No. 84-555
I N THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE O F MONTANA
1985
ARLYN J. SOOY,
P l a i n t i f f and A p p e l l a n t ,
PETROLANE S T E E L GAS, INC.,
e t al.,
D e f e n d a n t s and R e s p o n d e n t s ,
APPEAL FROM: D i s t r i c t C o u r t of t h e F i f t h J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t ,
I n and f o r t h e C o u n t y of B e a v e r h e a d ,
T h e H o n o r a b l e Frank D a v i s , Judge p r e s i d i n g .
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For Appellant:
B u r g e s s , Joyce & Whelan; T h o m a s F. Joyce a r g u e d ,
Butte, Montana
For Respondents:
Corette, S m i t h , P o h l m a n & A l l e n ; L i s a S w a n argued
f o r P e t r o l a n e S t e e l G a s , B u t t e , Pllontana
P o o r e , R o t h & R o b i n s o n ; I . R i c h a r d O r i z o t t i argued
for Exxon Corp., B u t t e , Montana
H e n n i n g s o n & P u r c e l l ; J a m e s E. P u r c e l l argued f o r
Shell O i l , B u t t e , Montana
Submitted: Nay 30, 1 9 3 5
Decided: $ J o v e m b e r 1 2 , 1 9 35
Filed:
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M r . J u s t i c e J o h n Conway H a r r i s o n d e l i v e r e d t h e O p i n i o n of t h e
Court.
This is an appeal from a judgment of the District
Court, Fifth Judicial District, Beaverhead County, denying
plaintiff, Arlyn J. Sooy's motion for leave to file an
amended complaint and granting respondents' motions for
summary j u d g m e n t . W e reverse.
On June 19, 1980, Sooy a t t e m p t e d t o light the pilot
l i g h t on t h e h o t w a t e r h e a t e r i n t h e b a s e m e n t o f h i s home i n
Wisdom. An e x p l o s i o n ensued and h e w a s s e r i o u s l y i n j u r e d .
O J u n e 1 7 , 1 9 8 3 , h e f i l e d a c o m p l a i n t i n S i l v e r Bow C o u n t y .
n
In the complaint Sooy a l l e g e d that he bought propane from
Petrolane Steel Gas, Inc. and P e t r o l a n e S t e e l Gas S e r v i c e ,
t h a t t h e s e d e f e n d a n t s f a i l e d t o add a n o d o r i z i n g a g e n t t o t h e
propane, and as a result, he could not smell t h e escaping
p r o p a n e when h e l i t t h e m a t c h t h a t c a u s e d t h e e x p l o s i o n . In
a d d i t i o n t o P e t r o l a n e S t e e l G a s , I n c . a n d P e t r o l a n e S t e e l Gas
Service, Sooy named, by fictitious names, other defendants
whose n e g l i g e n c e may h a v e c a u s e d him i n j u r y . He also alleged
damages t o h i s r e a l p r o p e r t y .
The t w o named d e f e n d a n t s were s e r v e d on J u n e 2 2 , 1983,
and r e s p o n d e d on J u l y 1 9 , 1 9 8 3 , b y f i l i n g a m o t i o n t o d i . s m i s s
and to change venue to Beaverhead County. The m o t i o n to
c h a n g e v e n u e was g r a n t e d .
Shortly thereafter, Sooy l e a r n e d t h a t Exxon, S h e l l O i l ,
P e t r o l a n e S u p p l y a n d P e r r y Gas P r o d u c t s w e r e t h e r e F i n e r s o f
propane furnished to named defendants and that they were
responsible for adding the odorant to the propane a t the
refinery. Therefore, on June 11, 1 9 8 4 , h e had additional
summons issued, and the summons, a copy of the original
complaint, and n o t i c e w e r e s e r v e d on J u n e 1 4 , 1984 on G . T.
Corporation, t h e designated agent f o r s e r v i c e of process of
t h e f o u r newly d i s c o v e r e d d e f e n d a n t s . Exxon was made a p a r t y
a s John Doe No. 3; S h e l l O i l a s John Doe No. 4; Petrolane
S u p p l y a s J o h n Doe No. 5 , and P e r r y Gas a s John Doe No. 6.
Each o f t h e s e f o u r d e f e n d a n t s f i l e d a motion t o d i s m i s s
and moved f o r summary judgment. They a r g u e d t h a t none o f
them knew o f t h e a c t i o n u n t i l June 1 4 , 1 9 8 4 , and t h a t t h e
s t a t u t e of l i m i t a t i o n s had r u n on S o o y ' s c l a i m a g a i n s t them
on J u n e 1 9 , 1983.
O August
n 15, 1984, a h e a r i n g was h e l d a t which Sooy
moved t o f i l e an amended c o m p l a i n t . The amended c o m p l a i n t
changed t h e names o f t h e John Does t o t h e t r u e names o f t h e
f o u r c o r p o r a t e d e f e n d a n t s , r e a l l e g e d Count One, d e l e t e d Count
Two relating t o property damage, and substituted a strict
l i a b i l i t y claim a r i s i n g out of the facts set f o r t h i n t h e
i n i t i a l complaint. On August 30, 1984, t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t
d e n i e d t h e motion t o f i l e a n amended c o m p l a i n t and g r a n t e d
d e f e n d a n t s ' m o t i o n s f o r summary judgment.
Two i s s u e s a r e p r e s e n t e d f o r review:
(1) Whether t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t e r r e d i n d e n y i n g Sooy
l e a v e t o f i l e an amended c o m p l a i n t .
(2) Whether t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t e r r e d i n f i n d i n g t h a t
the s t a t u t e of limitations, S 27-2-204, MCA, barred Sooy's
c l a i m a g a i n s t Exxon, Shell O i l , P e t r o l a n e S u p p l y , and P e r r y
Gas.
We find first that the District Court did err in
d e n y i n g Sooy l e a v e t o f i l e a n amended c o m p l a i n t . Rule 15 ( a )
M.R.Civ.P. p r o v i d e s t h a t "A p a r t y may amend h i s p l e a d i n g o n c e
as a matter of course at any time before a responsive
pleading i s served ..." A t t h e t i m e Sooy moved f o r l e a v e
to file an amended complaint, defendants Exxon, Shell,
Petrolane Supply, and Perry Gas had made no responsive
pleading. Therefore, a p p e l l a n t should have been allowed t o
amend h i s c o m p l a i n t a g a i n s t t h e s e f o u r d e f e n d a n t s r e g a r d l e s s
of whether the court later felt bound to grant summary
judgment. Defendants Petrolane Steel Gas, Inc. , and
P e t r o l a n e S t e e l Gas S e r v i c e d i d f i l e r e s p o n s i v e p l e a d i n g s a n d
t h u s , a s t o t h e m , a p p e l - l a n t would n o t h a v e b e e n a b l e t o amend
h i s complaint "as a matter of course." However, Rule 1 5 ( a )
f u r t h e r p r o v i d e s t h a t onc e a r e s p o n s i v e p l e a d i n g i s s e r v e d "a
p a r t y may amend h i s p l e a d i n g o n l y by leave of c o u r t o r by
written consent of the adverse party; -
and leave
s h a l l b e f r e e l y g i v e n when j u s t i c e -
so requires." (Emphasis
added.) I n L i e n v . Murphy C o r p o r a t i o n (Mont. 1 9 8 2 ) , 6 5 6 P.2d
8 0 4 , 39 St.Rep. 2 2 5 2 , t h e p l a i n t i f f moved t o amend n i n e y e a r s
a f t e r t h e c o m p l a i n t was o r i g i n a l l y f i l e d . The D i s t r i c t C o u r t
d e n i e d t h e m o t i o n t o amend. We reversed, finding t h a t there
was n o b a d f a i t h , d i l a t o r y m o t i v e , o r u n d u e d e l a y on t h e p a r t
of the movant. In addition, we found that the amended
complaint stemmed from t h e same o c c u r r e n c e a s t h e o r i g i n a l
complaint and would cause only minimal prejudice to the
defendant. I n t h e p r e s e n t c a s e a l l o w i n g a n amended c o m p l a i n t
would not have prejudiced the two defendants who filed
responsive pleadings, as Sooy merely sought to add an
additional theory of l i a b i l i t y based on t h e same o p e r a t i v e
facts. Further, t h e r e i s no e v i d e n c e t h a t S o o y ' s m o t i o n t o
amend t h e c o m p l a i n t w a s m o t i v a t e d b y b a d f a i t h o r a d e s i r e t o
delay. Under t h e s e c i r c u m s t a n c e s w e f i n d t h a t t h e D i s t r i c t
Court erred by not granting Sooy leave to amend. With
respect t o t h e o r i g i n a l l y named d e f e n d a n t s , P ~ t r o l a n eS t e e l
Gas, Inc., and Petrolane Steel Gas Service, the amended
complaint relates back to the filing of the original
c o m p l a i n t a s p r o v i d e d by R u l e 1 5 ( c ) , M.R.Civ.P.
The s e c o n d i s s u e p r e s e n t e d by t h i s c a s e r e q u i r e s t h a t
w e re-examine Vincent v. Edwards ( 1 9 7 9 ) , 184 Mont. 92, 601
P.2d 1184. In that c a s e when the original complaint was
f i l e d t h e p l a i n t i f f had p o s i t i v e l y i d e n t i f i e d two d e f e n d a n t s .
T h r e e o t h e r d e f e n d a n t s whom t h e p l a i n t i f f had n o t p o s i t i v e l y
identified were d e s i c ~ n a t e d by f i c t i t i o u s names p u r s u a n t to
§ 25-5-103, MCA. When the identities of these three
d e f e n d a n t s w e r e d i s c o v e r e d t h e p l a i n t i f f moved t o amend t h e
o r i g i n a l c o m p l a i n t i n o r d e r t o s u b s t i t u t e t h e r e a l names f o r
t h e f i c t i t i o u s names. The m o t i o n was g r a n t e d and a n amended
c o m p l a i n t was f i l e d . The t h r e e f i c t i t i o u s l y named d e f e n d a n t s
moved f o r summary judgment on t h e g r o u n d s t h a t t h e s t a t u t e o f
l i m i t a t i o n s had r u n on p l a i n t i f f ' s c l a i m u n d e r 5 2 7 - 2 - 2 0 4 ( 1 ) ,
MCA. This Court affirmed the summary judgment on appeal,
relying on the provisions of Rule 15(c), M.R.Civ.P., as
applying t o f i c t i t i o u s l y named d e f e n d a n t s . In t h e case a t
bar, t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t r e l i e d on o u r h o l d i n g i n V i n c e n t v.
Edwards, in determining that in this case the statute of
limitations had run against the plaintiff as to the
f i c t i t i o u s l y named d e f e n d a n t s .
W e r e a l i z e now t h a t i n d e c i d i n g V i n c e n t v . Edwards, w e
did not take i n t o a c c o u n t t h e s t a t u s o f d e f e n d a n t s who a r e
named as parties under fictitious names when the original
c o m p l a i n t h a s been f i l e d .
The a p p l i c a b l e s t a t u t e i s S 25-5-103, which p r o v i d e s :
S u i n g a p a r t y by a f i c t i t i o u s name. When
t h e p l a i n t i f f i s i g n o r a n t o f t h e name o f
t h e -defendant, s u c h d e f e n d a n t may b e
designated i n any pleading or proceeding
by a n y name; and when h i s t r u e name i s
discovered, t h e pleadings o r proceedings
may b e amended a c c o r d i n g l y .
No case decided by this Court prior to Vincent v.
Edwards h a d d e t e r m i n e d w h e t h e r a f i c t i t i o u s l y named d e f e n d a n t
is a party to the action from t h e filing of the original
complaint. We now ho1.d t h a t when a c o m p l a i n t s e t s f o r t h a
c a u s e o f a c t i o n a g a i n s t a d e f e n d a n t d e s i g n a t e d by f i c t i t i o u s
name and his true name is thereafter discovered and
s u b s t i t u t e d by amendment, t h e f i c t i t i o u s l y named d e f e n d a n t i s
considered a party t o the action from i t s commencement so
that the statute of limitations stops running as to the
f i c t i t i o u s p a r t y on t h e d a t e t h e o r i g i n a l c o m p l a i n t i s f i l e d .
Accord, see O l d e n v . H a t c h e l (Cal. 1 9 8 4 ) , 201 C a l . R p t r . 71.5,
1 5 4 Cal.App.3d 1032. But i f parties are a d d e d b y amended
c o m p l a i n t a s new p a r t i e s a n d n o t a s p r e s e n t l y i d e n t i f i e d b u t
f o r m e r l y f i c t i t i o u s l y named d e f e n d a n t s , t h e amended c o m p l a i n t
does not relate back to the date of filing the original
c o m p l a i n t and t h e s t a t u t e o f l i m i t a t i o n s i s n o t t o l l e d a s t o
s u c h new p a r t i e s . Anderson v . Allstate I n s u r a n c e Co. (9th
Cir.Ca1. 1 9 8 0 ) , 630 F.2d 677 (applying California law). A
later identified party, formerly sued under a fictitious
name, i s a p a r t y from t h e b e g i n n i n g . Freeman v. S t a t e Farm
Mutual Automobile I n s u r a n c e Co. (Cal. 1 9 7 5 ) , 535 P.2d 341.
In deciding Vincent v. Edwards, we gave an improper
interpretation to the provisions of Rule 1 5 ( c ) , M.R.Civ.P.
That r u l e provides:
R e l a t i o n b a c k o f amendments. Whenever t h e
c l a i m o r d e f e n s e a s s e r t e d i n t h e amended
pleading arose out of the conduct,
transaction, o r occurrence set f o r t h o r
attempted t o be set f o r t h i n t h e o r i g i n a l
p l e a d i n g , t h e amendment r e l a t e s b a c k t o
t h e d a t e of t h e o r i g i n a l p l e a d i n g . An
amendment c h a n g i n g t h e p a r t y a g a i n s t whom
a c l a i m i s a s s e r t e d r e l a t e s back i f t h e
foregoing provision i s s a t i s f i e d and,
w i t h i n t h e p e r i o d p r o v i d e d by law f o r
commencing t h e a c t i o n a g a i n s t him, t h e
p a r t y t o b e b r o u g h t i n by amendment ( I - )
has received such notice of the
i n s t i t u t i o n of t h e a c t i o n t h a t he w i l l
n o t be p r e j u d i c e d i n maintaining h i s
d e f e n s e on t h e m e r i t s , and ( 2 ) knew o r
s h o u l d h a v e known t h a t , b u t f o r a m i s t a k e
concerning t h e i d e n t i t y o f t h e proper
p a r t y , t h e a c t i o n would h a v e been b r o u g h t
a g a i n s t him. ..
I t w i l l b e s e e n from a r e a d i n g o f R u l e 1 5 ( c ) , t h a t a n
amended c o ~ n p l a i n t r e l a t e s back t o t h e d a t e o f t h e o r i g i n a l
p l e a d i n g when t h e amended p l e a d i n g d e p e n d s on t h e same s e t o f
operative f a c t s a s contained i n t h e o r i g i n a l pleading. The
f u r t h e r p r o v i s i o n i n R u l e 1 5 ( c ) , w i t h r e s p e c t t o amendments
c h a n g i n g a p a r t y , r e l a t e s t o t h o s e s i t u a t i o n s where t h e p a r t y
asserting the claim has made a mistake concerning the
identity of t h e p r o p e r p a r t y r a t h e r t h a n when t h e p a r t y i s
ignorant of the true identity of the proper party. Our
holding in Vincent v. Edwards with respect to Rule 15(c)
denies t h e status of the f i c t i t i o u s party a s being i n t h e
a c t i o n from t h e b e g i n n i n g , and i n c a s e s s u c h a s t h e one a t
bar, robs the f i c t i t i o u s name statute, S 25-5-103, of its
efficacy.
W f i n d o u r s e l v e s i n a g r e e m e n t w i t h t h e Supreme C o u r t
e
o f C a l i f o r n i a i n B a r r i n g t o n v . A.H. Robbins Co. (Cal. 1985),
7 0 2 P.2d 563, a t 5 6 5 , where i t s a i d :
The r e l a t i o n - b a c k d o c t r i n e h a s been u s e d
t o d e t e r m i n e t h e t i m e o f cornmencemont o f
an a c t i o n f o r t h e p u r p o s e o f t h e s t a t u t e
of limitations. Normally, t h e s t a t u t e of
l i m i t a t i o n s commences t o r u n r e g a r d l e s s
of t h e injured p a r t y ' s ignorance of h i s
or her cause of action. (Citing
authority.) In Austin v. Massachusetts
Bonding & I n s u r a n c e Co. (1961) 56 C a l . 2 d
596, 1 5 C a l . R p t r . 817, 3 6 4 P.2d 681, w e
h e l d t h a t a n amended c o m p l a i n t i s n o t
b a r r e d by t h e s t a t u t e of l i m i t a t i o n s ,
e v e n t h o u g h it s u b s t i t u t e s a named p a r t y
for a fictitious defendant, if the
amended complaint r e l a t e s back to a
timely o r i g i n a l complaint. Reasoning
t h a t t h e d e f e n d a n t was n o t p r e j u d i c e d by
t h e f i l i n g o f a n amendment a f t e r t h e
s t a t u t o r y p e r i o d had e l a p s e d , w e o b s e r v e d
t h a t "a d e f e n d a n t unaware o f t h e s u i t
a g a i n s t him b y a f i c t i t i o u s name i s i n n o
worse position if, in addition to
s u b s t i t u t i n g h i s t r u e name, t h e amendment
makes o t h e r c h a n g e s i n t h e a l l e g a t i o n s o n
t h e b a s i s o f t h e same g e n e r a 1 s e t o f
facts. . . ." (Citing authority. )
C o n v e r s e l y , "a p l a i n t i f f who d i d n o t know
o f t h e t r u e name a t t h e t i m e t h e o r i g i n a l
c o m p l a i n t was f i l e d ... has a t least a s
great a need for the liberality of
amendment ... a s a p l a i n t i f f who knew
t h e d e f e n d a n t ' s name t h r o u g h o u t , a n d h e
should n o t b e penalized merely because he
was c o m p e l l e d t o r e s o r t t o h i s s t a t u t o r y
r i g h t o f u s i n g a f i c t i t i o u s name."
W e t h e r e f o r e r e v e r s e o u r h o l d i n g i n V i n c e n t v. Edwards,
supra, a n d d e t e r m i n e t h a t when a fictitious party is later
i d e n t i f i e d , t h e amendment s e t t i n g f o r t h h i s t r u e name r e l a t e s
back t o t h e d a t e o f t h e f i l i n g o f t h e o r i g i n a l pleading. In
t h i s case, i t means t h a t t h e s t a t u t e o f l i m i t a t i o n s had n o t
run against those fictitious defendants who where later
i d e n t i f i e d b y t h e i r t r u e names.
There i s p r o t e c t i o n f o r f i c t i t i o u s l y named d e f e n d a n t s
i n t h e p r o v i s i o n s o f o u r R u l e 4 1 ( e ) , M.R.Civ.P. Under t h a t
r u l e a n y d e f e n d a n t who h a s n o t a p p e a r e d i n t h e a c t i o n o r who
has n o t been served w i t h i n t h r e e y e a r s a f t e r t h e has
-
C L C ~ ~ D . I *~ H 1:!+5
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b e e n commenced i s e n t i t l e d t o a d i s m i s s a l . M o r e o v e r , un e r
that rule, u n l e s s summons s h a l l h a v e b e e n i s s u e d w i t h i n o n e
year of the commencement of the action a defendant is
entitled t o dismissal. I n t h i s c a s e , t h e o r i g i n a l a c t i o n was
f i l e d on J u n e 1 7 , 1983. The a d d i t i o n a l summons a g a i n s t t h e
newly identified defendants was issued on June 11, 1984,
w i t h i n t h e one y e a r p e r i o d .
We t h e r e f o r e r e v e r s e t h e summary j u d g m e n t s g r a n t e d in
this case and remand the cause for f u r t h e r proceedings in
accordance with t h i s opinion.
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