No. 84-498
I N THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
1985
STATE OF MONTANA,
P l a i n t i f f and R e s p o n d e n t ,
-vs-
DENNIS D. THORNTON,
Defendant and A p p e l l a n t .
APPEAL FROM: District Court o f t h e Eleventh Judicial D i s t r i c t ,
I n a n d f o r t h e C o u n t y of F l a t h e a d ,
The H o n o r a b l e M i c h a e l K e e d y , J u d g e p r e s i d i n g .
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For Appellant:
D o n a l d L. S h a f f e r , ~ i b b y ,Montana
For Respondent:
Hon. Mike G r e e l y , A t t o r n e y G e n e r a l , H e l e n a , Montana
Ted 0. Lympus, C o u n t y A t t o r n e y , K a l i s p e l l , Montana
M i c h a e l P r e z e a u , Deputy County A t t o r n e y , K a l i s p e l l ,
Montana
S u b m i t t e d on b r i e f s : J u l y 11, 1 9 8 5
Decided: O c t o b e r 3 1 , 1985
Filed:
OCT 3 i I985
*#
Clerk
J u s t i c e John Conway H a r r i s o n d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion o f t h e
?qr.
Court.
T h i s i s an a p p e a l from a judgment o f t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t
of t h e E l e v e n t h J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , F l a t h e a d County, d e c l a r i n g
Dennis D . Thornton g u i l t y o f o b s t r u c t i n g a peace o f f i c e r o r
other public servant, aggravated assault, and escape, in
violation of $ 45-7-302, MCA, $ 45-5-202, MCA, and
§ 45-7-306, MCA, respectively. W e affirm.
On August 31, 1983, i n the afternoon, Art Sarnow, an
e n f o r c e m e n t o f f i c e r w i t h t h e Montana Department o f Highways,
observed a t r a c t o r - t r a i l e r h a u l - i n g a s k i d d e r and c a t e r p i l l a r
which appeared to be overweight and overwidth. Officer
Sarnow gave p u r s u i t . H e a c t i v a t e d t h e p u r s u i t l i g h t s on t h e
top of h i s patrol c a r , but the truck did not stop. Officer
Sarnow c o n t i n u e d t o pursue, and a t one p o i n t drew up a l o n g
side the truck and motioned to the driver to pull over.
Finally, a f t e r three miles of pursuit, t h e truck pulled off
t h e highway o n t o a p r i v a t e d r i v e w a y .
O f f i c e r Sarnow a p p r o a c h e d t h e d r i v e r o f t h e t r u c k , Gary
Wood, a s h e emerged from t h e v e h i c l e and a s k e d him t o p r o d u c e
v a r i o u s p e r m i t s and r e c o r d s . I n t h e meantime, O f f i c e r Sarnow
o b s e r v e d t h e p a s s e n g e r i n t h e t r u c k , d e f e n d a n t Dennis Thorn-
t o n , who w e n t t o t h e r e a r o f t h e t r a i l e r and began u n c h a i n i n g
t h e skidder with t h e evident intention of removing it from
the trailer. Since Officer Sarnow intended t o weigh the
trailer with his portable scales to determine if it was
o v e r w e i g h t , h e went t o t h e r e a r o f t h e t r a i l e r t o a s k Thorn-
ton not t o unload it a t t h i s time. When h i s r e q u e s t was
i g n o r e d , O f f i c e r Sarnow r e p e a t e d t h e r e q u e s t . Thornton a g a i n
ignored O f f i c e r Sarnow's request, and continued t o unchain
t h e skidder.
After talking further with M r . Wood and c o n t i n u i n g t o
observe Thornton unchain the s k i d d e r and p r e p a r e t o remove
i t , O f f i c e r Sarnow r e t u r n e d t o T h o r n t o n and a d v i s e d him t h a t
h e was u n d e r a r r e s t f o r r e f u s i n g t o a l l o w t h e w e i g h i n g o f t h e
trailer. At this time, Thornton l i f t e d a c h a i n h i n d e r above
h i s head and t h r e a t e n e d t o bash O f f i c e r Sarnow's head-in if
h e d i d n o t g e t away.
O f f i c e r Sarnow r e t r e a t e d from T h o r n t o n i n f e a r o f h i s
own s a f e t y , and c a l l e d f o r p o l i c e a s s i s t a n c e on h i s r a d i o .
A t t h i s point, O f f i c e r Sarnow r e p e a t e d t o T h o r n t o n t h a t h e
was u n d e r a r r e s t and s h o u l d n o t remove t h e s k i d d e r . Thornton
continued t o unload the s k i d d e r and c a t e r p i l l a r and after
doing so, prepared to leave alone in a pick-up. Officer
Sarnow a g a i n i n f o r m e d T h o r n t o n t h a t h e w a s u n d e r a r r e s t a n d
should n o t leave. T h o r n t o n t h e n l e f t t h e s c e n e a n d was l a t e r
apprehended.
T h o r n t o n was s u b s e q u e n t l y f o u n d g u i l t y i n J u s t i c e C o u r t
on O c t o b e r 1 8 , 1 9 8 3 , o f t h e m i s d e m e a n o r c h a r g e o f o b s t r u c t i n g
a peace officer or other public official i n violation of
§ 45-7-302(1), MCA. Thornton t h e n appealed h i s c o n v i c t i o n t o
t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t and t h e a p p e a l was c o n s o l i d a t e d w i t h t h e
two felony charges of aqgravated assault and escape in
v i o l a t i o n o f S 45-5-202(1) ( c ) , MCA, a n d 5 45-7-306(3) (b) (ii)
,
MCA, respectively. A j u r y t r i a l commenced o n March 1 9 , 1 9 8 4 ,
a n d T h o r n t o n was f o u n d g u i l t y o f a l l t h r e e c h a r g e s . H e was
sentenced to a total of five years imprisonment w i t h two
years suspended, a n d was g i v e n t w o $500 fines. Defendant
appeals h i s convictions.
The f o l l o w i n g i s s u e s a r e r a i s e d by t h i s a p p e a l :
(1) W h e t h e r t h e d e f e n d a n t was e n t i t l e d t o a n i n s t r u c -
t i o n on r e s i s t i n g a r r e s t ?
(2) W h e t h e r a n e s c a p e from " o f f i c i a l d e t e n t i o n " a c t u -
a l l y o c c u r r e d i n t h e p r e s e n t c a s e a s r e q u i r e d b y 5 45-7-306,
MCA?
(3) Whether the defendant's conviction on the three
crimes charged c o n s t i t u t e s double jeopardy?
The f i r s t i s s u e r a i s e d by d e f e n d a n t c o n t e n d s t h a k t h e
t r i a l c o u r t committed r e v e r s i b l e e r r o r by n o t i n s t r u c t i n g t h e
jury t h a t the offense of r e s i s t i n g a r r e s t was a l e s s o r i n -
cluded offense of aggravated assault. As the defendant
c o r r e c t l y p o i n t s o u t , it i s a b a s i c r u l e i n t h i s s t a t e t h a t
the trial court's instructions must cover every issue or
theory having support in the evidence. S t a t e v. Buckley
(1976), 1 7 1 Mont. 238, 557 P.2d 283. The defendant also
correctly recognizes that:
... a defendant i s e n t i t l e d t o i n s t r u c -
t i o n s on l e s s o r i n c l u d e d o f f e n s e s i f any
e v i d e n c e e x i s t s i n t h e r e c o r d which would
p e r m i t t h e j u r y t o r a t i o n a l l y f i n d him
g u i l t y o f a l e s s o r o f f e n s e a n d a c q u i t him
of a greater.
S t a t e v. Ostwald ( 1 9 7 9 ) , 180 Mont. 530, 538, 591 P.2d 646,
651. However, w h i l e t h e d e f e n d a n t c o r r e c t l y r e c o g n i z e s t h e
law i n t h i s a r e a , h e f a i l s t o a p p l y it t o h i s own c a s e . The
facts clearly illustrate defendant was given a lessor
i n c l u d e d o f f e n s e i n s t r u c t i o n which f o l l o w s t h e r a t i o n a l e s e t
f o r t h i n Ostwald, quoted above.
The t r i a l c o u r t r e c o r d s t a t e s t h e f o l l o w i n g i n s t r u c t i o n
was r e a d and g i v e n t o t h e j u r y :
A p e r s o n commits t h e o f f e n s e o f a g g r a v a t -
ed a s s a u l t , a f e l o n y , i f h e p u r p o s e l y o r
knowingly c a u s e s r e a s o n a b l e a p p r e h e n s i o n
o f s e r i o u s b o d i l y i n j u r y i n a n o t h e r by
u s e o f a weapon.
1f you d o n o t f i n d t h a t t h e d e f e n d a n t
1
p u r p o s e l y o r knowingly c a u s e d r e a s o n a b l e
apprehension o f s e r i o u s b o d i l y i njury i n
a n o t h e r by u s e o f a weapon, b u t you d o
find that h e p u r p o s e l y o r knowingly
caused r e a s o n a b l e apprehension o f b o d i l y
i n j u r y i n a n o t h e r , you may, n e v e r t h e l e s s ,
f i n d him g u i l t y o f t h e l e s s o r i n c l u d e d
o f f e n s e o f a s s a u l t , a misdemeanor.
The record clearly shows that defendant obtained an
i n s t r u c t i o n on t h e l e s s e r i n c l u d e d o f f e n s e of s i m p l e a s s a u l t ,
a misdemeanor. This instruction amply c o v e r e d d e f e n d a n t ' s
v e r s i o n of t h e e v e n t a s w e l l a s r e s i s t i n g a r r e s t could have.
Under t h e f a c t s o f t h i s c a s e , t h e r e was no m a t e r i a l d i f f e r -
ence between the offenses of resisting arrest and simple
assault. Consequently, if t h e j u r y had a c c e p t e d d e f e n d a n t ' s
version of the event, it could have found him guilty of
simple assault and acquitted him of aggravated assault.
D e f e n d a n t was n o t , a s h e a r g u e s , d e p r i v e d o f h i s o p p o r t u n i t y
t o have t h e j u r y c o n s i d e r h i s v e r s i o n o f t h e e v e n t , b e c a u s e
t h e lesser i n c l u d e d o f f e n s e i n s t r u c t i o n on s i m p l e a s s a u l t was
s u f f i c i e n t f o r t h i s purpose. I n s h o r t , d e f e n d a n t s u f f e r e d no
harm by t h e t r i a l c o u r t ' s r e f u s a l t o a c c e p t h i s l a s t - m i n u t e
p r o p o s e d i n s t r u c t i o n on r e s i s t i n g a r r e s t . This Court f a i l s
t o see how d e f e n d a n t ' s s i t u a t i o n d i f f e r s s u b s t a n t i a l l y from
t h e r a t i o n a l e s e t f o r t h and e n d o r s e d by d e f e n d a n t i n O s t w a l d ,
q u o t e d above.
Defendant also presents the case of S t a t e v. Gopher
(Mont. 1 9 8 1 ) , 6 3 3 P.2d 1195, 38 St.Rep. 1521, a s a u t h o r i t y
f o r t h e p r o p o s i t i o n t h a t h e was e n t i t l e d t o a n i n s t r u c t i o n on
the lesser included offense of resisting arrest. However,
t h e d a n g e r a d v e r t e d t o i n Gopher, t h a t t h e j u r y would b e l i e v e
d e f e n d a n t g u i l t y o f some o f f e n s e and would c o n v i c t him o f t h e
felony offense because it had no other choice, was not
present i n t h e i n s t a n t case. The j u r y i n the instant case
was instructed on the lesser included offense of simple
assault. C o n s e q u e n t l y , t h e j u r y , had i t b e l i e v e d d e f e n d a n t ' s
version of the event, c o u l d have found him g u i l t y o f s i m p l e
assault. The s i t u a t i o n p r e s e n t i n Gopher t h a t t h e j u r y c o u l d
h a v e been f o r c e d t o f i n d t h e d e f e n d a n t g u i l t y - - t h a t is, the
j u r y may n o t have wanted t o let the defendant's a c t i o n s go
unpunished s o they chose to f i n d him g u i l t y o f aggravated
assault because the only a l t e r n a t i v e was acquittal--simply
does n o t exist i n t h e i n s t a n t case. Therefore, we h o l d t h e
District Court did not commit r e v e r s i b l e error b y r e f u s i n g
d e f e n d a n t ' s i n s t r u c t i o n on r e s i s t i n g a r r e s t .
The s e c o n d i s s u e r a i s e d b y d e f e n d a n t a s k s t h i s C o u r t t o
c o n s i d e r whether a n e s c a p e from " o f f i c i a l d e t e n t i o n " a c t u a l l y
occurred i n t h e present case. As n o t e d a b o v e , d e f e n d a n t w a s
charged and c o n v i c t e d w i t h t h e o f f e n s e o f e s c a p e , a felony,
i n v i o l a t i o n o f S 45-7-306, MCA. Defendant a s s e r t s t h a t he
was wrongly c o n v i c t e d o f t h i s o f f e n s e b e c a u s e t h e S t a t e n e v e r
provided any e v i d e n c e whatsoever t h a t d e f e n d a n t escaped from
"official detention" which is a necessary element of the
charge o f escape. We disagree.
Section 45-7-306 ( 2 ) and ,
( 3 ) ( b ) (ii) MCA, define the
offense of escape in pertinent part as follows: "A p e r s o n
subject t o official d e t e n t i o n commits t h e o f f e n s e o f escape
i f he knowingly o r p u r p o s e l y removes h i m s e l f from o f f i c i a l
detention . . . by the use or threat of force." Section
45-7-306 (1) f u r t h e r d e f i n e s i n p e r t i n e n t p a r t t h a t t h e p h r a s e
"official detention" means "detention by a peace officer
pursuant t o arrest." I n l i g h t of t h e s e s t a t u t e s , t h i s C o u r t
asserts, and b o t h p a r t i e s a g r e e , t h a t a v a l i d a r r e s t i s an
underlying element o f "official detention" and a l s o , there-
fore, is an underlying element of the o f f ~ n s eo f escape.
Consequently, it becomes n e c e s s a r y t o examine t h e facts of
t h i s c a s e a n d t h e l a w o f Montana t o d e t e r m i n e i f t h e d e f e n -
d a n t was p l a c e d u n d e r a v a l i d a r r e s t .
The pertinent statute in Montana with regard to the
method o f a valid arrest i s S 46-6-104, MCA. This s t a t u t e
provides i n pertinent part: "An a r r e s t i s made by a n a c t u a l
r e s t r a i n t o f t h e p e r s o n t o be a r r e s t e d o r b y h i s s u b m i s s i o n
t o t h e c u s t o d y o f t h e p e r s o n making t h e a r r e s t . " Defendant
argues because he d i d n o t submit t o t h e custody o f Officer
Sarnow n o r was h e p h y s i c a l l y r e s t r a i n e d b y O f f i c e r S a r n o w , a
valid arrest never occurred. Conversely, the State argues
t h a t a p h y s i c a l r e s t r a i n t o f t h e d e f e n d a n t was n o t a n e c e s -
s a r y element of a valid arrest. We agree with the State.
Montana h a s had v i r t u a l l y no r e p o r t e d c a s e s u n d e r i t s
arrest statute ( S 46-6-104), b u t s i n c e it was i n l a r g e p a r t
adopted from I l l i n o i s some o f t h e i r cases are instructive.
I n P e o p l e v. U s s e r y (111.App. 1 9 7 4 ) , 3 2 1 N.E.2d 7 1 8 , 720-721,
an I l l i n o i s A p p e l l a t e c o u r t o u t l i n e d t h e e l e m e n t s o f a r r e s t :
An a r r e s t i n v o l v e s t h r e e e l e m e n t s : (I)
authority to arrest; (2) a s s e r t i o n of
t h a t authority with intention to affect
an a r r e s t ; and (3) restraint of the
person a r r e s t e d . [Citations omitted. ]
Clearly, applied to the facts of this case, the f i r s t two
elements of an arrest are satisfied. Officer Sarnow by
s t a t u t e had a u t h o r i t y t o a r r e s t t h e d e f e n d a n t and h e o b v i o u s -
l y a-sserted h i s authority with t h e i n t e n t i o n o f a r r e s t i n g t h e
defendant. The o n l y r e m a i n i n g q u e s t i o n i s w h e t h e r t h e r e w a s
r e s t r a i n t of t h e defendant.
I n resolving t h e question of r e s t r a i n t , there a r e some,
mostly older, cases which hold that an oral statement of
a r r e s t w i t h o u t any p h y s i c a l touching i s n o t s u f f i c i e n t f o r a
valid arrest. S e e 5 Am. J u r . 2 d A r r e s t §1; P e o p l e v . Jackson
(111.App. 1 9 6 8 ) , 240 N.E.2d 421. However, m o s t modern c o u r t s
are examining all circumstances surrounding an arrest, in
which c a s e an o r a l s t a t e m e n t may b e s u f f i c i e n t . People v.
Miller (111,App. 1 9 8 0 ) , 412 N.E.2d 175; Bey v. State (Fla.
1 9 7 8 ) , 355 So.2d 850; S t a t e v . White (Neb. 1 9 8 1 ) , 306 N.W.2d
906. The Maine Supreme C o u r t recently refused t o apply a
requirement o f p h y s i c a l t o u c h i n g f o r an a r r e s t :
Defendant's counsel concedes t h a t defen-
d a n t would h a v e b e e n v a l i d l y a r r e s t e d i f
T r o o p e r G a l l a n t had a l s o m e r e l y p l a c e d
h i s hand o n d e f e n d a n t ' s arm o r s h o u l d e r .
T h e r e i s no r e a s o n f o r making t h e v a l i d i -
ty of an arrest in the present
circumstances turn on such an
insignificant formality, reminiscent of
t h e medieval l i v e r y o f s e i s i n .
S t a t e v . Donahoe ( M e . 1 9 8 0 ) , 420 A.2d 9 3 6 , 938.
Therefore, the view that a physical restraint is a
necessary element of an arrest is largely discredited in
recent cases. W e agree with t h i s position. Furthermore, we
a s s e r t t h a t t h e s t a n d a r d f o r an a r r e s t when t h e r e i s n o t a
physical r e s t r a i n t o f t h e defendant is whether a reasonable
person, i n n o c e n t o f a n y crime, would h a v e f e l t f r e e t o w a l k
away u n d e r the circumstances. Miller, 412 N.E.2d at 179;
United States v. Johnson (9th Cir. 1980), 626 F.2d 753;
United S t a t e s v. O'Connor (9th C i r . 1981), 658 F.2d 688.
T h i s s t a n d a r d d r o p s any t e c h n i c a l r e q u i r e m e n t s f o r a n a r r e s t
and t h e c o n c e p t o f r e s t r a i n t , and i n s t e a d l o o k s upon a l l t h e
f a c t s and c i r c u m s t a n c e s o f e a c h c a s e .
W e a g r e e w i t h t h e S t a t e t h a t where t h e e n t i r e circum-
stances of t h i s e n c o u n t e r a r e f a i r l y examined, it i s c l e a r
that any reasonable person would have considered himself
u n d e r a r r e s t a n d n o t f r e e t o w a l k away. O f f i c e r Sarnow was
wearing a law enforcement uniform w i t h a badge and had t h e
obvious authority to arrest the defendant; Officer Sarnow
a d v i s e d t h e d e f e n d a n t h e was v i o l a t i n g t h e law; and O f f i c e r
Sarnow r e p e a t e d l y t o l d t h e d e f e n d a n t h e was u n d e r a r r e s t a n d
should not leave t h e scene. C o n s e q u e n t l y , we h o l d t h e d e f e n -
d a n t was p r o p e r l y c h a r g e d w i t h t h e o f f e n s e o f e s c a p e when h e ,
a f t e r being validly arrested, secured h i s r e l e a s e by t h r e a t
of p h y s i c a l f o r c e o r v i o l e n c e .
The t h i r d a n d f i n a l i s s u e r a i s e d by d e f e n d a n t a s k s t h i s
C o u r t t o c o n s i d e r w h e t h e r t h e d e f e n d a n t ' s c o n v i c t i o n on t h e
three crimes charged c o n s t i t u t c ? ~d o u b l e jeopardy. Defen-
dant's argument on t h i s i s s u e i s s k e t c h y , b u t h e a p p e a r s t o
b e a r g u i n g t h a t d o u b l e j e o p a r d y e x i s t e d on a l l t h r e e c h a r g e s
because all three charges arose out of the same incident.
Defendant apparently fails to understand the concept of
d o u b l e j e o p a r d y and t h e a p p l i c a b l e law i n t h i s a r e a .
D e f e n d a n t s a r g u m e n t r e l i e s upon t h e h o l d i n g found i n
Blockburger v. United S t a t ~ s ( 1 9 3 2 ) , 284 U.S. 299, 304, 52
S.Ct. 1 8 0 , 1 8 2 , 76 L.Ed. 3 0 6 , 309, w h i c h s t a t e s :
The a p p l i c a b l e r u l e i s t h a t w h e r e t h e
same a c t o r t r a n s a c t i o n c o n s t i t u t e s a
violation of two distinct statutory
provisions, t h e test t o be applied t o
d e t e r m i n e w h e t h e r t h e r e a r e two o f f e n s e s
o r o n l y one i s whether e a c h p r o v i s i o n
r e q u i r e s p r o o f o f a f a c t which t h e o t h e r
does not.
The s o - c a l l e d B l o c k b u r g e r r u l e h a s b e e n a d o p t e d by s t a t u t e i n
Montana a t S 46-11-502, MCA.
The f i r s t s e n t e n c e of S 46-11-502, MCA, states: "When
the same transaction may establish the commission of more
than one o f f e n s e , a p e r s o n c h a r g e d w i t h s u c h c o n d u c t may b e
prosecuted f o r each such offense." The s t a t u t e g o e s on t o
enumerate some exceptions to this statement. Defendant,
however, h a s n o t i n d i c a t e d which e x c e p t i o n h e r e l i e s o n , b u t
h i s argument appears t o c e n t e r around e x c e p t i o n (1). This
exception states: " [Defendant] may not, however, be
convicted of more than one o f f e n s e i f . . . one offense is
included i n t h e other."
In a series o f r e c e n t c a s e s t h i s C o u r t h a s c l a r i f i e d
t h e a p p l i c a t i o n o f t h e B l o c k b u r g e r r u l e and S 46-11-502. To
determine i f one o f f e n s e i s includable within another, the
a n a l y s i s looks t o t h e s t a t u t o r y elements, not t h e p a r t i c u l a r
factual situation. S t a t e v. Ritchson (Mont. 1 9 8 1 ) , 630 P.2d
234, 38 S t . R e p . 1015; S t a t e v . Wells (Mont. 1 9 8 3 ) , 658 P.2d
381, 40 St.Rep. 127. If each o f f e n s e c o n t a i n s an element
d i f f e r e n t t h a n t h e o t h e r t h e r e i s no i n c l u s i o n , e v e n t h o u g h
t h e r e may b e a s u b s t a n t i a l o v e r l a p i n p r o o f . S t a t e v . Madera
(Mont. 1983), 670 P.2d 552, 558, 40 St.Rep. 1558, 1564,
c i t i n g I a n n e l l i v. United S t a t e s ( 1 9 7 5 ) , 420 U.S. 770, 785,
fn. 1 7 , 95 S.Ct. 1284, 1294, f n . 1 7 , 43 L.Ed. 616, 627, fn.
The c r i m i n a l o f f e n s e s i n v o l v e d i n t h i s c a s e a r e a g g r a -
vated a s s a u l t , escape, and o b s t r u c t i n g a p e a c e o f f i c e r . It
can readily be determined t h a t each of these offenses are
separate . The elements of agcjravated assault are: (1)
purposely o r knowingly, ( 2 ) cause, ( 3 ) reasonable apprehen-
sion of serious bodily injury i n another, ( 4 ) by u s e o f a
weapon. The e l e m e n t s o f escape a : (1) k n o w i n g l y o r p u r -
posely, ( 2 ) removing h i m s e l f from o f f i c i a l d e t e n t i o n , ( 3 ) by
use or threat of force, physical violence o r weapon, (4)
a f t e r h a v i n g b e e n p l a c e d u n d e r a r r e s t by a p e a c e o f f i c e r and
being subject t o o f f i c i a l detention. Thus e s c a p e and a g g r a -
vated a s s a u l t a r e r e a d i l y distinguishable: escape r e q u i r e s an
a r r e s t and removal from o f f i c i a l d e t e n t i o n , n e i t h e r o f w h i c h
is required f o r aggravated assault; aggravated assault re-
quires a reasonabl-e apprehension o f serious bodily injury,
whereas escape r e q u i r e s o n l y a use o r t h r e a t o f f o r c e , physi-
c a l v i o l e n c e o r weapon.
The misdemeanor o f f e n s e , o b s t r u c t i n g a peace o f f i c e r ,
has t h e s e elements: (1) k n o w i n g l y , (2) obstructs, impairs,
or hinders, (3) the enforcement of the criminal law, the
p r e s e r v a t i o n o f t h e p e a c e , o r t h e performance o f a government
function. The t h i r d e l e m e n t i s n o t common t o e i t h e r o f t h e
o t h e r o f f e n s e s and makes it r e a d i l y d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e from t h e
two. Likewise each o f t h e o t h e r o f f e n s e s c o n t a i n s a t l e a s t
o n e e l e m e n t n o t common t o t h e o f f e n s e o f o b s t r u c t i n g a p e a c e
officer: aggravated a s s a u l t r e q u i r e s a reasonable apprehen-
s i o n o f s e r i o u s b o d i l y i n j u r y and e s c a p e r e q u i r e s an a r r e s t .
In l i g h t of the above discussion, defendant has not
shown t h a t t h e c h a r g e s a g a i n s t him m e e t a n y o f t h e e x c e p t i o n s
set f o r t h i n fj a6-11-502, incl-uding exception (1) . In h i s
argument, defendant merely a s s e r t s t h a t t h e d i f f e r e n t charges
w e r e b o r n o f t h e same t r a n s a c t i o n a n d t h u s w e r e a v i o l a t i o n
of the United States Constitutional prohibition against
double jeopardy. However, as fj 46-11-502, quoted above,
makes c l e a r , d i f f e r e n t c h a r g e s may, a n d o f t e n d o , a r i s e f r o m
a s i n g l e o r closely r e l a t e d event. The c r i t i c a l i n q u i r y i s
w h e t h ~ rt h e s t a t u t o r y elements o f the various offenses are
wholly i n c l u d a b l e w i t h i n one another. Here, the offenses of
aggravated a s s a u l t , escape, and o b s t r u c t i n g a p e a c e o f f i c e r ,
examined by t h e i r s t a t u t o r y elements, a r e not co-extensive.
Each h a s a t l e a s t o n e e l e m e n t w h i c h d i s t i n g u i s h e s i t f r o m t h e
other offenses. T h e r e f o w , t h i s Court holds t h e defendant's
c o n v i c t i o n s o n t h e t h r e e crimes c h a r g e d d o e s n o t c o n s t i t u t e
double jeopardy.
The c o n v i c t i o n s o f t h e d e f e n d a n t a r e a f f i r m e d .
W e concur: ''
L-