No. 86-533
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
1987
AARON STANSBERRY,
Petitioner/Respondent and
Cross-Appellant,
-vs-
ED ARGENBRIGHT, Superintendent of Public
Instruction and TRUSTEES OF ROOSEVELT
COUNTY HIGH SCHOOL DISTRICT #5A,
Respondents/Appellants and
Cross-Respondents.
APPEAL FROM: The District Court of the First Judicial District,
In and for the County of Lewis & Clark,
The Honorable Henry Loble, Judge presiding.
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For Appellant:
Charles E. Erdmann; Erdmann & Wright, Helena,
Montana
For Respondent:
Emilie Loring; Hilley & Loring, Great Falls, Montana
Submitted on Briefs: Feb. 26, 1987
Decided: May 26, 1987
Mr. Justice Fred J. Weber delivered the Opinion of the Court.
The District Court of the First Judicial District, Lewis
and Clark County, reversed the actions of the Roosevelt
County Board of School Trustees (School Trustees), the County
Superintendent of Schools (County Superintendent), and the
State Superintendent of Public Instruction (State Superinten-
dent), and directed that Mr. Stansberry be offered a contract
as a tenured teacher. School Trustees appealed and Mr.
Stansberry cross-appealed. We reverse.
The issues are:
1. Did the District Court err in reversing the deci-
sions of the School Trustees, the County Superintendent, and
the State Superintendent and directing that Mr. Stansberry be
offered a contract?
2. Did the District Court err by not directing the
School Trustees to pay Mr. Stansberry back pay and retroac-
tive fringe benefits?
Mr. Stansberry was a tenured teacher who taught in the
Wolf Point High School District for seven years prior to this
controversy. In 1 9 8 1 Mr. Stansberry requested sabbatical
leave for the 1 9 8 2 - 8 3 school year pursuant to the Profession-
al Policies Agreement between the School District and the
Wolf Point Education Association. The agreement provides in
pertinent part:
5575.8 Sabbatical Leave
a. Sabbatical leave shall be available to
a teacher after seven (7) years of
service. A teacher receiving sabbatical
leave shall be awarded 50% of their
annual base salary they would have
received had he or she remained at his
or her teaching position. Such salary
will be paid upon completion of the
granted sabbatical leave and upon be-
ginning to teach in the system in the
school year following his/her absence.
b. Leave may be granted by the Board of
Trustees upon application approval by
a joint review panel representing the
WPEA and the school system to engage
in full-time study, travel, research,
work experience or other professionally
advantageous activity. . .
.
c. Teachers on sabbatical leave receive
normal salary increments, tenure
rights, and fringe benefits while on
leave and must return to their former
position or similar position.
In part Mr. Stansberry's application letter stated:
I would like to make formal application for a
Sabbatical Leave during the 1982-83 school year.
If this application is accepted, I intend to pursue
either an MA or MFA degree in English, concentrat-
ing in Creative Writing.
In a December 1981 School Board meeting, Mr. Stansberry's
application was approved. The School Board minutes provided:
The Board next took under consideration the
written request from Mr. Aaron Stansberry for
Sabbatical Leave during the 1982-83 school year.
He stated that his intent is to persue [sic] either
a MA or MFA in English, concentrating in Creative
Writing. A letter accompanied this request which
was signed by Mrs. Penny Nelson, Mr. William
Gilman, High School Principal, and Mr. Michael
Thompson, High School English Instructor recom-
mending that Mr. Stansberry's Sabbatical Leave
request be approved. A motion was made by Listerud
and seconded by Hansen that the Board approve
granting a request that Mr. Stansberry have Sabbat-
ical Leave during the 1982-83 school year. A vote
was taken and the motion carried.
In April 1982, Mr. Stansberry was informed by the Uni-
versity of Montana English Department that he had not been
accepted to the graduate program. The above facts are all
undisputed. The parties dispute what occurred at a May 18,
1982, meeting between Mr. Stansberry and District Superinten-
dent Robert Kinna.
Mr. Stansberry testified that he met with Mr. Kinna,
informed him that his application for graduate school had
been denied, and asked him what he should do. Mr. Stansberry
further testified that Mr. Kinna responded by saying that it
was fine to "continue with my sabbatical leave" and that "the
purpose of the sabbatical leave was for a teacher to recharge
his or her batteries." Mr. Kinna testified that he did not
make the above statements and that he was not informed by Mr.
Stansberry that he had not been accepted to the graduate
program. Mr. Kinna stated they had talked about sabbatical
leave fringe benefits and salary.
In August 1982, Mr. Stansberry wrote Mr. Kinna and
stated: " . .. I didn't attend the university this summer;
therefore, I won't be advancing an additional step on the pay
scale." The purpose of this letter was to confirm the School
District's records on Mr. Stansberry's current level of
teacher education. The letter would not have placed the
School District on notice that Mr. Stansberry would not be
attending graduate school because the letter was only to
inform the District which salary level to use in computing
Mr. Stansberry's salary during his sabbatical year. Had Mr.
Stansberry completed the summer school course he would have
been entitled to a small pay increase.
In February 1983, Mr. Kinna wrote Mr. Stansberry and
requested documentation that he had pursued the intent of his
sabbatical leave. On March 11, 1983, Mr. Stansberry wrote to
Mr. Kinna and stated:
I have instructed the Registrar at the Univer-
sity of Montana to send you a transcript of my work
last quarter. Originally I moved to Helena to
attend several classes at Carroll College, but my
pocketbook couldn't afford $98 per credit, so I
have been working at a variety of jobs. However, I
do plan to take several more classes before return-
ing to Wolf Point. As I remember a person on a
sabbatical leave can do three things: 1) return to
school; 2) travel; and 3) work at a job related to
his teaching field.
Well, I have returned to school. Also I've
traveled: Mexico, Texas, Colorado, Utah and West-
ern Montana. Currently I'm working as a tutor in
English, Social Studies and Math. I also work at
outside sales and public relations.
I hope this outline of my leave is
satisfactory.
The previous quarters' work Mr. Stansberry referred to was a
six-credit, graduate non-degree course which could not be
applied to his MA or MFA. The School Trustees, the County
Superintendent, and the State Superintendent all maintain
that this was the first indication they had that Mr.
Stansberry had not attended graduate school during his leave.
In a letter dated March 15, 1983, Mr. Kinna informed Mr.
Stansberry that:
At a regular March 14, 1983, School Board meeting,
the Trustees voted unanimously to terminate your
teaching services for the 1983-84 school year.
After reviewing the reason for granting your sab-
batical leave and comparing it to your letter of
March 11, 1983, no other decision could be reached.
In a follow up letter regarding the reasons for the termina-
tion of his teaching services, Mr. Kinna stated that " [t]he
stated reason for the sabbatical leave was in no way honored
by Mr. Stansberry."
Mr. Stansberry appealed the School Trustees' decision to
the County Superintendent of Schools, who affirmed the School
Board. He then appealed to the State Superintendent of
Public Instruction, who also affirmed the School Trustees.
He then appealed the matter to the District Court which first
remanded for additional fact gathering and then reversed the
School Trustees, the County Superintendent, and the State
Superintendent, and directed them to offer Mr. Stansberry a
contract as a tenured teacher. The School Trustees appealed
that decision to this Court. Mr. Stansberry cross-appealed
requesting back pay and fringe benefits which the District
Court did not award him.
I
Did the District Court err in reversing the decisions of
the School Trustees, the County Superintendent, and the State
Superintendent and directing that Mr. Stansberry be offered a
contract?
A recent Montana case provides us with precedent which
gives us guidance on this issue. In Yanzick v. School Dis-
trict No. 23, Lake County Montana (1982), 196 Mont. 375, 641
P.2d 431, a tenured school teacher's contract was not renewed
because he had allegedly demonstrated a lack of fitness by:
(1) cohabitating with a female teacher; (2) using human
fetuses in the classroom when discussing abortion; and (3)
making statements to his classroom regarding his living
arrangements with the teacher and the subject of abortion.
The opinion pointed out that the record must show good cause
for the termination of a teacher's tenure and that in addi-
tion the conduct of the teacher, including a characterization
that it is immoral, must be such as to directly affect the
performance by the teacher of his duties as a teacher.
The Yanzick court's reversal of the District Court
upheld the nonrenewal of the teacher's contract. The Court
held that the District Court and the Supreme Court may re-
verse the previous decision only if substantial rights of the
teacher were prejudiced because the administrative findings
and conclusions were:
. . . clearly erroneous in view of the reliable,
probative and substantive evidence on the whole
record.
Yanzick, 644 P.2d at 439 (citing SS 2-4-704 and 711, MCA.)
In comparing the powers of the school district to termi-
nate a teacher and the rights of a tenured teacher, the
Yanzick court stated:
While it is true that the trustees of a school
district do have the power and duty to both employ
a teacher and terminate a teacher under the appro-
priate circumstances, the rights of the teachers
must also be kept constantly in mind. The tenure
- a teacher is clearly both a valuable and a
of
substantial right which cannot be-taken away excepF
for good cause. (Emphasis added.)
Yanzick, 644 P.2d at 440. Therefore, the question before the
County Superintendent, the State Superintendent, and the
District Court was whether the school trustees had "good
cause" not to renew Mr. Stansberry's contract keeping in mind
that Mr. Stansberry's tenure was a substantial and valuable
right which could only be taken away for good cause.
The District Court found that "the administrative find-
ings and conclusions of both the County Superintendent and of
the State Superintendent 'were clearly erroneous in view of
the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence on the
whole record. ' " Thus, there are two questions that this
Court must answer in addressing this issue. First, did the
District Court err in finding that the County Superinten-
dent's findings were clearly erroneous in view of the reli-
able, probative, and substantial evidence on the whole
record? Second, did the District Court err in reversing the
decisions of the County Superintendent and the State Superin-
tendent based on an error of law?
It is well established that the District Court may not
substitute its judgment for that of the County Superintendent
as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact.
Yanzick, 644 P.2d at 438. In this case the District Court
remanded to the County Superintendent for additional findings
of fact on two questions -- whether the May 18, 1982, meeting
between Mr. Stansberry and Mr. Kinna put the School District
on notice that Mr. Stansberry had not been accepted to gradu-
ate school and whether the August 18, 1982, letter placed the
School District on notice that Mr. Stansberry was not plan-
ning to attend graduate school. After remand to the County
Superintendent, both of these issues were specifically found
in favor of the School District. These determinations were
then apparently reversed by the District Court.
The primary factual controversy in this case concerns
what was said during the May 18th meeting between Mr.
Stansberry and Mr. Kinna. The County Superintendent found
that Mr. Stansberry had failed to inform Mr. Kinna at the May
18th meeting that he had not been accepted to graduate
school. In making that determination, the County Superinten-
dent had the opportunity to listen to and observe the demean-
or, conduct, and testimony of the witnesses. Testimony was
given on both sides of the controversy and the County Super-
intendent found for the School District. We conclude that
the District Court erred in substituting its judgment for
that of the County Superintendent. As was stated in another
administrative case:
If there is substantial credible evidence on the
record, the findings are not "clearly erroneous." .
.. If the record contains support for the factual
determinations made by the agency, the courts may
not weigh the evidence. They are bound by the
findings of the agency.
City of Billings v. Billings Firefighters (1982), 200 Mont.
421, 431, 651 P.2d 627, 632.
Substantial credible evidence supports the factual
determinations made by the County Superintendent. Therefore,
the District Court was bound by the County Superintendent's
findings. We conclude that the findings of the County Super-
intendent and State Superintendent were not clearly erroneous
in view of the reliable, probative and substantial evidence
and therefore reverse the District Court in its conclusion
that such administrative findings were clearly erroneous.
The County Superintendent found that the August 18,
1982, letter from Mr. Stansberry to Mr. Kinna did not place
the School District on notice that Mr. Stansberry was not
planning to attend graduate school. The District Court did
not specifically reverse this holding, but indicated the
letter may have been notice to the School District that Mr.
Stansberry was not planning on attending graduate school.
Once again, we affirm the County Superintendent's decision
that the letter was not such notice. Substantial credible
evidence in the record supports that determination.
The second question is whether the District Court erred
in reversing the decisions of the County Superintendent and
the State Superintendent based on an error of law. Section
2-4-704(2), MCA, provides in pertinent part:
The Court may reverse or modify the decision if
substantial rights of the appellant have been
prejudiced because the administrative findings,
inferences, conclusions, or decisions are:
(d) affected by other error of law.
The District Court concluded that the County and State
Superintendents erroneously referred to S 20-4-207, MCA,
instead of the proper statute, S 20-4-204, MCA, and that Mr.
Stansberry's conduct did not constitute "good cause" for
termination of his job. The District Court was correct in
concluding that the County and State Superintendents errone-
ously referred to S 20-4-207, MCA. Section 20-4-207, MCA,
only applies to the dismissal of a teacher before the expira-
tion of his or her contract. That statute is inapplicable to
Mr. Stansberry's case because his contract was simply not
renewed, as opposed to a dismissal during the contract term.
Yanzick held:
We hold that section 20-4-207, MCA, which sets
forth the grounds upon whch the trustees may dis-
miss a teacher before the expiration of his employ-
ment contracat is not applicable to the termination
of the services of a tenure teacher under the
provisions of Section 20-4-203 and 20-4-204, MCA.
Yanzick, 641 P.2d at 441.
In his first order, the County Superintendent concluded:
5. Petitioner was properly given reasons for
his termination and was granted a hearing pursuant
to section 20-4-204, MCA.
6. Good cause existed for the termination of
Petitioner and the Wolf Point Board of Trustees
acted properly within their discretion.
ORDER
On the basis of the foregoing Findings of Fact
and Conclusion of Law the Hearing Officer finds
that good cause existed for the termination of
Petitioner.
The State Superintendent's first order stated that " [t]here
was good and just cause for his termination." Up to this
point, the County and State Superintendents correctly applied
the law. However, the State and County Superintendents then
confused the issue and erred by referring to $ 20-4-207, MCA,
the violation of "adopted policies", and Mr. Stansberry's
purported dismissal before the expiration of his employment
contract. For instance, the State Superintendent stated in
his second order:
14. That Petitioner did violate Wolf Point
School Board's policy on sabbatical leave when he
did not pursue his sabbatical as outlined in his
letter of October 18, 1981 and when he did not
notify the school board of his change in plans and
goals for his sabbatical leave.
15. That Petitioner was properly dismissed
before expiration of his employment contract for
violation of the adopted policies of the school
board.
18. There is sufficient evidence in the record
to support a finding that there was a violation of
adopted board policy and that such violation is
cause for dismissal under contract pursuant to
Section 20-4-207, MCA, and within the prerogatives
of the Board of Trustees of Roosevelt County High
School District No. 45A.
Although these references were made in error, we con-
clude this does not constitute reversible error. Mr.
Stansberry's substantial rights were not prejudiced as a
result of the erroneous references. Mr. Stansberry was put
on notice of the reasons for nonrenewal from the day he was
informed his contract was not being renewed. The procedure
followed by both the Board of Trustees and the County Super-
intendent followed the provision of $ 20-4-204, MCA. In
addition, in the original orders, both the County Superinten-
dent and the State Superintendent correctly referred to
5 20-4-204, MCA, and the good cause standard. We conclude
that the erroneous reference to 5 20-4-207, MCA, in the
subsequent orders did not prejudice Mr. Stansberry and does
not constitute reversible error.
We will next turn to the "good cause" standard and its
application to Mr. Stansberry's contract nonrenewal. In
Yanzick, the good cause standard was premised on whether the
teacher's conduct directly affected his duties as a teacher.
Yanzick, 641 P.2d at 441. No contention is made in the
present case that the conduct of Mr. Stansberry directly
affected his duties as a teacher. The question is of course
not related to his conduct in the classroom as was true in
Yanzick. Nonetheless, based on Yanzick we conclude that good
cause must be shown in order to terminate Mr. Stansberry's
contract because he was a tenured teacher.
We conclude that the breach of an agreement between a
teacher and the School Trustees may constitute good cause for
nonrenewal of the teacher's contract. The statutes do not
give any specific guidance on what constitutes good cause
under these circumstances. Each case therefore must be
considered on its own facts to determine whether or not good
cause has been established.
We conclude that the findings of fact establish an
agreement between Mr. Stansberry and the School Trustees
under which Mr. Stansberry would study toward an MA or MFA
and improve his teaching qualifications in return for the
sabbatical leave. Under the Professional Policies Agreement
Mr. Stansberry was to be awarded 50 percent of his annual
base salary which was to be paid upon completion of the
granted sabbatical leave and upon beginning to teach in the
system in the school year following his absence. The find-
ings of fact establish there was no modification of that
agreement.
The Professional Policies Agreement establishes that a
sabbatical leave may be granted by the School Trustees upon
application approval by the Teachers' Association and the
school system to "engage in full time study, travel, re-
search, work experience or other professionally advantageous
activity.'l Here Mr. Stansberry was found to have applied by
a letter in which he stated that if accepted he intended to
pursue either an MA or an MFA in English, concentrating in
creative writing. The correct application procedure was
followed in this case.
Clearly an agreement under which Mr. Stansberry, an
English teacher, would gain credits towards an MA or an MFA
would be a professionally advantageous activity so far as the
School Trustees are concerned. Clearly a significant or
substantial benefit would result from compliance with the
agreement. The failure of Mr. Stansberry to comply with that
agreement therefore eliminated a substantial benefit to the
School Trustees. Based upon the wording of the Professional
Policies Agreement, we may properly conclude the benefit to
the School Trustees was the primary reason for the approval
of the sabbatical leave. In doing so, we note that this is
the first teacher in the Wolf Point system to have been
granted such a sabbatical leave. The breach of the agreement
by Mr. Stansberry deprived the school district of an essen-
tial part of the bargain which it had made in the agreement.
We conclude that the breach of an agreement which resulted in
such a deprivation of benefit to the school district consti-
tuted good cause for nonrenewal of his contract.
We agree with the findings of fact and conclusions of
law made by the County Superintendent in his original order:
FINDINGS OF FACT
3. Petitioner applied for Sabbatical Leave on
October 18, 1981 to "pursue either a MA or MFA
degree in English, concentrating in Creative Writ-
ing". Source: Joint Exhibit 1.
4. The school board voted to grant Petition-
er's leave based on the representation that he
would pursue a graduate degree. Source: Bartel
testimony; Respondent's Exhibit 3.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
2. Petitioner violated his agreement with the
School Board when he failed to pursue the full
course of study that was the basis for his leave.
3. Petitioner violated Wolf Point School Board
Policy when he failed to pursue the full course of
study that was the basis for his leave.
4. By failing to attend graduate school and
pursue either a MA or MFA in English Petitioner
violated his professional responsibilities as a
teacher.
5. Petitioner was properly given reasons for
his termination and was granted a hearing pursuant
to section 20-4-204, MCA.
6. Good cause existed for the termination of
Petitioner and the Wolf Point Board of Trustees
acted properly within their discretion.
Based upon these facts, we affirm the conclusion reached
by the County Superintendent that good cause existed for
refusal to renew Mr. Stansberry's contract. Accordingly, we
reverse the District Court.
Did the District Court err by not directing the School
Board to pay Mr. Stansberry back pay and retroactive fringe
benefits?
We need not address this issue since we have reversed
the District Court in effect reinstating the County Superin-
tendent's decision that Mr. Stansberry should not be offered
a contract as a tenured teacher.
We reverse the District Court, and affirm the decision
of the State Superintendent that Mr. Stansberry's nonrenewal
We Concur: ./
.
Justices
Mr. Justice John C. Sheehy, dissenting:
I dissent from the wrongful refusal to renew the
teaching contract of this tenure teacher.
Under our statutes teachers are accorded a good many
powers and responsibilities, and some substantial rights.
Foremost among the rights, and perhaps the most cherished, is
the right of tenure. First granted, as far as my research
goes, in 1913 (Section 801, Chapter 76, Laws of 1913), for
nearly 75 years it is a right that has been continuously
reenacted, fiercely guarded by the teachers, and protected by
this Court:
A teacher's tenure is a substantial, valuable and
beneficial right which cannot be taken away except
for good cause. State ex rel. Saxtorph v. District
Court (1954), 128 Mont. 352, 275 P.2d 209.
Though the original enactment provided tenure to a
teacher upon the second annual teaching contract, S 20-4-203,
MCA, its effect at the time that the matters related to this
action took place was that whenever a teacher "has been
elected by the offer and acceptance of a contract for the
fourth consecutive year of employment by a district" the
teacher became a "tenure teacher" (not "tenured teacher";
legislators and perhaps educators feel no compunction in
using a noun for an adjective.)
Under the statutes prevailing and applicable here, S
20-4-204, MCA, provided that if the trustees of a school
district resolved not to reelect a teacher for a coming
teaching year, the district had to notify the teacher of the
termination in writing before April 1 of the last contract
year. The statute did not state reasons upon which such lack
of reelection might be based. However this Court inserted
the requirement of "good cause" in Saxtorph, supra and we
reaffirmed that position in Yanzick v. School District No.
23, Lake County, Montana (1982), 196 Mont. 375, 641 ~ . 2 d431.
The majority have cited Yanzick at several points, but
they have neglected a critical part of that decision in
Yanzick, where we said:
In view of our reversal of the District Court, it
is necessary that we review the record in some
detail. We have already indicated that the record
must show good cause for the termination of the
teacher's tenure. In addition, the conduct - -
of the
teacher, including a characterization - -it is
that
immoral, must be such- to directly affect the
- - - - as
erformance by the teacher - - duties - -
of his of a
feacher. (Emphasis supplied.)
196 Mont. 392; 641 P.2d 441.
Nothing in the record before us, the same record that
was before the County Superintendent, the State
Superintendent, and the District Court, indicates that the
ability of Stansberry to teach was affected in the slightest
degree by the brouhaha arising out of the sabbatical leave.
District Judge Henry Loble determined that we had set out in
Yanzick a true test for the non-reelection of a tenure
teacher for cause, and ruled accordingly.
More than that, District Judge Loble made a fact finding
in this case which is clearly correct, and as such is binding
on us. (Rule 52 (a), M.R.Civ.P.) The District Court sat in
review of proceedings before the County Superintendent and
then the State Superintendent of Education. As such he was
bound by the standards of review in § 2-4-704. He obviously
determined that he should reverse the decision of the State
Superintendent and of the County Superintendent because their
administrative findings and conclusions were clearly
erroneous in view of the reliable, probative substantial
evidence on the whole record, and arbitrary and capricious.
The District Court determined that the County
Superintendent and the State Superintendent had proceeded in
terminating Stansberry as a tenure teacher under the wrong
statute. They had utilized the provisions of S 20-4-207,
MCA, which applies only to the termination of a tenure
teacher during - contract year, and not the statute
the
applying to the reelection of a teacher for the coming year.
Incorrectly relying on 20-4-207, the administrators had
determined that Stansberry's contract should not be renewed
for "violation of the adopted policies" of the school
district. There was no such adopted policy.
Another factual dispute involved whether Stansberry had
informed Superintendent Kinna on May 18, 1982 that his
application for graduate study at the University of Montana
had been rejected. Stansberry wanted to know from Kinna if
he was to "stick around for the following year or just what I
should do." Stansberry said that Kinna's response was "fine,
to continue with his sabbatical leave and that the purpose of
a sabbatical leave was for a teacher to recharge his or her
batteries." In examining the record, the District Court
found that the Superintendent was uncertain as to what was
said at the May 18 meeting, that the Superintendent could not
recall making the statements attributed to him by the
petitioner and that Kinna did not deny that he had made the
statements, although if he had he probably would recall it.
The District Court felt that this point was important to
be resolved by a more specific finding and remanded the cause
to the County Superintendent for a further determination as
to what was actually said at the meeting of May 18. The
County Superintendent convened another hearing on this point
and then, two years later, Superintendent Kinna's memory
became crystal clear. He denied the statements.
On August 18, 1982, Stansberry wrote superintendent
Kinna to give him his current address in Missoula and to
advise him "I didn't attend the University this summer;
therefore I won't be advancing an additional step on the pay
scale." Stansberry also said, "It has been a good summer.
Besides attending my 20th year high school reunion, I
recently returned from a trip to Mexico."
Kinna and the school district and now this Court
determined that this letter did not sufficiently advise them
that Stansberry was not pursuing a Master's or other degree
on his sabbatical. It is difficult to see what other
conclusions could be drawn from the letter.
The findings of the District Court should be agreed to
by this Court. On the whole record, the District Court was
correct:
Stansberry, apparently believing he had the
permission of Superintendent Kinna after he had
been advised that he wasn't accepted to graduate
school, went ahead with his sabbatical leave and
did accomplish some of the requirements of
sabbatical leave as set forth in the Professional
Policies Agreement of the Board and the Union which
represents the teachers. He engaged in study as a
student at the University of Montana; he read some
worthwhile books; he traveled; he worked; he took a
six-credit course at the University of Montana; and
he engaged in other professionally advantageous
activity, such as being a tutor to junior high
school students. The conduct for which he was
terminated did not rise to the seriousness of "good
cause" which must be shown before he could be
refused employment as a tenured teacher. It should
be kept in mind that he has not only lost his job,
but that his professional career is placed in
serious jeopardy.
In determining that the County Superintendent and the
State Superintendent were clearly erroneous in view of the
whole record, the District Court found:
... The County Superintendent and the State
Superintendent proceeded under the wrong statute
after remand. Both before and after remand they
made a finding concerning a violation of "adopted
policies" which was properly considered only under
a statute that has no relation to the present
proceeding. The conduct of Petitioner Stansberry
did not rise to the level of "good cause" for which
the School Board might lawfully terminate his
status as a tenured teacher. The School Board in
this instance had never granted a sabbatical leave
before. Except as might be stated in the
Professional Policies Agreement, there was no
"adopted policy" of the Trustees as concerns
sabbatical leave.. ..
Thus we have in this case a situation where the County
Superintendent and the State Superintendent found that
Stansberry had breached the adopted policies of the board,
policies which did not exist. The majority here have
resorted to a different ground, a "breach of an agreement
between the teacher and a school trustee" where no such
agreement existed. The only agreement existing between this
teacher and the school district is that formed by his union,
agreed to by the District, which provides that in sabbatical
leave, a teacher may return to school, travel, or work at a
job relating to his teaching field.
The principle of tenure for teachers deserves a higher
interpretation of good cause than is advanced here. I would
affirm the District Court. Because of the majority opinion I
do not discuss the cross-appeal of the teacher.
I concur in the foregoing dissent: b'