Lussy v. Dye

No. 84-153
1 1 THE SUPREbE COURT OF THE STATE OF FIONTANA
1

1985

RICHARD C. LUSSY,

Plaintiff and Appellant,

H. V. DYE and the Law Firm
of fiIILODRAGOVICH, DALE & DYE,
P.C. ,
Defendants and Respondents.

APPEAL FROPI: District Court of the Third Judicial District,
In and for the County of Deer Lodge,
The Honorable Mark Sullivan, Judge presiding.

COUNSEL OF RECORD:

For Appellant:

Richard C. Lussy, pro se, Seattle, Washington

For Respondents:
Worden, Thane & Haines, Missoula, Montana

Submitted on Briefs: Jan. 10, 1985
Decided: February 15, 1985

Clerk
Mr. Justice William E. Hunt, Sr. , delivered the Opinion of
the Court.

The respondents were counsel for the appellant in a debt
action brought by First Security Eank of Deer Lodge. The
bank obtained a favorable judgment or, December 1, 1.978, in
Powel-I County and a judgment was filed in both Powell County
and Deer Lodge County. The bank proceeded toward having the
appellant's property sold at a sheriff's sale, however, the
appellant satisfied the judgment prior to the sale. A notice
of satisfaction of judgment was filed in Powell County on
March 3, 1979, but no notice was filed in Deer Lodge County.
On September 17, 1982 the appellant brought an action
against the attorneys that had represented the bank in the
debt action. The complaint in this action was subsequently
amended to include the respondents, appellant's own attorneys
in the debt action, as defendants on January 28, 1983. The
appellant alleged that due to the respondents' and others'
failure to file notice of satisfaction of judgment in Deer
Lodge County, as was done in Powell County, the appellant was
injured when a land sale failed due to the improper "cloud"
on the title.
The respondents filed a motion to dismiss on Fehruary
28, 1983. The motion was based on the contention that the
applicable statute of limitation barred the appellant's
action. The motion was briefed by both parties and a heari.ng
was held. On September 20, 1983 the District Court granted
respondents ' motion and ordered the appellant's compl-aint
dismissed as to respondents. On January 10, 1984, the
appellant moved for relief from the order dismissing the
complaint against the respondents. This motion was based on
the contention that relief should be qranted because the
applicable statute of limjtations did not bar the appellant's
action against the respondents. The motion was briefed and a
hearing was held. On February 24, 1984, the District Court
denied the appellant's motion. This appeal followed.
We affirm.
This appeal concerns the application of Rule 60(b) (6)
M.R.Civ.P. The issues on appeal are: 1.) whether the
appellant had "arry other re?-son justifying relief from the
operation of the judgment" so that Rule 60(b)(6) could be
applied; and 2.) whether the appellant brought the Rule
6O(b)(6) motion within the required reasonable time.
The appellant contends that Rule 60(h) (6) applies
because the District Court allegedly erred in ruling that the
original complaint against the respondents was barred by the
statute of limitations. Tn other words, the appellant
attempted to apply Rule 60(b) (6) because the order from which
relief was sought was allegedly erroneous. The proper avenue
for seeking redress from an allegedly erroneous decision,
solely on the basis that it is erroneous, is the appeal
process.
It is not the intent of Rule 60(b) (6) to be a substitute
for appeal. The substance of a motion for relief under Rule
60 (b)(6) must be something more than a request for rehearing
or a request that the District Court change its mind. It
must be shown that something prevented a full presentation of
the cause or an accurate determination on the merits and that
for reasons of fairness and equity redress is justified.
It is important for the sake of the 1-itigants and for
the judicial system that litigation will at some time be
finally ended. When the time for appeal has elapsed and no
grounds justify other relief the case is final as to all

matters properly appealable. We find t h a t the appel-lant's
r e q u e s t f o r r e l i e f was g r o u n d e d so1.el.y on t h e b a s i s t h a t t h e

District Court order dismissing the respondents was

erroneous, t h a t s u c h was p r o p e r l y a p p e a - l a b l e , a n d t h a t t h e
appellant has set f o r t h no g r o u n d s t h a t would j u s t i f y the
a p p l i c a t i o n o f R u l e 6 0 (b)( 6 ) , M.R.Civ.P. W e therefore hold

that the District Court acted properly in denying the

a p p e l l a n t ' s motion.

The r e s o l u t i o n o f t h i s i s s u e r e n d e r s a d i s c u s s i o n on t h e

issue of reasonable time unnecessary. The order of the
District Court s h a l l stand.

Affirmed.

W Concur:
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f Chief J u s t i c e