No. 86-476
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
1987
ROBERT C. ANDERSON and VIOLET C.
ANDERSON,
Plaintiffs and Appellants,
TW CORPORATION, CANTEEN CORPORATION,
TWA SERVICES, INC., a/k/a TW SERVICES,
INC., HAL RITCHIE LAUREN MILES and
THEODORE R. WOOLSEY,
Defendants and Respondents.
APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Sixth Judicial District,
In and for the County of Park,
The Honorable Byron L. Robb, Judge presiding.
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For Appellant:
Berg, Coil, Stokes & Tollefsen; Michael Coil argued,
Bozeman, Montana
For Respondent:
Moulton, Bellingham, Longo & Mather; W. Anderson
Forsythe argued, Billings, Montana
Submitted: June 9, 1987
Decided: August 4, 1987
Filed: A U G 1 - 1987
Clerk
Mr. Justice William E. Hunt, Sr., delivered the Opinion of
the Court.
Appellants, Robert C. Anderson and Violet C. Anderson,
brought an action in the Sixth Judicial District, Park
County, to recover damages resulting from an alleged
.
"constructive" discharge of Robert C Anderson and other
related torts arising from violations of good faith and fair
dealing by his employer. Violet C. Anderson alleges
negligent and intentional infliction of emotional distress
arising from her husband's charges against respondents.
On January 24, 1984, at a hearing before the District
Court, several pending motions were decided, including
motions by both parties for summary judgment. At that
hearing, the judge dismissed appellants' case, holding that
it was preempted by federal labor law according to
Allis-Chalmers v. Lueck (1985), 471 U.S. 202, 105 S.Ct. 1904,
85 L.Ed.2d 206.
The issues presented for our review on appeal are as
follows:
1. Are appellants' tort claims preempted by the
National Labor Relations Act, thereby denying the State
District Court subject matter jurisdiction?
2. Does the District Court dismissal deny appellants
due process of law and equal protection as guaranteed by the
Montana Constitution?
3. Did the District Court err by dismissing the claims
of appellant, Violet C. Anderson?
4. Did the District Court err by denying appellants'
motion for partial summary judgment on the question of
vacation pay?
We affirm the District Court on all issues.
Appellant, Robert C. Anderson, was employed by TW
Services, a concessionaire in Yellowstone National Park. In
1970, appellant began work as a mechanic in the company's
garage located near Gardiner, Montana, just inside the Park
boundary. From May of 1971 through ,July 1, 1982, appellant
was the shop foreman at this facility. TW Services operates
a fleet of cars, buses, trucks, snowmobiles, boats and snow
cats in Yellowstone. These vehicles are maintained and
repaired by the mechanics at the Gardiner garage.
On June 4, 1982, appellant removed a number of rags
which had been used to clean up a 55 gallon drum spillage of
a degreaser called Tensene. Anderson developed contact
dermatitis (skin allergy), and was forced to go on sick
leave. Appellant is allergic to all petroleum-based prod-
ucts. In July, 1982, appellant was advised by his doctor to
avoid contact with all such petroleum-based substances.
Anderson alleges that while off work on sick leave, the
management improperly changed his job description. He claims
that the new position required him to spend 75% of his time
acting as a mechanic and 25% of his time as a supervisor.
Due to this job description, he was required to come in
contact with numerous petroleum-based products which caused
the reoccurrence of his allergic reaction and made him unable
to return to his prior employment.
As an employee of TW Services, Anderson was a member of
the International Association of Machinists and Aerospace
Workers (Union). As a member of this TJnion, the terms and
conditions of Anderson's employment were governed by a
collective bargaining agreement (CBA) outlined in the Union
contract.
On Anderson's behalf, the Union objected to the job
description of "working shop foreman" and proceeded with the
grievance procedure provided for in the Union agreement.
This resulted in a mutual agreement that Anderson would be
returned to the position which he held at the time of his
accident with no changes in wages or working conditions as
per contract, which were in effect at the time of injury.
The agreement required that Anderson obtain a physician's
release and be able to perform the duties associated with
"working shop foreman." Anderson continued to object to the
job description but alleges that the Union refused to proceed.
any further with his claim.
After leaving work, appellant returned to the garage to
retrieve his personal files containing documents important
for his personal use. Appellant contends that these files
were destroyed, but the record does not show any evidence of
intentional destruction of his files.
Appellant's wife, Violet C. Anderson, filed a complaint
against the same defendants alleging that both she and her
husband had suffered great emotional distress and mental
anguish due to defendant's intentional negligent acts.
Before dismissal of appellants claims, defendants payed
Robert Anderson money owed him for unused vacation time.
This unpaid money was the subject of appellants' count 9 of
the original complaint. Appellants requested partial summary
judgment on this issue after the money was paid. The Dis-
trict Court denied the motion and dismissed both appellants'
claims.
Issue # 1
Are the appellants1 tort claims preempted by the NLRA,
thereby denying the State District Court jurisdiction?
The District Court relied upon Allis-Chalmers in hold-
ing that plaintiffs-appellants' claims were preempted by
federal labor law. We agree that Allis-Chalmers is
controlling in this case. See also Smith v. Montana Power
Company (Mont. 1987), 731 P.2d 924, 44 St.Rep. 124, a case
where we considered the rule in the Allis-Chalmers case and
reached the same conclusion as the District Court did here.
The federal law which preempts appellants' claims is
S 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 (LMRA),
61 Stat. 156, 29 U.S.C. 5 185(a). Section 301 states in
part :
Suits for violation of contracts between
an employer and a labor organization
representing employees in an industry
affecting commerce ... may be brought
in any district court of the United
States having jurisdiction of the par-
ties ...
The preemptive effect of 5 301 was first stated in
Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co. (1962), 369 U.S. 95, 103, 82
S.Ct. 571, 7 L.Ed.2d 593. The United States Supreme Court in
Lucas Flour concluded that "in enacting § 301 Congress
intended doctrines of federal labor law uniformly to prevail
over inconsistent local rules." 369 U.S. at 104.
In Allis-Chalmers, the United States Supreme Court
applied the Lucas Flour analysis to hold that plaintiffs may
not avoid the preemptive effect of federal labor law when a
dispute involves an interpretation of a union contract by
pleading in tort.
Since nearly any alleged willful breach
of contract can be restated as a tort
claim for breach of a good-faith obliga-
tion under a contract, the arbitrator's
role in every case could be bypassed
easily if 5 301 is not understood to
pre-empt such claims. Claims involving
vacation or overtime pay, work assign-
ment, unfair discharge--in short, the
whole range of disputes traditionally
resolved through arbitration--could be
brought in the first instance in state
court by a complaint in tort rather than
in contract. A ru1.e that permitted an
individual to sidestep available griev-
ance procedures would cause arbitration
to lose most of its effectiveness,
Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 379 U.S.
650, 653 (1965), as w x l as eviscerate a
central tenet of federal labor-contract
law under S 301 that it is the arbitra-
tor, not the court, who has the respon-
sibility to interpret the labor contract
in the first instance.
471 U.S. at 219-220.
Although Montana does have statutory laws which co-
incide and seem to overlap the federal labor laws, "[a] state
rule that purports to define the meaning or scope of a term
in a contract suit therefore is pre-empted by federal labor
law." - at 210.
Id.
Were state law allowed to determine the
meaning intended by the parties in
adopting a particular contract phrase or
term, all the evils addressed in
Lucas Flour would recur. The parties
would be uncertain as to what they were
binding themselves to when they agreed
to create a right to collect benefits
under certain circumstances. As a
result, it would be more difficult to
reach agreement, and disputes as to the
nature of the agreement would prolifer-
ate. Exclusion of such claims "from the
ambit of S 301 would stultify the con-
gressional policy of having the adminis-
tration of collective bargaining
contracts accomplished under a uniform
body of federal substantive la-w." Smith
- Evening News Assn., 371 U.S. 195, 200
v.
(1962).
- at 211.
Id.
v. MPC,
In Smith - - this Court considered a wrongful
discharge allegation in violation of the covenant of good
faith and fair dealing. This Court found that because his
employment was governed by a col.lective bargaining agreement,
which included a mandatory and binding arbitration and griev-
ance procedure, Smith's state law claim was preempted by
federal labor law.
The Union contract at issue specifically provides for a
discharge dispute. The grievance procedure also provides for
arbitration which is final and binding on the parties.
Robert Anderson failed to exhaust the grievance proce-
dure outlined in his employment contract. There is nothing
on the record that shows defendants acted in any way to
interfere with the arbitration process. Regardless of fault
for failing to exhaust the collective bargaining agreement
remedies, the issue of preemption by federal labor law is
separate from the issue of whether the plaintiff has
exhausted his grievance procedure remedies.
The full scope of the pre-emptive effect
of federal labor-contract law remains to
be fleshed out on a case-by-case basis.
We do hold that when resolution of a
state-law claim is substantially depen-
dent upon analysis of the terms of an
agreement made between the parties in a
labor contract, that claim must either
be treated as a S 301 claim, see Avco
Corp. v. Aero Lodge - 390 U.S. 557
735,
(1968), or dismissed as pre-empted by
federal labor-contract law. This com-
plaint should have been dismissed for
failure to make use of the grievance
procedure established in the
collective-bargaining agreement,
Republic steel-corp.-v. Maddox,-379 U.S.
at 652, or dismissed as pre-empted by 5
Allis-Chalmers, 471 U.S. at 220-221.
We affirm the District Court on issue no. 1.
Issue # 2
Does the District Court's dismissal deny appellants due
process of law and equal protection as guaranteed by the
Montana Constitution?
Appellants' assertions of due process and equal protec-
tion violation are without merit. If federal law did not
preempt appellants' causes of action, they would be free to
proceed in state court. If their causes of action are pre-
empted, their rights under the Montana Constitution would not
apply because of the United States Constitution's supremacy
clause, Art. VI, 5 2, and Congress's power to preempt any
state law. In that case, federal laws under the United
States Constitution would provide appellants due process and
equal protection.
We affirm the District Court on this issue.
Issue #3
Did the District Court err by dismissing the claims of
Violet C. Anderson?
The District Court was correct in dismissing Violet
Anderson's cause of action. Her claim for the loss of con-
sortium and consequential intentional infliction of emotional
distress is inextricably intertwined with the federal inter-
pretation of her husband's employment contract. In Montana,
one who has a proper tort action for negligence resulting in
injury to himself may claim, as a damage, emotional distress.
Johnson v. Super Save Markets, Inc. (Mont. 1984), 686 P.2d
209, 41 St.Rep. 1495.
Montana case law has established that a cause of action
for emotional distress to a third party can arise when a
close relative witnesses a death or physical injury to the
victim of a tort. See Versland v. Caron Transport (Mont.
1983), 671 P.2d 583, 40 St.Rep. 1681.
Violet Anderson has not alleged that she was a victim
of a tort, but rather that she is entitled to compensation
for loss of consortium and mental suffering which resulted
from her husband being a victim of a tort.
We affirm the District Court's dismissal of Violet
Anderson's claim.
Issue #4
Did the District Court err by denying appellants'
motion for partial summary judgment on the issue of vacation
pay?
Appellants claim that since respondent paid Robert
Anderson past due vacation pay during the discovery period
for this case, the employer thereby acquiesced to the charges
against the company. According to appellants, summary judg-
ment on this issue should have been granted, along with
attorney fees and costs because the amount was not paid in a
timely fashion. Appellants cite 5 s 39-3-201 ( 5 ) ,
39-3-205(1)(2), 39-3-206, and 39-3-214, MCA, in support of
their allegations. They claim that the issue of vacation pay
is not preempted by federal labor law, as it is a right
protected by these state laws.
As previously discussed, Allis-Chalmers specifically
lists vacation pay as one of those items preempted by the
operation of federal labor law. Also, vacation pay was
grievable under Anderson's collective bargaining agreement
and covered by federal labor law interpretation. For this
Court to find that state law applies to this issue would
render the binding grievance and arbitration procedure
ineffectual and frustrate the uniform federal interpretation
outlined in Allis-Chalmers.
Affirmed.
We Concur:
/r'
' Chie'f J u s t i c e
43-c4!.8-GkaLl
d4
Former C h i e f J u s t i c e
Frank I . H a s w e l l s i t t i n g
f o r J u s t i c e John C. Sheehy