State v. Osteen

No. 84-516

I N THE SUPmME COURT OF THE STATE O MONTANA
F

1985

STATE O MONTAPJA,
F

P l a i n t i f f and A p p e l l a n t ,

-vs-

NARVIIJ E. OSTEEN,

Defenaant and Respondent.

APPEAL FROM: D i s t r i c t Court of t h e Nineteenth J u d i c i a l ~ i s t r i c t ,
I n and f o r t h e County o f L i n c o l n ,
The H o n o r a b l e R o b e r t M. H o l t e r , J u d g e p r e s i d i n g .

COUNSEL O RECORD:
F

For Appellant:

Hon. Mike G r e e l y , A t t o r n e y G e n e r a l , H e l e n a , Montana
W i l l i a m A. D o u g l a s , ( S u s a n Loehn, D e p u t y ) , County
A t t o r n e y , L i b b y , Montana

For Respondent :

Law O f f i c e )of David W. Harman, L i b b y , Montana

S u b m i t t e d on B r i e f s : Jan. 1 8 , 1985

Decided: May 3 0 , 1 9 8 5

-
Clerk
Mr. J u s t i c e F r e d J. Weber d e l i v e r e d t h e O p i n i o n o f t h e C o u r t .

The State of Montana appeals from an order of the

Lincoln County District Court suppressing evidence seized

a f t e r o f f i c e r s e n t e r e d t h e d e f e n d a n t ' s home w i t h o u t a w a r r a n t

and also suppressing defendant's s t a t e m e n t s made prior to

r e c e i v i n g a Miranda w a r n i n g . W e affirm.

The i s s u e s a r e :

1. Did t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t err i n s u p p r e s s i n g e v i d e n c e

seized after officers entered defendant's home without a

warrant?

2. Did the District Court err j.n suppressing defen-

dant's s t a t e m e n t s made p r i o r t o r e c e i v i n g Miranda w a r n i n g s ?

Around 10:15 p.m. on A p r i l 6, 1 9 8 4 , a man r e p o r t e d t o

t h e L i n c o l n County S h e r i f f ' s O f f i c e t h a t h e had b e e n a s s a u l t -

ed. He reported that the driver of a Lincoln Continental

a u t o m o b i l e w i t h l i c e n s e p l a t e s b e a r i n g t h e name " O s t e e n " had

pointed a handgun at him and threatened him. The victim

s t a t e d h e d i d n o t know t h e d r i v e r , b u t had f o l l o w e d t h e c a r

t o a h o u s e where i t was p a r k e d .

S h e r i f f ' s o f f i c e r s interviewed t h e victim a t t h e Sher-

i f f ' s Office a short t i m e l a t e r . The v i c t i m a g r e e d t o show

the officers where the vehicle was parked. He gave the

officers the following information about t h e suspect: the

s u s p e c t ' s v e h i c l e was a g r e y L i n c o l n C o n t i n e n t a l ; t h e v e h i c l e

bore t h e personalized license plates "Osteen;" the suspect

was m a l e , 40-50 y e a r s o l d and had g r e y i n g h a i r .

The v i c t i m l e d t h r e e o f f i c e r s t o t h e h o u s e w h e r e h e had

seen t h e s u s p e c t ' s v e h i c l e parked. The c a r was i n t h e d r i v e -

way when t h e y a r r i v e d . The h o u s e had a s i g n on t h e o u t s i d e

which r e a d " O s t e e n . " While t h e v i c t i m and one o f f i c e r w a i t e d

across t h e street i n a p a t r o l c a r , two armed and u n i f o r m e d

officers approached the house. One o f f i c e r looked through
t h e windows o f t h e L i n c o l n and saw a p i s t o l a m m u n i t i o n b o x on

the rear floor.

Without an arrest or search warrant, the two officers

went t o t h e f r o n t p o r c h o f t h e h o u s e and knocked on t h e d o o r .

The d e f e n d a n t testified that t h e o f f i c e r s d i d n o t announce

themselves b u t began banging l o u d l y on t h e d o o r . T h i s was

a r o u n d 1 0 : 4 0 p.m. and i t was d a r k o u t s i d e . Defendant testi-

f i e d h e had b e e n a s l e e p f o r a b o u t one h o u r . H e was w e a r i n g

h i s b a t h r o b e when h e came t o t h e d o o r . One o f f i c e r t e s t i f i e d

they told defendant, "We would l i k e t o t a l k t o you, we a r e

from t h e S h e r i f f ' s O f f i c e " a n d t h e d e f e n d a n t r e p l i e d , "Come

on in." The defendant testified that when he opened the

front door, the officers s i m p l y came all t h e way into his

l i v i n g room w i t h o u t a n y i n v i t a t i o n b y word o r g e s t u r e .

One o f f i c e r t e s t i f i e d t h a t t h e d e f e n d a n t h a d b e e n d r i n k -

ing, was upset and did not appear to understand what the

officers were doing. The d e f e n d a n t testified h e had been

s o u n d a s l e e p a n d t h a t when h e w e n t t o t h e d o o r , h e w a s " s t i l l

asleep, very sleepy." He testified h e had n o i d e a why t h e

o f f i c e r s w e r e t h e r e , b u t t h o u g h t maybe someone h a d d i e d . The

o f f i c e r s d i d n o t t e l l d e f e n d a n t h e h a d a r i g h t t o r e f u s e them

entry.

A f t e r t h e o f f i c e r s e n t e r e d d e f e n d a n t ' s l i v i n g room, t h e y

saw a p i s t o l l y i n g on a t a b l e n e x t t o t h e c o u c h . T h i s gun

was n o t v i s i b l e f r o m t h e f r o n t d o o r . One o f f i c e r t h e n b e g a n

questioning t h e defendant. The o f f i c e r a s k e d d e f e n d a n t w h e r e

h e had b e e n t h a t e v e n i n g and w h e t h e r h e had been a t a s p e c i f -

ic location. The d e f e n d a n t s a i d h e had n o t b e e n t h e r e a n d

could not t e l l them where h e had b e e n o r what h e had been

doing. The o f f i c e r a s k e d d e f e n d a n t i f t h e p i s t o l was h i s a n d

whether h e had had i t w i t h him t h a t n i g h t . The d e f e n d a n t

r e p l i e d t h e p i s t o l was h i s , t h a t h e k e p t it i n t h e h o u s e f o r
p r o t e c t i o n and n e v e r t o o k i t o u t s i d e t h e h o u s e . After fur-

t h e r questioning, t h e d e f e n d a n t a d m i t t e d h e had b e e n o u t i n

h i s c a r t h a t e v e n i n g and t h a t h e had t h e handgun w i t h him.

A f t e r e l i c i t i n g t h e s e admissions, t h e o f f i c e r a r r e s t e d defen-

d a n t and r e a d him t h e Miranda w a r n i n g s . The o f f i c e r t o l d him

t o g e t d r e s s e d t o go t o t h e S h e r i f f ' s O f f i c e , f o l l o w e d him t o

h i s room, watched him w h i l e h e d r e s s e d , t h e n h a n d c u f f e d him

and t o o k him t o t h e p a t r o l c a r .

The d e f e n d a n t was c h a r g e d w i t h a g g r a v a t e d a s s a u l t u n d e r

45-5-202, MCA. The d e f e n d a n t p l e d n o t g u i l t y and f i l e d a

motion t o s u p p r e s s e v i d e n c e o f t h e weapon found i n h i s home

and t h e s t a t e m e n t s made i n r e s p o n s e t o t h e o f f i c e r ' s q u e s -

tioning. The D i s t r i c t C o u r t h e l d a s u p p r e s s i o n h e a r i n g and

g r a n t e d t h e motion t o suppress. The S t a t e a p p e a l s .

I

Did the District Court err in suppressing evidence

seized after officers entered defendant's home without a

warrant?

The S t a t e a r g u e s i n s u b s t a n c e t h a t t h e S h e r i f f ' s o f f i -

cers a c t e d r e a s o n a b l y i n e n t e r i n g d e f e n d a n t ' s h o u s e w i t h o u t a

warrant. The S t a t e c o n t e n d s t h a t t h e o f f i c e r s l a c k e d p r o b a -

ble cause t o believe defendant committed an offense u n t i l

t h e y found t h e weapon i n h i s home and h e a d m i t t e d t h e weapon

was i n h i s c a r w i t h him t h a t n i g h t . The S t a t e a r g u e s t h e

o f f i c e r s were m e r e l y i n v e s t i g a t i n g a r e p o r t e d o f f e n s e , t h a t

t h e y d i d n o t know t h e i d e n t i t y o f t h e s u s p e c t , t h a t t h e y d i d

n o t want t o a c c u s e t h e d e f e n d a n t p r e m a t u r e l y , and t h a t t h e y

d i d n o t i n t e n d t o a r r e s t t h e d e f e n d a n t when t h e y went t o t h e

door o f t h e house. The S t a t e c o n t e n d s t h a t t h e defendant

voluntarily admitted the officers, that the officers were

p r o p e r l y w i t h i n t h e d e f e n d a n t ' s home when t h e y saw t h e weap-

o n , and t h a t s e i z u r e o f t h e weapon was p r o p e r u n d e r t h e p l a i n
view exception to the warrant requirement. The State there-
fore argues that the District Court erred in suppressing the

weapon seized from defendant's home.
Under certain circumstances, peace officers may seize
evidence in plain view without a warrant. State v. Sorenson

(1979), 180 Mont. 269, 272, 590 P.2d 136, 139. The plain
view doctrine may be relied on if two threshold requirements
are met: the officers must have a prior justification for
the intrusion and the incriminating evidence must be discov-

ered inadvertently in the course of the justified intrusion.
Sorenson, 180 Mont. at 272, 590 P.2d at 139.
The officers' initial intrusion in this case was not
under authority of a warrant. Thus, the intrusion must be

justified under one of the recognized exceptions to the
Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement. "Searches conducted

outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge
or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth
Amendment - subject only to a few specifically established
and well-delineated exceptions." Katz v. United States

(1967), 389 U.S. 347, 357, 88 S.Ct. 507, 514, 19 L.Ed.2d 576.
Those exceptions are "jealously and carefully drawn," and

those seeking an exemption from the warrant requirement have
the burden of showing "that the exigencies of the situation
made that course imperative." Sorenson, 180 Mont. at 273,
590 P.2d at 139, citing Coolidge v. New Hampshire (1971), 403
U.S. 443, 455, 91 S.Ct. 2022, 2032, 29 L.Ed.2d 564, reh. den.
404 U.S. 874, 92 S.Ct. 26, 30 L.Ed.2d 120.
Here, the State seeks to justify the initial intrusion
into defendant's home under the consent exception to the
warrant requirement. The State contends that the officers'

entry was proper because the defendant invited them into his
home.
 The D i s t r i c t C o u r t f o u n d a s f o l l o w s :

"Here, w e f i n d t h e s e f a c t o r s :

" (1) U n i f o r m e d , armed o f f i c e r s a p p e a r e d
a t t h e d o o r o f d e f e n d a n t ' s p r i v a t e home
a t n i g h t and s o u g h t e n t r a n c e .

" ( 2 ) Defendant f e l t a compulsion t o l e t
them i n .

" ( 3 ) The p u r p o s e o f t h e i n t r u s i o n was
not apparent, he thought maybe someone
had d i e d .

" ( 4 ) The d e f e n d a n t was j u s t a r o u s e d from
s l e e p by t h e o f f i c e r s .

" (5) Defendant p r e v i o u s l y had consumed
l i q u o r a n d was u p s e t .

"And, w h e t h e r t h e r e was a 'come i n ' o r
j u s t holding a s i d e t h e door o r whatever
u n d e r t h e s e c i r c u m s t a n c e s , t h e e n t r y was
not proper."

I n o r d e r t o show t h a t v o l u n t a r y c o n s e n t t o s e a r c h was

g i v e n , t h e S t a t e m u s t show t h a t t h e c o n s e n t was u n e q u i v o c a l ,

specific, and uncontaminated by duress or coercion. The

C o u r t d i s c u s s e d c o n s e n t a t some l e n g t h i n S t a t e v . LaFlamme

( 1 9 7 6 ) , 170 Mont. 202, 204-05, 5 5 1 P.2d 1 0 1 1 , 1012-13, where

we s t a t e d :

". . . There i s a heavy burden o f proof
r e q u i r e d t o show t h a t t h e r e was a con-
sent. The U n i t e d S t a t e s Supreme C o u r t i n
Bumper v . N o r t h C a r o l i n a , 391 U.S. 5 4 3 ,
5 4 8 , 8 8 S . C t . 1 7 8 8 , 1 7 9 2 , 20 L.Ed.2d 7 9 7 ,
502, s e t f o r t h t h e b a s i c r e q u i r e m e n t :

"'When a p r o s e c u t o r s e e k s t o r e l y upon
consent t o j u s t i f y t h e lawfulness of a
s e a r c h , he h a s t h e burden o f proving t h a t
t h e c o n s e n t was, i n f a c t , f r e e l y and
voluntarily given. * * * '

"The N i n t h C i r c u i t C o u r t o f A p p e a l s g i v e s
a more e l a b o r a t e s t a t e m e n t o f t h i s re-
quirement i n Channel v. United S t a t e s ,
285 F.2d 2 1 7 , 219 ( 1 9 6 0 ) , s a y i n g :

" 'A s e a r c h a n d s e i z u r e may b e made w i t h -
o u t a search warrant i f t h e individual
f r e e l y and i n t e l l i g e n t l y g i v e s h i s un-
e q u i v o c a l and s p e c i f i c c o n s e n t t o s e a r c h ,
uncontaminated by any d u r e s s o r c o e r c i o n ,
actual o r implied. The Government h a s
 t h e b u r d e n o f p r o v i n g by c l e a r p o s i t i v e
e v i d e n c e t h a t s u c h c o n s e n t was g i v e n . '

"The q u e s t i o n t o b e answered i n t h i s c a s e
i s w h e t h e r t h e words and a c t i o n s o f t h e
defendant w e r e such t h a t a f r e e l y given,
unequivocal, and s p e c i f i c consent is
shown by c l e a r p o s i t i v e e v i d e n c e . "

In examining the surrounding circumstances, we must

c o n s i d e r a n y s u b t l y c o e r c i v e p o l i c e a c t i o n s and q u e s t i o n s a s

w e l l a s t h e vulnerable s u b j e c t i v e s t a t e of t h e person a l l e g e d

t o have c o n s e n t e d . The t e s t i m o n y on t h e p a r t o f t h e d e f e n -

d a n t and t h e o f f i c e r s s u p p o r t s t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t ' s conclu-

sion t h a t t h e defendant felt a compulsion t o l e t them in.

Their testimony a l s o supports t h e c o u r t ' s conclusion t h a t t h e

p u r p o s e o f t h e i n t r u s i o n was n o t a p p a r e n t , e s p e c i a l l y s i n c e

defendant had just been aroused from sleep after having

consumed some l i q u o r . There i s c l e a r l y s u f f i c i e n t evidence

to support the conclusion that there was not a specific

c o n s e n t t o s e a r c h and t h a t t h e r e was c o e r c i o n , e i t h e r a c t u a l

o r implied.

We p o i n t o u t t h a t t h e o f f i c e r s i n t h i s c a s e had ample

grounds and o p p o r t u n i t y t o o b t a i n a w a r r a n t b e f o r e s e e k i n g

entry t o defendant's home. There i s no i n d i c a t i o n in the

r e c o r d t h a t t o h a v e done s o would h a v e i n any way i m p a i r e d

t h e e f f e c t i v e n e s s of t h e i r i n v e s t i g a t i o n . A s we r e i t e r a t e d

in State v. Kao (Mont. 1985), 697 P.2d 903, 907-08, 42

"The F o u r t h Amendment t o t h e United
States Constitution and Article 11,
s e c t i o n 11 o f t h e Montana C o n s t i t u t i o n
provide f o r t h e r i g h t of t h e people t o be
s e c u r e i n t h e i r p e r s o n s , p a p e r s , homes
and e f f e c t s from u n r e a s o n a b l e s e a r c h e s
and s e i z u r e s . ...
"The p h y s i c a l i n v a s i o n of t h e home i s t h e
c h i e f e v i l t o which t h e F o u r t h Amendment
is historically directed.
 "'In terms that apply equally to seizures
of property and to seizures of persons,
the Fourth Amendment has drawn a firm
line at the entrance to the house.
Absent exigent circumstances, that
threshold may not reasonably be crossed
without a warrant. ' Pryton v. New York
(1980), 445 U.S. 573, 100 S.Ct. 1371, 63
L.Ed.2d 639.
'I. .. [Tlhe fact that an entry is made
at night raises particular concern over
its reasonableness. Although crime has
become an increasingly serious problem,
.
. . the right of officers to thrust
themselves into a home is also a grave
concern, not only to the individual but
to a society which chooses to dwell in
reasonable security and freedom from
surveillance."

Here, the officers failed to obtain a warrant and the State
has failed to demonstrate any other valid basis for the
officers' entry into defendant's home.

We conclude there was no consent given under the stan-
dard set forth in LaFlamme, and that there was no justifica-
tion or exigency allowing a warrantless entry into the
defendant's home. The officers' entry under the facts of

this case was unreasonable and their observation of the
weapon was an unreasonable, warrantless search. We therefore

reject the State's argument that the weapon seized by the
officer is admissible under the plain view exception to the
warrant requirement.
We hold that the District Court did not err in suppress-
ing evidence seized after the officers entered defendant's
home without a warrant.

Did the District Court err in suppressing defendant's
statements made prior to receiving Miranda warnings?
After entering defendant's home without a warrant or
other authorization and finding defendant's weapon, the

officers interrogated the defendant at some length without
g i v i n g Miranda w a r n i n g s . In t h e course of t h i s interroga-

t i o n , t h e o f f i c e r s e l i c i t e d i n c r i m i n a t i n g a d m i s s i o n s from t h e

d e f e n d a n t r e g a r d i n g t h e weapon, t h e v e h i c l e and d e f e n d a n t ' s

a c t i v i t i e s t h a t night. The D i s t r i c t C o u r t c o n c l u d e d t h a t t h e

i n t e r r o g a t i o n was done i n a c u s t o d i a l a t m o s p h e r e and o r d e r e d

s u p p r e s s i o n o f d e f e n d a n t ' s s t a t e m e n t s made d u r i n g t h i s i n t e r -

rogation. W find t h e record contains s u b s t a n t i a l c r e d i b l e
e

evidence t o support t h e D i s t r i c t Court's conclusion.

Custodial interrogation is defined as "questioning

i n i t i a t e d by law e n f o r c e m e n t o f f i c e r s a f t e r a p e r s o n h a s b e e n

taken i n t o c u s t o d y o r o t h e r w i s e d e p r i v e d - -s
of h i freedom -
of

a c t i o n - any s i g n i f i c a n t way."
in S t a t e v. Lapp (Mont. 1 9 8 3 ) ,

658 P.2d 400, 402, 40 St.Rep. 120, 1 2 2 , q u o t i n g Miranda v .

Arizona ( 1 9 6 6 ) , 384 U.S. 436, 444, 86 S . C t . 1602, 1 6 1 2 , 16

L.Ed.2d 694, 706 (emphasis i n Lapp). A s t h e S t a t e contends,

an i n t e r r o g a t i o n becomes c u s t o d i a l and i s s u b j e c t t o Miranda

r e q u i r e m e n t s i f t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s i n which t h e i n t e r r o g a t i o n

t a k e s p l a c e a r e such t h a t a reasonable person being i n t e r r o -

g a t e d would f e e l h e was i n c u s t o d y o r o t h e r w i s e s i g n i f i c a n t l y

d e p r i v e d o f h i s freedom. Lapp, 658 P.2d a t 403, 40 St.Rep.

a t 123. The S t a t e a r g u e s u n d e r t h i s s t a n d a r d t h a t t h e i n t e r -

rogation in this case was not custodial and that Miranda

w a r n i n g s were n o t r e q u i r e d . W disagree.
e

Courts consider a number of factors in determining

whether a suspect i s i n c u s t o d y o r h a s been significantly

deprived of his freedom o f action f o r purposes of Miranda

warnings. These f a c t o r s i n c l u d e t h e p l a c e o f i n t e r r o g a t i o n ,

t h e t i m e of i n t e r r o g a t i o n , persons present during interroga-

tion, w h e t h e r Miranda w a r n i n g s w e r e g r a t u i t o u s l y g i v e n , and

w h e t h e r o r n o t t h e s u s p e c t was a r r e s t e d f o l l o w i n g q u e s t i o n -

ing. Lapp, 658 P.2d a t 403, 40 S t . R e p . a t 122. It i s not

necessary t h a t i n t e r r o g a t i o n occur a t t h e p o l i c e s t a t i o n i n
order to invoke the Miranda requirements. Interrogation which
occurs in the suspect's home is subject to Miranda where it
occurs in a coercive environment in which the suspect's

freedom of action has been significantly restricted. State

v. Ryan (1979), 182 Mont. 130, 133-35, 595 P.2d 1146,
1147-48; Orozco v. Texas (1969), 394 U.S. 324, 89 S.Ct. 1095,
22 L.Ed.2d 311.

Here, two armed and uniformed police officers appeared
at defendant's door at night and sought entry. Meanwhile,
another officer and the alleged victim waited in a vehicle
outside defendant's home. The two officers entered defen-
dant's home without a warrant or other authorization, and
began to interrogate the defendant regarding the weapon, his
vehicle and his activities that night. The defendant was
alone in his home at the time. The questioning apparently

exceeded ten minutes in length. The officers repeated their
questioning until receiving satisfactory answers. Both
officers testified that, at first, the defendant denied
having the gun in his car that night. After additional
questioning, the defendant admitted the gun was with him in

the car and he was formally arrested. These facts establish
that the defendant was significantly deprived of his freedom
of action.
The State attempts to characterize the officers' visit
and questioning as a general investigative inquiry. The
record establishes that prior to actually knocking at the
door, the officers had been given a description of the sus-
pect and his weapon, the suspect's vehicle and its license
plate. The officers were led by the victim to the home,
which was identified by the same name as that which appeared
on the license plate. The vehicle was in the driveway and
the officers observed a pistol ammunition box inside the
vehicle. A t t h i s point, t h e o f f i c e r s c l e a r l y had s u f f i c i e n t

information t o obtain a search o r a r r e s t warrant.

V conclude t h a t t h e record contains s u b s t a n t i a l credi-
i
e

b l e evidence t o support t h e District Court's conclusion t h a t

the defendant was interrogated in a custodial atmosphere

r e q u i r i n g Miranda w a r n i n g s . The f a i l u r e o f t h e o f f i c e r s t o

p r e f a c e t h e i r q u e s t i o n s w i t h Miranda w a r n i n g s r e n d e r s i n a d -

missible the defendant' s statements made during that

interrogation.

We hold that the District Court correctly suppressed

defendant's s t a t e m e n t s made p r i o r t o r e c e i v i n g t h e Miranda

warning.

The D i s t r i c t C o u r t i s a f f i r m e d .

W e concur: ,
/