No. 85-155
I N THE SUPREME C0UR.T O F THE S T A T E O F MONTANA
1985
THE S T A T E O F MONTANA, A C T I N G BY AND
THROUGH THE DEPARTMENT O F HIGHWAYS
O F THE S T A T E O F MONTANA,
P l a i n t i f f and R e s p o n d e n t ,
VICTOR and VIBEKE DeTIENNE,
husband & w i f e ,
Defendants and Appellants.
APPEAL FROM: D i s t r i c t C o u r t of t h e F i f t e e n t h J u d i c i a l - D i s t r i c t ,
I n a n d f o r t h e C o u n t y of S h e r i d a n ,
T h e H o n o r a b l e R. C . M c D o n o u g h , Judge p r e s i d i n g .
COUNSEL O F RECORD:
For A p p e l l a n t :
O'Toole & Hunt, Plentywood, Montana
For R e s p o n d e n t :
Beate Galda, Dept. of H i g h w a y s , H e l e n a , M o n t a n a
S u b m i t t e d o n briefs: J u l y 2 5 , 1985
Decided: O c t o b e r 1 0 1 1985
Filed:
Clerk
Mr. Justice John Conway Harrison delivered the Opinion of the
Court.
This is an appeal from the District Court of the
Fifteenth Judicial District, Sheridan County, Montana, in a
highway condemnation action. A six-man jury found the
defendant-appellants negligent in constructing a building as
close to the highway as they did and returned a verdict for
the appellants of $5,802.60 for the land taken by the State
of Montana. The jury found no depreciation to the remaining
property. We affirm.
The plaintiff, State of Montana, through the Department
of Highways, brought an action to condemn priva te property
owned by defendants, Victor and Vibeke DeTienne, for
construction of a state highway pursuant to 5 60-4-102, MCA.
The property in question is an 8.36 acre tract containing two
steel buildings located east of Plentywood. One of the
buildings, a 70' x 180' structure, used in part for a garage
and sales office for trucks and equipment and in part for
storage of lumber and building materials, is affected by the
location of a new highway. The highway right-of-way was 95
feet from the building before the construction project , but
the new right-of-way is about 4% feet from one corner of the
building. When the building was built there was adequate
room to back a 60 to 80 foot semi-truck into the building.
It is now difficult to drive trucks into the building and
impossible to drive them completely around the building
because of the location of the new highway. A hearing to
determine the value of the property being condemned was held
before a three-man value commission who valued the land and
improvements taken at $5,800 but found no depreciation to the
remainder. The DeTiennes appealed that finding to the
District Court.
The i s s u e s p r e s e n t e d t o t h e C o u r t a r e :
(1) Whether the jury statement that appe?lant was
negligent in constructing his huilding too close to the
highway c o n s t i t u t e s r e v e r s i b l e e r r o r .
(2) Whether the court erred in granting the State's
motion i n l i m i n e c o n c e r n i n g s a l e s between o t h e r l a n d owners
on t h e p r o j e c t and t h e S t a t e a s condemning a u t h o r i t y .
(3) Whether the court erred i n admitting c e r t a i n of
the State's exhibits.
(4) Whether the court erred in giving its jury
i n s t r u c t i o n on t h e " q u o t i e n t method" f o r d e t e r m i n i n g damages
t o b e awarded.
(5) Whether the court erred in refusing to give
DeTiennes' p r o p o s e d j u r y i n s t r u c t i o n on i n c o n v e n i e n c e o f u s e .
I n a n e m i n e n t domain a c t i o n t h e r i g h t o f t h e p r o p e r t y
owner to receive compensation accrues at the d a t e of the
s e r v i c e o f summons ( t h e t a k i n g ) , i n t h i s c a s e J u l y 3 0 , 1982.
The f a i r market v a l u e of t h e p r o p e r t y on t h a t d a t e i s t h e
measure of compensation for the property actually taken.
Section 70-30-302(l), MCA. I t i s o n l y t h a t v a l u e which i s
relevant. The DeTiennes ' b u i l d i n g was l a w f u l l y c o n s t r u c t e d
before the taking and the reasons for its location in
relation t o t h e new highway a r e i r r e l e v a n t t o t h e v a l u e o f
t h e land a t t h e time of t h e taking. The o n l y i s s u e s p r o p e r l y
b e f o r e t h e j u r y a r e t h e f a i r m a r k e t v a l u e on J u l y 3 0 , 1982,
of the land taken, and w h e t h e r , a s a r e s u l t o f t h e t a k i n g ,
the value of DeTiennes' remaining property, including the
building, was depreciated. The jury found the remaining
property did not depreciate. DeTiennes a r g u e , however, the
j u r y made t h i s f i n d i n g on " n e g l i g e n c e " r a t h e r t h a n i n a c c o r d
with t h e i n s t r u c t i o n s given and b e c a u s e no i n s t r u c t i o n s on
negligence were given, the jury's finding constitutes
reversible error.
When t h e j u r y returned its verdict, t h e foreman, w i t h
t h e c o u r t ' s p e r m i s s i o n , made t h e f o l l o w i n g s t a t e m e n t :
Well, w e were a l l w o n d e r i n g when we
t a l k e d a b o u t t h i s a s t o why t h a t b u i l d i n g
was b u i l t t h a t c l o s e t o t h e highway, and
w e f e e l t h e d e f e n d a n t was n e g l i g e n t i n
d o i n g what h e d i d , b u i l d i n g it t h a t c l o s e
t o t h e highway.
I t i s d o u b t f u l t h e jury understood negligence a s a l e g a l t e r m
of art requiring the existence of a duty, but as it is
commonly u n d e r s t o o d by t h e layman t o mean c a r e l e s s o r showing
poor judgment. The c o u r t r e f u s e d t h e Highway D e p a r t m e n t ' s
motion i n l i m i n e t o exclude evidence o f i t s d i s c u s s i o n s with
DeTiennes i n 1980 about t h e location of the building. The
Highway Department argued the testimony could result in a
verdict which was not based on fair market value but on
location of the building. DeTiennes a r g u e d s u c c e s s f u 7 1.y t h e
jury should hear t h e reasons f o r t h e l o c a t i o n o f t h e b u i l d i n g
and d e c i d e f o r i t s e l f w h e t h e r t h e b u i l d i n g s h o u l d h a v e been
placed f a r t h e r back from t h e highway. DeTiennes c a n n o t now
a r g u e t h e j u r y ' s v e r d i c t was e r r o r b e c a u s e it was d e c i d e d on
negligence r a t h e r than i n accord with t h e i n s t r u c t i o n s given.
By i n s i s t i n g t h e e v i d e n c e o f l o c a t i o n b e a d m i t t e d , DeTiennes
c a n n o t now complain t h e j u r y v e r d i c t was n o t what t h e y had
expected, if in f a c t t h e v e r d i c t was even a f f e c t e d by t h e
evidence. The law i n Montana i s c l e a r :
I t has long been t h e r u l e o f t h i s Court
t h a t on a p p e a l w e w i l l n o t p u t a D i s t r i c t
Court i n e r r o r f o r a r u l i n g o r procedure
in which the appellant acquiesced,
p a r t i c i p a t e d , o r t o which a p p e l l a n t made
no o b j e c t i o n . [Citing cases.]
Green v . Green (1978), 176 Mont. 532, 536, 579 P.2d 1235,
1237.
T h e r e i s no e v i d e n c e showing t h e j u r y did not follow
the court's instruction. The j u r y was p r o p e r l y instructed
r e g a r d i n g t h e measure o f damages i n a n e m i n e n t domain a c t i o n .
I t h e a r d v a l u a t i o n t e s t i m o n y from two w i t n e s s e s . I t reached
a v e r d i c t within t h e evidence. I t apparently agreed with t h e
Highway Department appraisers and the three value
commissioners in finding no depreciation. There is no
e v i d e n c e t h e j u r y r e a c h e d i t s d e c i s i o n on t h e l e g a l d o c t r i n e
o f n e g l i g e n c e , which c l e a r l y i s n o t p a r t o f t h i s c a s e . W e do
n o t f i n d any i m p r o p e r c o n d u c t on t h e p a r t o f t h e j u r y o r a n y
prejudicial effect because of the foreman's comments.
Although neither counsel objected to allowing the jury
foreman's remarks, prudence suggests refusal of extraneous
comments. The foreman's statement, however, is not
reversible error. Nor d o we find any i n d i c a t i o n t h e j u r y
intended to, or did, impeach its verdict. "The rule in
Montana i s a j u r y may n o t impeach i t s own v e r d i c t b a s e d on
mistake of the evidence or misapprehension of the law."
J o h n s o n v. Green ( 1 9 6 9 ) , 153 Mont. 251, 255, 456 P.2d 290,
293.
A second motion in limine offered by the Highway
Department t o p r e v e n t t e s t i m o n y from o t h e r l a n d owners a l o n g
the project regarding their sales to the Department was
properly granted. The sales were not fair market
t r a n s a c t i o n s , b u t w e r e made b e c a u s e o f impending condemnation
proceedings and therefore w e r e n o t made between a willing
b u y e r and a w i l l i n g s e l l e r . See S t a t e v . Hoblitt ( 1 9 3 0 ) , 87
Mont. 403, 413, 288 P. 181, 185. "Current f a i r market value
is the price that would be agreed to by a willing and
i n f o r m e d s e l l e r and b u y e r , . .. " S e c t i o n 70-30-313, MCA.
The cases cited by D e T i e n n e s , S t a t e v. Voyich ( 1 9 6 3 ) , 142
Mont. 355, 384 P. 2d 765, and S t a t e v. G r e e n f i e l d ( 1 9 6 5 ) , 145
Mont. 164, 399 P.2d 989, a r e n o t on p o i n t . I n Voyich t h e
issue is comparability of t h e n e i g h b o r i n g l a n d and n o t t h e
final test of the market value of the property being
condemned. The i s s u e i n G r e e n f i e l d i s w h e t h e r an e x p e r t c a n
testify as to comparable sales and the prices paid in
transactions between private persons before there was any
knowledge o f condemnation o f t h e l a n d s f o r highway p u r p o s e s .
The reasons for excluding evidence of such sales to a
condemning authority are well summarized in 5
N i c h o l s on Eminent Domain through
(Rev. 3 r d . Ed. 1984) a s f o l l o w s :
Even in those jurisdictions where
evidence o f comparable s a l e s i s a d m i t t e d ,
it i s g e n e r a l l y h e l d by t h e w e i g h t o f
a u t h o r i t y t h a t evidence of t h e s a l e of a
p a r c e l o f l a n d s u b j e c t t o condemnation t o
t h e p r o p o s e d condemnor o r t o a n o t h e r
p o t e n t i a l condemnor may n o t b e a d m i t t e d
a s evidence o f t h e v a l u e o f t h e land
condemned. E v i d e n c e showing what t h e
company s e e k i n g t o condemn h a s p a i d f o r
o t h e r l a n d s would p r o b a b l y b e t a k e n by
t h e jury a s i n d i c a t i n g t h e market value,
when, a s a m a t t e r o f f a c t , it d o e s n o t
t e n d t o show t h e m a r k e t v a l u e o f t h e
land. A company condemning l a n d m i g h t b e
w i l l i n g t o g i v e more t h a n it i s w o r t h ,
and t h e owner o f l a n d m i g h t b e w i l l i n g t o
t a k e less t h a n it i s w o r t h , t h a t i s , l e s s
t h a n i t s m a r k e t v a l u e , r a t h e r t h a n have a
lawsuit. Moreover, when a company s e e k s
t o g e t l a n d o r condemn i t f o r p u b l i c
u s e s , h a v i n g t h e power t o condemn, t h e
landowner would p r o b a b l y come t o some
agreement w i t h it r a t h e r than have a
l a w s u i t , and t h i s a g r e e m e n t would show a
compromise r a t h e r t h a n t h e m a r k e t v a l u e
of t h e land. T h e r e a r e many r e a s o n s
which m i g h t b e advanced i n s u p p o r t o f
t h i s almost, i f not quite, universal
rule. A s h e r e t o f o r e s t a t e d , such s a l e s
a r e almost always i n t h e n a t u r e o f a
compromise. The l a n d o w n e r , on t h e one
side, may force a sale; and the
condemnor, on t h e o t h e r , must have t h e
l a n d , even t h o u g h it c o s t s more t h a n i t s
value. Again, t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s and
surroundings a r e n e c e s s a r i l y d i s s i m i l a r ,
and t h e amount p a i d i s n o t o n l y t h e v a l u e
o f t h e land a c t u a l l y taken, b u t a l s o t h e
damages done to the entire tract,
d e p e n d i n g upon t h e e x i g e n c i e s o f t h e
location of t h e parcel acquired, the
number o f a c r e s i n t h e e s t a t e , and o t h e r
f a c t s peculiar t o the p a r t i c u l a r case.
A1 I i n c i d e n t a 1 damages a r e i n c l u d e d , and
t h e s e , o f course, should n o t be taken
i n t o account i n f i x i n g t h e acreage value
i n t h e market. E v i d e n c e a s t o damages
p a i d i n o n e c a s e would c e r t a i n l y n o t b e
admissible i n o r d e r t o determine t h e
damages done i n a n o t h e r . Such t e s t i m o n y
d o e s n o t , a f t e r a l l , go t o t h e m a r k e t
value of t h e land, except incidentally,
and i t i s n o t a r e a s o n a b l e o r f a i r t e s t
of m a r k e t v a l u e .
For these reasons we hold sales to condemnors are not
a d m i s s i b l e t o e s t a b l i s h f a i r m a r k e t v a l u e when t h e s a l e s a r e
p a r t o f t h e same p r o j e c t which r e s u l t e d i n t h e condemnation
of other property, however s i m i l a r t h e p r o p e r t y may b e to
that i n controversy, and r e g a r d l e s s o f w h e t h e r t h e payment
was t h e r e s u l t o f a s e t t l e m e n t , an award o r a j u r y v e r d i c t .
W e a g r e e w i t h t h e Oregon C o u r t i n C i t y o f P o r t l a n d v. Holmes
(Or. 1962), 376 P.2d 120, 123, that there is a very r e a l
distinction between voluntary sales and sales made to
a u t h o r i t i e s a b o u t t o i n i t i a t e condemnation p r o c e e d i n g s . Only
i f t h e p r i c e p a i d i s v o l u n t a r y can it b e a r e a s o n a b l e i n d e x
of v a l u e .
DeTiennes argue admission of two of the Highway
Department's e x h i b i t s c o n s t i t u t e r e v e r s i b l e e r r o r . DeTiennes
objected t o t h e i r admission during t r i a l f o r t h e reason they
did not believe the exhibits were official records.
DeTiennes f a i l e d t.o o b j e c t on t h e b a s i s o f l a c k o f f o u n d a t i o n
and c a n n o t d o s o now. This Court has r u l e d previously t h a t a
p a r t y c o m p l a i n i n g o f e r r o r must s t a n d o r f a l l on t h e ground
r e l i e d on b y t h e t r i a l c o u r t . T e e s d a l e v. A n s c h u t z D r i l l i n g
Co. f 1 9 6 0 ) , 138 Mont. 4 2 7 , 4 4 1 , 357 P.2d 4, 11; a n d B o w e r v.
Tebbs ( 1 9 5 7 ) , 132 Mont. 146, 160, 314 P.2d 731, 739. Rule
9 0 1 , Montana R u l e s o f E v i d e n c e , p e r m i t s a u t h e n t i c a t i o n o f a
document by testimony of a witness with knowledge that a
m a t t e r i s what it i s claimed t o be. T h i s i s p r e c i s e l y what
was d o n e h e r e . Mr. Jay Randall, a d i s t r i c t engineer f o r t h e
Montana Highway Department, testified the documents in
q u e s t i o n were a set o f c o n s t r u c t i o n p l a n s f o r t h e Plentywood
South project . Had DeTiennes been concerned with
inaccuracies i n t h e p l a n s o r w h e t h e r t h e p r o j e c t was b e i n g
b u i l t according t o t h e plans, t h e y could have attempted t o
show t h i s . They d i d n o t show u s e o f t h e e x h i b i t s a t t r i a l
affected any of their rights, or they were prejudiced by
t h e i r admission. For t h e s e r e a s o n s w e f i n d no error by t h e
court i n admitting t h e exhibits.
DeTiennes o b j e c t t o p l a i n t i f f ' s j u r y i n s t r u c t i o n on t h e
" q u o t i e n t method" f o r d e t e r m i n i n g c o m p e n s a t i o n :
You a not permitted t o a r r i v e a t t h e
amount o f c o m p e n s a t i o n t o b e a w a r d e d b y
the "quotient method," o r any o t h e r
method w h e r e b y i n a d v a n c e o f d e t e r m i n i n g
t h e amount, you a g r e e t o b e bound b y t h e
d e t e r m i n e d amount. R a t h e r , f o u r o r more
o f y o u r number who h a v e a g r e e d t o award
damages m u s t a g r e e upon a s p e c i f i c amount
known t o e a c h o f you when you v o t e i n
f a v o r o f a w a r d i n g t h a t amount.
This instruction, i n d e e d , may h a v e a t e c h n i c a l d e f e c t .
Mere t e c h n i c a l d e f e c t s i n t h e i n s t r u c t i o n s , i f considered a s
a w h o l e , d o n o t r e n d e r s u c h errors r e v e r s i b l e error. Lauman
v . Lee (Mont. 1 9 8 1 ) , 626 P.2d 8 3 0 , 8 3 4 , 38 S t . R e p . 499, 503.
The o p e n i n g p h r a s e o f t h e i n s t r u c t i o n c o u l d b e u n d e r s t o o d t o
mean t h e q u o t i e n t method p e r se i s i m p e r m i s s i b l e . Reading
the entire sentence, however, ma.kes c l e a r a n agreement in
advance t o be bound by a n amount y e t t o be determined i.s
impermissible. The i n s t r u c t i o n c 1 e a r l . y p r o h i b i t s t h i s k i n d
of agreement. I t i s p o s s i b l e t h e j u r y was c o n f u s e d by t h e
f i r s t phrase, but c l e a r l y t h e jury reached a v e r d i c t . There
i s no showing t h i s was done by t h e i m p e r m i s s i b l e method o f
a g r e e m e n t t o b e bound by an u n d e t e r m i n e d amount. DeTiennes
failed to show any prejudice or interference with their
s u b s t a n t i a l r i g h t s by r e a s o n o f t h e i n s t r u c t i o n . U n l e s s an
error affects the substantial rights of an appellant,
judgment w i l l n o t b e r e v e r s e d :
On a p p e a l , p r e j u d i c e i s n e v e r presumed,
and a judgment w i l l n o t b e r e v e r s e d
merely because t h e lower c o u r t e r r e d ; i n
order t o work a reversal, i t must
a f f i r m a t i v e l y appear t h a t t h e e r r o r has
a f f e c t e d s u b s t a n t i a l r i g h t s o f defendant
on t h e m e r i t s o f t h e c a s e . [Citations
omitted. ] It does n o t a f f i r m a t i v e l y
a p p e a r from t h e r e c o r d t h a t d e f e n d a n t was
prejudiced or t h a t substantial r i g h t s
w e r e a f f e c t e d by r e a s o n o f t h e e r r o r .
Conway v. Fabian (1939), 108 Mont. 287, 323-324, 89 P.2d
1022, 1 0 3 7 , c e r t . d e n i e d 308 U.S. 578, 60 S.Ct. 94, 84 L.Ed.
F i n a l l y DeTiennes a r g u e e r r o r b e c a u s e t h e c o u r t r e f u s e d
t o g i v e t h e i r i n s t r u c t i o n no. 10:
You a r e i n s t r u c t e d t h a t i n d e t e r m i n i n g
t h e amount o f d e p r e c i a t i o n t o t h e f a i r
market v a l u e o f t h e remainder t o be paid
by the State for the part of the
Defendant's land not taken, you may
consider inconvenience o f use t o t h e
landowner resulting from t h e taking.
O r d i n a r i l y damages may b e awarded o n l y f o r i n j u r y done
to the particular lot or tract of land for which the
right-of-way s t r i p i s taken. I n a s c e r t a i n i n g t h e award t o b e
made, t h e v a l u e o f t h e a c r e a g e t a k e n and t h e d e p r e c i a t i o n i n
v a l u e o f t h e remainder o f t h e p a r t i c u l a r t r a c t i s determined
r e g a r d l e s s o f what o t h e r l a n d s t h e owner may p o s s e s s . Every
item of inconvenience need not he considered by the jury.
Instruction no. 10 could mislead the jury into believing it
could consider any inconvenience to use suffered by DeTiennes
whether or not it affected the market value of the property
on the day of the taking. This is not the law. The amount
of compensation to be awarded, whether the property actually
is taken or injuriously affected by the taking, must be based
on the market value of the property at the time of the
taking. Only when inconvenience results in a diminution of
market value of the property is it compensated. Compensation
can not be for inconvenience per se. The damage being
compensated must be to the [value of the] property itself.
Less v. City of Butte (1903), 28 Mont. 27, 33, 72 P. 140,
141.
The jury heard testimony on inconvenience and were
properly instructed on the method to determine compensation.
It concluded there was no diminution in the value of the
property because of the location of the new highway, or
because of any inconvenience resulting from its location.
The judgment of the District Court is affirmed.
Justices
Mr. J u s t i c e Frank B. M o r r i s o n , Jr. d i s s e n t s a s f o l l o w s :
I d i s s e n t i n p a r t and c o n c u r i n p a r t .
I s p e c i f i c a l l y a g r e e w i t h t h e r e s o l u t i o n o f t h e i s s u e on
impeaching t h e j u r y v e r d i c t u t i l i z i n g t h e v o l u n t e e r s t a t e m e n t
o f t h e foreman. The s t a t e m e n t by t h e foreman i n d i c a t i n g t h a t
the jury considered negligence presents an interesting
question. By a n a l o g y , I believe t h e i s s u e t o be c o n t r o l l e d
by J o h n s o n v. S u p e r Save M a r k e t s , Inc. ( 1 9 8 4 ) , 686 P.2d 209,
4 1 St.Rep. 1495. In t h a t case t h e jury returned a v e r d i c t
f o r g e n e r a l damages i n t h e amount o f $17,000. However, t h e
j u r o r s v o l u n t a r i l y added a hand w r i t t e n l i s t e n u m e r a t i n g f i v e
separate elements of damage accounting for the total of
$17,000. The itemization showed that the jury awarded
damages f o r t h i n g s which d i d n o t f i n d s u p p o r t i n t h e r e c o r d .
In refusing to impeach the verdict with the handwritten
notations of the jurors, we said,
... w e a r e n o t c o m p e l l e d t o impeach a v e r d i c t
with considerations of the jury which are
vo1untariI.y o f f e r e d j u s t a s w e uniformly r e f u s e t o
d o s o w i t h t h e same i n f o r m a t i o n a s e l i c i t e d u n d e r
o a t h through a f f i d a v i t s .
The s t a t e m e n t o f t h e foreman was a v o l u n t e e r s t a t e m e n t
as the hand written notations in Johnson v. Super Save,
supra, were. Therefore, I would hold that the foreman's
s t a t e m e n t s should be disregarded.
I dissent from the holding in the majority opinion
a f f i r m i n g t h e t r i a l c o u r t r u l i n g g r a n t i n g a motion i n limine
foreclosing consideration of s a I es under threat of
condemnation. The majority opinion distinguishes between
c o m p a r a b l e s a l e s u t i l i z e d by an e x p e r t w i t n e s s i n a r r i v i n g a t
market value and the admissibility of those sales to
establish market value. I believe this is unnecessary
" s p l i t t i n g of h a i r s . " However, t h e m o t i o n i n l i m i n e and t h e
ruling thereon, i n t h i s case, foreclose the consideration of
such s a l e s f o r any purpose. Such r u l i n g r u n s c o n t r a r y t o t h e
holding of this Court in State Highway Comm'n v. Voyich
( 1 9 6 3 ) , 1 4 2 Mont. 355, 384 P.2d 765. Justice Castles, in
holding such s a l e s admissible s a i d :
We a r e n o t c a l l e d upon, n o r d o we r u l e , on t h e
q u e s t i o n o f a d m i s s i b i l i t y o f s a l e s t o condemners t o
e s t a b l i s h market price. We have set forth
s u f f i c i e n t h e r e , t h o u g h , t o e s t a b l i s h t h a t upon t h e
o b j e c t i o n s r a i s e d by t h e S t a t e , a s h e r e t o f o r e
q u o t e d , t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t was n o t i n e r r o r i n
allowing t h e evidence f o r t h e reason t h a t t h e
o b j e c t i o n went t o c o m p a r a b i l i t y of t h e l a n d s , which
c o m p a r a b i l i t y was shown.. ..
I believe that the holding of the Court in Voyich,
supra, is clearly that sales made under threat of
condemnation a r e c o m p a r a b l e s a l e s . I f such s a l e s c o n s t i t u t e
c o m p a r a b l e s a l e s t h e y can b e u s e d by an a p p r a i s e r i n a r r i v i n g
a t market value. I t would a l s o seem t h a t t h e y a r e d i r e c t l y
a d m i s s i b l e a l t h o u g h t h e C o u r t d i d n o t r u l e on t h a t q u e s t i o n .
F o l l o w i n g t h e a u t h o r i t y found i n S t a t e Highway Comm'n v .
Voyich, supra, I would hold that it was error t o prohibit
consideration of these "comparable sales" for any purpose
whatsoever. Such a d e t e r m i n a t i o n would r e q u i r e a n e w t r i a l .
I would r e v e r s e and remand f o r a new t r i a l i n a c c o r d a n c e