No. 85-54
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
1985
MERILYN BRADLEY, as Personal Representative
of the Estate of MICHAEL BRADLEY, deceased,
and on behalf of all other heirs of MICHAEL
BRADLEY,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
-vs-
VALMONT INDUSTRIES, I J . , a Delaware
IC
corporation; TRIANGLE IRRIGATION,
a Montana corp.; GLACIER ELECTRIC
CO-OPERATIVE, INC., a Montana Corp.;
FIRST CONTINENTAL CORP., a Montana
corp.; JOHN GREYTAK; and JOHN DOES
I-X,
Defendants and Appellants.
APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Eighth Judicial District,
In and for the County of Cascade,
The Honorable Joel G. Roth, Judge presiding.
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For Appellants:
Cure, Borer & Davis; Maxon R. Davis, (Valmont Ind.)
Great Falls, Montana
Jardine, Stephenson, Blewett & Weaver; James E.
Aiken,(Triangle Irrigation), Great Falls, Fontana
Emmons & Coder; Robert J. Emmons, (Glacier Electric),
Great Falls, Montana
Marra, Wenz, Johnson & Hopkins, Dan L. Spoon,(Greytak
& First Continental Corp.), Great Falls, Montana
For Respondent :
Regnier, Lewis & Boland; James M. Regnier, Great
Falls, Montana
Submitted on Briefs: April 4, 1985
Decided: June 25, 1985
Filed: A.M 2 3 1985
Clerk
M r . J u s t i c e L. C. Gulbrandson d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion o f the
Court.
Defendant Glacier Electric Co-operativ~, Inc.
(hereinafter Glacier Electric) appeals from a denial of a
motion for change of venue by the District Court of the
E i g h t h J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , Cascade County. We affirm.
Michael Bradley was electrocuted while working on a
center pivot irrigation system on September 11, 1981, in
Pondera County. His widow, Merilyn Bradley, filed this
p r o d u c t s l i a b i l i t y a c t i o n f o r w r o n g f u l d e a t h and s u r v i v o r s h i p
against the five named defendants in Cascade County on
September 7 , 1984.
Each of the named defendants resides in a different
county f o r purposes o f venue. Valmont I n d u s t r i e s , Inc. is a
foreign corporation doing business in Montana. Triangle
Irrigation has its place of business in Cascade County.
First Continental Corporation is engaged in various
businesses throughout Montana, including the site of the
accident in Pondera County. John Greytak resides in
Yellowstone County. Glacier Electric has its principal place
of b u s i n e s s i n G l a c i e r C o u n t y . There i s no d i s p u t e a s t o t h e
s i t u s of t h e alleged t o r t , Pondera County, o r t h e r e s i d e n c e s
of t h e v a r i o u s d e f e n d a n t s . Further, no o t h e r d e f e n d a n t is
a p p e a l i n g t h e o r d e r denying t h e change o f venue.
G l a c i e r E l e c t r i c ' s m o t i o n f o r c h a n g e o f v e n u e was h e a r d
o n December 1 2 , 1.984 a n d t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t d e n i e d t h e m o t i o n
on December 13, 1984. Glacier Electric filed a notice of
a p p e a l t o t h i s C o u r t on J a n u a r y 7 , 1985.
The s o l e i s s u e on a p p e a l i s w h e t h e r t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t
properly denied Glacier Electric's motion to change venue
from Cascade County, a r e s i d e n c e o f one d e f e n d a n t , t o Pondera
County, t h e s i t u s o f t h e a l l e g e d t o r t .
The g e n e r a l rule f o r venue o f a c i v i l action is t h a t
"the action shall be tried in the county in which the
d e f e n d a n t s o r a n y o f t h e m may r e s i d e a t t h e commencement o f
the action ... " Section 25-2-108, MCA. A permissive
s t a t u t o r y e x c e p t i o n t o t h i s g e n e r a l ru1.e i s t h a t " [alctions
for torts may be tried in the county where the tort was
committed ... " S e c t i o n 25-2-102, MCA. The f o r e r u n n e r o f
these statutes was section 93-2904, R.C.M. (1947). In
S e i f e r t v. Gehle (1948), 1 3 3 Mont. 320, 3 2 3 P.2d 269, the
plaintiff f i l e d a t o r t a c t i o n i n Lake County. The t o r t h a d
occurred in Lincoln County and the defendant resided in
F l a t h e a d County. The d i s t r i c t c o u r t d e n i e d t h e d e f e n d a n t ' s
r e q u e s t t o have venue changed t o h i s r e s i d e n t c o u n t y . This
Court, in reversing the district court, interpreted this
s e c t i o n a s follows:
" I n t h i s c a s e t h e s t a t u t e means t h a t
either the county of defendant's
r e s i d e n c e o r t h e county where t h e t o r t
was committed i s a p r o p e r c o u n t y f o r t h e
trial of the action, and had the
p l a i n t i f f chosen e i t h e r o f t h o s e c o u n t i e s
t h e d e f e n d a n t c o u l d n o t h a v e had it
removed." 3 2 3 P.2d a t 270.
I n Slovak v. Kentucky F r i e d Chicken ( 1 9 7 3 ) , 1 6 4 Mont. 1, 518
P.2d 791, t h i s Court again explained t h e elective procedure
available to plaintiff "to file either in the county of
defendant's residence or i n the county where the t o r t was
committed." (Citations omitted.) 5 1 8 P.2d a t 794. These
cases, along with others, make M o n t a n a ' s v e n u e r u l e i n t o r t
actions clear. So l o n g a s t h e p l a i n t i f f f i l e s a t o r t a c t i o n
i n a c o u n t y where a d e f e n d a n t r e s i d e s o r i n t h e c o u n t y where
t h e t o r t was committed, venue i s p r o p e r . In t h i s case, the
plaintiff f i l e d h e r cause o f a c t i o n i n Cascade County, the
residence of defendant Triangle I r r i g a t i o n . W e hold t h a t t h e
plaintiff filed the action i n a p r o p e r c o u n t y and G l a c i e r
E l e c t r i c i s n o t e n t i t l e d t o removal.
The 1985 r e v i s i o n s i n Montana's venue laws change t h e
form, n o t t h e s u b s t a n c e o f t h i s r u l e . S e c t i o n 25-2-102, MA
C
(1985) s t a t e s : "The p r o p e r p l a c e o f t r i a l f o r a t o r t a c t i o n
is: (1) The c o u n t y i n w h i c h t h e d e f e n d a n t s , o r any o f them,
r e s i d e a t t h e commencement o f t h e a c t i o n ; or ( 2 ) The c o u n t y
w h e r e t h e t o r t was c o m m i t t e d ..."
This s e c t i o n c o d i f i e s t h e long-standing interpretation
of Montana's t o r t e x c e p t i o n t o t h e b a s i c venue r u l e found i n
S e i f e r t and Slovak, cited above. The result in this case
w o u l d b e t h e same u n d e r t h e s e new r u l e s .
Glacier E l e c t r i c c i t e d Whalen v. Snell (Mont. 1983),
6 6 7 P.2d 436, 40 S t . R e p . 1283 f o r i t s p o s i t i o n t h a t venue i n
a t o r t a c t i o n " m u s t " be b r o u g h t i n t h e c o u n t y w h e r e t h e t o r t
was c o m m i t t e d . T h i s i s n o t t h e h o l d i n g o f Whalen. In fact,
Whalen r e p e a t s t h e g e n e r a l r u l e t h a t :
". . . t h e a c t i o n s h a l l b e t r i e d i n t h e
county i n which t h e d e f e n d a n t r e s i d e s
. . . Permissive s t a t u t o r y exceptions t o
t h i s general rule include provisions t h a t
. . . t o r t s may b e t r i e d i n t h e c o u n t y
where t h e t o r t was committed." 667 P.2d
a t 437. (Emphasis added.)
The order of the District Court is hereb affirmed.
fP&
W e concur: /