University of Montana v. Coe

Xo. 84-417

I N THE SUPIQEME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA

1985

UNIVERSITY OF MONTANA,

P l a i n t i f f and R e s p o n d e n t ,

MARK COE, TAMERLY D. COE and
JORDON COE,

D e f e n d a n t s and A p p e l l a n t s .

PEAL FROM: D i s t r i c t C o u r t of t h e F o u r t h J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t ,
I n and f o r t h e C o u n t y of M i s s o u l a ,
T h e H o n o r a b l e John S. H e n s o n , Judge p r e s i d i n g .

COUNSEL OF RECORD:

For Appellant:

T e r r y Wallace argued, M i s s o u l a , M o n t a n a

For Respondent :

M o r a l e s & V o l i n k a t y ; J u l i o K. M o r a l e s argued, M i s s o u l a ,
Montana

Submitted: May 2 , 1 9 8 5

Decided: A u g u s t 5, 1 9 8 5

Filed:
Rut; .' 1985

Clerk
Mr. Justice John Conway Harrison delivered the Opinion of the
Court.

This is an appeal from the judgment of the District
Court of the Fourth Judicial District of the State of
Montana, County of Missoula, the Honorable John S. Henson
presiding. This case involves an execution on a bank account
to recover student loans under the National Direct Student
Loan Program.
The appellant, Mark D. Coe, a former Montana University
student, took out a series of student loans under the
National Direct Student Loan Program, amounting to $6,437.30.
For these loans he was required to sign, through the

University, a promissory note pursuant to the National Direct
Student Loan Program of the United States. He defaulted on
the loans and when later requested, made only one payment of
$20. The University, respondent herein, brought suit and
obtained a partial summary judgment in the sum of $6,437.30.
Through one of several executions, the University
levied against the joint savings account of Mark Coe at the
First Bank-Western Montana, Missoula. The savings account
was in the name of "Tammerly or Mark D. Coe" which at the
time of execution had a balance of $3,179.23. Tammerly Coe
requested the Bank not to release the funds, claiming that

the funds did not belong to Mark Coe, but rather belonged to
her and to Jordan Coe, brother to Tammerly and Mark.
Pursuant to agreement of counsel, and a stipulation fi1ed ,
plus to avoid the cost of an interpleader by the bank, the
funds were deposited with the District Court. A second
stipulation was filed to allow intervention by Tammerly Coe
and Jordon Coe.
 Tammerly Coe and h e r b r o t h e r , J o r d a n c o n t e n d t h a t t h e y

d e p o s i t e d t h e money i n t h e bank and t h a t t h e i r b r o t h e r , Mark,

d e p o s i t e d no f u n d s w h a t s o e v e r . However, one o f t h e e x h i b i t s

p r e s e n t e d t o t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t was a copy o f t h e s i g n a t u r e

c a r d o f t h e a c c o u n t which l i s t e d t h e names o f Tammerly Coe o r

Mark D . Coe, a l o n g w i t h t h e i r a d d r e s s e s , which s t a t e d t h a t
.
Mark was "the owner of a joint savings account with his

sister." J o r d a n Coe d i d n o t s i g n t h i s a c c o u n t , n o r d o e s h i s

name a p p e a r on t h e s i g n a t u r e c a r d t h o u g h h e c l a i m s h e owns

$2,000 o f t h e f u n d s i n t h e a c c o u n t . Jordan a l l e g e s he gave

that amount to Tammerly for safe keeping on his behalf.

Tammerly c l a i m s t h e r e m a i n d e r o f t h e f u n d s , l e s s t h e $2,000

d e p o s i t e d by h e r b r o t h e r J o r d a n , b e l o n g t o h e r and t h a t Mark

Coe, a s p r e v i o u s l y n o t e d , n e v e r made a d e p o s i t .

O n e b a s i c i s s u e and t h r e e s u b - i s s u e s a r e presented f o r

our consideration. Listed a s t h e b a s i c i s s u e is:

(1) Whether t h e c o u r t e r r e d i n d e c l a r i n g a l l t h e f u n d s

in a joint c h e c k i n g a c c o u n t a r e s u b j e c t t o e x e c u t i o n on a

judgment a g a i n s t o n e j o i n t t e n a n t .

Listed a s t h e t h r e e sub-issues a r e t h e following:

(2) What p o r t i o n o f a j o i n t c h e c k i n g a c c o u n t , i f a n y ,

i s s u b j e c t t o e x e c u t i o n on a judgment a g a i n s t o n e who h a s

signed a s i g n a t u r e card?

(3) Was i n t e n t o f t h e c o - t e n a n t s o f a j o i n t checking

account a f a c t o r i n determining a c r e d i t o r ' s r i g h t t o execute

a judgment a g a i n s t one c o - t e n a n t ?

(4) What, i f any, i n t e r e s t s of co-tenants i n a joint

checking account a r e s u b j e c t t o p r o t e c t i o n ?

A s noted i n t h e r e s p o n d e n t ' s b r i e f t h i s c a s e i s one o f

f i r s t impression addressing t h e q u e s t i o n o f whether a j o i n t

bank a c c o u n t i s s u b j e c t t o e x e c u t i o n on a judgment against
o n l y one joint depositor, and i f so, t o what e x t e n t . The

D i s t r i c t C o u r t a f t e r h a v i n g examined s t a t u t o r y c a s e law i n

Montana and e l s e w h e r e , as well a s t h e e q u i t a b l e arguments

raised, concluded that under the present fact the entire

a c c o u n t was s u b j e c t t o e x e c u t i o n .

The a p p e l l a n t s a r g u e t h a t t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t e r r e d f o r

two r e a s o n s . The f i r s t r e a s o n was t h a t t h e s o l e i s s u e t h a t

t h e c o u r t was t o d e c i d e , a s s e t f o r t h i n t h e s t i p u l a t i o n , was

who owned the money in the account. Based upon that

determination, the court was to decide what amount was

subject t o execution. A p p e l l a n t s a l l e g e t h e a f f i d a v i t was

n o t s u p p o s e d t o a d d r e s s t h e i s s u e o f i n t e n t , a s c o u n s e l had

stipulated. They f u r t h e r allege t h a t t h e only issue, the

o n l y b u r d e n t h a t t h e s e d e p o s i t o r s h a d , was t o show who owned

t h e money i n t h e a c c o u n t . Tarnrnerly and J o r d a n s u b m i t t e d an

affidavit that set f o r t h whose money was in the account,

which t h e U n i v e r s i t y f a i l e d t o r e f u t e .

The second r e a s o n was t h a t a p p e l l a n t s were n e v e r g i v e n

an opportunity to argue the issue of intent. The court

looked t o t h e argument o u t s i d e t h e s t i p u l a t i o n o f counsel,

which appellants contend constituted error. They claim,

under the circumstances of this case, the issue of the

judgment creditor's rights to funds in the joint account

n e v e r h i n g e d on t h e i s s u e o f i n t e n t .

We f i n d t h a t t h e f i r s t two i s s u e s a r e t h e c o n t r o l l i n g

issues in this case. These two issues can be properly

r e s t a t e d whether t h i s i s a j o i n t tenancy account with r i g h t

o f s u r v i v o r s h i p , o r w h e t h e r it i s a t e n a n c y i n common. Both

t h e a p p e l l a n t s and t h e r e s p o n d e n t r e l y on p r e v i o u s c a s e law

in Montana that addresses issues involving joint bank

accounts regarding rights of inheritance and inheritance
taxes. Malek v. Patten (Mont. 1984), 678 P.2d 201, 41
St.Rep. 305; Anderson v. Baker (Mont. 1982), 641 P.2d 1035,
39 St-Rep. 273; In the Matter of Sinclair (Mont. 1982), 640
P.2d 918, 39 St.Rep. 331; Casagranda v. Donahue (1978), 178
Mont. 479, 585 P.2d 1286; Patterson v. Halterman (1973), 161
Mont. 278, 505 P.2d 905; State Board of Equalization v. Cole
(1948), 122 Mont. 9, 195 P.2d 989; In Re Sullivan's Estate
(1941), 112 Mont. 519, 118 P.2d 383.
Appellants direct our attention to cases outside this
jurisdiction, claiming this particular set of circumstances
has not previously been answered by Montana case law. Purma
v. Stark (Kan. 1978), 585 P.2d 991; Walnut Valley State Bank
v. Stova11 (Kan. 1978), 574 P.2d 1382; Yakima Adjustment
Services v. Durand (Wash.App. 1981), 622 P.2d 408.
Appellants argue these out of state jurisdictional cases
state the majority rule. We find that the Montana rule set
forth in our case law as to joint tenancy and tenancy in
common, represents a more reliable manner of determining
questions concerning the ownership of joint accounts. As
Justice Sheehy very ably noted in this Court's opinion in
Casaqranda v. Donahue, supra, that rule was set forth and
reiterated in Ludwig v. Montana Bank & Trust Co. (1939), 109
Mont. 477, 98 P.2d 377, wherein this Court quoted with
approval from Hill v. Badeljy (Ca.App. 1930), 290 P. 637 at
640:
"The question involved in cases of this
character is the intention of the
parties ...
and when such intention is
evidenced by a written agreement, as was
done in the case at bar, this question of
intention ceases to be an issue, and the
Courts are bound by the written
agreement ...Furthermore . ..
parol
evidence is not admissible to change the
terms of the legal effect of such a
written instrument where it is in no
 r e s p e c t u n c e r t a i n o r ambiguous.'' 9 8 P.2d
a t 389.

I n o u r most r e c e n t c a s e , Malek v . Patten, supra, this

C o u r t a g a i n r e a s s e r t e d t h a t it " p r e f e r r e d " t h e Montana rule

e v e n t h o u g h t h e d o n e e / j o i n t owner n e v e r s i g n e d t h e s i g n a t u r e

card. I n M o n t a n a ' s c a s e s i n v o l v i n g t h i r d p a r t i e s , one j o i n t

owner is truly an owner with an unquestionable right to

withdraw t h e e n t i r e funds. I t i s o n l y where o n e j o i n t t e n a n t

seeks to take advantage of the other without third party

r i g h t s being affected, t h a t t h i s Court h a s allowed evidence

beyond the joint account signature card and its legal

consequences.

In the instant case such t h i r d party rights are the

p r i m a r y c o n s i d e r a t i o n and t h e r e f o r e no e x t r i n s i c e v i d e n c e was

admissible. Mark Coe, Tammerly Coe and J o r d a n Coe a l l a d m i t

in their affidavit that Mark was an owner of the joint

account.

The second i s s u e c o n s i d e r s w h e t h e r t h e j o i n t a c c o u n t i s

d i s t i n g u i s h e d from a t r a d i t i o n a l common law f r a c t i o n a l s h a r e ,

and a creditor of one depositor can execute on t h e whole

account. The s t a t u t e s t h a t c o n t r o l i n t h i s m a t t e r c o v e r t h e

property and o w n e r s h i p t h e r e o f and o w n e r s h i p o f joint bank

a c c o u n . t s i n Montana. That s e c t i o n , 70-1-101, MCA, provides

a s follows:

"Property defined--ownership. The
o w n e r s h i p o f a t h i n g i s t h e r i g h t o f one
o r more p e r s o n s t o p o s s e s s and u s e i t t o
t h e exclusion of others. I n t h i s code,
t h e t h i n g o f which t h e r e m a y b e o w n e r s h i p
is called property."

Section 32-1-442, MCA, concerning ownership o f joint

bank a c c o u n t s i n Montana, p r o v i d e s i n p e r t i n e n t p a r t :

"When a d e p o s i t h a s been made o r s h a l l
h e r e a f t e r b e made i n any bank t r a n s a c t i n g
b u s i n e s s i n t h i s s t a t e i n t h e names o f
 two o r more p e r s o n s , p a y a b l e t o e i t h e r o r
p a y a b l e t o e i t h e r o r t h e s u r v i v o r , o r any
survivor, such d e p o s i t , o r any p a r t
thereof, o r any i n t e r e s t o r dividend
t h e r e o n , may b e p a i d t o any o f s a i d
p e r s o n s w h e t h e r t h e o t h e r o r o t h e r s be
living o r not ... "
S e c t i o n 70-1-306, MCA, provides:

"Ownership by several persons--types.
The o w n e r s h i p o f p r o p e r t y by s e v e r a l
persons i s e i t h e r o f :

" (1) j o i n t i n t e r e s t s ;
" (2) partnership interests;
" ( 3 ) i n t e r e s t s i n common."

A s previously noted i n consideration of t h e c o n t r o l l i n g

i s s u e s i n t h i s c a s e , numbers 1 and 2 , t h e q u e s t i o n i s w h e t h e r

t h i s i s a j o i n t a c c o u n t u n d e r o u r s t a t u t o r y and c a s e law, o r

a t e n a n c y i n common w i t h no s u r v i v o r . T h i s C o u r t i n I v i n s v.

Hardy ( 1 9 4 7 ) , 120 Mont. 3 5 , 179 P.2d 745, h e l d t h a t a t e n a n c y

in common is created whenever the instrument bringing an

estate of two or more persons into existence does not

s p e c i f i c a l l y s t a t e t h a t t h e e s t a t e created i s o t h e r than a

"tenancy in common." The facts situation concerning the

signing of the signature card in Casagranda v. Donahue,

supra, and t h e f a c t s s i t u a t i o n i n t h i s c a s e a r e d i f f e r e n t .

The card signed in the joint account in Casagranda

specifically said:

"The u n d e r s i g n e d h e r e b y open a n a c c o u n t
i n y o u r bank a s j o i n t t e n a n t s and n o t a s
t e n a n t s i n common, a n d , upon t h e d e a t h o f
e i t h e r o r a n y o f u s , a l l monies t h e n i n
this account shall be paid to the
s u r v i v o r o r s u r v i v o r s a s h i s , her, o r
t h e i r individual property. A l l monies
h e r e a f t e r deposited i n t h i s account s h a l l
l i k e w i s e b e j o i n t t e n a n t s and n o t t e n a n t s
i n common. You a r e h e r e b y d i r e c t e d t o
h o n o r c h e c k s o r o r d e r s on t h i s a c c o u n t
s i g n e d by e i t h e r o r a n y o f u s , or
s u r v i v o r s o f e i t h e r o r any o f u s . "
 Under t h a t f a c t s s i t u a t i o n i n C a s a g r a n d a , w e h e l d t h a t

the savings account became the individual property of

r e s p o n d e n t upon t h e d e c e d e n t ' s d e a t h . Right of survivorship,

which i s an e s s e n t i a l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c o f a n y j o i n t t e n a n c y ,

c a n n o t b e d e f e a t e d by t h e e x e c u t r i x o f d e f e n d a n t ' s e s t a t e ,

and any a t t e m p t t o s a t i s f y t h e g e n e r a l d e v i s e s i n a w i l l .

In the case at bar the signature card signed by

Tammerly D . Coe o r Mark D . Coe n o t e d :

"The s i g n a t u r e o f e a c h p e r s o n a u t h o r i z e d
t o s i g n on t h i s a c c o u n t a p p e a r s on t h e
r e v e r s e s i d e o f t h i s c a r d and s i g n i f i e s
agreement t h a t t h e account i s s u b j e c t t o
a l l a p p l i c a b l e r u l e s o f t h i s bank now
existing or hereafter adopted. I
acknowledge r e c e i p t of a copy o f t h e
B a n k ' s R u l e s and R e g u l a t i o n s Governing
Bank A c c o u n t s . "

The reverse side of the signature card had the following

n o t a t e d a t t h e bottom:

"The u n d e r s i g n e d d e p o s i t o r , whose bank
a c c o u n t i s d e s c r i b e d on t h e r e v e r s e s i d e ,
hereby appoints the person(s) whose
specimen signature (s) appears above,
agent (s) o f t h e undersigned with r e s p e c t
t o s a i d bank a c c o u n t w i t h t h e a u t h o r i t y
s p e c i f i e d i n t h e Bank's posted General
R u l e s and Regulations G o v e r n i n g Bank
Accounts. l1

W e f i n d t h a t t h e major d i s t i n g u i s h i n g c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of

a j o i n t t e n a n c y a s opposed t o a t e n a n c y i n common i s a r i g h t

of t h e survivor of each of t h e co-tenants. W e hold, under

t h e f a c t s o f t h i s c a s e , t h a t t h i s i s a t e n a n c y i n common and

that the creditor, University of Montana, is entitled to

one-half, not the total amount levied against the account

c u r r e n t l y b e i n g h e l d by t h e C l e r k o f t h e C o u r t o f t h e F o u r t h

Judicial District.

Ha.ving decided the first two issues which are

controlling, it is unnecessary to consider the remaining

issues presented by the respondent, that being whether

appellants had failed to establish an intent not t o make
Mark Coe an owner and whether equitable considerations favor
the appellants.

The judgment of the District Court is modified and
remanded with direction to comply with the provisions of this
opinion.
Mr. Justice Frank B. Morrison, Jr., dissenting:
I respectfully dissent from what I find to be a bewil-
dering rationale in the majority opinion.
In stating the facts, the majority notes:
"Through one of several executions, the
University levied against the joint
savings account of Mark Coe at the First
Bank-Western Montana, Missoula."
With little explanation, the majority concludes its opinion
by finding that the account is not a joint account, but
rather a tenancy in common. Apparently, the majority's
conclusion rests upon the fact that the signature card did
not contain a clear designation of ownership, nor was there a
reference to survivorship; therefore, the Court deems the
funds in the account to be held by the account designees as
tenants in common rather than joint tenants.
This is a case of first impression in Montana. In
Casagranda v. Donahue (1978), 178 Mont. 479, 585 P.2d 1286,
relying on State Board of Equalization v. Cole (1948), 122
Mont. 9, 195 P.2d 989, this Court held that where depositors

sign a signature card containing an agreement that the depos-
it is payable to one of the co-depositors or the survivor,
the question of donative intent is settled and the funds in
the account are a joint tenancy. However, in both Casagranda
and Cole, one of the people whose names appeared on the
signature card had died. This Court made an exception to
that rule in Anderson v. Baker (1981), 196 Mont. 494, 641
P.2d 1035. In Anderson, the donor/depositor attempted in her
lifetime to divest the alleged joint tenant of any interest
in the account. This Court held that the donor/depositor had
exclusive ownership of the funds in the joint account and
that the signature card was not conclusive under Montana law.
The distinguishing feature from Casaqranda and Cole was that
the donor/depositor was alive and donative intent was

assertainable.

In the case a t bar, there i s no agreement for these

funds t o be owned in any certain manner. Therefore, the

q u e s t i o n o f o w n e r s h i p must remain open.

The u n r e f u t e d f a c t s i n t h i s c a s e show t h a t t h e f u n d s i n

t h e a c c o u n t were owned by Tammerly Coe and J o r d a n Coe. Mark

Coe, u n d e r f a c t s which a r e n o t c o n t e s t e d , had no o w n e r s h i p i n

t h e funds.

i t s h o u l d b e n o t e d t h a t a bank a c c o u n t i t s e l f c a n b e

held i n a d i f f e r e n t ownership than t h e funds deposited i n t h e

account. Two l a w y e r s may have a j o i n t account a s p a r t n e r s

and d e p o s i t a c l i e n t ' s money i n t h e a c c o u n t . Those monies d o

not a u t o m a t i c a l l y become t h e p r o p e r t y o f t h e named a c c o u n t

owners. I t i s t r u e t h a t , a s between t h e bank and t h e d e p o s i -

t o r s , t h e bank i s w i t h o u t l i a b i l i t y when i t r e l e a s e s f u n d s t o

those named an t h e account. However, if the funds i n t h e

account belong t o another, t h e a c c o u n t owners must h o l d t h e

money i n t r u s t f o r t h e r i g h t f u l ownpr.

In O'Hair v. O'Hair (Ariz. 1973), 508 P.2d 66, the

Arizona c o u r t d e a l t w i t h a s i m i l a r q u e s t i o n . Under t h e f a c t s

o f t h a t c a s e , t h e c o u r t was i n v o l v e d i n d e t e r m i n i n g o w n e r s h i p

o f $150,000 d e p o s i t e d by husband i n husband and w i f e ' s j o i n t

bank a c c o u n t . The c o u r t s t a t e d :

"While a s between t h e bank and t h e depos-
i t o r t h e c o n t r a c t o f d e p o s i t i s conclu-
s i v e , t h e m e r e form o f t h e bank a c c o u n t
i s n o t regarded a s s u f f i c i e n t t o estab-
l i s h the i n t e n t of t h e depositor t o give
a n o t h e r a j o i n t i n t e r e s t i n o r ownership
of t h e d e p o s i t . B o l t o n v . B o l t o n , 306
111. 473, 138 N.E. 158 (1923) ; B a l l v .
F o r b e s , 314 Mass. 200, 49 N.E.2d 898
( 1 9 4 3 ) ; Hodgins v . Z a b e l , 7 Misc.2d 484,
166 N.Y.S.2d 135 (Sup.Ct. 1.957); I n d u s -
t r i a l T r u s t Co. v. T a y l o r , 69 R . I . 6 2 , 30
A.2d 853 (1943) . As the court said in
Cashman v . Mason, 7 2 F.Supp. 487, 492
(D.Minn. 1947) :
 "'Joint accounts are a common method of
handling funds in a bank as between
husband and wife and others for mutual
convenience and economy, but without
necessarily intending to bestow any
present interest in the fund on the one
who is joined for the convenience of the
owner of the moneys deposited.'
" ' [TIhe intention of the depositor is
controlling.' McNabb v. Fisher, supra,
38 Ariz. at 295, 299 P. at 681." 508
P.2d at 68.
Unfortunately, the precedent of this case is incredibly
far-reaching and will effectuate absurd results. Despite
actual evidence of ownership including the intent of deposi-
tors, funds in a bank account are joint tenancy funds if the
account provides for survivorship and tenancy in common funds
if the account is silent as to survivorship. Under the
authority of this case, the ownership of all funds will be
automatically transferred to reflect the ownership designated
on the account itself.
Although the majority opinion is not clear as to what
disposition occurred in the District Court, the fact is that
the District Court allowed execution upon all of the funds in
the joint bank account. I would reverse and remand with
directions to dismiss.
 Mr. Justice Fred J. Weber dissents as follows:
I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion. While
this dissent adds no authority, I trust it will help to raise
questions not yet answered by the majority opinion and
Justice Morrison's dissent. For clarity in the discussion,
following is Exhibit 6, the signature card for this account:

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CIV /LfS A4 Stata e
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Soclai Secur~tyor
Taxpayer Ident. N o 5-3 17
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or Employer

First Bank (N.A.) -Western Monlana Mlssoula
Ylt.oula, U o n t a r u 69807
Membar F l n t Bank Syncem
Savln~l 0 SpeClll Sevlngs 0 Check~ng Specla1 Checklng Con~merclal 0 T~me
Certlficetaa.,

0 Psnnerrnip u Unlform Gilt t o M ~ n o r a
0 Indtvldual 0 S o c ~ e t y Organizat~on
or
63 J o ~ n l 0 Truatee CJ Mulllple Trustee
I.

Onicer'r I n l t l r l r
2.2-10s
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S l p n e t u r a r raqulred on all checks or wllhdrewala
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POWER Of ATTORNEY

Ttle undersloned deposllor. whose bank aCCOUnl Is de¶crlbad on reverse slda, hereby apuolnts (ha
peraon(aJ r h o a e rpeclmen aignatureIaJ apPaars above, aganl(rJ o f lha undarrlgned w l l h raapect to r a l d
, bank r c c o u n l w ~ l h
8ank AccounU.
Iha euthorlly @ p e c l l ~ aIn tna Bank'@Postad G a n r r r l Rular and Ragulallona Qovarnlnp
d
cy

In a number of the decisions of this Court discussing

bank accounts, the account cards indicated an express
intention to create a joint tenancy with right of
survivorship. The foregoing only indicates an intent to
establish a "Joint" account.
 S e c t i o n 32-1-442, MCA, i n s u b s t a n c e p r o v i d e s t h a t when a

deposit is made payable to either of two persons, such

d e p o s i t may b e p a i d t o e i t h e r o f s u c h p e r s o n s , w h e t h e r 1 - i v i n g

or not. As a result, from the Bank's standpoint, this

account is treated as a joint tenancy with right of

survivorship.

I n c o n t r a s t , S 70-1-307, MCA, i n substance provides t h a t

a joint tenancy i s one owned by several persons in equal.

s h a r e s by a t i t l e c r e a t e d by a s i n g l e t r a n s f e r when e x p r e s s l y

declared in the transfer to be a joint tenancy. The

signature card does n o t contain a d e c l a r a t i o n of intent t o

c r e a t e a j o i n t tenancy. I n a s i m i l a r manner, § 70-1-314 in

substance provides t h a t every i n t e r e s t created i n favor of

s e v e r a l p e r s o n s i s a n i n t e r e s t i n common u n l e s s d e c l a r e d i n

its creation to be a joint interest as provided in

§ 70-1-307, MCA. These code sections suggest that the

a c c o u n t i n q u e s t i o n s h o u l d b e c l a s s e d a s a t e n a n c y i n common.

However, i n M a r s h a l l v. Minlschmidt (1966) , 148 Mont.

263, 419 P.2d 486, t h i s C o u r t c o n c l u d e d t h a t a b r a n d w i t h an

"or" designation e s t a b l i s h e d a j o i n t tenancy. Following i s

t h e form o f o w n e r s h i p and c o n c l u s i o n o f t h e C o u r t :

"The o w n e r s h i p o f t h e b r a n d a s o f December 7 , 1 9 5 4 ,
was i n t h e name o f 'Wm. L. o r E t t a M. M i n l s c h m i d t
o r Vern F i e l d . . . Then, o n J u l y 1 0 , 1958,
d u r i n g t h e d e c e a s e d ' s l a s t i l l n e s s , t h e b r a n d was
t r a n s f e r r e d t o t h e names o f 'Wm. L. o r E t t a M.
Minlschmidt ..
.'

"The r e c o r d e d b r a n d s i g n i f i e s a j o i n t i n t e r e s t i n
t h e brand, t h e s e v e r a l persons having equal shares.
S e c t i o n 67-308, R.C.M. 1947. [Now S 70-1-307,
MCA. ] I'

M a r s h a l l was subsequently followed by this Court in First

Westside N a t ' 1 Bank v. Llera, Tynes & Fisher (1978) , 176

Mont. 481, 580 P.2d 100. There the Court concluded that

f o l l o w i n g M a r s h a l l , i n Montana an o w n e r s h i p document showing

title in two o r more persons "and/orV has the effect of

creating a joint t e n a n c y e s t a t e w i t h r i g h t of survivorship.

This applied to personal property, not real estate. The
Court then considered t h e nature of t h e i n t e r e s t of a j o i n t

t e n a n t i n j o i n t t e n a n c y p r o p e r t y and r e f e r r e d t o what i s now

S 70-1-307, MCA, t o conclude t h a t t h e e f f e c t of t h e s t a t u t e

i s t o include a l l of t h e i n c i d e n t s of a j o i n t tenancy e s t a t e

a t common law. The C o u r t t h e n s t a t e d :

"Thus, a c c e p t i n g t h e 'and/or1 t i t l e a s having
c r e a t e d a j o i n t tenancy i n t h i s c a s e , t h e l e g a l
r e s u l t i s t h a t A l l e n R. L l e r a owned a n e q u a l s h a r e
i n t h e a u t o m o b i l e , and t h e r i g h t o f s u r v i v o r s h i p
w i t h h i s mother."

The f o r e g o i n g c a s e s h a v e n o t been o v e r r u l e d .

Based on the foregoing authority, I conclude t h a t we

must c l a s s t h e p r e s e n t bank a c c o u n t a s a j o i n t t e n a n c y bank

a c c o u n t , w i t h e a c h o f t h e two a c c o u n t h o l d e r s h a v i n g a l l o f

t h e r i g h t s o f j o i n t t e n a n t s with. r i g h t o f s u r v i v o r s h i p .

Our next consideration is the effect of the levy of

execution upon the interest of Mark D. Coe in the joint

account. A s pointed out, § 32-1-442, MCA, clearly gives t o

Mark D . Coe t h e r i g h t t o w i t h d r a w a l l o f t h e f u n d s from t i m e

to time in t h e account, and o b l i g a t e s t h e Bank t o pay any

amounts drawn from t h e a c c o u n t by him. T h a t c o d e s e c t i o n was

c o n s t r u e d i n Ludwig v. Montana Bank & T r u s t Co. ( 1 9 3 9 ) , 109

Mont. 477, 98 P.2d 379, where t h e C o u r t was f a c e d w i t h t h e

w i t h d r a w a l o f a l l o f t h e f u n d s from a n a c c o u n t by o n e j o i n t

p a r t y without t h e consent of t h e o t h e r . The C o u r t c i t e d w i t h

approval H i l l v. Badeljy, 117 Cal.App. 598, 290 P . 637, 6 4 0

stating:

" 'The q u e s t i o n i n v o l v e d i n c a s e s o f t h i s c h a r a c t e r
i s t h e i n t e n t i o n o f t h e p a r t i e s making t h e d e p o s i t ,
and where s u c h i n t e n t i o n i s e v i d e n c e d by a w r i t t e n
a g r e e m e n t , a s was done i n t h e c a s e a t b a r , t h i s
q u e s t i o n o f i n t e n t i o n c e a s e s t o b e a n i s s u e , and
t h e c o u r t s a r e bound by t h e w r i t t e n a g r e e m e n t ...
F u r t h e r m o r e , i n a n y a c t i o n between t h e d e p o s i t o r s
o r t h e bank d u r i n g t h e l i f e t i m e o f b o t h d e p o s i t o r s ,
i n t h e absence o f fraud o r mistake, par01 evidence
i s n o t a d m i s s i b l e t o change t h e terms o f t h e l e g a l
e f f e c t o f s u c h a w r i t t e n i n s t r u m e n t where it i s i n
no r e s p e c t u n c e r t a i n o r a m b i g u o u s . ' "

T h e r e i s no e v i d e n c e i n t h e r e c o r d t o i n d i c a t e any c o n t r a r y

i n t e n t on t h e p a r t o f t h e p a r t i e s .
 I would conclude that the execution creditor can

p r o p e r l y a t t a c h a l l of t h e f u n d s i n t h e bank a c c o u n t i n t h e

same manner t h a t Mark Coe c o u l d have withdrawn a l l of the

f u n d s from t h e same a c c o u n t .

The u n d e r s i g n e d J u s t i c e William E. Hunt, Sr. joins in

t h e foregoing d i s s e n t .
/
- - - -

Justice