IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
No. 84-172
THE MILLER-WOHL COMPANY, INC.,
Petitioner and Respondent, 1
1
VS . 1 OPINION AND
ORDER
COMMISSIONER OF LABOR AND INDUSTRY,)
STATE OF MONTANA, and
TAMARA L. BULEY, 1
Respondents and Appellants. )
Miller-Wohl Company, Inc. appealed to the United States
Supreme Court from our decision against it in Miller-Wohl Co.
v. Com'r of Labor and Industry (Mont. 1984), 692 P.2d 1243,
41 St.Rep. 2445.
On January 20, 1987, the United States Supreme Court
entered the following order in the appeal:
The judgment is vacated and the case is remanded to
the Supreme Court of the State of Montana for
further consideration in the light of California
Federal Savings and Loan Association v. Guerra,
479 U.S. , 1 0 7 S 683,
T . ~ z d 2d
.
Justice BLACKMUN, Justice STEVENS and Justice
SCALIA would dismiss the appeal for want of a
substantial federal question.
1 The United States Supreme Court assessed costs of
$200.00 against the Commissioner and Tamara Buley in
vacating our judgment.
CLERK OF SUPUEME COURS
I T A T F OF MPINTANA r
On March 24, 1987, we issued a schedule addressed to the
parties for the briefing and presentation of the remanded
case.
On April 30, 1987, Miller-Wohl Co., Inc., moved to
dismiss the remanded cause on the basis that it had become
moot. It submitted that the remand and further proceedings
before this Court were no longer necessary because "in the
light of the United States Supreme Court's decision and the
anticipated time, costs, and burden of remand of proceedings
before the Supreme Court of Montana and the anticipated
eventual decision," Miller-Wohl Co., Inc. had agreed to
accept the Commissioner's order. The Company conceded that
it violated the Montana Maternity Leave Act, S5 49-2-310 and
-311, MCA. The Company had further submitted payments of the
net back pay and the amounts of penalty with accrued interest
to the complainant via her attorney, and the amounts tendered
appear to be correct.
Buley's attorney responded to the motion to dismiss, and
objected thereto, contending that Buley was entitled to
attorney fees in addition to other relief. Miller-Wohl Co.,
Inc. answered the objection stating that no statute in this
case provides for the recovery of attorney fees and without
statutory authority, such attorney fees may not be awarded to
Buley .
2 The estimate of Miller-Wohl Co., Inc. that it could
anticipate the eventual result is not surprising. Try
as we may, we cannot discern the reasons why the United
States Supreme Court vacated our decision in the light
of California Federal Savinss and Loan Association v.
Guerra, supra. If anything Cuerra supports our decision
that neither the Civil Riqhts Act nor the amendment
under the Pregnancy ~iscrimination Act preempted the
Montana Maternity Leave Act. The United States Supreme
The Montana Maternity Leave Act was first adopted by the
legislature in Ch. 320, Laws of Montana (1975). Originally,
the statute defining unlawful acts of employers with respect
to women's pregnancy was codified in $ 39-7-203, MCA; the
right to reinstatement following pregnancy-related leave of
absence was set forth in $ 39-7-204, MCA; and complaints of
violations, of 5 39-7-203, and 5 39-7-204, MCA, were to be
handled through the Commissioner of Labor and Industry.
Under $ 39-7-207, MCA, also adopted in 1975, the
Commissioner was empowered to make findings of fact and to
order the employer to reinstate the complainant, to pay to
the complainant "the damages resulting from the violation."
No other provision appears in the related statutes allowing
attorney fees to a successful complainant.
While the parties of Miller-Wohl Co., Inc. v. Com'r of
Labor and Industry were in the courts, the legislature, in
Ch. 285, Laws of Montana (1983), transferred the functions of
the Commissioner of Labor and Industry regarding maternity
leave to the Commission for Human Rights. Sections 39-7-203
and 39-7-204, MCA, were recodified and now appear
respectively as $ 49-2-310 and 49-2-311, MCA. Because
violations of the Montana Maternity Leave Act are now
codified along with other provisions related to human rights,
in a contested case, the prevailing party may bring an action
in District Court for attorney fees under 5 49-2-505(4), MCA,
and if the matter is eventually reviewed in the District
Court, that court may award the prevailing party reasonable
attorney fees under $ 49-2-509 (31, MCA.
Court majority offered no other reason for vacating the
judgment in favor of the Commissioner and Buley.
Thus the law now allows a successful complainant for a
violation of the Montana Maternity Leave Act to recover
attorney fees for proceedings before the Commissioner of
Human Rights, whereas the former law did not provide for
attorney fees unless they were included within the word
"damages" in former 5 39-7-207, MCA.
We have consistently held that attorney fees are not an
element of "damages" in interpreting a specific statutory
grant or contract provision. Chagnon v. Hardy Construction
Co. (Mont. 1984), 680 P.2d 932, 41 St.Rep. 441; arti in v.
Crown Life Insurance Company (1983), 202 Mont. 461, 658 P.2d
1099; Foy v. Anderson (1978), 176 Mont. 507, 580 ~ . 2 d114.
However, this Court has recognized its power under
equitable principles to grant complete relief by way of
attorney fees. Foy v. Anderson, 176 Mont. at 511, 580 P.2d
at 116-117; Holmstrom Land Co. v. Hunter (1979), 182 Mont.
43, 48, 595 P.2d 360, 363. Here justice, equity and good
conscience dictate that Miller-Wohl Co., Inc. should bear the
costs incurred by Tamara Buley in presenting her claims in
court against Miller-Wohl Co., Inc. We are fortified in this
conclusion by the action of the legislature in 1983
establishing as a matter of public policy that prevailing
complainants in pregnancy discrimination cases may be awarded
attorney fees and costs in addition to other remedies
provided by law. The protracted history of her claim over an
eight year period demands an award of attorney fees and
costs. Tamara Buley has been led by Miller-Wohl Co. , Inc.
through a succession of administrative, federal court and
state court procedures since her discharge for pregnancy on
August 27, 1979. Under the statutes then existing, she filed
a complaint against Miller-Wohl Co., Inc. with the Montana
Commissioner of Labor and Industry. She claimed before the
Commissioner that Miller-Wohl Co., Inc. had violated the
Montana Maternity Leave Act. Miller-Wohl Co., Inc. then
brought suit against the Commissioner and Tamara Buley in the
United States District Court for the District of Montana
asking the federal court to declare Montana's statutes
invalid and to enjoin their enforcement. The United States
District Court issued a temporary restraining order for a
brief period, but then permitted the state agency to proceed.
On October 3, 1980, the Commissioner determined through an
administrative order that Miller-Wohl Co., Inc. had violated
the Montana Maternity Leave Act by dismissing Tamara Buley,
and that she was entitled to back pay and penalties in the
amount of $6,517.60. The United States District Court
reviewed the Commissioner's findings and concurred in the
Commissioner's conclusions. Miller-Wohl Co., Inc. appealed
this decision to the United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit. There, in 1982, the Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit dismissed the action, determining that no
federal question had been presented.
Miller-Wohl Co., Inc. then returned to the state court
for a review of the Commissioner's decision. On February 8,
1984, the District Court for Cascade County reversed the
Commissioner's order. An appeal was brought to this Court
and our decision eventually was reported as above stated.
Miller-Wohl Co., Inc. then appealed our decision to the
United States Supreme Court with resulting vacation of
judgment as we above set forth.
Now finally, in anticipation of the eventual result,
Miller-Wohl Co., Inc. has conceded that it violated the
Montana Maternity Leave Act and has tendered to the attorney
for Tamara Buley all of her damages, penalties and interest.
If the amount of attorney fees claimed by her attorney for
these protracted litigations is proper, her total attorney
fees and costs would practically eat up whatever judgment she
might obtain here.
We therefore determine that this is one of those rare
cases where circumstances demand that this Court order the
payment of attorney fees to the prevailing party, and we so
order.
ACCORDINGLY, proceeding on the order of remand from the
United States Supreme Court, we reinstate the judgment
contained in our Opinion reported in Miller-Wohl Co., Inc. v.
Com'r of Labor and Industry (Mont. 1984), 692 P.2d 1243, 41
St.Rep. 2445; and this cause is remanded to the District
Court of the Eighth Judicial District, in and for Cascade
County, Judge Joel G. Roth presiding, for the determination
of appropriate attorney fees and costs to be awarded to
Tamara Buley.
Dated this g& day of Octob
We Concur:
n Chief Justice
Mr. Justice Fred J. Weber dissents as follows.
I respectfully dissent from the award of attorney fees.
On the basis of "justice, equity and good conscience,"
the majority exempts Ms. Buley from the general rule that
attorney fees may not be awarded absent statutory authority.
The Court cites as precedent Foy v. Anderson (1978), 176
Mont. 507, 580 P.2d 114, and Holmstrom Land Co. v. Hunter
(1979), 182 Mont. 43, 595 P.2d 360.
In - the equitable power of the Court was invoked to
Foy,
award attorney fees to defendant Eggan because plaintiff had
no basis for bringing defendant Eggan into the lawsuit. Fay,
580 P.2d at 117. In awarding attorney fees in Holmstrom, the
Court stated, "Just as Anderson had no reason or justifica-
tion for dragging Eggan into the lawsuit ... Holmstrom had
no reason to sue Hunter." Holmstrom, 595 P.2d at 363.
Had 5: sat on the Court at the time Foy and Holmstrom
were decided, I would have joined the dissents of Mr. Chief
Justice Haswell. In his dissent in Foy, 580 P.2d at 117,
Chief Justice Haswell stated,
The majority recognize that attorney fees
cannot be awarded to the prevailing party in the
absence of statute or contract. Here there is
neither. The award is justified on the basis of
making the prevailing party whole and granting
complete relief. This justification is equally
applicable to any defendant who is sued, hires an
attorney, and ultimately prevails.
In my view, this decision constitutes a sharp
break from existing law. ..
Substantial arguments can be made for and
against awarding attorney fees to the prevailing
party in a lawsuit. In my view this is a matter of
public policy to be resolved by the legislature.
To date the legislature has not seen fit to grant
attorney fees to a prevailing defendant (except in
certain instances not pertinent to this case, e.g.
eminent domain and reciprocal rights statutes).
I would adhere to existing law and require
statutory authorization for an award of attorney
fees in the absence of contract.
The rationale stated by the majority in Fay and
Holmstrom is absent here because this is not a case where the
plaintiff improperly dragged a defendant into a lawsuit. The
primary reason for the award of attorney fees here appears to
be that Ms. Buley's total attorney fees and costs would
practically eat up her judgment. That seems to suggest an
equitable principle that attorney fees should be awarded
whenever the fees approach the amount of the judgment granted
to a party.
I agree that it is unfortunate that the plaintiff's
judgment could be eaten up by attorney fees. If I were a
legislator, that might be a sufficient reason for me to vote
in favor of legislation. However, notwithstanding the meet-
ing of a number of legislatures since = and Holmstrom, the
legislature has not adopted any specific legislative standard
which would allow the award of attorney fees in this case.
No standards or boundaries are set forth in the majority
opinion. Apparently every zealous advocate now must argue in
district court and in this Court for the use of equitable
authority to award attorney fees to his prevailing client. I
find myself unable to suggest which cases should require an
award of attorney fees under the rule of the majority.
I would deny the plaintiff's request for attorney fees
and leave the changing of standards to the legislature.
Chief Justice J.A. Turnage and Ju
concur in the foregoing opinion.