No. 85-232
I N THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
1985
C I T Y OF HAMILTON,
P l a i n t i f f and Respondent,
-vs-
BYRON CRAIG HAYDEN,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL FROM: D i s t r i c t C o u r t of t h e F o u r t h J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t ,
I n a n d F o r t h e C o u n t y of R a v a l l i ,
T h e H o n o r a b l e John S . H e n s o n , Judge p r e s i d i n g .
COUNSEL O F RECORD:
For Appellant:
J u d i t h A. Loring, Hamilton, Montana
F o r Respondent:
Koch, McKenna, Goheen & Boggs; D.W. McKenna, Hamilton,
Montana
S u b m i t t e d on B r i e f s : Oct. 3, 1985
Decided: November 1 4 , 1985
Filed:
NUI/ 1 4 1985
Clerk
M r . J u s t i c e Franlr B. Morrison, Jr. d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion o f
t h e Court.
D e f e n d a n t B y r o n Hayden a p p e a l s h i s A p r i l 2 9 , 1985, j u r y
conviction in the District Court of the Fourth Judicial
District, for driving under the influence of alcohol. We
reverse t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t j u d g m e n t and d i s m i s s t h e cause.
D e f e n d a n t w a s a r r e s t e d a n d c h a r g e d w i t h D U I on J u l y 2 ,
1983, i n Hamilton, Montana. Defendant waived h i s r i g h t t o a
speedy t r i a l a t the c i t y court l e v e l on November 10, 1983.
Subsequently, he was tried and convicted in C i t y Court on
January 26, 1984. Defendant filed a defective notice of
a p p e a l t o t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t on February 2 , 1 9 8 4 ; a n amended
n o t i c e o f a p p e a l w a s f i l e d o n March 1 5 , 1984. On A p r i l 5,
1984, t h e C i t y o f Hamilton ( C i t y ) moved t o d i s m i s s t h e a p p e a l
a s being untimely. An o r d e r d e n y i n g t h e m o t i o n t o d i s m i s s
was e n t e r e d on May 11, 1 9 8 5 .
Defendant f i l e d a motion t o dismiss f o r lack o f speedy
trial on August 21, 1984. T h i s was denied on August 30,
1 9 8 4 , and d e f e n d a n t a p p l i e d t o t h e Montana Supreme C o u r t f o r
a w r i t o f s u p e r v i s o r y c o n t r o l on September 4, 1984. The w r i t
w a s d e n i e d on O c t o b e r 22, 1984, and t h e m a t t e r r e t u r n e d t o
the District Court. Defendant filed a second motion to
d i s m i s s f o r l a c k o f s p e e d y t r i a l on M a r c h 6 , 1 9 8 5 , w h i c h w a s
d e n i e d A p r i l 5 , 1985.
Defendant f a i l e d t o appear a t t h e jury t r i a l scheduled
on April 8, 1985, and t h e m a t t e r was reset for April 29,
1985. T r i a l was h e l d on A p r i l 29, 1985, and t h e j u r y found
defendant guilty of DUI. On appeal., the sole issue is
whether d e f e n d a n t was d e n i e d h i s constitutional right t o a
speedy t r i a l .
In S t a t e - -
v . Knox ( 1 9 8 4 ) , 675 P . 2 d 950, 4 1 St.Rep. 126,
w e h e l d t h a t a d e f e n d a n t who a p p e a l s a l o w e r c o u r t d e c i s i o n
t o t h e d i s t r i c t court level has a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r i g h t t o a
speedy t r i a l . Whether o r n o t a d e f e n d a n t h a s been d e p r i v e d
of this right involves a balancing of four factors: 1)
length of delay; 2) reason for the delay; 3) defendant's
a s s e r t i o n o f h i s r i g h t t o a speedy t r i a l ; and 4 ) p r e j u d i c e t o
t h e defendant. Applying t h e s e f a c t o r s t o t h e p r e s e n t c a s e ,
w e f i n d t h e d e f e n d a n t was d e n i e d h i s c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r i g h t t o
a speedy t r i a l a t t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t l e v e l .
D e f e n d a n t ' s amended n o t i c e o f a p p e a l w a s f i l e d March 1 5 ,
1984, and h i s first trial d a t e was set f o r April 8, 1985,
over one year later. A delay of nearly 1 3 months is
sufficient to s h i f t t h e burden to the City t o explain the
reason for the delay and the absence of prejudice to the
defendant. S t a t e v . Tiedemann ( 1 9 7 8 ) , 1 7 8 Mont 3 9 4 , 584 P.2d
1284.
The City cites the District Court opinion denying
defendant's motion to dismiss for lack of speedy t r i a l in
a s s e r t i n g t h e major reasons f o r delay w e r e t h e motions f i l e d
by the defendant. The District Court opinion is not
s u p p o r t e d b y t h e f a c t s , i n t h a t it i g n o r e s t h e " d e a d t i m e " i n
t h i s c a s e from May 11, 1 9 8 4 t o A u g u s t 2 1 , 1984, and O c t o b e r
23, 1984, to March 6, 1985. We find an unintentional
institutional delay of 236 days i s unacceptable where the
C i t y h a s o f f e r e d no r e a s o n f o r t h e d e l a y .
The C i t y a r g u e s t h e r e h a s b e e n n o s h o w i n g o f p r e j u d i c e
a g a i n s t t h e d e f e n d a n t c a u s e d by t h e d e l a y i n g e t t i n g t h e c a s e
to trial. I n T i e d e m a n n , we s a i d p r e j u d i c e would b e p r e s u m e d
where there is excessive delay between the date of the
occurrence and the time of trial. 178 Mont. at 407, 584 P.2d
at 1292. In this case, the City has presented no substantial
credible evidence showing that the delay has not prejudiced
the defendant.
The judgment of the District Court is reversed and the