State v. Spencer A. Fletcher

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO Docket No. 40121 STATE OF IDAHO, ) 2013 Unpublished Opinion No. 350 ) Plaintiff-Respondent, ) Filed: February 6, 2013 ) v. ) Stephen W. Kenyon, Clerk ) SPENCER A. FLETCHER, ) THIS IS AN UNPUBLISHED ) OPINION AND SHALL NOT Defendant-Appellant. ) BE CITED AS AUTHORITY ) Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, State of Idaho, Ada County. Hon. Lynn G. Norton, District Judge. Order revoking probation and requiring execution of modified determinate three- year sentence and consecutive indeterminate eight-year sentence for two counts of burglary, affirmed. Sara B. Thomas, State Appellate Public Defender; Brian R. Dickson, Deputy Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for appellant. Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General; Kenneth K. Jorgensen, Deputy Attorney General, Boise, for respondent. ________________________________________________ Before GUTIERREZ, Chief Judge; LANSING, Judge; and MELANSON, Judge PER CURIAM Spencer A. Fletcher pled guilty to two counts of burglary. I.C. § 18-1401 and 18-204. The district court imposed a determinate four-year sentence for one count of burglary and a consecutive indeterminate eight-year term for the second count of burglary. The district court, however, suspended the sentences and placed Fletcher on probation. Subsequently, Fletcher admitted to violating several terms of the probation, and the district court consequently revoked probation. The district court ordered execution of the Fletcher’s sentences, but sua sponte reduced Fletchers sentence on the first count of burglary to a determinate term of three years. 1 Fletcher appeals, contending that the district court abused its discretion in revoking probation and that his reduced sentences are still excessive. It is within the trial court’s discretion to revoke probation if any of the terms and conditions of the probation have been violated. I.C. §§ 19-2603, 20-222; State v. Beckett, 122 Idaho 324, 325, 834 P.2d 326, 327 (Ct. App. 1992); State v. Adams, 115 Idaho 1053, 1054, 772 P.2d 260, 261 (Ct. App. 1989); State v. Hass, 114 Idaho 554, 558, 758 P.2d 713, 717 (Ct. App. 1988). In determining whether to revoke probation a court must examine whether the probation is achieving the goal of rehabilitation and consistent with the protection of society. State v. Upton, 127 Idaho 274, 275, 899 P.2d 984, 985 (Ct. App. 1995); Beckett, 122 Idaho at 325, 834 P.2d at 327; Hass, 114 Idaho at 558, 758 P.2d at 717. The court may, after a probation violation has been established, order that the suspended sentence be executed or, in the alternative, the court is authorized under Idaho Criminal Rule 35 to reduce the sentence. Beckett, 122 Idaho at 326, 834 P.2d at 328; State v. Marks, 116 Idaho 976, 977, 783 P.2d 315, 316 (Ct. App. 1989). The court may also order a period of retained jurisdiction. State v. Urrabazo, 150 Idaho 158, 162, 244 P.3d 1244, 1248 (2010). A decision to revoke probation will be disturbed on appeal only upon a showing that the trial court abused its discretion. Beckett, 122 Idaho at 326, 834 P.2d at 328. Sentencing is also a matter for the trial court’s discretion. Both our standard of review and the factors to be considered in evaluating the reasonableness of a sentence are well established and need not be repeated here. See State v. Hernandez, 121 Idaho 114, 117-18, 822 P.2d 1011, 1014-15 (Ct. App. 1991); State v. Lopez, 106 Idaho 447, 449-51, 680 P.2d 869, 871- 73 (Ct. App. 1984); State v. Toohill, 103 Idaho 565, 568, 650 P.2d 707, 710 (Ct. App. 1982). When reviewing the length of a sentence, we consider the defendant’s entire sentence. State v. Oliver, 144 Idaho 722, 726, 170 P.3d 387, 391 (2007). When we review a sentence that is ordered into execution following a period of probation, we will examine the entire record encompassing events before and after the original judgment. State v. Hanington, 148 Idaho 26, 29, 218 P.3d 5, 8 (Ct. App. 2009). We base our review upon the facts existing when the sentence was imposed as well as events occurring between the original sentencing and the revocation of probation. Id. Applying the foregoing standards, and having reviewed the record in this case, we cannot say that the district court abused its discretion either in revoking probation or in ordering 2 execution of Fletcher’s reduced sentences without additional modification. Therefore, the order revoking probation and directing execution of Fletcher’s previously suspended sentences is affirmed. 3