Whitehawk v. Clark

No. 8 8 - 5 8 2

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
1989

PHIL WHITEHAWK and CONNIE BELLET,
Plaintiffs and Appellants,
-VS-

STAN CLARK,
Defendant and Respondent.

APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Sixth Judicial District,
In and for the County of Park,
The Honorable Byron Robb, Judge presiding.
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For Appellant:
Karl Knuchel, Livingston, Montana
For Respondent:
J. Robert Planalp, Landoe, Brown, Planalp and Kommers,
Bozeman, Montana

Submitted on Briefs: April 27, 1 9 8 9
Decided: June 29, 1989

Filed:
Mr.J u s t i c e J o h n Conway H a r r i s o n d e l i v e r e d t h e O p i n i o n o f t h e
Court.

Plaintiffs, Phil Whitehawk and Connie Bellet
(Whitehawks), appeal from a jury verdict rendered in the
Sixth Judicial D i s t r i c t , P a r k County, t h e Honorable Byron L.
Robb presiding, in favor of the defendant, Stan Clark.
Plaintiffs initiated the action s e e k i n g t o r e c o v e r damages
for the destruction of personal property. W reverse
e and
remand f o r a new t r i a l .
The Whitehawks r e n t e d a l o g c a b i n and f o u r o u t b u i l d i n g s
l o c a t e d n e a r W i l s a l l , Montana, from t h e d e f e n d a n t S t a n C l a r k .
The Whitehawks r e s i d e d i n t h e c a b i n and u s e d t h e o u t b u i l d i n g s
t o s t o r e various personal i t e m s , i n c l u d i n g a r t work, m u s i c a l
instruments, musical recordings and historical documents.
Much o f t h e m a t e r i a l s t o r e d i n t h e o u t b u i l d i n g s w e r e u s e d i n
c o n n e c t i o n w i t h t h e Whitehawks' m u s i c a l p e r f o r m a n c e s e n t i t l e d
" I n s p i r a d a Americana."
On A p r i l 28, 1 9 8 5 , Duane C l a r k , son o f t h e defendant,
began b u r n i n g d i t c h e s on t h e f a m i l y r a n c h s o u t h e a s t o f the
property rented by the Whitehawks. In the e a r l y evening
hours, a s l i g h t b r e e z e c a u s e d t h e f i r e t o move o u t o f the
ditches, burning brush and swamp area to the northeast.
Duane t e n d e d t h e f i r e t h r o u g h o u t t h e d a y and r e t u r n e d home a t
6:00 p.m. f o r dinner. Later, Duane received a phone c a l l
from t h e Whitehawks e x p r e s s i n g c o n c e r n o v e r t h e f i r e . Duane
r e t u r n e d t o t h e f i e l d and c o n t i n u e d t o watch t h e f i r e u n t i l
a p p r o x i m a t e l y 10:OO p.m.
The testimony a t t r i a l c o n f l i c t e d regarding the fire
a c t i v i t y d u r i n g t h e n i g h t and t h e f o l l o w i n g morning. Duane
testified that when he returned to the field in the late
evening, t h e f i r e had d i m i n i s h e d t o o n l y embers and smoke.
I n a d d i t i o n , Duane s t a t e d t h a t h e viewed t h e f i e l d t h e n e x t
morning and found the embers and smoke completely
extinguished. Thereafter, Duane l e f t t h e area t o continue
work with his father in another portion of the ranch several
miles away.
On the other hand, the Whitehawks testified that
throughout the night, they could see both embers and flames.
However, they testified that the following morning, no embers
were visible, but a substantial amount of smoke was present.
The Whitehawks stated that they remained concerned about the
fire, but that a heavy dew, a backburn, a still wind and lack
of any embers reassured them that they could leave their
residence for a doctor's appointment. Additionally, Mr.
Whitehawk testified that he spoke to Duane in the morning and
was assured that Duane would continue to watch the area.
Duane denied the conversation entirely.
During the afternoon, the fire flared up, sweeping
across the marshes and open fields. When the Whitehawks
returned home in the afternoon, they found three of the four
outbuildings completely destroyed and fire threatening the
log cabin. Mrs. Janet Clark, Duane's wife, was on the
premises when the Whitehawks returned. Immediately, the
Whitehawks began fighting the fire. After 45 minutes, the
local volunteer fire department arrived and extinguished the
blaze.
The Whitehawks filed suit against Stan Clark, alleging
negligence and strict liability. On September 18, 1987, the
Whitehawks moved for summary judgment on the issue of
liability, arguing that S 50-63-103, MCA, imposed strict
liability upon one who intentionally starts a fire which
destroys property, and therefore, they were entitled to
judgment as a matter of law. The District Court denied the
motion without opinion.
On August 29, 1988, the case was tried before a twelve
member jury. Upon the completion of testimony, the District
Judge met with the attorneys to settle jury instructions and
prepare a special verdict form. At this time, the District
Court rejected plaintiffs' Proposed Instruction No. 22
c o n c e r n i n g 8 50-63-103, MCA, c o n c l u d i n g t h e s t a t u t e p e r t a i n e d
only t o t h e i n t e n t i o n a l burning of excess f o r e s t m a t e r i a l .
Thereafter, the jury returned a verdict in favor of the
defendant.
The Whitehawks a p p e a l t h e f o l l o w i n g i s s u e s :
1. Does S 50-63-103, MCA, apply t o t h e i n s t a n t case?
2. Did the District Court err when it denied
p l a i n t i f f s ' motion f o r summary judgment?
3. Did t h e D i s t r i c t Court e r r when it r e f u s e d t o
i n s t r u c t t h e j u r y on p l a i n t i f f s ' Proposed I n s t r u c t i o n No. 22
r e g a r d i n g 8 50-63-103, MA
C?
S e c t i o n 50-63-103, MCA, s t a t e s i n part:
L i a b i l i t y o f o f f e n d e r f o r damages and
costs. Any p e r s o n who s h a l l upon - any
l a n d w i t h i n t h e s t a t e , whether on h i s own
or on another's land, s e t o r leave
any f i r e t h a t s h a l l s p r e a d and damage o r
d e s t r o y p r o p e r t y o f any k i n d n o t h i s own
s h a l l be l i a b l e f o r a l l damages caused
thereby, and any owner of property
damaged o r d e s t r o y e d by such f i r e may
m a i n t a i n a c i v i l s u i t f o r t h e purpose o f
r e c o v e r i n g such damages. Any p e r s o n who
s h a l l upon any l a n d w i t h i n t h i s s t a t e ,
whether on h i s own o r on a n o t h e r ' s l a n d ,
s e t o r l e a v e any f i r e which t h r e a t e n s t o
s p r e a d and damage o r d e s t r o y p r o p e r t y
s h a l l be liable for all costs and
expenses incurred by the state of
Montana, by any f o r e s t r y a s s o c i a t i o n , o r
by any p e r s o n e x t i n g u i s h i n g o r p r e v e n t i n g
t h e s p r e a d o f such f i r e . (Emphasis
added. )

T h i s C o u r t h a s been c a l l e d upon t o i n t e r p r e t t h e s t a t u t e on
two o c c a s i o n s . Montana Dept. o f N a t u r a l Res. and Cons. v .
C l a r k Fork Logging ( 1 9 8 2 ) , 198 Mont. 494, 646 P.2d 1207; and
Belue v. State (1982), 199 Mont. 451, 649 P.2d 752.
Defendant contends t h a t our previous d e c i s i o n s c o n t r o l t h e
outcome o f t h e f i r s t i s s u e which q u e s t i o n s t h e a p p l i c a b i l i t y
of S 50-63-103, MCA. Defendant argues that the statute
applies only to the burning of excess forest materials. We
find defendant's interpretation unduly restrictive.
In Clark Fork Logging, defendants entered into a timber
sale contract with the United States Forest Service to log an
area in Sanders County. During operation, an employee
started a chain saw which backfired and ignited a forest
fire. The Department of Natural Resources and Conservation
(DNRC), acting under contract with the United States Forest
Service, extinguished the fire at a cost of $126,721.80.
Thereafter, the DNRC brought suit to recover the cost under
theories of strict liability and negligence. On appeal, we
affirmed the lower court's grant of summary judgment against
DNRC's strict liability count, holding:
As they are used in section
50-63-103, MCA, the words "set or leave a
fire" refer to the deliberate act of
burning excess forest material. The
statute does not apply to the instant
situation. The --- deliberately
fire was not
ignited. Rather, it accidentally started
when a spark from the chain saw ignited a
slash pile. Under these facts summary
judgment on Count I was proper.
(Emphasis added. )
Clark Fork Logging, 646 P.2d at 1209.
Subsequently, this Court issued its decision in Belue.
During a severe windstorm, a fire ignited near a slag pile.
The fire spread four and one half miles across defendant's
land to plaintiffs ' property. Relying upon
Clark Fork Logging, we concluded the facts did not support
the applicability of 5 50-63-103, MCA. Belue, 649 P.2d at
754. Our decisions emphasized that the statute applied to
the intentional setting of a fire.
None of the factual circumstances which limited the
statute's applicability in Clark Fork Logging, or Belue, are
present here. Our review of the statute failed to disclose
limiting factors which would render the provision
inapplicable to private landowners, or language which
i n d i c a t e s an a p p l i c a t i o n e x c l u s i v e l y t o t h e b u r n i n g o f f o r e s t
materials. T h e r e f o r e , we c o n c l u d e (5 50-63-103, MCA, may be
applicable t o the i n s t a n t case.
Next, t h e Whitehawks contend t h e D i s t r i c t Court s h o u l d
have granted their motion for summary judgment on the
liability issue, l e a v i n g damages as the sole issue t o be
decided a t t r i a l . W disagree.
e
The s t a n d a r d t h e a p p e l l a t e c o u r t a p p l i e s when r e v i e w i n g
a grant o r denial of a motion f o r summary judgment is the
same a s t h a t u t i l i z e d by t h e t r i a l c o u r t i n i t i a l l y ; summary
judgment i s p r o p e r when it a p p e a r s t h e r e i s no g e n u i n e i s s u e
a s t o any m a t e r i a l f a c t and t h e moving p a r t y i s e n t i t l e d t o
judgment a s a m a t t e r o f law. Rule 56, M.R.Civ.P.; Reagan v .
Union O i l Co. of California ( 1 9 8 4 ) , 208 Mont. 1, 675 P.2d
953. If there i s any doubt as to the propriety of the
motion, it s h o u l d be d e n i e d . Dare v. Montana Petroleum
Marketing Co. ( 1 9 8 4 ) , 2 1 2 Mont. 274, 687 P.2d 1015.
The violation of a statute intended to protect the
plaintiff from t h e i n j u r y i n c u r r e d i s g e n e r a l l y h e l d t o be
negligence per se. Taylor, Thon, Thompson & P e t e r s o n v.
Cannaday (Mont. 1 9 8 8 ) , 749 P.2d 63, 45 St.Rep. 102; ~ e h r i n g
v. LaCounte (1986), 219 Mont. 462, 712 P.2d 1329. The
d e f e n d a n t ' s c o n d u c t must s t i l l be t h e proximate c a u s e o f t h e
harm t o t h e p l a i n t i f f s , and t h e r e remains t h e p o s s i b i l i t y of
defenses, such as contributory negligence. Restatement
(Second) o f T o r t s § 288B (1974) ; M a r t e l v . Montana Power Co.
(Mont. 1 9 8 8 ) , 752 P.2d 140, 4 5 St.Rep. 460. Because t h e s e
a r e i s s u e s o f f a c t , summary judgment was i n a p p r o p r i a t e . The
D i s t r i c t C o u r t ' s d e n i a l o f t h e Whitehawks' motion f o r summary
judgment was t h e r e f o r e p r o p e r .
Finally, we address the t h i r d i s s u e on a p p e a l . The
Whitehawks c o n t e n d t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t i m p r o p e r l y r e f u s e d t o
grant their Proposed Instruction No. 22 which set forth
verbatim t h e f i r s t sentence of § 50-63-103, MCA. A t trial,
defendant objected to the instruction and argued the
Whitehawks abandoned t h e v i o l a t i o n o f s t a t u t e c l a i m b e c a u s e
t h e y by f a i l e d t o i n c l u d e i t w i t h i n t h e p r e t r i a l o r d e r . The
District Court d e n i e d the instruction and s t a t e d t h a t the
statute pertained only to the burning of excess forest
material.
The purpose of the pretrial order is to prevent
surprise, s i m p l i f y i s s u e s and p e r m i t c o u n s e l t o p r e p a r e f o r
trial on the basis of the pretrial order. Workman v.
M c I n t r y r e ( 1 9 8 0 ) , 190 Mont. 5 , 617 P.2d 1281. This Court has
h e l d t h a t t h e p a r t y may n o t r a i s e an i s s u e on a p p e a l which
d e v i a t e d from t h o s e s t a t e d i n t h e p r e t r i a l o r d e r . Morse v .
Cremer ( 1 9 8 2 ) , 2 0 0 Mont. 71, 647 P.2d 358. Under t h e s e two
p r e m i s e s , it a p p e a r s r e a s o n a b l e f o r d e f e n d a n t t o have assumed
t h a t t h e i s s u e o f l i a b i l i t y under t h e s t a t u t e would n o t a r i s e
a t trial.
However, o t h e r f a c t o r s weigh a g a i n s t d e f e n d a n t ' s w a i v e r
contention. First, the Whitehawks properly preserved the
i s s u e f o r appeal a s applied t o jury i n s t r u c t i o n s . Rule 51,
M.R.Civ.P., provides i n p a r t t h a t " [ n l o p a r t y may a s s i g n a s
e r r o r t h e f a i l u r e t o i n s t r u c t on any p o i n t o f law u n l e s s he
offers an instruction thereon." When the Whitehawks
p r e s e n t e d an i n s t r u c t i o n which s t a t e d v e r b a t i m t h e language
of S 50-63-103, MCA, the District Court denied the
i n s t r u c t i o n a s inapplicable t o the case.
In addition, t h e s t a t u t e was t h e s u b j e c t o f a motion
for summary judgment. Notwithstanding certification, an
order denying summary judgment i s interlocutory. Rule 1,
M.R.Civ.P. Thus, t h e a p p l i c a b i l i t y o f 5 50-63-103, MCA, h a s
n o t been waived i n s o f a r a s it was p r e s e n t e d t o t h e D i s t r i c t
C o u r t i n t h e Whitehawks' motion. W t h e r e f o r e a r e persuaded
e
that the Whitehawks' issue of the failure to instruct is
proper f o r appeal.
W have h e l d t h a t t h e r e f u s a l t o i n s t r u c t a j u r y on an
e
important p a r t of a p a r t y ' s theory of t h e case i s r e v e r s i b l e
error. Smith v . Rovick (Mont. 1 9 8 8 ) , 751 P.2d 1053, 45
St.Rep. 451; Northwestern Union Trust Co. v. Worm (1983), 204
Mont. 184, 663 P.2d 325. While other instructions addressed
the elements necessary to establish negligence, none of the
given instructions informed the jury of the effect of a
violation of statute. This was an essential part of the
Whitehawks' case and therefore they were entitled to have
Proposed Instruction No. 22 submitted to the jury.
Reversed and remanded for new trial.

We concur: +
,
'