(after stating the facts as above). [1] This proceeding is brought here under the provisions of section 24b of the Bankruptcy Act (Act July 1, 1898, c. 541, 30 Stat. 553 [U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 3432]). Therefore we are not authorized to determiiie questions of fact upon which the order of the lower court is based, but may only superintend, and, if need be, revise, its action in the matter of law. This is now the settled interpretation given section 24b. Matter of Loving, 224 U. S. 183, 32 Sup. Ct. 446, 56 L. Ed. 725; Coder v. Arts, 213 U. S. 223, 29 Sup. Ct. 436, 53 L. Ed. 772, 16 Ann. Cas. 1008; First National Bank v. Title & Trust Company, 198 U. S. 280, 25 Sup. Ct. 693, 49 L. Ed. 1051; Mueller v. Nugent, 184 U. S. 1, 22 Sup. Ct. 269, 46 L. Ed. 405; Samel v. Dodd (Fifth Cir.) 142 Fed. 68, 73 C. C. A. 254; Tn re Purvine (Fifth Cir.) 96 Fed. 192, 37 C. C. A. 446. The matter of law to be passed on is the validity of the order of the lower court of October 18, 1911, and this is to be determined on the record of the District Court. Mueller v. Nugent, cited supra.
[2] From the evidence before him, which was of a conflicting nature, the judge was unable affirmatively to find as a fact that the bankrupt, at the time of the making of the order against him by the referee, then had in his possession or under his control either the goods orthe money he was'directed to turn over to the trustee of his estate. Failing to find this, it was incumbent on the judge to reverse the action of the referee and discharge the rule against the bankrupt. No other *713order than the one passed by him was compatible with or justified by the judge’s view of the evidence and the conclusions entertained by him.
In view of the brief and argument submitted in behalf of the petitioner, we deem it appropriate to say the doctrine announced by this court in Re Purvine, cited supra, has neither been modified nor changed. The same doctrine was subsequently announced and sanctioned by the Supreme Court of the United States in Mueller v. Nugent, 184 U. S. 1, 22 Sup. Ct. 269, 46 L. Ed. 405. There is no departure from this doctrine in Samel v. Dodd, cited supra. In the latter case it was held the court, finding in a summary proceeding that bankrupts had in their possession or under their control goods and merchandise, the property of their estate in bankruptcy, had not the power lawfully to order them to pay over the value of such goods and merchandise in money under penalty of commitment for contempt; that in such a proceeding the court was restricted to ordering a return of the goods and merchandise in specie or kind, and this only when it was made clear by proof that the bankrupts were in possession or control of them. '
The petition for a revision of the action of the judge will be denied.
PARDEE. Circuit Judge, concurs in the foregoing opinion and decision.