No. 87-333
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
1987
IN THE MATTER OF T.J.F.,
Respondent.
APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Thirteenth Judicial District,
In and for the County of Yellowstone,
The Honorable William J. Speare, Judge presiding.
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For Appellant:
Terry L. Seiffert argued, Billings, Montana
For Respondent :
Hon. Mike Greely, Attorney General, Helena, Montana
Betsy Brandborg argued, Asst. Atty. General, Helena
Harold Hanser, County Attorney; Curtis Bevolden,
Deputy County Attorney, Billings, Montana
For Amicus Curiae:
Allen Smith, Jr. argued for Mental Disabilities Board
of Visitors, Warm Springs, Montana
Submitted: December 3, 1987
Decided: December 22, 1987
Filed. (-* ; 2
[J;
- 7987
Mr. Justice William E. Hunt, Sr. , delivered the opinion of
the Court.
A youth, T.J.F., appeals from an order of the District
Court, Thirteenth Judicial District, County of Yellowstone,
committing him to continued treatment of up to 3 months to
Rivendell of Billings, Inc., a lock-up treatment facility for
mentally disturbed youths. The Legal Services Program of
Warm Springs has filed an amicus brief. The youth, T.J.F.,
has been discharged from custody and we therefore dismiss
this case on the grounds of mootness.
Appeal dismissed.
We cannot let this case be dismissed without commenting
on the facts that gave rise to this appeal. The appellant has
alleged serious procedural errors committed by the State.
The commitment procedure is governed by S 53-21-101, et seq.
MCA. These statutes are clear and must be strictly adhered
to. Although we do not pass upon the validity of the
appellant's claims today, we will not hesitate to do so in,4
future cases where there are allegations of procedural
abuses, whether moot or not.
Issues of the appellant are as follows:
1. Did the District Court err by not dismissing the
petition for conunitment on grounds of procedural defect?
2. Was there sufficient evidence to find that T.J.F.
was mentally ill to a reasonable mesical certainty?
3. Was there sufficient evidence to find that T.J.F.
was a danger to himself or others?
4. Did the District Court err when it based its order
on a medical report not in evidence?
The appellant, T.2.F. was committed to the Rivende1.1
facility for mentally disturbed youths on April. 13, 1987.
T.J.F. is a 12 year old male. On July 1, 1987, a petition
for extension of commitment was filed by the deputy county
attorney. Because the petition was not filed within the
statutory time frame, appellant made a motion to dismiss on
procedural grounds at the hearing. This motion was never
ruled on but on July 8, 1987, the deputy county attorney
filed a petition for commitment supported by a June 23
medical report by T.J.F.'s psychiatrist, Dr. Newman. T.J.F.
again made a motion to dismiss because no request for
commitment had been filed as required by statute and because
the appellant had not been advised of his rights prior to the
June 23 exam. The District Court ordered that a psychiatrist
examine T. J.F. No examination was ever given pursuant to
this order.
Without ruling on the motion to dismiss (which went
unopposed by the State), the court held a hearing. John
Kiedrowski, a certified mental health professional at
Rivendell, testified that through his daily contact with
T.J.F., he felt that T.J.F. was seriously mentally ill and
believed that if placed back in his home he would be
dangerous to younger children owing to a past history of
abuse. Kiendrowski is neither a psychiatrist nor a
psychologist but holds a degree in personnel guidance. No
personal evaluation of T.J.F. was made nor was any report
written. Kiendrowski testified that he concurred with Dr.
Newman's June 23 report. The report, however, was never
introduced into evidence and Dr. Newman did not testify.
Kiendrowski further testified that T.J.F. had not been
violent while at Rivendell but had made threats about getting
back at people.
The Court ordered that T.J.F. be committed and attached
Dr. Newman's June 23 report to its findings of fact. It is
from this order that appellant appeals.
It is unnecessary to address the appellant's arguments
because we hold that the case before us today is moot. Moot
questions may not be addressed by this Court. State ex rel.
Miller v. Murray (1979), 183 Mont. 499, 503, 600 P.2d 1174,
1176. We defined a moot question in Murray as "one which
existed once but because of an event or happening, it has
ceased to exist and no longer presents an actual
controversy." 600 P.2d at 1176. A case will become moot for
the purpose of an an appeal "where by a change of
circumstances prior to the appellate decision the case has
lost any practical purpose for the parties, for instance
where the grievance that gave rise to the case has been
eliminated . . .." 5 Am.Jur.2d, 5 762, Appeal and Error
(1962).
Since this action arose, T.J.F. has been released from
the Rivendell facility. There is no longer any actual
controversy.
Dismissed on grounds of mootness
i
We Concur:
Chief Justice ,/"