IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
Docket No. 38274
STATE OF IDAHO, )
) 2012 Opinion No. 4
Plaintiff-Respondent, )
) Filed: January 23, 2012
v. )
) Stephen W. Kenyon, Clerk
ABRAHAM VARGAS, )
)
Defendant-Appellant. )
)
Appeal from the District Court of the Fifth Judicial District, State of Idaho, Cassia
County. Hon. Michael R. Crabtree, District Judge.
Judgment of conviction for grand theft, affirmed.
Brian M. Tanner, Twin Falls, for appellant.
Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General; Elizabeth A. Koeckeritz, Deputy
Attorney General, Boise, for respondent. Elizabeth A. Koeckeritz argued.
________________________________________________
LANSING, Judge
Abraham Vargas appeals from his conviction for grand theft following a jury trial.
Vargas asserts that the district court erred by refusing his requested jury instruction concerning
the definition of “value.” He also asserts that his conviction must be reduced to petit theft
because the State failed to introduce sufficient evidence either that he possessed all of the stolen
property at issue or that the value of the property exceeded one thousand dollars. We affirm.
I.
BACKGROUND
In March 2010, a Cassia County farm operator hired an irrigation pump company to do
some work on one of its wells. The crew pulled nineteen ten-foot pieces of pipe 1 from the well
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The well assembly consisted of a “shaft” that rotates at high speed and rides inside an “oil
tube” that in turn rides inside a “well column.” For ease of discussion, we refer to the oil tube
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and left the material on the ground on a Friday with the intent to re-install it the following week.
When the crew arrived the following Monday, however, the pipe was gone.
When alerted to the loss, the farm manager went directly to a local recycling scrapyard
and asked the owner whether he had seen the pipe. The owner immediately directed the farm
manager to the pipe, which the scrapyard had purchased for $332.52. The scrapyard
relinquished the pipe back to the farm and it was reinstalled in the well. The scrapyard owner
also gave police the license plate number and a copy of the driver’s license of the individual who
brought the pipe to the yard. These showed the individual to be Vargas.
Vargas was interviewed by the police and subsequently charged with grand theft by
possession of stolen property with a value in excess of one thousand dollars. Idaho Code §§ 18-
2403(4), 18-2407(1)(b)(1). Vargas was found guilty at a jury trial, and he appeals the
consequent conviction.
II.
ANALYSIS
A. The District Court Did Not Err by Refusing Vargas’s Requested Jury Instruction on
Value
To establish Vargas’s guilt of felony grand theft, the State was required to prove, among
other elements, that the theft involved property with a “value” in excess of one thousand dollars.
I.C. § 18-2407(1)(b)(1). A specific definition of value applicable to theft cases is given in Idaho
Code § 18-2402(11)(a):
[V]alue means the market value of the property at the time and place of the crime,
or if such cannot be satisfactorily ascertained, the cost of replacement of the
property within a reasonable time after the crime.
Vargas requested that the following instruction be given to the jury concerning value:
The term “value” as used in these instructions means as follows:
The market value of the property at the time and place of the crime, or if
the market value cannot be satisfactorily ascertained, value can be shown by any
number of measures including salvage value, replacement cost, purchase price,
and the property’s general use and purpose.
and shaft together as “pipe.” Two pieces of well column were also taken, but discussion of that
material is not needed for disposition of the issues in this appeal.
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The district court refused the requested instruction, holding that it was inconsistent with the
statutory definition of “value.” The district court instead instructed the jury with the statutory
definition, but said that Vargas was free to argue in closing that the jury should use the salvage
price paid by the scrapyard in its determination of the market value of the pipe. Vargas posits
error in the refusal of his requested instruction.
There was no error. When a statute provides the definition of a term as used in the same
or a related statute, it is correct, of course, to instruct the jury with that definition.
Vargas’s proposed instruction was derived from this Court’s comments in State v.
Johnson, 149 Idaho 259, 233 P.3d 190 (Ct. App. 2010), a grand theft case. Although we there
applied the Idaho Code § 18-2402(11)(a) definition of value to the facts of the case, our opinion
also included the following remarks:
Although salvage value may be admissible and relevant to determine the
value of stolen items, it is not ipso facto the market value of property that has
been sold for scrap. As we stated in State v. Hughes, 130 Idaho 698, 703, 946
P.2d 1338, 1343 (Ct. App. 1997), if market value cannot be established, value can
be shown by any number of measures other than just salvage value including
purchase price, replacement cost, and the property’s general use and purpose.
The choice of which measure is appropriate depends upon the circumstances of
the individual case. Salvage value generally will not be the appropriate measure
if it was the defendant’s actions that caused the item to be useless for anything
other than scrap. State v. Cope, 7 Ariz. App. 295, 438 P.2d 442, 444-45 (1968);
McClure v. State, 295 Ga. App. 465, 673 S.E.2d 856, 858 (2009); State v. Albert,
117 Or. 179, 242 P. 1116, 1118 (1926).
Johnson, 149 Idaho at 263, 233 P.3d at 194 (emphasis added). The case from which the
italicized language above was drawn, State v. Hughes, 130 Idaho 698, 703, 946 P.2d 1338, 1343
(Ct. App. 1997), addressed a felony malicious destruction of property charge. The inquiry in
Hughes was how to measure the value of the damage caused by the defendant’s destruction of
the victim’s property. Unlike the grand theft statutes, the statute defining the crime of malicious
destruction of property includes no definition of “value.” See I.C. § 18-7001; Hughes, 130 Idaho
at 702-03, 946 P.2d 1342-43. Thus, in Hughes, this Court was called upon to define how value
may be proven when no statutory definition has been provided. Our incorporation of this portion
of our Hughes analysis into the Johnson opinion was ill advised because, for the grand theft
charge at issue in Johnson, the method of measuring value is that specified in Idaho Code § 18-
2402(11)(a). That statute directs that, for theft cases, if the market value cannot be satisfactorily
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ascertained, value is to be determined by “the cost of replacement of the property within a
reasonable time after the crime.” Therefore, utilization of alternative measures identified in
Hughes for malicious destruction of property cases would be inappropriate in theft cases. The
district court did not err in rejecting Vargas’s proposed instruction which presented methods of
measuring value that are inconsistent with the governing statute.
B. The State Provided Sufficient Evidence that the Value of the Pipe Exceeded One
Thousand Dollars
Vargas next contends there was insufficient evidence to prove that the value of the stolen
pipe exceeded one thousand dollars, and therefore his conviction must be reduced to petit theft.
Appellate review of the sufficiency of the evidence is limited in scope. A judgment of
conviction, entered upon a jury verdict, will not be overturned on appeal where there is
substantial evidence upon which a reasonable trier of fact could have found that the prosecution
sustained its burden of proving the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.
State v. Herrera-Brito, 131 Idaho 383, 385, 957 P.2d 1099, 1101 (Ct. App. 1998); State v.
Knutson, 121 Idaho 101, 104, 822 P.2d 998, 1001 (Ct. App. 1991). Substantial evidence is such
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. State
v. Byington, 132 Idaho 589, 593, 977 P.2d 203, 207 (1999); Johnson, 149 Idaho at 263, 233 P.3d
at 194. We will not substitute our view for that of the jury as to the credibility of the witnesses,
the weight to be given to the testimony, and the reasonable inferences to be drawn from the
evidence. Knutson, 121 Idaho at 104, 822 P.2d at 1001; State v. Decker, 108 Idaho 683, 684,
701 P.2d 303, 304 (Ct. App. 1985). Rather, we consider the evidence in the light most favorable
to the prosecution. Herrera-Brito, 131 Idaho at 385, 957 P.2d at 1101; Knutson, 121 Idaho at
104, 822 P.2d at 1001.
Here, the State relied upon evidence of market value to prove that the stolen pipe was
worth more than $1,000. Vargas argues that the State failed in this effort. He contends that the
evidence showed that there existed no market for used pipe of this type because such pipe was
not generally available. This argument fails on the face of the record. The State’s witness on
valuation was the owner of the irrigation pump company that removed the stolen pipe from the
farm well and later reinstalled the same pipe. He testified that as a part of his business, he
bought and sold new and used equipment for irrigation systems, including pipe. The man said
that he would be willing to buy the pipe at issue for 40 percent of the cost of new pipe, and that
he could resell it for 60 percent of the cost of new pipe. He said that his customers often ask for
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used pipe because it would be less expensive, but that he generally does not have such pipe
available for sale because people who possess used pipe keep it in use. He noted: “I had a
customer yesterday ask for used stuff, but I don’t have it to sell is the problem. If I have the
stuff, I could sell it more often. It’s just not available.” According to Vargas, this testimony
about the low availability of used pipe establishes that there exists no market for the product.
We disagree. That the market demand for a product exceeds its supply does not demonstrate that
there exists no market value. Here, the owner of a company engaged in the business of selling
new and used pipe clearly testified that when used pipe is available he can generally sell it for
60 percent of the price of equivalent new pipe. He testified about the price he would pay for the
used pipe at issue (slightly over $200 per ten-foot section) and what he would charge for the pipe
on re-sale (slightly over $300 per ten-foot section). Because there were nineteen sections of pipe
stolen, under either measure there was sufficient evidence that the market value of the pipe
exceeded $1,000.
Vargas’s next contention--that the State did not establish that this value applied to pipe of
the same type and condition as the stolen pipe--is also incorrect. During direct examination, the
prosecutor elicited the following testimony:
Q. . . . Based on your work experience and your history of running this
business, are you familiar with the value of this type of tube and shaft?
A. It’s expensive. I think that stuff is somewhere around 530 some odd
dollars a joint, I think, when it’s brand-new.
Q. So more than $500 per 10-foot section--
A. That’s correct.
Q. -- of tube and shaft together?
A. That’s correct.
Q. And what about when it’s used?
A. We usually get 60 percent of the new value for used price.
Q. And so if the new value was $500, used would be around 300?
A. Yeah.
Q. Now, talking specifically about the material from this case, let’s say
Mr. Young had recovered it, but after--he had already recovered it but after he had
already installed new material so it was then excess and he needed to sell it.
Around that time, end of March 2010, would this material have gone for that used
price that you just gave us?
A. Yeah.
Q. So about $300 per 10-foot section?
A. That’s correct.
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Clearly, the witness was talking about the value of the precise pipe that was stolen in this case,
not other pipe that might have been of a different quality or condition. The evidence of market
value is sufficient to support the jury’s verdict.
C. The State Presented Sufficient Evidence that Vargas Was in Possession of the Pipe
The stolen pipe was taken to the scrapyard in two pickup loads, one on Saturday
March 20, 2010, and one on Monday, March 22, 2010. The second delivery occurred about
twenty minutes before the farm manager arrived looking for the pipe. Vargas contends that the
State failed to provide sufficient evidence that he personally delivered, and thus possessed, the
pipe on both occasions.
Again, the record refutes Vargas’s claim. The owner of the scrapyard testified that
although both Vargas and another man came in with loads of scrap metal at various times on the
two days in question, Vargas was the one who delivered the pipe at issue. The owner said that
he personally unloaded the pipe from the pickup that Vargas was driving. A detective who
interviewed Vargas before his arrest testified that Vargas admitted driving his pickup loaded
with scrap metal to the yard twice on Saturday and twice on Monday. Thus, the State presented
substantial and competent evidence that Vargas personally possessed both pickup loads of the
pipe.
III.
CONCLUSION
The jury was properly instructed, and substantial evidence supports the verdict.
Therefore, the judgment of conviction is affirmed.
Chief Judge GRATTON and Judge GUTIERREZ CONCUR.
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