Xo. 84-354
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
1985
JOHN A. DAVIS (FATAL) VIVIAN
MARIE DAVIS,
Claimant and Respondent,
GEORGE W. JONES, Employer,
and
MOUNTAIN WEST FA,W BUREAU MUTUAL
INSURANCE COMPAYY ,
Defendaht and Appellant.
APPEAL FROM: Workers' Compensation Court, The Honorable Timothy
Reardon, Judge presiding.
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For Appellant:
Utick, Grosfield & Uda; Andrew J. Utick, Helena,
Montana
For Respondent:
Joseph E. Engel, 111, Great Falls, Montana
Submitted on Briefs: March 28, 1985
Decided: June 13, 1985
- -
-
Clerk
Mr. Justice L. C. Gulbrandson d e l i v e r e d t h e O p i n i o n of the
Court.
D e f e n d a n t Mountain West appeals from a n o r d e r o f the
Workers' Compensation Court finding employer and insurer
liable to claimant for benefits under the Workers'
Compensation A c t .
This i s a continuation of a case t h a t has previously
been b e f o r e t h i s Court. I n Davis v. Jones (Mont. 1 9 8 3 ) , 661
P.2d 859, 40 S t . R e p . 5 7 0 , we h e l d t h a t t h e e m p l o y e r , J o n e s ,
was e s t o p p e d from a s s e r t i n g t h e s t a t u t e o f l i m i t a t i o n s t o b a r
claimant's r e q u e s t f o r compensation. The p r e s e n t a c t i o n i s
an appeal from the Workers' Compensation Court's
determination that Davis' fatal heart attack was a
compensable i n j u r y .
Testimony i n d i c a t e d t h e following f a c t s : On F e b r u a r y
1 6 , 1 9 8 0 , J o h n D a v i s was w o r k i n g a s a r a n c h hand. One o f h i s
d u t i e s was t o chop t h r o u g h t h e i c e c o v e r i n g c a t t l e w a t e r i n g
holes s o t h a t t h e c a t t l e could drink. To d o t h i s , h e u s e d a
d u l l a x t o b r e a k t h e i c e and a s h o v e l o r p i t c h f o r k t o rpmove
t h e b r o k e n i c e from t h e h o l e . H e would h a v e t o c h o p a h o l e
through the ice two feet wide and ten feet long. This
activity usually led to Davis getting wet from the knees
down, and o t h e r w i s e was v e r y s t r e n u o u s work. On t h e d a t e i n
question, t h e a i r t e m p e r a t u r e was somewhere b e t w e e n -10 and
+20 degrees Fahrenheit, with a wind chill down to -31
degrees.
P r i o r t o 10:30 a.m. on F e b r u a r y 1 6 , D a v i s had a l r e a d y
chopped o n e w a t e r i n g h o l e . Sometime d u r i n g t h a t m o r n i n g h e
began t o experience a sensation like a brick on h i s c h e s t
while c h o p p i n g i c e t o make the second w a t e r i n g h o l e . One
time he passed out on the ice and when regaining
consciousness f e l t very cold. A t a p p r o x i m a t e l y 10:30 a.m.,
after Davis regained consciousness, the employer and a
co-employee, Louis Velasco, found him s i t t i n g o r k n e e l i n g on
t h e i c e and l e a n i n g a g a i n s t t h e h a n d l e o f h i s a x h e u s e d t o
chop t h r o u g h t h e i c e . The employer s p o k e w i t h employee D a v i s
who complained o f c h e s t p a i n and s a i d t h a t h e d i d n o t f e e l
well. The employer s u g g e s t e d t h a t h e l e a v e work and s e e a
doctor.
Shortly thereafter, Davis left the water hole and
proceeded t o h i s v e h i c l e . H e continued t o experience c h e s t
pain, although less severe than originally experienced.
B e t w e e n a p p r o x i m a t e l y noon and 1:00 p.m., h e was s i t t i n g i n
h i s v e h i c l e and c o n t i n u i n g t o e x p e r i e n c e m o d e r a t e c h e s t p a i n .
He declined to help a co-employee. Davis told another
co-employee t h a t h e was g o i n g t o see a d o c t o r and t h a t h e
f e l t s i c k , a s t h o u g h he had t h e f l u .
A t approximately 1:00 p.m. t h a t day, Davis a r r i v e d a t
t h e home o f J u d y and Ralph Paddock. While s t a n d i n g i n t h e
f r o n t yard, h e c o m p l a i n e d t o Judy Paddock a b o u t h a v i n g f e l t
like there was a brick on his chest while chopping ice,
passing out, and feeling very cold when regaining
consciousness. H e complained o f s t i l l being cold, of c h e s t
p a i n , and r e p e a t e d l y s a i d h e wanted t o c a l l D r . Sidensticker.
O t h e r c o m p l a i n t s were o f numbness i n h i s h a n d s and a c h i n g i n
h i s arms; and w h i l e h e d i d s o h e r o t a t e d h i s s h o u l d e r s and
arms. To Judy Paddock, he appeared pale, cold and
"shook-up." I n t h e Paddock h o u s e , D a v i s t o l d Ralph Paddock
t h a t h e had p a s s e d o u t w h i l e c h o p p i n g i c e t h a t morning and
t h a t r i g h t t h e n h e f e l t c o l d and had a c h e s t p a i n . Ralph
Paddock testified that Davis appeared upset, nervous and
scared.
Davis left the Paddocks' house a t approximately 4:30
p.m. W h i l e d r i v i n g home h e a l m o s t b l a c k e d - o u t three t i m e s
and had to stop his vehicle on each occasion. When he
a r r i v e d home a b o u t 7:30 or 8:00 p.m., h e immediately asked
his wife, the claimant, for something cold to drink,
c o m p l a i n i n g a b o u t h a v i n g b e e n t h i r s t y a l l d a y and a b o u t n o t
h a v i n g been a b l e t o g e t enough c o l d f l u i d s t o d r i n k . H e then
s a t down and drank approximately a g a l l o n o f ice t e a . He
looked tired, g r a y and was s h a k i n g . He told h i s wife t h a t
w h i l e c h o p p i n g ice d u r i n g t h e morning h e had p a s s e d o u t a f t e r
experiencing chest pain. H e a l s o complained o f h a v i n g "hard
c h e s t p a i n s on and o f f a l l day." A little b i t l a t e r while
s i t t i n g a t t h e d i n n e r t a b l e , Davis complained o f c h e s t p a i n s
a n d numbness i n o n e arm. He did not f i n i s h dinner. H e asked
for something cold to eat and then ate two bowls of ice
cream. H i s wife ran a t u b o f hot water s o t h a t he could t a k e
h i s u s u a l b a t h , b u t h e s a i d t h a t h e was t o o t i r e d , and t h a t
h e would r a t h e r l i e down. He t h e n g o t u p f r o m t h e d i n n e r
t a b l e a n d w e n t i n t o t h e bedroom. Soon a f t e r D a v i s l e f t t h e
k i t c h e n and w h i l e h i s w i f e was removing t h e d i n n e r d i s h e s s h e
h e a r d him m o a n i n g i n t h e bedroom. S h e e n t e r e d t h e bedroom
and saw t h a t he had vomited. He was rolling on the bed
h o l d i n g h i s c h e s t and moaning, a c t i n g a s t h o u g h h e was u n a b l e
t o g e t enough a i r .
Vivian Davis, the claimant, g o t h e r husband into the
family car and then drove to a nearby gasoline service
station. As t h e y p u l l e d up t o t h e g a s s t a t - i o n , John Davis
grabbed his chest and starting gasping for breath and
rocking. The c l a i m a n t a t t e m p t e d t o c l e a r h i s t h r o a t . He
suddenly q u i t breathing. S h e g a v e him a r t i f i c i a l r e s p i r a t i o n
a n d r e v i v e d him t e m p o r a r i l y . H i s h e a r t a t t a c k c o n t i n u e d , and
s e v e r a l m i n u t e s l a t e r h e s i g h e d d e e p l y and d i e d .
The W o r k e r s ' C o m p e n s a t i o n C o u r t f o u n d t h a t t h e d e c e d e n t
d i e d of a h e a r t a t t a c k . I t a l s o found t h a t h i s h e a r t a t t a c k
b e g a n w h i l e h e was chopping i c e t o make a s e c o n d w a t e r i n g
hole on the morning of February 16, 1980 and continued
t h r o u g h o u t t h e d a y and e n d e d w i t h h i s d e a t h t h a t e v e n i n g . On
those findings, the Workers' Compensation Court held that
employer and insurer were liable for claimant's benefits
under the Workers' Compensation Act. Appellant, Mountain
W e s t Farm B u r e a u , p r e s e n t s t h e following i s s u e s f o r review:
(1) W h e t h e r there was a causal r e l a t i - o n s h i p between
John Davis' myocardial i n f a r c t i o n and r e s u l t i n g d e a t h and h i s
work a c t i v i t i e s .
(2) Whether, even assuming there was a causal
r e l a t i o n s h i p between John Davis' myocardial infarction and
his work activities, such myocardial infarction is a
compensable injury under t h e Montana Workers' Compensation
Act.
The W o r k e r s ' Compensation C o u r t h e l d t h a t t h e d e c e d e n t
died from a m y o c a r d i a l i n f a r c t i o n and t h a t t h i s i n j u r y was
s u f f i c i e n t l y work r e l a t e d s o a s t o b r i n g i t w i t h i n t h e a m b i t
of the Workers' Compensation Act. In challenging this
determination, the appellant raises inconsistencies and
weaknesses in claimant's case, alleging an insufficient
causal relationship between claimant's work activities and
the heart attack. I n c o n s i d e r i n g such an argument, w e have
f i r m l y a d h e r e d t o t h e view t h a t w h e r e t h e f i n d i n g s a r e b a s e d
on conflicting evidence, this Court's function on review is
confined to determining whether there is substantial evidence
to support the findings, and not to determine whether there
is sufficient evidence to support contrary findings . Little
v. Structural Systems (1980), 188 Mont. 482, 614 P.2d 516;
Jensen v. Zook Brothers Construction Company (1978), 178
Mont. 59, 582 P.2d 1191; see also Jones v. St. Regis Paper
Company (1981), 196 Mont. 138, 639 P.2d 1140.
We find that the Workers' Compensation Court's order
was based on substantial credible evidence in the record. In
a well-reasoned and comprehensive opinion, the Workers'
Compensation Court addressed many factors that went into its
decision. The claimant herself was found to be a very
credible witness. The claimant's hypothetical question
presented to each party's expert was found to be accurate.
The claimant1 medical expert was found to be more qualified
s
and his opinion was accorded greater weight. Finally, the
nature of decedent's work and the particular activity he was
engaged in at the time the initial heart attack occurred
lends support to the Workers' Compensation Court's order.
Given the presumption of correctness that accompanies the
Workers' Compensation Court's findings when they reach this
Court, we will not overrule this order, Erhart v. Great
Western Sugar Company (1976), 169 Mont. 375, 546 P.2d 1055;
Hurlbut v. Vollstedt Kerr Company (1975), 167 Mont. 303, 308,
538 P.2d 344, 346; Hunt and Luinstra, "The Montana Workers'
Compensation Court" 41 Mont.L.Rev. 1, 18, (1980).
As to the second issue, we have in the past held that
in certain cases heart attacks are cornpensable injuries under
Montana Workers' Compensation Act. See, Rathbun v. Taber
Tank Lines, Inc. (1955), 129 Mont. 121, 283 P.2d 966,
(compensation allowed); Dumont v. Wickens Bros. Constr.
Company (1979), 1 8 3 Mont. 190, 598 P.2d 1107; Hurlbut v.
Vollstedt Kerr Company, supra; Ness v. Diamond Asphalt
Company ( 1 9 6 4 ) " 1 4 3 Mont. 560, 393 P.2d 43, (compensation
denied) . S e e a l s o G r o s f i e l d , Montana Workers ' Compensation
Manual 53.40 (1979). The q u e s t i o n of w h e t h e r a n employee
suffered a job related " t a n g i a b l e happening o f a traumatic
n a t u r e from a n u n e x p e c t e d c a u s e o r u n u s u a l strain resulting
in . . . harm," s e c t i o n 39-71-119, MCA, i s one o f f a c t . In
t h a t r e g a r d t h e c o u r t must " r e l y on c r e d i b l e m e d i c a l e v i d e n c e
to determine" whether the injury i s compensable, Jones v.
B a i r ' s Cafe ( 1 9 6 8 ) , 152 Mont. 1 3 , 1 9 , 445 P.2d 923, 9 2 6 , see
a l s o Dumont v. Wickens B r o s . C o n s t r . Company, s u p r a , a t 205,
206, 598 P.2d a t 1107.
The l o w e r c o u r t i n t h i s c a s e n o t e d t h a t " i n t h e i n s t a n t
case, t h e d e c e d e n t was p e r f o r m i n g strenuous physical labor
and . . . the medical evidence proved it caused his heart
attack. I' The Hurlbut case, supra, upon which appellant
relies is distinguishable in the fact that this Court,
quoting t h e medical w i t n e s s , noted t h a t he could - s t a t e
not
what was t h e c a u s e o f M r . Hurlbut's h e a r t a t t a c k and h e l d :
"Claimant failed to carry his burden and therefore cannot
qualify under the statute for benefits." In accord are
Dumont , supra Hurlbut, supra, Ness , supra, and Ra t h b u n ,
supra.
Again, w e a r e p r e s e n t e d w i t h t h e q u e s t i o n of whether
t h e r e i s s u b s t a n t i a l e v i d e n c e on t h e r e c o r d t o support t h e
Workers' Compensation Court's determination that the
decedent's heart attack was caused by his work. Experts
t e s t i f i e d on b e h a l f of each side. Each e l a b o r a t e d upon t h e
cause of decedent's heart attack. The court heard this
testimony, and h e l d t h a t t h e c l a i m a n t had e s t a b l i s h e d by a
preponderance of the credible medical evidence that
d e c e d e n t ' s h e a r t a t t a c k w a s work r e l a t e d . We find there is
s u b s t a n t i a l e v i d e n c e i n t h e r e c o r d and t h e c o u r t ' s o r d e r i s ,
therefore, affirmed.
W e concur: N /'
iJustice