No. 87-272
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
1988
CHARLOTTE JOHNSON; ROBERT E. JOHNSON;
0. PRISCILLA JOHNSON; T. OTTO JOHNSON;
KARLA D. JOHNSON; JACQUELENE J.LAMBERT;
and EVERETT E. LAMBERT,
Plaintiffs and Respondents,
THE ESTATE OF WM. A. SHELTON, Deceased;
THE ESTATE OF LAURA E. SHELTON, Deceased;
ALLEN B. SHELTON; ALLEN B. SHELTON, Trustee;
THE ESTATE OF ALLEN B. SHELTON, Deceased;
RUTH 0 SHELTON; ROBERT M. GRAVES; VERA
.
SHELTON GRAVES, a/k/a VERA L. SCHNASE; COUNTY
OF LEWIS AND CLARK, a political subdivision
of the State of Montana; COUNTY TREASURER OF
LEWIS AND CLARK COUNTY; DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE,
an administrative agency of the State of
Montana, and its Director, JOHN LaFAVER, et al,
Defendants and Appellants.
APPEAL FROM: District Court of the First Judicial District
In and for the County of Lewis and Clark
The Honorable Thomas C. Honzel, Judge presiding.
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For Appellant:
J. Brian Tierney, Butte, Montana
For Respondent:
Michael J. Rieley; Luxan and Murfitt, Helena, Montana
Submitted on Briefs: March 24, 1988
Clerk
Mr. Justice John Conway Harrison delivered the Opinion of the
Court.
The plaintiff, Mrs. Charlotte Johnson, has brought an
action in equity to quiet title to 320 acres of land located
in Lewis and Clark County, near East Helena, Montana. The
only defendant contesting the quiet title action is Mrs. Vera
Shelton Graves, Mrs. Johnson's first cousin, who asserts that
the property is rightfully hers under the wills of William
and Laura Shelton, the grandparents of both women as well as
the adoptive parents of Mrs. Graves.
The Sheltons died in 1926 and 1927. This present
dispute centers on their wills, which devise an undivided
one-half interest in 320 acres of property in Lewis and Clark
County, Montana, and 23 acres of property in Walla Walla
County, Washington, to Allen B. Shelton, the son of the
testators and uncle to the parties here. Allen B. Shelton
was qualified and served as trustee under the will. The will
directed that if Allen B. Shelton died without issue of his
body, as he did in 1967, and Mrs. Graves survived him, the
property of the trust would pass to Mrs. Graves.
Subsequently, if Mrs. Graves also died without issue of her
body, the will directed that the property of the trust would
pass to the children of Alma Shelton Foster and C.U. Foster.
Mrs. Johnson is the sole surviving child of Alma and C.U.
Foster. The record reveals that Mrs. Graves is 71 years old,
widowed, and has no living natural children, thus making it
unlikely that she would have issue of her body at the time of
her death. It is noted, however, that she adopted a
65-year-old man as her son in 1986.
Mrs. Graves argues to this Court that the second
contingent limitation on the trust property, which would pass
the property to Mrs. Johnson if Mrs. Graves dies without
issue, is void under 70-15-205, MCA, vesting the trust
property in Mrs. Graves. Mrs. Johnson, the plaintiff, argues
that a contest over the construction of the Shelton wills is
inappropriate 60 years after the Shelton deaths and also that
Mrs. Graves' rendering of a quitclaim deed on the Montana
property is conclusive.
In 1976, Mrs. Graves decided to sell a piece of
property called the "Snake River Property," which Allen
Shelton had acquired during his lifetime. However, before
she could sell the property for $235,000 her attorney advised
her to get the signatures of Mrs. Johnson and Mrs. Johnson's
brother, Allen Foster, since deceased, because they had a
contingent interest in the Shelton estate. Mrs. Graves
pocketed $150,000 from the sale, Mrs. Johnson and her brother
received $42,500 each.
Mrs. Graves and Mrs. Johnson decided in 1977 to divide
up the Shelton estate. Mrs. Johnson, who had been living
near the Montana property, offered to Mrs. Graves a quitclaim
deed on the 23 acres in Washington in consideration of "clear
title." Likewise, Mrs. Graves gave Mrs. Johnson a quitclaim
deed on the 320 acres in Montana. Mrs. Johnson recorded that
deed and has since considered the Montana property to be hers
even though tax notices identify the property as belonging to
the William Shelton estate. Mrs. Johnson has paid all taxes
on the property and deeded portions of it to her children.
The District Court of the First Judicial District,
having considered these factors, entered summary judgment in
favor of Mrs. Johnson. Mrs. Graves appeals and argues that
the District Court erred:
-by disregarding Mrs. Graves' alleged full fee simple
absolute in the Montana property;
-by ruling there had been no mistake of fact or of law
in the exchange of quitclaim deeds;
-by ruling that there was valid consideration for the
exchange of quitclaim deeds; and
-by dismissing Mrs. Graves' counterclaim as barred by
laches.
We affirm the District Court's judgment.
We note first that in actions in equity, this Court
will accept the findings of the District Court unless there
is a "decided preponderance of the evidence against them,"
and that where issues of fact are close, we defer to the
District Court because it is in a better position to
determine the facts. Peterson v. Taylor (Mont. 1987), 735
P.2d 1120, 1122, 44 St.Rep. 754, 756, citing Dahlberg v.
Lannen (1929), 84 Mont. 68, 77, 274 P. 151, 153; and Rase v.
Castle Mountain Ranch, Inc. (Mont. 1981), 631 P.2d 680, 684,
38 St.Rep. 992, 996. The basis underlying summary judgment
in a quiet title action is similar to that elsewhere:
summary judgment is proper when there are no genuine issues
of material fact. Benson v. Diehl (Mont. 1987), 745 P.2d
315, 316, 44 St.Rep. 1455, 1456, citing Rule 56 M.R.Civ.P.
Mrs. Graves has argued throughout this case that the
wills of her grandparents/adoptive parents devised the trust
property unto her. The District Court, however, was correct
when it ruled that Montana courts need not give a
construction to those wills at this late date. The simple
fact is that subsequent to receiving by devise what she now
calls a full fee simple absolute in 320 acres of land in
Montana and 23 acres in Washington, Mrs. Graves offered a
quitclaim deed on the Montana property to Mrs. Johnson in
exchange for Mrs. Johnson's quitclaim deed on the Washington
property. Thus, this dispute does not concern whether Mrs.
Graves had a fee simple absolute in all of the property of
the Shelton estate. If indeed she had a fee simple absolute
in the entire estate, she exercised one of the rights of
ownership by dividing and alienating the Montana property.
If her interest was less than a fee simple absolute, the
exchange of quitclaim deeds indicates that she was
contracting for a fee simple in the Washington property from
the person who held a contingent interest. Instead, this
dispute focuses on whether the exchange of quitclaim deeds
was valid.
Section 70-20-103, MCA, provides sample wording for a
quitclaim deed. The contested quitclaim deed, although using
different wording, remains substantially similar since it
names the grantor and grantee, locates by legal description
the property involved, notes the consideration and is signed
and dated by the grantor. As such, it represents a valid
quitclaim deed, and Mrs. Johnson enjoys conclusive rights in
the property as against anyone other than a purchaser in good
faith for valuable consideration previously recorded. See
$ 70-20-303, MCA. Mrs. Johnson gave up valid consideration
for this quitclaim deed since she relinquished a quitclaim
deed on the Washington property, in which she had a
contingent interest, in order to clear all titles. Section
28-2-801, MCA, defines good consideration, inter alia, as
"[alny prejudice suffered or agreed to be suffered by [a]
person, other than such as he [or she] is at the time of
consent lawfully bound to suffer, as an inducement to the
promisor ... " The relinquishment of a legal right is
sufficient consideration for a contract. Rickett v. Doze
(1979), 184 Mont. 456, 459, 603 P.2d 679, 680. In short,
Mrs. Johnson gave consideration for this exchange when she
surrendered her contingent interest in the Washington
property, which afforded Mrs. Graves a fee simple absolute in
the Washington property.
Mrs. Graves' assertion that she acted under mistaken
belief or due to mistaken legal advice does not overcome the
fact that she chose to surrender a quitclaim deed on the
property. Mrs. Graves was charged with the responsibility of
acquainting herself with the effects of the quitclaim deed
before she signed it since her husband's consultant made out
the deeds. One who executes a written contract is presumed
to know its contents and assent to them; ignorance of the
contents is not grounds for relief from liability. Quinn v.
Briggs (1977), 172 Mont. 468, 476, 565 P.2d 297, 301.
Neither does Mrs. Graves' reliance on her attorney's advice
in a previous land transaction and the advice of her husband
and his consultant on the exchange of quitclaim deeds
represent mistake of law. Mrs. Graves cannot obtain relief
unless she proves ambiguity in the deed, misrepresentation,
bad faith action by Mrs. Johnson, or knowledge on Mrs.
Johnson's part that the transaction was something more than a
mutual exchange of quitclaim deeds. Quinn, 565 P.2d at 301.
She has proven none of these elements.
Finally, we sustain the District Court's decision that
it would be inequitable to allow Mrs. Graves to repudiate
this exchange of quitclaim deeds nine years after the
transaction. The doctrine of laches applies "where there has
been an unexplained delay of such duration or character as to
render the enforcement of an asserted right inequitable."
Clayton v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (Mont. 1986), 717 P.2d 558,
561, 43 St.Rep. 717, 720, quoting Brabender v. it
Manufacturing Co. (1977), 174 Mont. 63, 67-68, 568 P.2d 547,
549. In the present dispute, more than nine years elapsed
from the time of the exchange of quitclaim deeds to I4rs.
Graves' pronouncement in her counterclaim that she still
owned the Montana property by virtue of the Shelton wills.
In that interval Mrs. Johnson had improved on the land and
Mrs. Johnson's grandson had built a home on a portion of the
property she deeded to him.
Where a party is actually or presumptively aware of her
rights but fails to act, laches is appropriate. Clayton, 717
P.2d at 561. A party is held to be presumptively aware of
his or her rights "where the circumstances of which he [or
she] is cognizant are such as to put a [person] of ordinary
prudence on inquiry." Hereford v. Hereford (1979), 183 Mont.
104, 108-09, 598 P.2d 600, 602. The mutual transfer of
quitclaim deeds in property between two parties is a most
serious matter; Mrs. Graves testified at her deposition that
the exchange was made to facilitate her sale of five acres of
the Washington property. She further testified that at the
time of the transaction she trusted her husband would obtain
the proper legal advice even though the wills named her as
devisee. Mrs. Graves demonstrated by such testimony that she
had presumptive knowledge of the effect of the transaction,
but did not advise a lawyer of her concerns until October,
1983. Mrs. Graves' counterclaim is properly barred by
laches.
Affirmed.
We concur: .fl