No. 84-453
I N THE SUPREBE COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTAXA
1985
STATE ex r e l . , JOHN F O S S ,
Relator,
D I S T R I C T COURT O F THE FOURTH
J U D I C I A L D I S T R I C T O F THE STATE
OF MONTANA, I N AI'JD FOR THE COUNTY
OF RAVALLI, AND THE WARD I R R I G A T I O N
DISTRICT,
Respondents.
ORIGINAL PROCEEDING:
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For Relator:
Loble & Pauly, Helena, Montana
F o r Respondents:
Recht & Greef; C h a r l e s H. Recht, Hamilton, Montana
Submitted: January 21, 1985
Decided: June 1 3 , 1 9 8 5
-- --
Clerk
Mr. Justice L.C. Gulbrandson delivered the Opinion of the
Court.
Relator, John Foss, petitions this Court to review by a
writ of certiorari an order of the District Court of the
Fourth Judicial District, Ravalli County, holding him in
contempt of court.
This proceeding is a continuation of Ravalli County,
Cause No. 6999, "In the Matter of the Establishment and
Organization of the Ward Irrigation District." The District
Court's continuing jurisdiction over the District, and this
action, began with the petition filed by certain parties to
form the Ward Irrigation District on April 6, 1938. General-
ly, the only actions involving the District that the District
Court has been called to rule upon has been audits,
administrative matters, petitions for the inclusion of lands,
and other matters pertaining to the operation of the
District.
The controversy that eventually led to this Cause No.
84-453, and its companion case, Cause No. 84-298, was first
brought before the District Court in 1979. On April 30,
1979, Ralph Springer, Ronald M. Porter and George W. Else,
all commissioners of the Ward Irrigation District filed
affidavits with the District Court alleging that John Foss,
relator in this action, "without permission removed padlocks
from diversion dam [sic] in Ward Irrigation Ditch and refused
to replace or return locks to Ward Irrigation
commissioner (s) ." Based upon those affidavits, the District
Court issued a temporary restraining order and, on June 4,
1979, held a hearing on the order to show cause why the
temporary restraining order should not be made permanent.
Both the Irrigation District and John Foss were represented
at that hearing, and both presented evidence pertaining to
the control of the headgate in issue. The District Court, in
that action, found that J o h n F o s s was not in contempt of
court. The court's order included a temporary injunction
against John Foss from interfering "in any way with the
administration, regulation, o r c o n t r o l o f t h e dams, d i t c h e s ,
headgates and o t h e r m a t t e r s p e r t a i n i n g t o t h e [District]."
F u r t h e r , t h e J u n e 11, 1979 o r d e r d i r e c t e d J o h n F o s s a n d o t h e r
members o f t h e F o s s r a n c h t o a p p e a r on August 3 1 , 1979, t o
show c a u s e why t h e t e m p o r a r y i n j u n c t i o n s h o u l d n o t b e made
permanent. The transcript indicates that a t the time the
District Court i s s u e d t h e temporary i n j u n c t i o n , it s t r o n g l y
urged the Foss Ranch to seek another remedy, such as an
adjudication of the relative rights and priorities in the
waters of t h e affected ditches, i n s t e a d o f s e e k i n g t h e same
adjudication i n the injunctive action. The court stated:
"Well, there has been considerable
testimony concerning water r i g h t s , water
r i g h t s o n Camas C r e e k , p o i n t s o f d i v e r -
s i o n s i n c l u d i n g p o i n t s o f d i v e r s i o n on
Camas C r e e k . I don't believe those
issues a r e properly before the court a t
this time. I would s t r o n g l y u r g e coun-
sel t o p u r s u e t h o s e remedies. Obviously
you [ c o u n s e l f o r t h e F o s s e s ] f e e l t h a t
M r . Foss h a s a c a u s e o f a c t i o n , b u t once
again I d o n ' t f e e l they a r e properly
before t h e court a t t h i s t i m e . There
a r e j u d i c i a l remedies a v a i l a b l e i f he
d o e s h a v e s u c h a c a u s e o f a c t i o n , and a s
I s a i d b e f o r e , I would s t r o n g l y u r g e you
t o pursue those. ...
"I w i l l set t h e o r d e r f o r 60 d a y s t o
g i v e you a n o p p o r t u n i t y t o f i l e a n
action, ... w h a t I would d o i s s e t i t
f o r a n o t h e r show c a u s e h e a r i n g t o show
why it s h o u l d n ' t b e made p e r m a n e n t i f
you h a v e n o t i n f a c t s o u g h t a n o t h e r
remedy. "
Counsel for the Fosses did not petition for an
a d j u d i c a t i o n o f w a t e r r i g h t s p r i o r t o t h e August 31, 1979,
hearing. At that hearing, only the counsel for the
I r r i g a t i o n D i s t r i c t appeared, and a d v i s e d t h e c o u r t t h a t n o
further orders w e r e requested, stating:
" C o u n s e l f o r t h e F o s s e s , Doug S k e l s e t ,
h a s asked t h a t we c o n t i n u e t h e temporary
order i n force without date. I have no
o b j e c t i o n t o t h a t , your honor, a s long
a s it i s understood t h a t a t any time I
can r e n o t i c e t h e matter before t h e c o u r t
t o make it permanent.
"The court: So ordered, thank you."
N o t h i n g a p p a r e n t l y happened f o r t h e n e x t s e v e r a l y e a r s .
N e i t h e r t h e D i s t r i c t a p p e a r e d b e f o r e t h e c o u r t t o make t h e
temporary i n j u n c t i o n permanent, nor d i d t h e Fosses p e t i t i o n
f o r a determination of water r i g h t s . Then, on J u n e 8 , 1 9 8 3 ,
Dean F r o s t , Ronald P o r t e r and Ralph S p r i n g e r , a l l commission-
e r s o f t h e Ward I r r i g a t i o n D i s t r i c t f i l e d a f f i d a v i t s w i t h t h e
D i s t r i c t C o u r t a l l e g i n g t h a t M i l l o Huggins, a r e l a t i v e o f t h e
Fosses, and acting in her capacity as agent thereof,
interfered with the operation of the District's headgate
system. Based on t h e s e a f f i d a v i t s , t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t i s s u e d
a n o t h e r t e m p o r a r y r e s t r a i n i n g o r d e r and o r d e r t o show c a u s e .
A h e a r i n g o n ' t h e t e m p o r a r y r e s t r a i n i n g o r d e r was s e t f o r J u l y
7, 1983. P r i o r t o t h a t , t h e Fosses f i l e d with t h e D i s t r i c t
C o u r t a " R e q u e s t f o r D e t e r m i n a t i o n o f R e l a t i v e Water R i g h t s , "
a s k i n g t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t t o d e t e r m i n e t h e n a t u r e and e x t e n t
of t h e w a t e r r i g h t s o f t h e v a r i o u s p a r t i e s i n v o l v e d i n t h i s
litigation, and t o d e t e r m i n e t h e r e l a t i v e p r i o r i t i e s o f t h e
w a t e r s i n Hayes C r e e k , t h e Ward I r r i g a t i o n D i t c h and Camas
Creek. H e a r i n g s on t h e t e m p o r a r y r e s t r a i n i n g o r d e r w e r e h e l d
on J u l y 7 and J u l y 2 6 , 1983. Both p a r t i e s w e r e r e p r e s e n t e d
by c o u n s e l . The D i s t r i c t C o u r t , s t a t i n g t h a t it had h e a r d
t h e t e s t i m o n y of t h e v a r i o u s w i t n e s s e s , argument o f c o u n s e l ,
and h a v i n g r e v i e w e d t h e p l e a d i n g s on t h e r e c o r d , found M i l l o
Huggins in contempt of court f o r v i o l a t i n g t h e August 31,
1979, i n j u n c t i o n . F u r t h e r , t h e D i s t r i c t Court continued t h e
i n j u n c t i o n i n e f f e c t by o r d e r i n g :
"3. M i l l o Huggins, John Foss, the
owners o f t h e F o s s r a n c h , t h e r e l a t i v e s ,
servants, agents and employees are
h e r e b y o r d e r e d and e n j o i n e d from i n t e r -
f e r i n g i n a n y way, e i t h e r d i r e c t l y o r
i n d i r e c t l y , w i t h t h e a c t i v i t i e s of t h e
Ward I r r i g a t i o n D i s t r i c t , i t s commis-
sioners, ditch walkers, agents and
employees.
"4. Millo Huggins, John Foss, the
owners o f t h e F o s s r a n c h , t h e r e l a t i v e s ,
servants, agents and employees, are
h e r e b y o r d e r e d and e n j o i n e d from i n t e r -
f e r i n g i n a n y way, e i t h e r d i r e c t l y o r
indirectly with the administration,
regulation, o r c o n t r o l o f t h e dams,
d i t c h e s , h e a d g a t e s and o t h e r m a t t e r s
pertaining to the Ward Irrigation
District."
M i l l o Huggins d i d n o t a s k t h i s C o u r t t o r e v i e w by c e r t i o r a r i
t h e o r d e r adjudging h e r i n contempt.
The Fosses' petition f o r an adjudication of relative
w a t e r r i g h t s went ahead i n t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t . After several
preliminaries, i n c l u d i n g a s u b s t i t u t i o n o f judge, the matter
was h e a r d on December 14, 1 9 8 3 , by t h e H o n o r a b l e R o b e r t M.
H o l t e r , D i s t r i c t Judge. Judge H o l t e r , a f t e r h e a r i n g evidence
and r e v i e w i n g t h e r e c o r d i s s u e d f i n d i n g s and c o n c l u s i o n s on
April 17, 1984. That o r d e r i s t h e s u b j e c t o f t h e appeal i n
Cause No. 84-298.
The n e x t summer, in 1984, t h i s m a t t e r a r o s e . Affida-
v i t s o f t h e c o m m i s s i o n e r s o f t h e D i s t r i c t and a m o t i o n by t h e
D i s t r i c t f o r a n o r d e r h o l d i n g John F o s s i n c o n t e m p t o f c o u r t
were f i l e d . T h i s m a t t e r was h e a r d by J u d g e Henson and i n h i s
findings he recognized the August 4, 1983 o r d e r , (quoted
a b o v e ) found t h a t J o h n F o s s had been a w a r e o f s a i d o r d e r , and
found a l s o t h a t h e had w i l l f u l l y v i o l a t e d i t s t e r m s . He then
found John Foss in contempt of court, fined him $500 and
s e n t e n c e d him t o s e r v e f i v e d a y s i n t h e R a v a l l i County j a i l
s u s p e n d e d on c e r t a i n c o n d i t i o n s . The D i s t r i c t C o u r t f u r t h e r
granted the Ward Irrigation District attorneys fees and
costs. John Foss appea1.s from t h i s order, presenting the
f o l l o w i n g i s s u e s f o r review:
1. T h a t no v a l i d i n j u n c t i o n o r d e r was ever i s s u e d and
nor is injunction a remedy available in this proceeding;
therefore, t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t was p o w e r l e s s t o f i n d r e l a t o r
i n contempt.
2. T h a t t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t j u d g e no l o n g e r had j u r i s -
diction t o t r y the matter.
3. That t h e District Court e r r e d i n r e q u i r i n g r e l a t o r
F o s s t o pay a t t o r n e y ' s f e e s .
O r e v i e w i n g a c o n t e m p t c i t a t i o n by w r i t o f c e r t i o r a r i ,
n
we a r e limited t o t h e following considerations: whether t h e
l o w e r c o u r t had j u r i s d i c t i o n t o i s s u e t h e o r d e r and s e c o n d l y ,
whether there i s evidence supporting t h e same. I n Re t h e
Marriage of Smith (Mont. 1984), 686 P.2d 912, 4 1 St.Rep.
2325; M i l a n o v i c h v. M i l a n o v i c h (Mont. 1 9 8 2 ) , 655 P.2d 963, 39
St.Rep. 963; Schneider v. Ostwald (Mont. 1980), 617 P.2d
1293, 37 St.Rep. 1728; In the Matter of the Contempt of
Graveley and Hammerbacker (1980), 188 Mont. 546, 614 P.2d
Relator argues that the District Court was without
jurisdiction t o f i n d him i n c o n t e m p t . S e c t i o n 3-1-501, MCA,
states that:
"The following a c t s o r omissions i n
respect to a court of justice or
proceedings t h e r e i n a r e contempts o f t h e
authority of the court:
" (e) disobedience of any lawful
judgment, order, or process of the
court; . . ."
Here, relator argues that the order h e was found to have
v i o l a t e d was n o t "lawful" and t h e r e f o r e t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t
had no j u r i s d i c t i o n t o f i n d him i n c o n t e m p t . H e argues t h a t
no valid injunction order was ever issued, nor is an
injunction remedy available in this type of proceeding.
Citing the general rule that an injunction is an action
a n c i l l a r y t o another a c t i o n and i s a n e x t r a o r d i n a r y remedy
available only when there is an underlying proceeding
pending, section 27-19-101, MCA, and State ex rel. Working v.
Mayor (1911), 43 Mont. 61, 114 P. 777, he points out that the
only documents the District Court had before it prior to
issuing the August 31, 1979, temporary injunction were the
three affidavits filed by the Ward District commissioners.
These affidavits do not contain the elements requisite to a
pleading, and thus no action was pending at the time that
order was issued.
Relator's argument is without merit. He neglects to
observe that he was found in contempt of court for violating
the August 4, 1983, order. At the time of that order, at
relators own instance, an action was pending. Although the
existence of an underlying action was not specifically pled
in the District's motion or the affidavits, the District
Court in the 1983 order finding Millo Huggans in contempt,
and making permanent the injunction stated that it had read
"the pleadings" herein and was "advised thereof. " Further,
the affidavits filed in support of the District's motion
contain the necessary elements to find relator in contempt.
Relator cites section 27-19-102, MCA and argues that an
injunction is improper in this action because there was no
"obligation existing in favor of the applicant." This argu-
ment is also not persuasive. The August 4, 1983, order
clearly obligated relator to refrain from tampering with any
of the District's distribution system. Relator had notice of
his obligation and willfully violated it. The District Court
both had jurisdiction to issue the contempt order and had
evidence before it to support the same.
Secondly, relator argues that Judge Henson was without
jurisdiction to find him in contempt because he had ceded
jurisdiction of the underlying adjudication action to Judge
Holter. This argument is also without merit. In Kuzara v.
Kuzara (Mont. 1984), 682 P.2d 1371, 41 St.Rep. 1201, we
stated:
" T h i s C o u r t h a s h e l d t h a t a contempt
proceeding i s e n t i r e l y independent of
t h e c i v i l a c t i o n o u t o f which i t a r o s e .
Myhre v . Myhre (1976) , 168 Mont. 5 2 1 ,
548 P.2d 1395. The D i s t r i c t C o u r t
therefore has t h e authority t o enforce
i t s judgment e v e n t h o u g h a n a p p e a l i s
pending thereon. Contempts are
p u n i s h a b l e b e c a u s e of t h e n e c e s s i t y o f
m a i n t a i n i n g t h e d i g n i t y o f and r e s p e c t
t o w a r d s t h e c o u r t s and t h e i r d e c r e e s . "
S e e a l s o , S t a t e e x r e l . Bacorn v. D i s t r i c t C o u r t ( 1 9 2 5 ) , 73
Mont. 297, 236 P. 553; S t a t e e x r e l . Enochs v . D i s t r i c t C o u r t
( 1 9 4 2 ) , 1 1 3 Mont. 227, 123 P.2d 971; 1 7 Am.Jur.2d, Contempt,
A s s t a t e d i n t h e a b o v e c a s e s , t h e power o f c o n t e m p t i s
t o e n f o r c e t h e decorum o f t h e c o u r t , n o t t h e d i g n i t y o f any
particular judge thereof. Thus, it does not matter that
J u d g e Henson had c e d e d j u r i s d i c t i o n o v e r t h e a d j u d i c a t i o n t o
Judge H o l t e r , b e c a u s e a l l . t h a t h e was d o i n g i n t h i s a c t i o n
was e n f o r c i n g a l a w f u l o r d e r o f t h e c o u r t .
Finally, relator argues that the District Court
exceeded its jurisdiction when it authorized an award of
attorney's fees t o the D i s t r i c t . F i r s t , w e must n o t e t h a t a
D i s t r i c t C o u r t may p r o p e r l y award a p a r t y , i n t h i s case the
movant D i s t r i c t , c o s t s o f a l i t i g a t i o n u n d e r t h e a u t h o r i t y o f
25-10-103, MCA. P r i o r c a s e s h a v e l i m i t e d t h e amount o f t h e s e
c o s t s t o what can b e t a k e n o u t o f t h e f i n e l e v i e d a g a i n s t t h e
contemnor. See S t a t e e x rel. N e t t v. D i s t r i c t Court (1925),
72 Mont. 206, 232 P . 204; S t a t e ex rel. Edwards v . District
Court ( 1 9 1 0 ) , 4 1 Mont. 369, 109 P. 434; Dunlavey v . Doggett
(1909), 38 Mont. 204, 99 P. 436; State ex rel. Flynn v.
D i s t r i c t Court ( 1 9 0 0 ) , 2 4 Mont. 33, 60 P. 493.
The more d i f f i c u l t i n q u i r y i s w h e t h e r a D i s t r i c t C o u r t
may award t h e " p r e v a i l i n g p a r t y " i n a c o n t e m p t a c t i o n a t t o r -
ney's fees. We first must note the unique nature of a
contempt a c t i o n . It is the state's interest, and n o t an.y
private party's, t h a t i s v i n d i c a t e d by t h e i n v o c a t i o n o f t h i s
power. A s w e s t a t e d i n Dunlavey v. D o g g e t t , supra..
"What w e d o h o l d i s t h a t c o n t e m p t p r o -
c e e d i n g s d o n o t f u r n i s h a remedy a v a i l -
able t o the plaintiff for the redress o r
p r e v e n t i o n o f a p r i v a t e wrong. While
s u c h p r o c e e d i n g s may h a v e t h e r e s u l t n f
deterring t h e defendants from a g a i n
i n t e r f e r i n g with plaintiff 's rights,
s t i l l t h e o b j e c t t o be a t t a i n e d i s t h e
v i n d i c a t i o n o f t h e d i g n i t y o f t h e au-
t h o r i t y o f t h e c o u r t , and n o t i n d e m n i t y
f o r t h e p l a i n t i f f o r any judgment i n h i s
favor. (Citations omitted.)
"Again, it i s u r g e d t h a t b e c a u s e i n
p r a c t i c e contempt proceedings a r e always
i n s t i t u t e d a t t h e e x p e n s e o f t h e owner
o f t h e w a t e r , he i s t h e one p r i m a r i l y
i n t e r e s t e d , and s h o u l d b e r e i m b u r s e d f o r
h i s expenditures i n connection there-
with. I t i s u n d o u b t e d l y t r u e t h a t many
owners d o f i n d t h e m s e l v e s i n a n u n f o r t u -
n a t e s i t u a t i o n when t h e i r w a t e r r i g h t s
are violated; but t h i s is a subject for
t h e l e g i s l a t u r e t o deal with." 38 Mont.
a t 210, 99 P. a t 438.
The g e n e r a l r u l e i n Montana i s t h a t a p r e v a i l i n g p a r t y
in an action is not entitled to attorney's fees unless a
statutory or contractual provision expressly provides for
s u c h , C a t e v . H a r g r a v e (Mont. 1 9 8 4 ) , 680 P.2d 952, 4 1 St.Rep.
697; Bovee v . Helland ( 1 9 1 6 ) , 52 Mont. 151, 155, 156 P.2d
416, 417. R e l a t o r c i t e s t o u s no s t a t u t o r y a u t h o r i t y upon
which we may uphold t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t ' s award o f a t t o r n e y ' s
fees. F u r t h e r , w e do n o t f i n d t h a t t h i s c a s e f i t s w i t h i n t h e
exceptions recognized i n Foy v . Anderson ( 1 9 7 8 ) , 175 Mont.
507, 511, 580 P.2d 114, 116 (upholding t h e c o u r t ' s general
equity power to afford complete relief) ; Cate, supra
(awarding attorney's fees to penalize reprehensible
self-help); o r I n re M a r r i a g e o f Redfern (Mont. 1 9 8 4 ) , 692
P.2d 468, 41 St.Rep. 2391 (attorney's fees awarded in
contempt action to enforce terms of divorce decree). See
also; Williams, ". . . and Attorneys Fees t o t h e P r e v a i l i n g
Party: Recovering Attorneys Fees Under Montana Statutory
Law," 46 Mont.L.Rev. 119, 121 (1985).
The order of the District Court finding relator in
contempt is hereby affirmed, and that portion of the order
awarding attorney's fees to the Ward Irrigation District is
hereby reversed.
We concur: /
4
' Chief Justice
1
7 ~ ~ .