Bradley v. Valmont Industries, Inc.

No. 85-54 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 1985 MERILYN BRADLEY, as Personal Representative of the Estate of MICHAEL BRADLEY, deceased, and on behalf of all other heirs of MICHAEL BRADLEY, Plaintiff and Respondent, -vs- VALMONT INDUSTRIES, I J . , a Delaware IC corporation; TRIANGLE IRRIGATION, a Montana corp.; GLACIER ELECTRIC CO-OPERATIVE, INC., a Montana Corp.; FIRST CONTINENTAL CORP., a Montana corp.; JOHN GREYTAK; and JOHN DOES I-X, Defendants and Appellants. APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Eighth Judicial District, In and for the County of Cascade, The Honorable Joel G. Roth, Judge presiding. COUNSEL OF RECORD: For Appellants: Cure, Borer & Davis; Maxon R. Davis, (Valmont Ind.) Great Falls, Montana Jardine, Stephenson, Blewett & Weaver; James E. Aiken,(Triangle Irrigation), Great Falls, Fontana Emmons & Coder; Robert J. Emmons, (Glacier Electric), Great Falls, Montana Marra, Wenz, Johnson & Hopkins, Dan L. Spoon,(Greytak & First Continental Corp.), Great Falls, Montana For Respondent : Regnier, Lewis & Boland; James M. Regnier, Great Falls, Montana Submitted on Briefs: April 4, 1985 Decided: June 25, 1985 Filed: A.M 2 3 1985 Clerk M r . J u s t i c e L. C. Gulbrandson d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion o f the Court. Defendant Glacier Electric Co-operativ~, Inc. (hereinafter Glacier Electric) appeals from a denial of a motion for change of venue by the District Court of the E i g h t h J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , Cascade County. We affirm. Michael Bradley was electrocuted while working on a center pivot irrigation system on September 11, 1981, in Pondera County. His widow, Merilyn Bradley, filed this p r o d u c t s l i a b i l i t y a c t i o n f o r w r o n g f u l d e a t h and s u r v i v o r s h i p against the five named defendants in Cascade County on September 7 , 1984. Each of the named defendants resides in a different county f o r purposes o f venue. Valmont I n d u s t r i e s , Inc. is a foreign corporation doing business in Montana. Triangle Irrigation has its place of business in Cascade County. First Continental Corporation is engaged in various businesses throughout Montana, including the site of the accident in Pondera County. John Greytak resides in Yellowstone County. Glacier Electric has its principal place of b u s i n e s s i n G l a c i e r C o u n t y . There i s no d i s p u t e a s t o t h e s i t u s of t h e alleged t o r t , Pondera County, o r t h e r e s i d e n c e s of t h e v a r i o u s d e f e n d a n t s . Further, no o t h e r d e f e n d a n t is a p p e a l i n g t h e o r d e r denying t h e change o f venue. G l a c i e r E l e c t r i c ' s m o t i o n f o r c h a n g e o f v e n u e was h e a r d o n December 1 2 , 1.984 a n d t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t d e n i e d t h e m o t i o n on December 13, 1984. Glacier Electric filed a notice of a p p e a l t o t h i s C o u r t on J a n u a r y 7 , 1985. The s o l e i s s u e on a p p e a l i s w h e t h e r t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t properly denied Glacier Electric's motion to change venue from Cascade County, a r e s i d e n c e o f one d e f e n d a n t , t o Pondera County, t h e s i t u s o f t h e a l l e g e d t o r t . The g e n e r a l rule f o r venue o f a c i v i l action is t h a t "the action shall be tried in the county in which the d e f e n d a n t s o r a n y o f t h e m may r e s i d e a t t h e commencement o f the action ... " Section 25-2-108, MCA. A permissive s t a t u t o r y e x c e p t i o n t o t h i s g e n e r a l ru1.e i s t h a t " [alctions for torts may be tried in the county where the tort was committed ... " S e c t i o n 25-2-102, MCA. The f o r e r u n n e r o f these statutes was section 93-2904, R.C.M. (1947). In S e i f e r t v. Gehle (1948), 1 3 3 Mont. 320, 3 2 3 P.2d 269, the plaintiff f i l e d a t o r t a c t i o n i n Lake County. The t o r t h a d occurred in Lincoln County and the defendant resided in F l a t h e a d County. The d i s t r i c t c o u r t d e n i e d t h e d e f e n d a n t ' s r e q u e s t t o have venue changed t o h i s r e s i d e n t c o u n t y . This Court, in reversing the district court, interpreted this s e c t i o n a s follows: " I n t h i s c a s e t h e s t a t u t e means t h a t either the county of defendant's r e s i d e n c e o r t h e county where t h e t o r t was committed i s a p r o p e r c o u n t y f o r t h e trial of the action, and had the p l a i n t i f f chosen e i t h e r o f t h o s e c o u n t i e s t h e d e f e n d a n t c o u l d n o t h a v e had it removed." 3 2 3 P.2d a t 270. I n Slovak v. Kentucky F r i e d Chicken ( 1 9 7 3 ) , 1 6 4 Mont. 1, 518 P.2d 791, t h i s Court again explained t h e elective procedure available to plaintiff "to file either in the county of defendant's residence or i n the county where the t o r t was committed." (Citations omitted.) 5 1 8 P.2d a t 794. These cases, along with others, make M o n t a n a ' s v e n u e r u l e i n t o r t actions clear. So l o n g a s t h e p l a i n t i f f f i l e s a t o r t a c t i o n i n a c o u n t y where a d e f e n d a n t r e s i d e s o r i n t h e c o u n t y where t h e t o r t was committed, venue i s p r o p e r . In t h i s case, the plaintiff f i l e d h e r cause o f a c t i o n i n Cascade County, the residence of defendant Triangle I r r i g a t i o n . W e hold t h a t t h e plaintiff filed the action i n a p r o p e r c o u n t y and G l a c i e r E l e c t r i c i s n o t e n t i t l e d t o removal. The 1985 r e v i s i o n s i n Montana's venue laws change t h e form, n o t t h e s u b s t a n c e o f t h i s r u l e . S e c t i o n 25-2-102, MA C (1985) s t a t e s : "The p r o p e r p l a c e o f t r i a l f o r a t o r t a c t i o n is: (1) The c o u n t y i n w h i c h t h e d e f e n d a n t s , o r any o f them, r e s i d e a t t h e commencement o f t h e a c t i o n ; or ( 2 ) The c o u n t y w h e r e t h e t o r t was c o m m i t t e d ..." This s e c t i o n c o d i f i e s t h e long-standing interpretation of Montana's t o r t e x c e p t i o n t o t h e b a s i c venue r u l e found i n S e i f e r t and Slovak, cited above. The result in this case w o u l d b e t h e same u n d e r t h e s e new r u l e s . Glacier E l e c t r i c c i t e d Whalen v. Snell (Mont. 1983), 6 6 7 P.2d 436, 40 S t . R e p . 1283 f o r i t s p o s i t i o n t h a t venue i n a t o r t a c t i o n " m u s t " be b r o u g h t i n t h e c o u n t y w h e r e t h e t o r t was c o m m i t t e d . T h i s i s n o t t h e h o l d i n g o f Whalen. In fact, Whalen r e p e a t s t h e g e n e r a l r u l e t h a t : ". . . t h e a c t i o n s h a l l b e t r i e d i n t h e county i n which t h e d e f e n d a n t r e s i d e s . . . Permissive s t a t u t o r y exceptions t o t h i s general rule include provisions t h a t . . . t o r t s may b e t r i e d i n t h e c o u n t y where t h e t o r t was committed." 667 P.2d a t 437. (Emphasis added.) The order of the District Court is hereb affirmed. fP& W e concur: /