he was demanding belongs to
his sister and her husband.
C. That on June 12, 1985, at approximately 3:00
o'clock p.m., the respondent was found in the Gary
Schlenz residence in Glen.dive, Montana. The
respond.ent was unknown to the Schlenz family and
had no authority to be there.
D. On June 10, 1985, the respondent told Officer
Marvin Johnson of the Richland County Sheriff's
Department that the respondent was not really there
and later he could be beamed to different places
and that Brooke Shields was older than she claimed.
Probable cause was found to support the petition.
Thereafter, Larry Mansch was appointed to represent D.B. as
his legal counsel. Peter J. Bruno was appointed as the
Professional Person to examine D.B.
D.B. requested a trial by jury. It was held June 25,
1985. At the trial, D.B.'s mother, his sister and Peter
Bruno, a psychologist, testified that they believed D.B. to
be seriously mentally ill and that the least restrictive
placement alternative would be Warm Springs State Hospital.
D.B. testified in his own behalf. Thereafter, the jury
unanimously determined D .B. to be seriously mentally i.11,
pursuant to S 53-21-102(14), MCA. A dispositional hearing
was held immediately, following which the trial judge
committed D.B. to Warm Springs State Hospital for "a period
of time not to exceed ninety ( 9 0 ) days, as is necessary to
adequately treat the respondent."
D.B. raises two issues on appeal:
1. Did the District Court err in allowing the jury to
hear evidence regarding violent behavior on the part of D.B.
when that behavior took place several years previous to this
petition and when those incidents were not set forth as
allegations in the petition?
2. Did the State fa.il to meet its burden of proof as
found in 53-21-126(2), MCA?
We find no error in the admittance of evidence of D.B. 's
past violent behavior. Rule 402, M.R.Evid., allows the
admittance of relevant evidence. "Relevant evidence means
evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any
fact that is of consequence to the determination of the
action more probable or less probable than it would be
without the evidence." Rule 401, M.R.Evid.
Section 53-21-126(2), MCA, states in part:
Imminent threat of self-inflicted injury or injury
to others shall be evidenced by overt acts,
sufficiently recent in time as to be material and
relevant as to the respondent's present condition.
D.B.'s past behavior is both material and relevant to his
present condition in that it shows the progression of D.B.'s
illness. It provides the jury with a history of his
problems, his family's efforts to work with him and his
potential with proper treatment. The past events are
unquestionably linked to D.B.'s present condition and could
make a determination of "seriously mentally ill" more
probable. We find no abuse of discretion by the trial judge
in choosing to allow the jury to hear that evidence.
Secondly, we find that the State met its burden of proof
as set forth in S 53-21-126(2), MCA.
(2) The standard of proof in any hearing held
pursuant to this section is proof beyond a
reasonable doubt with respect to any physical facts
or evidence and clear and convincing evidence as to
all other matters, except that mental disorders
shall be evidenced to a reasonable medical
certainty.
In order to commit D .B. , the jury had to find that the
evidence proved D.B. to be seriously mentally ill,
S 53-21-127 (2), MCA, that is "suffering from a mental
disorder which has resulted in self-inflicted injury or
injury to others or the imminent threat thereof or which has
deprived the person afflicted of the ability to protect his
life or health." Section 53-21-102 (14), MCA. This section
requires that respondent be a present threat to others or
presently unable to protect his life or health. In the
Matter of R.T. (1983), 665 P.2d 789, 790, 40 St.Rep. 1025,
There is sufficient evidence to support the jury's
determination that D.B. is seriously mentally ill. Not only
has he exhibited violent behavior in the past, his sister
testified that she felt threatened by him on the morning of
June 11, 1985, when he entered her home demanding the keys to
her car. Further, D.B. was found in a stranger's home that
same day. Fortunately, the woman responded calmly and no one
was hurt. However, the result could have been far more
tragic had she panicked. Finally, Peter Bruno, D.B.'s
court-appointed psychologist, testified that he believed D.B.
to be seriously mentally ill; that he lacked the ability to
care for himself, specifically in that he refuses to take his
medication; and that he poses a threat to others.
This evidence, if believed, supports the verdict.
We concur:
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Chief Justice