State v. Harper

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

Docket No. 37683

STATE OF IDAHO, ) 2011 Opinion No. 41
)
Plaintiff-Respondent, ) Filed: July 18, 2011
)
v. ) Stephen W. Kenyon, Clerk
)
MATTHEW T. HARPER, )
)
Defendant-Appellant. )
)

Appeal from the District Court of the Second Judicial District, State of Idaho, Nez
Perce County. Hon. Carl B. Kerrick, District Judge.

Judgment of conviction for trafficking in amphetamine and/or methamphetamine
by manufacturing and manufacture or delivery of a controlled substance where
children are present, affirmed.

Clark and Feeney, LLP, Lewiston, for appellant. Jonathan D. Hally argued.

Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General; Jessica M. Lorello, Deputy
Attorney General, Boise, for respondent. Jessica M. Lorello argued.
________________________________________________
GUTIERREZ, Judge

Matthew T. Harper appeals from the district court’s entry of a judgment of conviction
upon jury verdicts finding him guilty of trafficking in amphetamine and/or methamphetamine by
manufacturing and for manufacture or delivery of a controlled substance where children are
present. Specifically, he asserts that the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress
because the affidavit in support of the search warrant did not establish the requisite probable
cause and because the search warrant was constitutionally defective. For the reasons set forth
below, we affirm.
I.
FACTS AND PROCEDURE
After receiving information from pharmacy employees that Harper, Bradley Stinson, and
Ashley Wolff had been purchasing precursors for manufacturing methamphetamine, Detective

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Bryce Scrimsher and other law enforcement officers conducted an investigation between August
2008 and March 2009. During the investigation, officers conducted surveillance on a residence
located at 1536 Airway Avenue in Lewiston, Idaho, a single-family house owned by Bradley
Stinson, where officers believed that Harper also resided. Over the course of the investigation,
law enforcement received reports from employees of various pharmacies in town, and in several
instances confirmed the information themselves, that Harper, Stinson, and Wolff had collectively
purchased, each to varying degrees, over 7,000 pseudoephedrine tablets and other
methamphetamine precursors.
Based on information provided by Detective Scrimsher in an affidavit, a magistrate
issued a warrant authorizing the search of: (1) the residence located at 1536 Airway Avenue;
(2) Harper’s and Stinson’s vehicles and any other vehicles found at the residence when the
warrant was executed; (3) a storage unit where officers had observed Harper and Stinson
frequenting; and (4) the “persons” of Harper, Stinson, Wolff, and “any and all other persons at
the residence” when the warrant was executed. The warrant also specified items that could be
seized, including, but not limited to, ledgers, methamphetamine precursors, equipment used in
the manufacture of methamphetamine, and documents demonstrating ownership and residence.
When officers executed the warrant, they encountered the four residents of the house,
Stinson, Harper, Wolff, and Wolff’s two-year-old son. Stinson and Wolff resided in a bedroom
upstairs and Harper resided in a bedroom on the main level. Harper and Stinson both testified at
the hearing on Harper’s motion to suppress that Harper had objected to the search of his room,
telling the officers that he paid rent and had a separate lock on his door, and therefore they
needed a separate warrant to conduct the search. Officers proceeded to search Harper’s room
and found a number of items used to manufacture methamphetamine, along with
methamphetamine and other drug paraphernalia. Harper subsequently admitted he had been
“cooking meth” at the 1536 Airway Avenue residence for approximately a year and a half.
Harper was charged by information with trafficking in amphetamine and/or
methamphetamine by manufacturing, Idaho Code § 37-2732B(a)(3), and manufacture or delivery
of a controlled substance where children are present, I.C. § 37-2737A. He filed a motion to
suppress the evidence obtained during the search, alleging the affidavit which formed the basis
of the warrant failed to establish probable cause and that the search warrant was constitutionally
defective because it lacked the requisite particularity. After a hearing, the district court denied

2
the motion to suppress. Harper filed a motion to reconsider, which the district court also denied.
The case proceeded to a jury trial where a jury subsequently found him guilty as charged.
Harper now appeals the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress.
II.
ANALYSIS
Harper contends that the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress the
evidence found as a result of the execution of the search warrant on two bases: (1) the affidavit
for the search warrant failed to establish the requisite probable cause because it was vague,
lacking in detail, contained hearsay, and failed to provide a sufficient nexus between any alleged
wrongdoing and the premises and persons subject to the search; and (2) the search warrant was
constitutionally defective in that it was overly broad in allowing a search of the entire residence
when the officers knew that it was a multi-unit residence. Thus, Harper contends that, because
the warrant was invalid, the search and seizure of evidence violated his federal and state Fourth
Amendment rights.
The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. When a decision on a
motion to suppress is challenged, we accept the trial court’s findings of fact which are supported
by substantial evidence, but we freely review the application of constitutional principles to the
facts as found. State v. Atkinson, 128 Idaho 559, 561, 916 P.2d 1284, 1286 (Ct. App. 1996). At
a suppression hearing, the power to assess the credibility of witnesses, resolve factual conflicts,
weigh evidence, and draw factual inferences is vested in the trial court. State v. Valdez-Molina,
127 Idaho 102, 106, 897 P.2d 993, 997 (1995); State v. Schevers, 132 Idaho 786, 789, 979 P.2d
659, 662 (Ct. App. 1999).
A. Probable Cause
Harper first argues that the district court erred when it denied his motion to suppress the
evidence found during the officers’ search of his room because the affidavit supporting the
request for a search warrant failed to establish the requisite probable cause. Specifically, he
contends the affidavit contained insufficient detail as it consisted of “unsubstantiated and
conclusory statements” rooted in “unreliable hearsay” and it failed to establish the requisite
nexus between any criminal activity, the things to be seized, and the place and persons to be
searched.

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 The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation,
and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to
be seized.

Article I, Section 17, of the Idaho Constitution is virtually identical to the Fourth Amendment,
except that “oath or affirmation” is termed “affidavit.” In order for a search warrant to be valid,
it must be supported by probable cause to believe that evidence or fruits of a crime may be found
in a particular place. State v. Josephson, 123 Idaho 790, 792-93, 852 P.2d 1387, 1389-90 (1993);
State v. Belden, 148 Idaho 277, 280, 220 P.3d 1096, 1099 (Ct. App. 2009). When determining
whether probable cause exists:
The task of the issuing magistrate is simply to make a practical, common-sense
decision whether, given all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit before him,
including the “veracity” and “basis of knowledge” of persons supplying hearsay
information, there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will
be found in a particular place.

Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983). See also State v. Wilson, 130 Idaho 213, 215, 938
P.2d 1251, 1253 (Ct. App. 1997). A magistrate need only determine that it would be reasonable
to seek the evidence in the place indicated in the warrant, not that the evidence sought is there in
fact, or is more likely than not to be found, where the search takes place. State v. O’Keefe, 143
Idaho 278, 287, 141 P.3d 1147, 1156 (Ct. App. 2006); State v. Fairchild, 121 Idaho 960, 966,
829 P.2d 550, 556 (Ct. App. 1992).
When probable cause to issue a search warrant is challenged on appeal, the reviewing
court’s function is to ensure that the magistrate had a substantial basis for concluding that
probable cause existed. Gates, 462 U.S. at 238-39; Belden, 148 Idaho at 280, 220 P.3d at 1099.
In this evaluation, great deference is paid to the magistrate’s determination. Gates, 462 U.S. at
236; Wilson, 130 Idaho at 215, 938 P.2d at 1253. The test for reviewing the magistrate’s action
is whether he or she abused his or her discretion in finding that probable cause existed. State v.
Holman, 109 Idaho 382, 387, 707 P.2d 493, 498 (Ct. App. 1985). On appeal, our review of the
magistrate’s decision to issue the warrant is conducted with due regard for, but independently
from, the district court’s decision. State v. Chandler, 140 Idaho 760, 762, 101 P.3d 704, 706 (Ct.
App. 2004). When a search is conducted pursuant to a warrant, the burden of proof is on the

4
defendant to show that the search was invalid. State v. Kelly, 106 Idaho 268, 275, 678 P.2d 60,
67 (Ct. App. 1984).
1. Specificity
Initially, we address Harper’s contention that the affidavit did not establish probable
cause because it was “rife with conclusory statements” and based on hearsay. It is well settled
that hearsay information may be included in an affidavit in support of probable cause providing
that there is a substantial basis for crediting the hearsay. I.C.R. 4(e); State v. Elison, 135 Idaho
546, 549-50, 21 P.3d 483, 486-87 (2001); State v. Carlson, 134 Idaho 471, 476, 4 P.3d 1122,
1127 (Ct. App. 2000). In adopting the “totality of the circumstances” test in Gates, the United
States Supreme Court abandoned a previous standard developed in Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S.
108 (1964) and Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969), which required that the
government demonstrate both the informant’s veracity and the informant’s basis of knowledge.
Chandler, 140 Idaho at 762, 101 P.3d at 706. In State v. Chapple, 124 Idaho 525, 528, 861 P.2d
95, 98 (Ct. App. 1993), we explained the effect of the Gates decision:
[T]he Court did not completely abandon the two-pronged test of Aguilar-
Spinelli but suggested that the two prongs are closely intertwined, so that “a
deficiency in one may be compensated for, in determining the overall reliability
of a tip, by a strong showing as to the other, or by some other indicia of
reliability.” [Gates], 462 U.S. at 233, 103 S. Ct. at 2329. Thus, while the “totality
of the circumstances” has eliminated the rigid requirements of “veracity” and
“basis of knowledge” derived from the Aguilar-Spinelli decisions, these standards
remain a useful first step in evaluating probable cause where the information is
derived, at least in part, from an undisclosed informant. State v. Prestwich, 110
Idaho 966, 719 P.2d 1226 (Ct. App. 1986); State v. Schaffer, 107 Idaho 812, 817,
693 P.2d 458, 463 (Ct. App. 1984).

While acknowledging that hearsay is allowed to be included in search warrant affidavits,
Harper contends that the affidavit still needs to provide sufficient information to allow the
magistrate to determine the reliability and veracity of the source, which he contends was not
included here. He argues that, due to the affiant’s failure to identify the people he spoke to at the
pharmacies or the basis of those sources’ information, the magistrate “could not possibly have
determined the ‘veracity’ and ‘basis of knowledge’ of persons supplying hearsay information and
thus, the statements lack sufficient credibility to justify a finding of probable cause.”
In Chandler, 140 Idaho 760, 101 P.3d 704, we discussed the reliability and veracity of
informants whose names had not been disclosed in the affidavit. Initially, we noted that, where

5
the information has come from a “citizen informant,” disclosure of the person’s name and
address will ordinarily be sufficient to show the informant’s veracity and reliability. Id. at 763,
101 P.3d at 707. We then pointed out that an informant whose identity is known to the police is
not to be treated as an anonymous tipster even if the informant’s name is not disclosed to the
magistrate:
[An appellant’s] initial assertion . . . that the informant’s identity was not
known to the magistrate, even if it were supported by the record, would be of no
significance. It is not whether the magistrate was aware of an informant’s
identity, but whether law enforcement officials knew the identity, that is
important. An informant will know that if law enforcement personnel are aware
of his or her identity, negative consequences can flow from the provision of false
information. An informant cannot possibly foresee, at the time of giving
information to police officers, whether the officers will disclose his or her identity
to a magistrate, and therefore the presence or absence of such disclosure cannot
possibly affect the informant’s truthfulness.

Id. We then concluded that, while the informants in Chandler were “confidential” in the sense
that police had not disclosed their identity, they were not anonymous because their identity was
known to police; they gave their information during in-person interviews and risked
accountability to the police if they provided false information. Id. In addition, we noted that the
informants corroborated each other and that each had a reliable basis of knowledge, having
gained the knowledge reported to police through direct contact with Chandler and/or direct
observation of drugs at his residence. Id. at 764, 101 P.3d at 708. See also Carlson, 134 Idaho
at 476, 4 P.3d at 1127 (holding that personal observation by an informant is one of the strongest
possible indications of reliability and that information may be sufficiently reliable to support a
probable cause finding if the information is corroborated by independent evidence).
As to this case, we note that Harper’s contention that the officer was required to provide
the names and sources of information of the pharmacy employees in order to prove the veracity
and reliability of the information they conveyed to law enforcement is contrary to the practical,
common-sense approach mandated by Gates. Rather, as opposed to a requirement that
informants be identified, we consider the totality of the circumstances. Like in Chandler, the
identities of the pharmacy employees were known to law enforcement and thus, those employees
risked accountability if they provided false information. In addition, as pointed out by the state,
there is no indication how disclosure of the pharmacy employees’ names would aid in the

6
magistrate’s determination of whether the information they provided was accurate and sufficient
to form the basis of a probable cause determination. Further, Harper’s assertion that the
employees’ basis of knowledge was not disclosed is unavailing; it is clear that these employees
obtained this information due to the fact that they were employed at the pharmacies where
Harper and the others purchased methamphetamine precursors. Finally, like in Chandler, the
information provided by the informants that Harper, Stinson, and Wolff were frequently
purchasing pseudoephedrine was corroborated by various employees from various pharmacies
and by the officers’ own examination of pharmacy logs. Thus, we disagree that the magistrate
was required to disregard this information as unreliable hearsay as there was substantial basis to
find it credible.
Harper also contends that “nearly every single statement of [Detective] Scrimsher’s
which identifies that products containing pseudoephedrine were purchased are conclusory
statements” that were not independently verifiable and thus should not have been considered by
the magistrate in its probable cause determination. While Harper is correct that the affidavit in
support of a warrant must relate facts, not simply the conclusions that may be drawn from those
facts, State v. Guzman, 122 Idaho 981, 984, 842 P.2d 660, 663 (1992), such is not the case here.
Detective Scrimsher indicated that he and his colleagues were informed by numerous pharmacy
employees that Harper was purchasing pseudoephedrine that he obtained in their respective
pharmacies and that Detective Scrimsher had personally observed the names of all three as
having bought pseudoephedrine at Walgreens, Rite-Aid, and Wal-Mart in those stores’
respective written pseudoephedrine logs. That the basis of this knowledge could have been
clearer is not the standard--it is sufficient that Detective Scrimsher identified that he had obtained
this knowledge from pharmacy personnel, whom it is safe to assume are familiar with the
substance and can identify when it is being purchased, and from his identification of the
suspects’ names in written pharmacy records. Accordingly, the magistrate was not required to
disregard this evidence as merely conclusory statements in its determination of probable cause.
2. Requisite nexus
Harper also contends that the affidavit failed to establish the requisite nexus between the
alleged criminal activity, the items sought, and the residence and persons searched. More
specifically, the affidavit indicates that the residence searched was owned by Stinson, but does
not identify Stinson as having purchased pseudoephedrine. Additionally, while the affidavit

7
states that Harper purchased the substance, it fails to establish that he resided at the residence
searched as it only referenced him being observed at the residence three times over a 440-day
period. Likewise, Harper contends that there was no nexus between Wolff’s alleged criminal
conduct and the residence searched. Finally, he contends there was no evidence that any
purchased pseudoephedrine was ever brought to the residence that was the subject of the search.
Probable cause to search requires a nexus between criminal activity and the item to be
seized, and a nexus between the item to be seized and the place to be searched. U.S. Const.
amend. IV; State v. Yager, 139 Idaho 680, 686, 85 P.3d 656, 662 (2004); Belden, 148 Idaho at
280, 220 P.3d at 1099. Most courts require that a nexus between the items to be seized and the
place to be searched must be established by specific facts, and an officer’s general conclusions
are not enough. Yager, 139 Idaho at 686, 85 P.3d at 662; Belden, 148 Idaho at 280, 220 P.3d at
1099. Nonetheless, even though criminal objects are not tied to a particular place by any direct
evidence, an inference of probable cause to believe that they would be found in that place can be
reasonable. O’Keefe, 143 Idaho at 287, 141 P.3d at 1156; Fairchild, 121 Idaho at 966, 829 P.2d
at 556. A magistrate is entitled to draw reasonable inferences about where evidence is likely to
be kept based on the nature of the evidence and the type of offense. Belden, 148 Idaho at 280,
220 P.3d at 1099; O’Keefe, 143 Idaho at 287, 141 P.3d at 1156. Moreover, the magistrate may
take into account the experience and expertise of the officer conducting the search in making a
probable cause determination. O’Keefe, 143 Idaho at 287, 141 P.3d at 1156. In determining
there was the requisite nexus, the district court stated that, considering the totality of the
circumstances, the affidavit in support of the warrant documented that “large quantities” of
pseudoephedrine where being purchased by the occupants of the Airway Avenue residence as
well as “other indicia” of items used to manufacture methamphetamine.
Initially, we note that Harper is incorrect in contending that the affidavit did not include
allegations that Stinson had purchased pseudoephedrine. Detective Scrimsher explicitly alleged
in multiple paragraphs of the affidavit that Stinson had purchased the substances as well as other
methamphetamine components. In addition, Harper expends considerable effort arguing that
there was no nexus between the allegation of his criminal conduct stemming from his purchase
of pseudoephedrine and the residence because the affidavit consistently refers to the residence as
“Stinson’s residence” and only once refers to it as Harper’s residence. He argues that the
affidavit only references his being present at the residence on three occasions over a 440-day

8
period and that his car was there several times over this period. Overall, he contends, the
affidavit read as a whole indicates that he was, at most, an occasional guest. We do not agree
that this is the only proper interpretation of the statements in the affidavit. In fact, the affidavit
refers to the Airway Avenue home as Harper’s residence in at least four instances. Specifically,
in reference to the Airway Avenue residence, paragraphs eight and eleven of the affidavit state
that “Harper left his residence;” paragraph seventeen indicates that in his vehicle, Harper “turned
south and travelled back to Airway Avenue and turned east to go to his residence;” and
paragraph twenty-eight states that after leaving Walgreens and stopping by a storage unit, Harper
“went back home.” In addition, Harper’s presence was noted at the house on various other
occasions--including three times where he left the residence and purchased pseudoephedrine at
numerous pharmacies, before, on at least two occasions, returning to the residence. Contrary to
Harper’s seeming implication, the affidavit referencing the house as “Stinson’s residence” is not
mutually exclusive to the officers believing that Harper lived there as well--especially where it
was asserted by Detective Scrimsher on at least four occasions that it was also Harper’s
residence. 1 The affidavit allowed the magistrate to draw a reasonable inference that evidence
regarding the alleged drug activity was likely to be found at the residence. 2
3. Totality of the circumstances
Having established that there was a requisite nexus, and that the magistrate could
properly take into account the entirety of the affidavit, we now examine whether the totality of
the circumstances supported a conclusion that there existed the requisite probable cause to search

1
That there was no allegation that Harper had ever delivered any pseudoephedrine to the
residence is not dispositive. It is well settled where there is probable cause to believe than an
individual is trafficking in illegal drugs, it is reasonable to infer that the suspected trafficker
keeps evidence of his or her activities in his residence. O’Keefe, 143 Idaho at 287-88, 141 P.3d
at 1156-57. Here, the affidavit alleged that Harper, Stinson, and Wolff had collectively
purchased large amounts of pseudoephedrine (including over 7,000 tablets over a ten-month
period), such that there was probable cause of more than personal drug use, and thus, it was
reasonable to assume that evidence would be found at what was identified as Harper’s and
Stinson’s residence.
2
Harper also contends that the requisite nexus between Wolff’s alleged criminal activity
and the residence was not established. However, Wolff is not a party to this appeal and as the
State points out, even if the affidavit is insufficient to establish that Wolff lived at the residence,
such a deficiency would be irrelevant to the finding of probable cause in regard to Harper
because the search of the residence was not based on her supposed actions alone.

9
the residence. In support of his request for a warrant, in relevant part, Detective Scrimsher
averred that he commenced his investigation on August 15, 2008, after being notified by
employees of a Walgreens pharmacy that Stinson had been coming in two to three times a week
and purchasing two bottles of iodine tincture, a known component of methamphetamine.
Occasionally, Wolff accompanied him and also purchased two bottles of iodine tincture.
Detective Scrimsher followed up on this information, contacting several pharmacies and learning
that Stinson had been purchasing pseudoephedrine and other methamphetamine components
from Rite-Aid, Walgreens, and Wal-Mart. After identifying Stinson’s residence at 1536 Airway
Avenue, Detective Scrimsher saw a car at the residence registered to Harper. This car was seen
at the residence on several subsequent occasions and it is apparent from the affidavit that
Detective Scrimsher believed that Harper lived at the residence. Detective Scrimsher also saw
several other components commonly used to manufacture methamphetamine outside the
residence.
In November 2008, Detective Scrimsher confirmed that Harper and Wolff had been
frequently purchasing pseudoephedrine from Rite-Aid and other pharmacies in the area. He then
received a copy of the “pseudoephedrine logs” from three different pharmacies, which indicated
that from January 1, 2008, through November 10, 2008, Stinson, Harper, and Wolff had
collectively purchased over 7,000 pseudoephedrine tablets, which based on his training and
experience would make approximately one-half pound of methamphetamine.
Over the following month, Detective Scrimsher averred that he received “several” phone
calls from pharmacies that Wolff, Stinson, and Harper had been continuing to purchase
pseudoephedrine. He also indicated that he continued to see Harper’s car in the driveway of the
Airway Avenue residence. On December 15, officers watched as Harper left the residence and
went to Rite-Aid; Albertsons; Wal-Mart, where they later confirmed that he purchased
pseudoephedrine; and a Chevron gas station where he purchased approximately two bottles of
“Heet,” a known methamphetamine component. The officers then watched as Harper drove back
toward the Airway Avenue residence.
Officers again watched on January 12, 2009, as Harper left the Airway Avenue residence
and went to Wal-Mart; to Albertsons, where he was observed in the pharmacy department; to
Rite-Aid; to Walgreens; to a storage unit; and then went “back home.” Detective Scrimsher later
confirmed that Harper had purchased pseudoephedrine at each of the stores. On March 12, 2009,

10
officers again watched as Harper and Stinson left the Airway Avenue residence in Harper’s car
and went to Albertsons, where they were observed in the pharmacy area; to Rite-Aid; to Wal-
Mart; and then to a storage unit. It was confirmed that each of them had purchased
pseudoephedrine and/or other methamphetamine components at each store. Detective Scrimsher
surmised that as of March 13, 2009, Harper, Stinson, and Wolff had purchased a combined total
of approximately 400 grams of pseudoephedrine that he was aware of which could be used to
make “well over” one-half pound of methamphetamine and possibly more.
Based on this information in the affidavit, and giving the required deference to the
magistrate’s determination and drawing reasonable inferences in favor of the warrant’s validity,
we conclude that the requisite probable cause was established that Harper was involved in illegal
drug activity and there was a fair probability that contraband or evidence of that activity would
be found at the Airway Avenue residence.
B. Particularity
Harper also argues that the evidence seized should be suppressed because the search
warrant did not contain a description of the place to be searched with sufficient particularity.
Specifically, he argues that the search warrant was invalid because “[t]here is no question that
[he] rented a room at the home searched and that the police were aware of this fact at the time
they applied for the search warrant” and the warrant failed to identify his locked room as a
separate sub-unit rented to him.
The Fourth Amendment safeguards the privacy of citizens by insuring against the search
of premises where probable cause is lacking. O’Keefe, 143 Idaho at 285, 141 P.3d at 1154; State
v. Young, 136 Idaho 711, 714, 39 P.3d 651, 654 (Ct. App. 2002). Accordingly, a search warrant
must describe the place to be searched with particularity. State v. Schaffer, 112 Idaho 1024,
1027, 739 P.2d 323, 326 (1987); O’Keefe, 143 Idaho at 285, 141 P.3d at 1154. The purpose of
the particularity requirement is to minimize the risk that officers executing search warrants will
mistakenly search a place other than the one intended by the magistrate. O’Keefe, 143 Idaho at
285, 141 P.3d at 1154. Thus, the description must be sufficiently clear so that the property to be
searched is recognizable from other neighboring properties. Id.; Young, 136 Idaho at 715, 39
P.3d at 655. The test for determining the sufficiency of the description of the place to be
searched is whether the place is described with sufficient particularity as to enable the executing
officer to locate and identify the premises with reasonable effort and whether there is any

11
reasonable probability that another premise might be mistakenly searched. Young, 136 Idaho at
715, 39 P.3d at 655.
The issue is further complicated if a building is a multi-unit residential structure as
opposed to a single-family residence. The general rule is that a warrant issued for search of a
multi-unit structure will be invalidated if it does not identify the sub-unit to be searched with
sufficient particularity to preclude a search of other units in the same building occupied by
innocent persons. Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79, 84-85 (1987); State v. Reynolds, 148
Idaho 66, 69, 218 P.3d 795, 798 (Ct. App. 2009). However, an exception exists if officers did
not know or should not have known that there are multiple, separate dwelling units. Reynolds,
148 Idaho at 69, 218 P.3d at 798.
In Reynolds, 148 Idaho 66, 218 P.3d 795, this Court applied the exception. There, the
police had responded to a one-story house after receiving a call that a two-year-old child had
died in the home from unknown causes. An officer specializing in drug investigation was called
to the home, and he recognized the odor of growing marijuana plants coming from one of the
two locked bedrooms on the main floor of the house. The officers questioned Reynolds, who
stated that he lived in the room from which the marijuana smell was emanating and explained
that a roommate lived across the hall from him and that a couple lived in the basement. All
residents of the house had access to the common areas of the home, but each room in the house
had keyed locks. There were no other indications that the rooms were separate rental units.
After Reynolds refused the officer’s request to search his room, the officer applied for a
search warrant. The affidavit in support of the request detailed evidence of methamphetamine
use as well as the smell of growing marijuana plants and sought authorization to search the entire
house for evidence of the suspected criminal activity. On appeal, Reynolds challenged the
validity of the warrant, arguing that it did not specify the place to be searched with sufficient
particularity because it failed to identify the separate sub-units that the police sought to search.
This Court upheld the district court’s order denying Reynolds’ motion to suppress,
finding that the officer had no knowledge at the time he applied for the warrant that the house
was anything other than a single-family residence with multiple occupants living within. We
stated:
The only external indication that there may have been subdivided units was the
presence of locks on the doors--which the officer testified was not uncommon in
single residences occupied by several people. Beyond the fact that there were

12
 locks on the doors, all the occupants shared common entrances and common
areas, there was no evidence of separate utilities or mailboxes, and there were no
individual markings on the doors. In short, there was very little, if anything, to
create a belief that these were separate subunits. Therefore, the district court was
justified in finding that the officer did not know, nor should have known, that the
home was actually a multiunit structure. . . .

Reynolds, 148 Idaho at 71, 218 P.3d at 800.
In concluding that the warrant was not overbroad in the instant case, the district court
discussed both Garrison and Reynolds and concluded that there was no evidence that the officer
who applied for the search warrant had knowledge that the Airway Avenue residence was
anything other than a single-family residence. On appeal, Harper contends that the district
court’s reliance on Reynolds was misplaced because it is factually distinguishable from the
instant case. Unlike the situation in Reynolds, he contends that the officers in this case knew that
Harper rented a room in the residence given his unequivocal statement to the officers at the time
of the search. Thus, he contends the exception to the general Garrison rule that a unit need not
be described with particularity if the officers did not know, or should not have known, that a
residence was comprised of multiple units does not apply in this case. He also contends that
Reynolds does not apply because its analysis was limited to the federal constitution and did not
address Idaho’s heightened constitutional protections and rejection of the good faith exception to
the warrant requirement.
We need not determine whether the exception applied in Reynolds applies under our state
constitution, however, because as we discuss below, a Garrison inquiry into what the officers
knew, or should have known, regarding the living arrangements at the Airway Avenue residence
was unnecessary. 3 A review of Garrison and its progeny reveals that these cases involve
circumstances where the sub-unit alleged to not have been particularly described in the warrant
was the residence of a person not described as a suspect in the warrant. The instant case is
distinguishable--Harper himself was specifically named in the affidavit seeking the warrant as an
active participant in the drug operation and as a resident of the Airway Avenue residence.

3
We do note, however, that Harper’s contention that officers knew at the time they applied
for the search warrant that the home was a “multi-family dwelling and that Mr. Harper not only
resided there but paid rent” is not supported by the record. Rather, the record indicates that,
while they knew Harper resided there, the fact that he paid rent and had a lock on his bedroom
door did not become apparent until the officers were in the midst of executing the warrant.

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 The Connecticut Supreme Court succinctly addressed this issue in State v. Buddhu, 825
A.2d 48 (Conn. 2003), and we consider its approach instructive. There, an informant told the
police that the defendant (father) and his son were involved with the informant in a check forgery
scheme, which included several meetings between the informant and the father at the father’s
residence. On this basis, law enforcement applied for a warrant to search the father’s residence
and to seize, among other things, bank account records, office equipment, and other items used
in the manufacture of forged instruments. In the accompanying affidavit, the detectives stated
that a search of the state department of motor vehicles records verified that both the father and
son had listed their residential address as that identified by the informant, “958 Broad Street,
Hartford.” A warrant was issued, containing the following description of the place to be
searched: “The residence of [the son] and [father], 958 Broad Street, Hartford, Ct. This is also
the business location of PHOENIX CONSULTING SERVICES, operated by [the father].”
Law enforcement officers executed the warrant, and found that the building on Broad
Street that bore the number “958” was a three-story, multi-unit dwelling, which had two
unlabeled doors on each floor. Upon their arrival, officers ascended to the third floor of the
building where they found two doors. They first knocked on the door on the left and then on the
right. The son opened the door on the left and certain officers entered that unit and conducted a
protective sweep. Officers asked the son where the father’s room was located and the son told
them that the father lived in the unit on the right. Officers instructed the son to open the door
and the son complied, unlocking the door with a key. As a result of their search of the father’s
unit, officers seized several items that implicated the father in a forgery scheme.
The father filed a motion to suppress, arguing that the warrant did not describe with
sufficient particularity the place to be searched because it did not particularly describe that he
lived in a separate unit from the son. At the hearing on the motion, the detectives who applied
for the warrant testified that they were aware that the building in which the son and father
resided was a multi-unit dwelling and that the son and father resided on the third floor, but that
due to an oversight, they failed to specify as much in their application for a warrant. However,
the detectives also believed that the son and father resided at the same residence, even though it
became apparent during execution of the warrant that they resided in different units. The
Buddhu court held that the particularity requirement of the Fourth Amendment was satisfied.

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 The Buddhu court also noted that Garrison did not hold, implicitly or explicitly, that
officers have a duty to disclose to the judge issuing the warrant that a residence is located in a
multi-unit building--it merely held that if the police knew, or should have known, that the third
floor of the multi-unit building contained additional residences for which there was no probable
cause to search, the officers would have had a duty to exclude those residences from the warrant
application. Buddhu, 825 A.2d at 61 (citing Garrison, 480 U.S. at 84-85). Thus, the Buddhu
court surmised, Garrison only stands for the limited proposition that police officers have a duty
to disclose material information that they discover or reasonably should discover and that
reasonably would promote a narrow description of the place to be searched, so as to preclude
indiscriminate searches of places for which there is no probable cause to search. Id.
The Buddhu court then held that, because the affidavit established independent probable
cause to search both the son’s and father’s residences, a Garrison inquiry into what the officers
knew, or should have known, about their living arrangements was unnecessary. Id. In other
words, because police possessed probable cause to search both where the son resided and where
the father resided, then omission to disclose to the issuing judge that they technically resided in
separate residences would be irrelevant because there was no danger of authorizing a search of a
residence for which there existed no probable cause.
We agree with the Buddhu court’s interpretation that Garrison only requires that officers
describe the particular residence to be searched if there are other units in a multi-unit building for
which there is not probable cause to search. Idaho courts have consistently held that the purpose
behind the particularity requirement is to minimize the risk that officers executing search
warrants will mistakenly search a place other than the one intended by the magistrate, O’Keefe,
143 Idaho at 285, 141 P.3d at 1154, and, as we stated in Reynolds, “if officers know or should
know that there are multiple, separate dwelling units, they must exclude from a requested
warrant those units that are not under suspicion.” Reynolds, 148 Idaho at 69, 218 P.3d at 798.
Implicit in this rule is that there is no requirement that units that are under suspicion be excluded.
Thus, even assuming, without deciding, 4 that Harper occupied a separate residence within the

4
The general rule is that a locked bedroom door does not, in itself, automatically elevate a
bedroom to the status of a separate residential unit. See, e.g., United States v. Kyles, 40 F.3d
519, 524 (2d. Cir. 1994); State v. Anderson, 935 P.2d 1007, 1014 (Haw. 1997); People v.

15
Airway Avenue home, if the affidavit asserted probable cause to search his residence as well as
Stinson’s, the issue of whether officers identified the alleged multi-unit character of the residence
to the issuing magistrate is irrelevant.
As we discussed above, Harper and Stinson were both named in the warrant and probable
cause was established that both were involved in illegal drug activity and there was a fair
probability that contraband or evidence of that activity would be found at the Airway Avenue
residence--in either Harper’s room or the rest of the residence. Thus, it was not necessary for the
affidavit seeking the warrant to specifically describe Harper’s “residence” because it need not
have been excluded as there was no danger that it would be searched without probable cause.
Here, the affidavit identified the residence by the street number, color, description, orientation,
where the house number was located, and the vehicles typically located there. We conclude that
this satisfied the particularity requirement. 5
III.
CONCLUSION
Harper has failed to show that the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress
because he has failed to demonstrate that the warrant was issued without probable cause and
without the requisite particularity. Accordingly, we affirm his judgment of conviction for
trafficking in amphetamine and/or methamphetamine by manufacturing and manufacture or
delivery of a controlled substance where children are present.
Judge LANSING and Judge MELANSON CONCUR.

Siegwarth, 674 N.E.2d 508, 511 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996); State v. Hymer, 400 So. 2d 637, 638-39
(La. 1981).
5
We need not address Harper’s contention that the Idaho Constitution’s heightened
protection against unreasonable searches and seizures operates to invalidate the warrant in this
instance. He bases this argument on the premise that the warrant was only valid based on
application of the good faith doctrine which Idaho has rejected based on the Idaho Constitution.
However, as we conclude above, validity of the warrant was based on probable cause and did not
require application of the good faith exception to “save” it, and therefore application of the Idaho
Constitution would not be dispositive.

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