Legal Research AI

State v. Smith

Court: Montana Supreme Court
Date filed: 1985-09-10
Citations: 705 P.2d 1110, 217 Mont. 453
Copy Citations
3 Citing Cases

                                           No.    84-199

                I N THE SUPREME COURT O THE STATE O M N A A
                                       F           F OTN

                                                  1985




STATE O MONTANA,
       F

                 P l a i n t i f f and R e s p o n d e n t ,

     -vs-

R N L ALLEN SMITH,
 O AD

                 Defendant and A p p e l l a n t .




APPEAL FROM:     District Court of t h e Eleventh J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t ,
                 I n and f o r t h e County o f F l a t h e a d ,
                 The H o n o r a b l e M i c h a e l Keedy, J u d g e p r e s i d i n g .


COUNSEL O RECORD:
         F


         For Appellant:

                 Gary G.      Doran a r g u e d , K a l i s p e l l , Montana


         F o r Respondent :

                 Hon. Mike G r e e l y , A t t o r n e y G e n e r a l , H e l e n a , Montana
                 James S c h e i e r a r g u e d , A s s t . A t t y . G e n e r a l , H e l e n a
                 Ted 0. Lympus, County A t t o r n e y , K a l i s p e l l , Montana




                                           Submitted:          June 2 5 , 1985

                                              Decided:         September 1 0 , 1985


          Skp i o 1985
Filed:
M r . J u s t i c e J o h n Conway H a r r i s o n d e l i v e r e d t h e O p i n i o n of t h e
Court.


          The    defendant,           Ronald          Allen       Smith,        was     convicted        of

aggravated kidnapping,                   two c o u n t s ,        and d e l i b e r a t e h o m i c i d e ,

two     counts.          The        defendant           was      convicted           of   each       count

pursuant t o p l e a s o f g u i l t y entered i n t h e District Court of

Flathead        County,          State         of     Montana.             The        defendant        was

sentenced t o death.                 The j u d g m e n t a n d s e n t e n c e w e r e a f f i r m e d

by t h i s Court         in     S t a t e v.        Ronald A l l e n S m i t h         (Mont.        1985),

        P.2d.            ,    42 S t . R e p .      463.

          T h i s C o u r t i s a g a i n a s k e d t o r e c o n s i d e r t h e r e c o r d and

remand t h e m a t t e r f o r a n a d d i t i o n a l p s y c h i a t r i c e v a l u a t i o n o f

d e f e n d a n t and a r e h e a r i n g o f t h e d e f e n d a n t ' s s e n t e n c e , b a s e d

upon    a United         S t a t e s Supreme C o u r t c a s e o f Ake v.                       Oklahoma

(19851,               U.S.              , 105 S.Ct.            1 0 8 7 , 84 L.Ed.2d          53, which

came down a f t e r a r g u m e n t i n t h i s c a s e .

          On    August         4,     1982,         defendant           kidnapped         and      killed

H a r v e y Mad Man,          Jr.,      and      Thomas R u n n i n g R a b b i t ,          Jr.,     a t a

remote       location         near      U.S.        Highway        2,    west     of      the   eastern

b o r d e r o f F l a t h e a d County.             On A u g u s t 3 ,     1982, t h e defendant

and    two      companions,           Andre         Fontaine         and    Rodney        Munro,       had

d e p a r t e d from A l b e r t a , Canada.               The t h r e e e n c o u n t e r e d t h e t w o

victims,        Mad     Man       and     Running           Rabbit,        at    a     bar      in    East

G l a c i e r , Montana.         While a t t h e b a r , t h e t h r e e s h o t p o o l and

d r a n k b e e r w i t h Mad Man a n d R u n n i n g R a b b i t .                  The t h r e e l e f t

t h e b a r i n E a s t G l a c i e r a n d h i t c h h i k e d w e s t a l o n g Highway 2.

There     had     been       discussion             between       the    defendant           and     Andre

F o n t a i n e a b o u t s t e a l i n g a c a r and t h e need t o e l i m i n a t e a n y

witnesses t o the theft.                         Shortly thereafter,                  t h e t h r e e men

w e r e p i c k e d u p b y Mad Man a n d R u n n i n g R a b b i t .                  The men d r o v e

f o r a p p r o x i m a t e l y t w e n t y m i n u t e s a n d s t o p p e d t o a l l o w Mad Man
and Running R a b b i t t o r e l i e v e t h e m s e l v e s .           When t h e two men

got    back      into      the     car,       the    defendant        pulled       a    sawed-off

single-shot          bolt      action       .22     rifle,     brought         illegally        into

t h i s country,        and p o i n t e d it a t t h e d r i v e r .         Munro d i s p l a y e d

h i s k n i f e t o t h e passenger.                The d e f e n d a n t and Munro marched

t h e two v i c t i m s i n t o t h e t r e e s .         The d e f e n d a n t s h o t Harvey

Mad Man i n t h e back o f                 t h e head a t p o i n t - b l a n k        range.     He

reloaded        the     rifle,       walked         several      feet     to    where       Thomas

Running R a b b i t had f a l l e n t o t h e ground upon b e i n g s t a b b e d by

Munro, and s h o t him i n t h e t e m p l e a t p o i n t - b l a n k r a n g e .              Both

men w e r e k i l l e d i n s t a n t l y .       The d e f e n d a n t and t h e o t h e r two

t h e n s t o l e t h e v i c t i m s ' c a r and p r o c e e d e d t o C a l i f o r n i a .    The

c a r was l a t e r r ~ c o v e r e dwhen F o n t a i n e and Munro w e r e a r r e s t e d

f o r armed r o b b e r y i n C a l i f o r n i a .       The d e f e n d a n t was a r r e s t e d

i n Wyoming.

         An    i n f o r m a t i o n was      f i l e d charging t h e defendant with

two     counts        of     aggravated           kidnapping        and      two       counts     of

deliberate         homicide.           An      arraignment         hearing        was     held    on

November 1, 1982, a t which t i m e t h e d e f e n d a n t e n t e r e d a p l e a

of    "not guilty" t o a l l charges.                     O F e b r u a r y 24,
                                                           n                            1983, t h e

d e f e n d a n t e n t e r e d a change o f p l e a .           The d e f e n d a n t a d m i t t e d

s h o o t i n g b o t h v i c t i m s i n t h e head.        The c o u r t was a p p r i s e d o f

t h e d e f e n d a n t ' s i n t e n t i o n t o seek t h e d e a t h penalty.

         A t t h e s e n t e n c i n g h e a r i n g on March 21,            1983, t h e c o u r t

and    parties        reviewed       t h e presentence r e p o r t and,                 a f t e r one

minor     correction,           t h e c o u r t admitted         it without o b j e c t i o n .

At    t h e hearing,         t h e d e f e n d a n t t e s t i f i e d t h a t h e had been i n

p r i s o n f o r e i g h t o f t h e l a s t t e n y e a r s , and t h a t h e had l i v e d

by p e t t y t h e f t and s e l l i n g d r u g s when h e was n o t i n p r i s o n .

He    testified         in     detail       about      the     sixteen       prior       offenses

l i s t e d i n t h e presentence report.                    He testified t o the facts
of the killing.                H e s t a t e d t h a t Munro was a w a r e o f h i s i n t e n t

to kill       t h e victims because he intended t o s t e a l t h e i r c a r

and wished t o l e a v e no w i t n e s s e s .                 He stated t h a t in addition

t o h i s d e s i r e t o eliminate t h e witnesses t o t h e c a r t h e f t , he

had    had    a    "morbid          f a s c i n a t i o n t o f i n d o u t w h a t it w o u l d b e

like t o k i l l         somebody."               He    t e s t i f i e d t h a t h e h a d consumed

t w o o r t h r e e b e e r s on t h e n i g h t o f                 t h e crime b u t                that his

ability       to    understand              his    actions          were     not          impaired.            He

testified         he     sought        the      death penalty               because             a    prolonged

p e r i o d o f i n c a r c e r a t i o n would b e o f n o b e n e f i t t o h i m s e l f o r

society       and       because           he    foresaw         problems         with           the      Indian

population          at    the        prison.            He     testified         that           he     felt    no

remorse       for        the       killings,            that    he      considered                  himself     a

violent person,                and    t h a t he        f e l t he could k i l l                    again.     He

stated       that        he     had       no    desire         to     change             his        lifestyle.

Following e x t e n s i v e q u e s t i o n i n g by t h e c o u r t ,                        t h e defendant

denied       being       under        the      influence        of     drugs,            intoxicants           or

extreme       stress          and     stated           that    he     knew       of       no        mitigating

circumstances.

         On March 2 1 ,              1983 a t t h e conclusion o f t h e hearing t o

determine          the    existence             and      nature       of    any          aggravating           or

mitigating         circumstances,                 the       court     imposed             a     sentence       of

d e a t h upon t h e d e f e n d a n t .

         Subsequently,               t h e defendant            filed       a motion t o seek a

reconsideration               of     the       death        penalty        and       a     motion        for    a

psychiatric            examination.               The c o u r t h e l d          a       h e a r i n g on     the

motions       on       May     3,     1983.            At     the    hearing,             the        defendant

t e s t i f i e d t h a t h i s f a m i l y h a d i n d u c e d him t o c h a n g e h i s mind

and s e e k a lesser p e n a l t y t h a n d e a t h .                  He testified that his

earlier       desire          for     the      d ~ a t hp e n a l t y      was        the       product        of

depression          which           had     resulted           from        the       long           period     of
solitary        confinement              in    t h e Flathead             County J a i l         following

his arrest.             He      further testified                 t h a t he had d e s i g n e d h i s

earlier        testimony            to    induce          the    court       to     s e n t e n c e him    to

death,      and       that        he     had     concealed            a    potential            mitigating

factor--his           u s e o f d r u g s and a l c o h o l .               He t e s t i f i e d t h a t he

and Munrn had u s ~ d h r e e o r f o u r h u n d r e d " h i t s " o f LSD d u r i n g
                     t

the period         of       t i m e immediately p r i o r t o t h e i r e n t r y t o t h e

United S t a t e s , ending t h e day b e f o r e t h e murders.                                He further

testified         that        on       the     day    of        the    crime        he     had    consumed

a p p r o x i m a t e l y twelve b e e r s .

          On    June        10,        1983     the       court       granted        the      defendant's

motion      f o r psychiatric evaluation.                                 The c o u r t a p p o i n t e d a

p s y c h i a t r i s t , D r . W i l l i a m S t r a t f o r d , t o examine t h e d e f e n d a n t

and     report         to     the        court       as    to:            (1) w h e t h e r      he    could

d e t e r m i n e which o f         t h e v e r s i o n s g i v e n by t h e d e f e n d a n t was

credible;        and        ( 2 ) w h a t was t h e d e f e n d a n t ' s m e n t a l c o n d i t i o n

on August         4,        1982.         The    defendant            requested           the     court    to

amend     its order deleting t h e investigative function of D r .

Stratford.             The      court         amended       i t s o r d e r and d i r e c t e d           Dr.

S t r a t f o r d t o assume t h e t r u t h o f d e f e n d a n t ' s                   second v e r s i o n

of t h e f a c t s i n performing h i s examination.

          The     court        held       a     hearing         on     defendant's            motion      for

r e c o n s i d e r a t i o n o f t h e s e n t e n c e on December 1, 1983.                          A t the

hearing,        Dr.     Stratford testified                      t h a t he       found n o e v i d e n c e

that     the    use      of     drugs o r alcohol affected                           the defendant's

capacity        to      appreciate              the       criminality             of      his     conduct,

conform h i s          conduct           t o the      requirements             of      law,      or   form a

criminal intent.                 H e b a s e d h i s c o n c l u s i o n s on t h e d e f e n d a n t ' s

t e s t i m o n y and s t a t e m e n t s r e g a r d i n g h i s e x t e n s i v e u s e o f LSD

a n d h i s c o n d u c t on t h e d a y o f t h e crime.                           According t o D r .

S t r a t f o r d , a f t e r t h r e e o r f o u r c o n s e c u t i v e d a y s o f h e a v y LSD
usage       the       user    develops            a      tolerance            for           the       drug.                    As         a

result,         l a r g e d o s e s have            little         or    no     effect.                        Given                the

defendant's            history of            heavy LSD u s a g e                f o r a p e r i o d o f one

month       o r more         prior      t o the           crime,        Dr.         Stratford                   concluded

t h a t t h e u s e o f e i g h t o r n i n e , o r e v e n a s many a s f i f t y d o s e s

o f LSD would n o t h a v e a f f e c t e d t h e d e f e n d a n t ' s m e n t a l s t a t e

when h e committed t h e h o m i c i d e s .

          Rodney Munro,              the          defendant's            accomplice                       also                testi-

fied a t t h e hearing.                     Munro s t a t e d t h a t a t t h e t i m e o f t h e

crime,      h e was          experiencing confusion,                          f l a s h e s of                 l i g h t and

h a l l u c i n a t i o n s , h a v i n g i n g e s t e d a p p r o x i m a t e l y t h e same amount

of    d r u g s and      alcohol            a s t h e defendant.                        He also testified

t h a t h e had s t a b b e d Running R a b b i t o n c e b e f o r e t h e d e f e n d a n t

s h o t him, and t h a t i t was p o s s i b l e Running R a b b i t was a l r e a d y

dead b e f o r e h e was s h o t .

          On December             12,       1983,         t h e d e f e n d a n t f i l e d h i s motion

for    an      additiona 1 psychiatric evaluation                                   .        The d e f e n d a n t ' s

m o t i o n was d e n i e d .

          In         reviewing     defendant ' s motion                        for          reconsideration,

t h e c o u r t e n t e r e d f i n d i n g s o f f a c t and c o n c l u s i o n s o f law t o

support i t s o r i g i n a l sentence.                      The c o u r t found t h a t beyond a

r e a s o n a b l e d o u b t t h e a g g r a v a t e d k i d n a p p i n g s c o m m i t t e d by t h e

defendant            resulted      in       t h e death of              h i s victims,                        satisfying

the     statutory            aggravating                 circumstance               stated                in            section

46-18-303,            MCA.                                                                            -
                                                                                                      u       4 L-- v
                                                                                                              We




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               '3
               -'I    M3k       The c o u r t            found beyond               a       reasonable doubt

that     no m i t i g a t i n g      circumstances w e r e                     present.                       The             court

found t h a t w i t h o u t e x c e p t i o n ,            t h e d e f e n d a n t ' s consumption o f
alcohol        and     drugs        was        voluntary,           and        did     not     impair    or

o t h e r w i s e a f f e c t h i s s t a t e o f mind, h i s c a p a c i t y t o r e c o g n i z e

and a p p r e c i a t e t h c r i m i n a l i t y o f h i s c o n d u c t o r h i s a b i l i t y
                            ~

to    control         his    actions       and       to   conform          his        conduct     to    the

r e q u i r e m e n t s o f law.      The c o u r t c o n c l u d e d t h a t t h e d e f e n d a n t

made     a   c r > n s c i o u s and v o l u n t a r y c h o i c e        t o k i l l the victims

notwithstanding               his    use        of    drugs         and        alcohol,        and     that

i n t o x i c a t i o n was n o t a s u f f i c i e n t m i t i g a t i n g c i r c u m s t a n c e t o

c a l l f o r leniency.

          The d e f e n d a n t a p p e a l e d      from t h e s e n t e n c e imposed.                 We

affirmed.         S t a t e v. Ronald A l l e n S m i t h , s u p r a .

          Defendant's p e t i t i o n            f o r r e h e a r i n g i s b a s e d on Ake v.

Oklahoma        (1985),               U.S.                ,   105 S . C t .          1 0 8 7 , 84 L.Ed.2d

53.      Our p r o v i n c e on t h e a p p e a l i s t o d e t e r m i n e w h e t h e r t h e

d e f e n d a n t i s e n t i t l e d t o a n a d d i t i o n a l p s y c h i a t r i c exam u n d e r

Ake,
-        supra.             The    defendant          argues         that        the     Ake
                                                                                         -      decision

established a constitutional r i g h t f o r defendant's access t o

competent         psychiatric             assistance           where           such     assistance       is
essential         to        the     effective          defense            of     the      case.         The

defendant        argues t h a t           in    l i g h t of     the - decision,
                                                                     Ake                             he is

entitled         to     an        additional         psychiatric                examination.             We

disagree.          W e find t h e - decision lacks d i r e c t application
                                  Ake

t o M o n t a n a ' s c a p i t a l s e n t e n c i n g p r o c e e d i n g and t o t h e p r e s e n t

case.

          I n Ake v.          Oklahoma,          supra,        an    i n d i g e n t d e f e n d a n t was

charged       with      first-degree             murder.            At     his       arraignment        the

t r i a l j u d g e o r d e r e d him t o b e examined by a p s y c h i a t r i s t d u e

t o h i s b i z a r r e behavior.                The d e f e n d a n t was i n i t i a l l y found

i n c o m p e t e n t t o s t a n d t r i a l , b u t s i x weeks l a t e r h e was found

comp~tent so                long     as    he        continued            to     be      sedated       with

anti-psychotic              drugs.             The   defendant            raised         the    insanity
d e f e n s e and r e q u e s t e d       a p s y c h i a t r i c evaluation t o determine

h i s mental s t a t e a t t h e t i m e o f t h e o f f e n s e .                   The t r i a l c o u r t

d e n i e d d e f e n d a n t ' s m o t i o n f o r s u c h an e v a l u a t i o n .         The U n i t e d

S t a t e s Supreme C o u r t r e v e r s e d and h e l d t h a t when a d e f e n d a n t

h a s made a p r e l i m i n a r y showing t h a t h i s s a n i t y a t t h e t i m e o f

t h e offense i s l i k e l y t o be a s i g n i f i c a n t f a c t o r a t t r i a l . ,

the constitution requires t h a t t h e s t a t e provide access t o a

psychiatrist's                assistance         on     this      issue,        if     the    defendant

cannot o t h e r w i s e a f f o r d one.

          We    f i n d t h e - d e c i s i o n r e a d i l y d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e from
                              Ake

the case a t bar.                    First,       the psychiatric               testimony i n -
                                                                                              Ake

raised       the     issue         of     the   defendant's              f u t u r e dangerousness,

which      in    Oklahoma           is a        statutory         aggravating            factor         in a

capital         sentencing           proceeding.             Oklahoma           Stat.,       Title       21,

S152      (1981).             In    Montana,          future          dangerousness           is    not    a

s t a t u t o r y aggravating circumstance under t h e s t a t e ' s c a p i t a l

sentencing          scheme.              Section        46-18-303,            MCA.         Unlike        the

s i t u a t i o n t h a t e x i s t e d i n - t h e s t a t e d i d n o t r e l y upon o r
                                            Ake,

present         psychiatric              evidence       to     establish         any       aggravating

factors a t sentencing.                    F u r t h e r , i n t h i s c a s e , a t no t i m e d i d

the    S t a t e attempt            to elicit           from D r .       S t r a t f o r d an      opinion

concerning f u t u r e dangerousness o f t h e dependant.

          Second,         in       Ake
                                   -      there       was    a    trial.         The       defendant's

sanity      was      a    significant             factor         in     his   defense.             In    the

present        matter,         t h e defendant p l e a d g u i l t y t o t h e homicide

and aggravated kidnapping offenses.

          Third,         in    the       United       States          Supreme    Court        decision,

t h e r e was no e x p e r t t e s t i m o n y f o r e i t h e r s i d e on A k e ' s s a n i t y

at    the       time     of        the    offense.               Ake,
                                                                 -        105    S.Ct.        at     1091.

However,        i n Smith,           supra,       Dr.     Stratford,          the psychiatrist,
gave e x t e n s i v e t e s t i m o n y a s t o t h e d e f e n d a n t ' s s t a t e o f mind

a t t h e t i m e of the offense including:

                  ( a ) t h e e f f e c t o f a l c o h o l and d r u g s on
                 t h e d e f e n d a n t ' s s t a t e o f mind;

                  (b) whether t h e defendant a c t e d under
                 e x t r e m e m e n t a l o r e m o t i o n a l stress;

                  (c) whether t h e defendant ' s c a p a c i t y t o
                 a p p r e c i a t e t h e c r i m i n a l i t y o f h i s conduct
                 to        the          requirements             of     law    was
                 s u b s t a n t i a l l y i m p a i r e d ; and

                (d) a    diagnosis                of     the   defendant's
                mental condition.                  S t a t e v. S m i t h , 4 2
                St.Rep. a t 4 7 9 .

          Fourth,         in     -
                                 Ake,      the      trial        court       denied          defense

counsel ' s r e q u e s t f o r a p s y c h i a t r i c examination o f defendant

with     respect        to     his    mental      condition         at    the     time        of   the

offense.           In     the     present        case,      the     trial       court        granted

defendant 's i n i t i a 1 request               f o r the psychiatric evaluation.

F o l l o w i n g t h e e x a m i n a t i o n and t h e p s y c h i a t r i s t ' s    conclusion

r e g a r d i n g t h e d e f e n d a n t ' s s t a t e o f mind, t h e d e f e n d a n t f i l e d

a    motion      for      an    additional         psychiatric           evaluation.               The

second motion was d e n i e d .                 Based on t h e f o r e g o i n g ,           we f i n d

the      -
         Ake      decision           readily        distinguishable               and        without

precedential m e r i t t o t h i s case.

          The d e f e n d a n t a l s o a r g u e s t h a t h e was n o t p r o v i d e d w i t h

a     competent         psychiatrist.                 The      defendant          repeats          his

contention raised i n t h e i n i t i a l appeal t h a t D r .                        Stratford's

r o l e was c o n t a m i n a t e d by t h e i n v e s t i g a t i v e f u n c t i o n imposed

by    the     District          Court.          This      contention          raised         by    the

d e f e n d a n t i n h i s b r i e f s and argument is i d e n t i c a l t o t h a t i n

t h e f i r s t a p p e a l , S t a t e v . Ronald A l l e n S m i t h , s u p r a .

         We    h a v e c o n s i d e r e d t h e argument n o t o n l y i n              l i g h t of

t h e i s s u e s r a i s e d i n t h e o r i g i n a l a p p e a l , b u t a l s o on t h e -
                                                                                             Ake

decision.           The      United      State      Supreme       Court      in       -
                                                                                      Ake,    noted:
                 T h i s i s n o t t o s a y , o f c o u r s e , -t - tha the

                 -
                 i n d i g e n t defendant has a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l
                 r i a h t t o choose a ~ s v c h i a t r i s t o f h i s
                 p e r s o n a l l i k i n g o r i o L receive f u a s - i       E;
                 hire           his        own.                Our c o n c e r n i s
                 t h a t t h e i n d i g e n t defendant have a c c e s s
                 - - competent p s y c h i a t r i s t f o r t h e
                 to       a
                 p u r p o s e w e h a v e d i s c u s s e d , and a s i n t h e
                 case of t h e provision of counsel we leave
                 t o t h e S t a t e t h e d e c i s i o n on how t o
                 implement t h i s r i g h t .            (Emphasis a d d e d . )
                 Ake, s u p r a , 1 0 5 S.Ct. a t 1097.
                 -
The     basic         tenent      of     the      -
                                                  Ake     decision           was    to     assure       an

indigent defendant's                   a c c e s s t o a competent p s y c h i a t r i s t f o r

t h e p r e p a r a t i o n o f a d e f e n s e b a s e d on h i s m e n t a l c o n d i t i o n .

We    f i n d t h e d e f e n d a n t was a f f o r d e d t h i s r i g h t .             The r e c o r d

clearly reflects Dr.                 S t r a t f o r d ' s e d u c a t i o n a 1 and p r o f e s s i o n a 1

qualifications.                Dr.     S t r a t f o r d i n t e r v i e w e d t h e d e f e n d a n t on

two o c c a s i o n s a t t h e Plontana S t a t e P r i s o n a n d c o n s i d e r e d t h e

t r a n s c r i p t s of t h e p r i o r proceedings,                 t h e presentence report

and     witness         statements            provided         by      the       defendant.           Dr.

Stratford         a l s o interviewed             Rodney Munro and Andre                       Fontaine

and s e c u r e d a p s y c h o l o g i c a l p r o f i l e o f t h e d e f e n d a n t from D r .

Herman W l t e r s .
        a

          Dr.      Stratford's            conclusion           was        that     Smith       had    the

capacity         to    appreciate          the     criminality             of    his     conduct      and

t h a t t h e d r u g s and a l c o h o l d i d n o t h a v e a s u b s t a n t i a l e f f e c t

on t h e d e f e n d a n t ' s     s t a t e o f mind.              The r e c o r d d e m o n s t r a t e s

that Dr.         S t r a t f o r d was a n e u t r a l p s y c h i a t r i s t who examined

Smith a s t o h i s            sanity a t the t i m e                of    the     offenses.          Dr.

Stratford testified t o the                       f o r e g o i n g a t t h e h e a r i n g and         it

was     on      that      basis        that      this      Court          found     no    additional

p s y c h i a t r i c e v a l u a t i o n was n e c e s s a r y .

          Accordingly,            we     find     that      Ronald         Allen       Smith    is not

e n t i t l e d t o a second p s y c h i a t r i s t ' s e v a l u a t i o n .
We concur:
             ,.-.f




Justices