State v. Jason Terry Deems

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO Docket Nos. 40006/40009 STATE OF IDAHO, ) 2013 Unpublished Opinion No. 497 ) Plaintiff-Respondent, ) Filed: May 17, 2013 ) v. ) Stephen W. Kenyon, Clerk ) JASON TERRY DEEMS, ) THIS IS AN UNPUBLISHED ) OPINION AND SHALL NOT Defendant-Appellant. ) BE CITED AS AUTHORITY ) Appeal from the District Court of the First Judicial District, State of Idaho, Kootenai County. Hon. John T. Mitchell, District Judge. Order revoking probation and requiring execution of unified five-year sentence with three-year determinate term for possession of marijuana, and consecutive twenty-year unified sentence with two years determinate for possession of oxycodone with intent to deliver, affirmed; order denying I.C.R. 35 motion, affirmed. Stephen D. Thompson, Ketchum, for appellant. Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General; Kenneth K. Jorgensen, Deputy Attorney General, Boise, for respondent. ________________________________________________ Before GUTIERREZ, Chief Judge; GRATTON, Judge; and MELANSON, Judge PER CURIAM In these consolidated appeals, Jason Terry Deems pled guilty to possession of marijuana (Docket No. 40006). Idaho Code § 37-2732(c). The district court imposed a unified five-year sentence with a three-year determinate term, suspended the sentence and placed Deems on probation for a period of five years. Approximately one year later, Deems was charged with possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver and concealment of evidence, as well as violating probation (Docket No. 40009). Deems pled guilty and the district court revoked probation in Docket No. 40006, executed the original unified five years with three years determinate sentence, and retained jurisdiction. In Docket No. 40009, the district court imposed 1 a unified twenty-year sentence with two years determinate to be served consecutive to the sentence in Docket No. 40006, and retained jurisdiction. After a period of retained jurisdiction, the district court suspended the sentences in both cases and placed Deems on probation for five years. After another probation violation, the district court again retained jurisdiction and, following the period of retained jurisdiction, suspended Deems’ sentences, again placing him on probation. Subsequently, Deems again admitted to violating several terms of his probation, and the district court consequently revoked probation and ordered execution of the original sentences to run consecutively. Deems filed an Idaho Criminal Rule 35 motion for reconsideration of sentences, which the district court denied. Deems appeals, contending that the district court abused its discretion in revoking probation and by denying his Rule 35 motion. It is within the trial court’s discretion to revoke probation if any of the terms and conditions of the probation have been violated. I.C. §§ 19-2603, 20-222; State v. Beckett, 122 Idaho 324, 325, 834 P.2d 326, 327 (Ct. App. 1992); State v. Adams, 115 Idaho 1053, 1054, 772 P.2d 260, 261 (Ct. App. 1989); State v. Hass, 114 Idaho 554, 558, 758 P.2d 713, 717 (Ct. App. 1988). In determining whether to revoke probation, a court must examine whether the probation is achieving the goal of rehabilitation and consistent with the protection of society. State v. Upton, 127 Idaho 274, 275, 899 P.2d 984, 985 (Ct. App. 1995); Beckett, 122 Idaho at 325, 834 P.2d at 327; Hass, 114 Idaho at 558, 758 P.2d at 717. The court may, after a probation violation has been established, order that the suspended sentence be executed or, in the alternative, the court is authorized under Idaho Criminal Rule 35 to reduce the sentence. Beckett, 122 Idaho at 325, 834 P.2d at 327; State v. Marks, 116 Idaho 976, 977, 783 P.2d 315, 316 (Ct. App. 1989). The court may also order a period of retained jurisdiction. State v. Urrabazo, 150 Idaho 158, 162, 244 P.3d 1244, 1248 (2010). A decision to revoke probation will be disturbed on appeal only upon a showing that the trial court abused its discretion. Beckett, 122 Idaho at 325, 834 P.2d at 327. In reviewing the propriety of a probation revocation, the focus of the inquiry is the conduct underlying the trial court’s decision to revoke probation. State v. Morgan, 153 Idaho 618, 621, 288 P.3d 835, 838 (Ct. App. 2012). Thus, this Court will consider the elements of the record before the trial court relevant to the revocation of probation issues which are properly made part of the record on appeal. Id. 2 Sentencing is also a matter for the trial court’s discretion. Both our standard of review and the factors to be considered in evaluating the reasonableness of a sentence are well established and need not be repeated here. See State v. Hernandez, 121 Idaho 114, 117-18, 822 P.2d 1011, 1014-15 (Ct. App. 1991); State v. Lopez, 106 Idaho 447, 449-51, 680 P.2d 869, 871- 73 (Ct. App. 1984); State v. Toohill, 103 Idaho 565, 568, 650 P.2d 707, 710 (Ct. App. 1982). When reviewing the length of a sentence, we consider the defendant’s entire sentence. State v. Oliver, 144 Idaho 722, 726, 170 P.3d 387, 391 (2007). When we review a sentence that is ordered into execution following a period of probation, we will examine the entire record encompassing events before and after the original judgment. State v. Hanington, 148 Idaho 26, 29, 218 P.3d 5, 8 (Ct. App. 2009). We base our review upon the facts existing when the sentence was imposed as well as events occurring between the original sentencing and the revocation of the probation. Id. A motion for reduction of sentence under I.C.R. 35 is essentially a plea for leniency, addressed to the sound discretion of the court. State v. Knighton, 143 Idaho 318, 319, 144 P.3d 23, 24 (2006); State v. Allbee, 115 Idaho 845, 846, 771 P.2d 66, 67 (Ct. App. 1989). In presenting a Rule 35 motion, the defendant must show that the sentence is excessive in light of new or additional information subsequently provided to the district court in support of the motion. State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho 201, 203, 159 P.3d 838, 840 (2007). An appeal from the denial of a Rule 35 motion cannot be used as a vehicle to review the underlying sentence absent the presentation of new information. Id. Because no new information in support of Deems’ Rule 35 motion was presented, review of the sentence by this Court is precluded. Applying the foregoing standards, and having reviewed the records in these cases, we cannot say that the district court abused its discretion either in revoking probation or in ordering execution of Deems’ original sentences without modification. Therefore, the order revoking probation and directing execution of Deems’ previously suspended sentences and the order denying Deems’ Rule 35 motion are affirmed. 3