NO. 89-139
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
1989
IN RE THE MARRIAGE OF
SUSAN DRISCOLL JOHNSON,
petitioner and Respondent,
and
THOMAS JOHNSON,
Respondent and Appellant.
APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Second ~udicial~istrict,
In and for the County of silver Bow,
The Honorable Arnold Olsen, Judge presiding.
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For Appellant:
Brad L. Belke, Butte, Montana
For Respondent:
Mark A. Vucurovich, ~enningsen,Purcell, Vucurovich
and ~ichardson,Butte, Montana
Submitted on Briefs: June 8, 1989
Decided: July 11, 1989
I
. -
" ..
c-;j'~ +. Clerk
Mr. Justice L. C. Gulbrandson delivered the Opinion of the
Court.
The father, Thomas Johnson, appeals from the final
custody decree entered by the Second Judicial District Court,
Silver Bow County. The court denied the father's motion to
modify the current joint custody arrangement so as to appoint
him, instead of the mother, the primary physical custodian o f
their son. We affirm.
The following issues are presented on appeal:
1. Did the District Court err in failing to find that
the best interest of the child required a modification of the
present custody arrangement?
2. Did the District Court's adoption of the
petitioner's Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Final
Decree indicate that the court failed to properly consider
the facts or render its independent judgment on the matter?
The parties married October 23, 1978. A son was born
to this marriage. When the marriage was dissolved on October
3, 1984, the court awarded each parent joint custody of their
son. The custody arrangement provided that each parent would
have physical custody of their son on alternating days.
In October of 1985, the mother filed a petition for
modification of this alternating physical custody
arrangement. The father filed a cross-petition for
modification, requesting the court to grant him primary
physical custody of their son. He alleged that the best
interest of the child demanded such a modification because
the mother did not provide proper nourishment or care for
their son's physical or educational needs. Following a
hearing on the matter, the District Court granted the
mother's motion and awarded her primary physical custody of
their son. Both parents retained joint legal custody of the
child. The f a t h e r g e n e r a l l y was e n t i t l e d t o v i s i t a t i o n e v e r y
Tuesday and T h u r s d a y , e v e r y o t h e r weekend, and f o r one month
i n t h e summer. The c o u r t ' s m o d i f i c a t i o n d e c r e e was i s s u e d
a f t e r t h e c o u r t found t h a t t h e m o t h e r p r o v i d e d p r o p e r c a r e
for their son and that the best interest of the child
demanded a m o d i f i c a t i o n a s t h e a l t e r n a t i n g p h y s i c a l c u s t o d y
s c h e d u l e was c o n f u s i n g t o t h e s o n . The c o u r t a l s o had found
t h a t t h e d a i l y c o n t a c t between t h e p a r e n t s b e c a u s e o f this
a l t e r n a t i n g custody schedule continued t h e f a t h e r ' s h o s t i l i t y
toward t h e mother.
In July of 1 9 8 8 , t h e m o t h e r g a v e n o t i c e t h a t s h e was
moving t o t h e S t a t e o f Washington. H e r reasons f o r moving
i n c l u d e d w a n t i n g t o b e c l o s e r t o h e r f a m i l y and d e s i r i n g a
better j o b w i t h o p p o r t u n i t i e s f o r f u t u r e advancement. She
l e f t h e r s o n w i t h t h e f a t h e r f o r a few weeks i n J u l y w h i l e
l o o k i n g f o r a j o b and a home i n Washington. She r e t u r n e d t o
Montana and began c o l l e c t i n g h e r b e l o n g i n g s i n a n t i c i p a t i o n
o f h e r move w i t h t h e i r s o n t o Redmond, Washington, i n A u g u s t .
On August 3 , 1988, t h e f a t h e r f i l e d a m o t i o n t o modify
t h e c u s t o d y o r d e r s o a s t o g r a n t him p r i m a r y c u s t o d y and t o
p r e v e n t t h e m o t h e r from t a k i n g t h e i r s o n o u t o f Montana. A
few d a y s l a t e r , t h e m o t h e r p r o c e e d e d w i t h h e r i n t e n d e d move,
t a k i n g t h e i r son w i t h h e r .
Hearings were n o t h e l d u n t i l January 9, 1989, on t h e
f a t h e r ' s modification motion, t h e f a t h e r ' s November 22, 1988
contempt motion, and t h e m o t h e r ' s motion f o r c h i l d s u p p o r t .
(The father had moved the court to order the mother in
c o n t e m p t o f c o u r t b e c a u s e h e a l l e g e d s h e h a d d e n i e d him h i s
visitation rights.) Following h e a r i n g on t h e m o t i o n s , the
court denied the father's m o d i f i c a t i o n motion. The court
found that the son's best interest would be served by
retaining the mother as primary physical custodian. The
father remained e n t i t l e d t o reasonable and open v i s i t a t i o n
with their son. The court also ordered the parties to
negotiate child support obligations. The f a t h e r a p p e a l s from
t h i s f i n a l custody decree.
The r e c o r d i n t h i s c a s e r e v e a l s t h a t b o t h p a r t i e s a r e
good p a r e n t s who l o v e t h e i r s o n and d e s i r e t o h a v e him w i t h
them. Both w e r e a b l e t o s h a r e a c o m p a r a t i v e l y e q u a l amount
of time with their son while they both lived in Butte,
Montana. However, t h e p a r t i e s now l i v e o v e r 400 m i l e s a p a r t ,
and t h e r e i n l i e s t h e r o o t o f t h e problem g i v i n g r i s e t o t h i s
appeal.
W note a t t h e o u t s e t t h a t a parent with j o i n t custody
e
o f a c h i l d i s e n t i t l e d t o change h e r r e s i d e n c e , s u b j e c t o n l y
t o t h e power o f t h e c o u r t " t o r e s t r a i n a removal which would
prejudice the rights or welfare of the child." Section
40-6-231, MCA. A b s e n t s u c h p r e j u d i c e , a move by i t s e l f w i l l
n o t c o n s t i t u t e grounds s u f f i c i e n t t o e n a b l e t h e o t h e r p a r e n t
t o obtain a modification of the terms of a joint custody
arrangement. S e e I n r e M a r r i a g e o f P a r a d i s ( 1 9 8 4 ) , 213 Mont.
1 7 7 , 1 8 0 , 689 P.2d 1 2 6 3 , 1265.
The f a t h e r c o n t e n d s t h a t t h e w e l f a r e o f t h e i r s o n was
p r e j u d i c e d by t h e move and t h a t t h e b e s t i n t e r e s t o f t h e i r
son n e c e s s i t a t e d awarding t h e f a t h e r primary p h y s i c a l custody
because their son had already been integrated into the
f a t h e r ' s f a m i l y and i n t o t h e B u t t e community and s c h o o l . The
father argues that suchis necessary t o prevent
an award
destruction of h i s son's relationship with friends, family,
s c h o o l , and t h e community o f B u t t e , a d e s t r u c t i o n t h r e a t e n e d
by t h e m o t h e r ' s move o u t o f t h e S t a t e .
The court did not find this integration argument
persuasive a s t o the best i n t e r e s t of the child i n t h i s case,
and n e i t h e r d o w e . The f a t h e r d i d n o t move t o t e r m i n a t e t h e
joint l e g a l and p h y s i c a l c u s t o d y . Rather, t h e f a t h e r moved
o n l y t o modify t h e j o i n t c u s t o d y p r o v i s i o n s s o a s t o p r o v i d e
him, and n o t t h e m o t h e r , w i t h t h e p r i m a r y p h y s i c a l c u s t o d y o f
their son. The i n t e g r a t i o n r a t i o n a l e found i n S 40-4-219,
MCA, which applies only t o proceedings to terminate joint
custody, therefore a r e not applicable t o t h i s case. See,
e.g., I n re Custody o f A.L.S. (Mont. 1 9 8 7 ) , 747 P.2d 1 9 2 , 44
St.Rep. 1979; I n r e M a r r i a g e o f Gahm ( 1 9 8 6 ) , 222 Mont. 300,
722 P.2d 1138. Moreover, t h e s o n h a s r e a d i l y a d j u s t e d t o and
a l s o become i n t e g r a t e d i n t o h i s e x t e n d e d f a m i l y , s c h o o l and
community in Redmond, Washington. This integration of a
c h i l d i n t o t h e homes and community o f both parents i s t h e
n e c e s s a r y outcome and g o a l o f a joint custody arrangement;
integration thus may not serve as a justification for a
modification of the t e r m s of a joint custody decree. See
P a r a d i s , 689 P.2d a t 1265.
The r e c o r d a l s o f a i l s t o show a n y o t h e r f a c t o r s , such
as those listed in 5 40-4-212, MCA, which would lead the
court to determine that the son's best i n t e r e s t would be
s e r v e d and p r e s e r v e d by g i v i n g p r i m a r y p h y s i c a l c u s t o d y o f
the child t o the father. The f a t h e r a l l e g e d t h a t h i s s o n ' s
m e n t a l , m o r a l a n d p h y s i c a l h e a l t h was a d v e r s e l y a f f e c t e d by
t h e m o t h e r ' s d r i n k i n g and f r e q u e n t i n g o f b a r s i n t h e Redmond
area. The court, however, held otherwise. We will not
reverse the D i s t r i c t Court's findings unless they a r e clearly
erroneous. A s s t a t e d i n R u l e 5 2 ( a ) , M.R.Civ.P.:
F i n d i n g s o f f a c t s h a l l n o t be s e t a s i d e
u n l e s s c l e a r l y e r r o n e o u s , and d u e r e g a r d
s h a l l be given t o t h e opportunity of t h e
t r i a l c o u r t t o judge o f t h e c r e d i b i l i t y
of the witnesses.
The e v i d e n c e i n d i c a t e d t h a t t h e m o t h e r d i d i n f a c t go
o u t w i t h a f r i e n d and h a v e a " c o u p l e o f b e e r s " o n c e a week o r
so. However, t h e s o n was n o t l e f t a l o n e a t s u c h t i m e s . He
stayed with his grandparents or his aunt and cousins.
Further, the mother testified that she did not drink to
excess. W t h e r e f o r e hold t h a t t h e D i s t r i c t Court's finding
e
t h a t t h e m o t h e r was a c a r i n g and l o v i n g p a r e n t ( F i n d i n g # 1 3 )
was n o t c l e a r l y e r r o n e o u s , and t h e c o u r t d i d n o t a b u s e i t s
d i s c r e t i o n i n c o n c l u d i n g t h a t t h e f a t h e r ' s a l l e g a t i o n s were
groundless (Conclusion #4) and that the mother's primary
p h y s i c a l custody remained i n t h e b e s t i n t e r e s t of t h e c h i l d .
The father's second argument is that the District
Court's adoption of t h e mother's proposed f i n d i n g s o f fact
and c o n c l u s i o n s o f law i l l u s t r a t e d t h e c o u r t ' s f a i l u r e t o u s e
i t s i n d e p e n d e n t judgment a s i s r e q u i r e d by law. Further, the
father argues that several of the findings i s s u e d by the
D i s t r i c t C o u r t a r e n o t s u p p o r t e d by t h e e v i d e n c e .
This Court has previously s t a t e d t h a t a d i s t r i c t c o u r t
may a d o p t one p a r t y ' s proposed f i n d i n g s o f fact. Kowis v .
Kowis ( 1 9 8 3 ) , 202 Mont. 371, 379, 658 P.2d 1084, 1088. The
c o u r t errs i n a d o p t i n g a p a r t y ' s p r o p o s e d f i n d i n g s o n l y i f
t h e c o u r t does s o "without proper c o n s i d e r a t i o n of t h e f a c t s "
and w i t h a l a c k o f i n d e p e n d e n t judgment. I n re M a r r i a g e o f
Callahan (Mont. 1 9 8 8 ) , 762 P.2d 205, 209, 45 St.Rep. 1639,
1644. This Court will not overturn a district court's
f i n d i n g s and c o n c l u s i o n s s i m p l y b e c a u s e t h e y a r e b a s e d upon
t h o s e s u b m i t t e d by c o u n s e l i f :
[the] findings and conclusions are
s u f f i c i e n t l y comprehensive and p e r t i n e n t
t o t h e i s s u e s t o provide a b a s i s f o r
decision, and are s u p p o r t e d by the
evidence.
Kowis, 658 P.2d a t 1088.
The r e c o r d i n t h e p r e s e n t c a s e i n d i c a t e s t h a t t h e c o u r t
properly considered a l l t h e pertinent f a c t s during a hearing
c o n d u c t e d s e v e r a l weeks b e f o r e t h e c o u r t i s s u e d i t s f i n d i n g s
and conclusions. The court's conclusion, that the best
interest of the son entailed leaving him in the primary
p h y s i c a l c u s t o d y o f h i s m o t h e r , was r e n d e r e d a f t e r t h e judge
himself questioned the child. The findings in this case are
sufficiently comprehensive and pertinent to the issue raised
by the father. Moreover, the findings, when viewed as a
whole, are supported by existing evidence.
The father also argued that the court's decision to
award primary physical custody of their son to the mother
denied him his right to joint custody. This argument would
have been a proper subject for an appeal following the 1986
modification decree, which awarded the mother primary
physical custody. This appeal, however, is only from the
decree denying the father primary physical custody of his
son, and as such, the argument is not only irrelevant to this
appeal but actually counterproductive to the father's
contention that he should have been awarded primary physical
custody. We therefore decline to address this argument.
The decision of the District Court is affirmed.
We concur: