No. 8 6 - 5 6 1
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
1987
IN THE MATTER OF THE MENTAL
HEALTH OF R.J.W., Respondent.
APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Seventh Judicial District,
In and for the County of McCone,
The Honorable R.C. McDonough, Judge presiding.
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For Appellant:
Allen Smith, Jr., Warm Springs, Montana
For Respondent:
Hon. Mike Greely, Attorney General, Helena, Montana
George Schunk, Asst. Atty. General, Helena, Montana
Arnie A. Hove, County Attorney, Circle, Montana
Submitted on Briefs: Feb. 5, 1 9 8 7
Decided: April 16, 1987
#
he4&, Clerk
Mr. Justice William E. Hunt, Sr. delivered the Opinion of the
Court.
RJW appeals an order from the Seventh Judicial District
Court ordering his involuntary commitment to the Montana
State Hospital.
We affirm the commitment.
The issues on appeal are:
1. Whether there is sufficient evidence to support the
finding of the District Court that appellant is seriously
mentally ill.
2. Whether the District Court's findings are adequate
under S 53-21-127 (2) (c), MCA.
Criminal proceedings were initiated in McCone County
alleging RJW committed aggravated assault and carried a
concealed weapon. The incident precipitating these charges
occurred on May 11, 1986. The appellant, RJW, was walking
down a street in Circle, Montana, when he was approached by
his landlord, James Rau, and his landlord's wife, Eileen Rau,
in their pick-up truck. James Rau made an adamant demand for
overdue rent money and an argument ensued. The appellant
attempted to unbutton his coat to show his landlord that he
had a weapon. The weapon RJW was carrying under his coat is
disputed. RJW testified at his commitment hearing that it
was a Bowie knife or a "folding knife." The information
filed by the county attorney charged that RJW was carrying a
pistol underneath his coat which he reached for, causing
reasonable apprehension of bodily injury in James Rau and
Eileen Rau. RJW was charged and arrested at his home later
that day.
On motion of the county attorney, a psychiatric
evaluation was conducted on the appellant at the Montana
State Hospital. A report summarizing that evaluation was
completed by Dr. John Van Hassel. That report, dated July
29, 1986, concluded:
In summary, it is the staff Is opinion that the
patient does suffer from a mental disease or
defect, namely chronic paranoid schizophrenia. As
a result of this disorder, it is the staff's
opinion that he does not have the capacity to
understand the proceedings against him nor to
assist in his own defense. Further, the staff
believes that it is unlikely that he is capable of
having a particular state of mind which is an
element of the offense charged. That is, he is
considered incapable of acting with knowledge and
purpose because of the mental disorder.
The diagnosis reached by Dr. Van Hassel was based in
part on psychological observations contained in his report.
Following receipt of the report by the District Court,
the county attorney petitioned that appellant be declared
seriously mentally ill within the definition of 5
53-21-102 (4), MCA, and the criminal charges were dismissed.
A hearing on the petition was held on August 14, 1986.
Dr. John Van Hassel, McCone County Sheriff Robert Jensen and
RJW testified. The report of Dr. Van Hassel was admitted
into evidence.
Dr. Van Hassel, a clinical psychologist at the Montana
State Hospital and licensed professional person, testified
that RJW was suffering from a mental disorder, chronic
paranoid schizophrenia, which "is characterized not so much
\, by general deterioration of his thought processes, but is
5
characterized by a very elaborate and pronounced delusional
system. " Dr. Van Hassel expressed his opinion that RJW was
an imminent threat to others, particularly persons who
challenge his alleged delusion about a trust fund. Dr. Van
Hassel testified that RJW becomes angry and verbally hostile
when his delusion is challenged. Dr. Van Hassel further
testified that RJW had not made "a specific threat to harm
anyone. "
Robert Jensen, McCone County Sheriff, also testified at
the hearing. He testified that he had served eviction papers
to RJW and that RJW had a revolver in his possession when he
was arrested at his home on the criminal charges. Sheriff
Jensen further testified that RJW had made no specific
threats against anyone on either of the above occasions.
Upon the conclusion of Sheriff Jensen's testimony, the
District Court denied. RJTJ's motion to dismiss the petition.
RJW then testified on his own behalf.
He testified that he had not threatened any person.
When questioned as to whether he would harm someone who lied
to him about his finances, he replied that he would raise his
voice and call the person a liar.
When questioned about the incident that precipitated his
arrest, RJW testified that he did not have a gun with him.
He testified that he had a knife on his belt, but that he had
not threatened the landlord with it, and that he had in fact
stepped back away from the landlord's truck because the
conflict was escalating. When asked to clarify his response
to a hypothetical question about whether he would harm
someone, RJW testified that the person "would have to be, you
know, confronting me and be specific about it."
The court questioned RJW extensively about the existence
of his alleged trust fund and ranch. The court learned that
the appellant had previously accused his brother of
attempting to poison him with rattlesnake venom contained in
a sealed beer can, that one revolver had been taken away from
him while he was living in Texas, and that the appellant had
purchased another pistol after he allegedly had a beer spiked
with drugs or poison.
The court concluded that RJW was seriously mentally ill
and posed an imminent threat to himself and others. The
appellant was involuntarily committed to the Montana State
Hospital following a discussion of less restrictive
alternatives.
RJW appeals this involuntary commitment order. He
argues that the testimony shows that while he may have become
angry and verbally hostile he did not commit overt acts which
harmed anyone. RJW claims that when asked specific questions
pertaining to specific persons and incidents, his testimony
shows no evidence of threats or attempts to harm thus no
overt acts occurred as required for a finding of serious
mental illness.
Appellant claims there simply was not sufficient
evidence to support a finding that he was seriously mentally
ill as defined in 5 53-21-102, MCA.
Section 53-21-102 (14), MCA, defines "seriously mentally
ill" to mean a person is suffering from a mental disorder
which has resulted in self-inflicted injury or injury to
others or the imminent threat thereof or which has deprived
the person afflicted of the ability to protect his life and
health.
Specifically, in order to commit someone, the State must
prove :
(a) the respondent is suffering from a mental
disorder; and
(b) the mental disorder has resulted in
self-inflicted injury or injury to others or the
imminent threat thereof or has deprived the person
afflicted of the ability to protect his life or
health.
Section 53-21-126 (41, MCA.
Upon review this Court must evaluate whether these
statutory standards were met by the State as found by the
District Court.
RJW concedes that he suffers from a mental disorder
under 5 53-21-126(4)(a), MCA, but he argues the State did not
produce adequate evidence that one of the three possible
statutory criteria resulted because of the mental disorder.
The standard of proof is set forth in $ 53-21-126(2),
MCA.
The standard of proof in any hearing held pursuant
to this section is proof beyond a reasonable doubt
with respect to any physical facts or evidence and
clear and convincing evidence as to all other
matters, except that mental disorders shall be
evidenced to a reasonable medical certainty.
Imminent threat of self-inflicted injury or injury
to others shall be evidenced by overt acts,
sufficiently recent in time as to be material and
relevant as to the respondent's present condition.
On appeal this Court will look to the sufficiency of the
evidence in reviewing this civil proceeding and will view the
evidence in a light most favorable to the prevailing party.
Lima School District No. 12 and Elementary School District of
Beaverhead County v. Simonsen (Mont. 1984), 683 P.2d 471, 41
We note that
... the law does not require proof beyond a
reasonable doubt that an injury will occur in the
future ... The law requires only proof beyond a
reasonable doubt that the threat of future injury
presently exists and that the threat is imminent
...
Matter of F.B. (Mont. 1980), 615 P.2d 867, 869, 37 St.Rep.
1442, 1445.
A careful review of the record indicates there was
sufficient evidence on which the lower court could base a
finding of serious mental illness. Among other evidence, the
psychologist's report and defendant's own testimony are very
revealing. The statute does not require a court wait until a
person such as RJW takes the next step in a paranoid
delusional scheme of reality and actually uses weapons owned
by him against others.
The trial court had the benefit of observing the
demeanor and weighing the credibility of all the witnesses at
the hearing. Since sufficient evidence existed on the
record, this Court will defer to the decision of the District
Court on this issue and uphold the finding that RJW is
seriously mentally ill.
Appellant next contends that the District Court erred by
not entering into the record a detailed statement of the
facts upon which it found the appellant to be seriously
mentally ill.
The statute governing civil commitment states that
"[tlhe court shall enter into the record a detailed statement
of the facts upon which it found the respondent to be
seriously mentally ill. " Section 53-21-127 (2) (c), MCA. The
Montana Rules of Civil Procedure state that "the court shall
find the facts specially" by oral statement and recording
thereof in open court or by adopting the proposed findings of
any party. Rule 52(a), M.R.Civ.P.
In this case the court found that "the respondent is
seriously mentally ill and is an eminent (sic) threat to
himself and especially others." The findings of fact signed
by the District Court state I1[t]hat based upon the testimony
and the reports and pleadings on file [RJW] is seriously
mentally ill."
We do not believe this finding was a detailed statement
of the facts as contemplated by $ 53-21-127 (2) (c), MCA. No
particular testimony or facts were referenced. Even though
the transcript indicated the mental disorder resulted in
imminent threat to appellant and others, the findings of fact
failed to indicate which particular portion of §
5 3 - 2 1 - 1 2 6 ( 4 ) (b) was relied on for its determination of
"seriously mentally ill."
Given the detail in the record as a whole, we find that
this was harmless to appellant under the facts here. Future
findings of fact should more carefully detail the factual
basis on which a finding of serious mental illness is
premised. /
The decision of the District
We Concur: /9'
e A~TL
Chief
Justice
/@p%1
' Justices /'