No. 90-542
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
1991
DARRELL D. RAFFETY,
Claimant and Appellant,
-vs-
KANTA PRODUCTS, INC., Employer, and
STATE COMPENSATION INSURANCE FUND,
Defendant and Respondent.
APPEAL FROM: The Workersf Compensation Court,
The Honorable ~imothy Reardon, Judge presiding.
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For Appellant:
Greg J. Skakles; Johnson, Skakles & Kebe, Anaconda,
Montana
For Respondent:
Thomas E. Martello; Hughes, Kellner, Sullivan &
Alke, Helena, Montana
Submitted on Briefs: October 10, 1991
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5.) . 1 Decided: October 29, 1991
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Justice William E. Hunt, Sr., delivered the opinion of the Court.
Claimant Darrell D. Raffety appeals from a judgment of the
Workers' Compensation Court issued on October 10, 1990, which found
that he was only entitled to 140 weeks of permanent partial
disability benefits for injury to one eye, instead of 500 weeks as
claimant argued. We affirm.
The sole issue presented for review by the parties is whether
the Workers' Compensation Court erred in limiting claimant's award
of permanent partial disability benefits for injury to one eye to
140 weeks.
On October 17, 1983, claimant suffered an injury arising out
of and in the course of his employment. Claimant was struck in the
right eye by a nail while he was nailing sheet metal to a storage
shed, resulting in loss of vision in the eye. At the time of
claimant's injury, his employer was insured under Plan I11 of the
Workers8 Compensation Act. A claim for compensation was filed with
insurer, the State Fund, which accepted liability for the injury.
Insurer, in addition to paying medical and temporary total
disability benefits, paid 140 weeks of permanent partial disability
benefits at the rate of $138.50 per week.
On August 31, 1989, claimant petitioned the Workers'
Compensation Court for permanent partial disability benefits in
excess of the 140 weeks paid by the insurer. This petition was
filed after the insurer refused to entertain a petition for
benefits in excess of 140 weeks. Claimant contended he was
entitled to 500 weeks of benefits, minus the 140 weeks previously
paid by the insurer. Inasmuch as the dispute between the parties
involved a question of law only, the matter was submitted to the
Workersr compensation Court on an agreed statement of facts and
briefs by the parties. On October 10, 1990, the Workersf
Compensation Court issued its decision holding that the statutes
governing permanent partial disability benefits were clear and
unambiguous and limited the claimant to 140 weeks of benefits. It
is from this judgment that claimant appeals.
Both parties stipulated that the present dispute involved only
a question of law. In reviewing conclusions of law, this Court
will not apply the substantial credible evidence standard used in
reviewing factual findings of the Workersr Compensation Court.
Concerning this Courtrs review of conclusions of law by the
Workersr compensation Court we recently stated:
! I such a case, the appropriate standard of review is
'n
simply whether the lower courtrs interpretation of the
law is correct. We are not bound by the lower court's
conclusion and remain free to reach our own.I1
Schaub v. Vita Rich Dairy (1989), 236 Mont. 389, 391, 770 P.2d 522,
523. Additionally, concerning our review of conclusions of law, we
have stated:
The reasoning for simply determining if the courtrs
conclusions are correct is that no discretion is involved
when a tribunal arrives at a conclusion of law--the
tribunal either correctly or incorrectly applies the law.
For that reason, this Court concludes that our standard
of review relating to conclusions of law, whether the
conclusions are made by an agency, workersr compensation
court, or trial court, is whether the tribunal's
interpretation of the law is correct.
Steer, Inc. v. Department of Revenue (1990), 245 Mont. 470, 474-75,
803 P.2d 601, 603. The instant case deals with a conclusion of
law, and therefore, upon review we will simply determine whether
the conclusion was or was not correct.
At issue in this case is the Workerst Compensation Court's
interpretation of 5 5 39-71-703 and -705 MCA, (1983), concerning
compensation for injuries causing partial disability. Section
39-71-703, MCA, has undergone significant modification in virtually
every legislative session since 1983, and 5 39-71-705, MCA, has
been repealed. However, it is well-settled that the law existing
at the time of the injury governs. Watson v. Seekins (1988), 234
Mont. 309, 312, 763 P.2d 328, 331. claimant's injury occurred in
1983. Section 39-71-703, MCA (1983), reads as follows:
(1) Weekly compensation benefits for injury producing
partial disability shall be 66 2/3% of the actual
diminution in the worker's earning capacity measured in
dollars, subject to a maximum weekly compensation of
one-half the state's average weekly wage.
(2) The compensation shall be paid during the period of
disability, not exceeding, however, 500 weeks in cases of
partial disability. However, compensation for partial
disabilitv resultins from the loss of or injury to any
member shall not be payable for a sreater number of weeks
than is specified in 39-71-705 for the loss of the
member. [Emphasis added.]
Section 39-71-705, MCA (1983), contains a schedule of injuries to
various members of the body and a corresponding maximum duration of
compensation available for each such injury and reads, in part, as
follows:
(1) In addition to temporary total disability benefits
allowed in this chapter, indemnity benefits for loss of
a member shall be paid at the weekly rate provided in
39-71-703 and shall be paid for the following periods:
....
Total blindness of one eye .............140 weeks . . . .
Claimant points out that at the time of injury § 39-71-104,
MCA (1983), mandated that the Workerrs Compensation Act be
liberally interpreted. We construed this section to require that
when a statute in the Act Itisopen to more than one interpretation,
one favorable to the employee and the other against him, we must
give it the construction most favorable to the injured workman
. . . . Geary v. Anaconda Copper Mining Co. (1947), 120 Mont.
485, 489, 188 P.2d 185, 186. The claimant contends that the
statutes in question may be interpreted as allowing for 500 weeks
of permanent partial disability benefits for the loss of an eye.
We disagree. The Workersr Compensation Court was correct in
determining that the statutes in question are clear and unambiguous
on this point.
Section 39-71-703, MCA, provides that compensation for partial
disability "shall not be payable for a greater number of weeks than
is specified in 39-71-705 . . . ." Section 705 unambiguously sets
the maximum period for permanent partial benefits for loss of an
eye at 140 weeks. The decision of the Workersr Compensation Court
that the statute clearly precludes compensation in excess of 140
weeks for the loss of an eye is correct. Additionally, the
interpretation of the statute by the Workersf Compensation Court is
in accordance with the existing case law construingthese statutes.
In a case very similar to the present controversy, this Court held
that for the loss of vision to one eye an injured worker is limited
to 140 weeks of permanent partial disability benefits. Johnson v.
Industrial Accident Board (1971), 157 Mont. 221, 483 P.2d 918. In
Johnson, as here, the injured worker alleged he was entitled to
500 weeks of permanent partial benefits. The Court in Johnson
held that the legislative intent was clear that an injured worker
was limited to the maximum number of weeks of benefits as was
indicated by the statutory schedule of injuries. This Court has
consistently held that an individual with a scheduled injury is
limited to the benefits set out in the schedule. Walter v. Public
Auction Yards (1979), 181 Mont. 109, 592 P.2d 497. As we explained
in McDanold v. B.N. Transport, Inc. (1984), 208 Mont. 470, 477, 679
The 500-week limit is simply a statutory maximum period
for such compensation. The Legislature has further
limited this period of disability to the number of benefit
weeks for the comparable schedule injury under
sections 39-71-705-708, MCA, but only when the injury is
specifically listed in the schedule.
Claimant presents two arguments in support of his contention
that the above-mentioned cases were decided incorrectly by this
Court. First, claimant argues that our later decisions concerning
this issue are inconsistent with our prior opinion in Spieth v.
Stuart (1956), 130 Mont. 216, 299 P.2d 106. In Spieth, we upheld
the award of 500 weeks of permanent partial disability benefits for
a scheduled injury. The insurer argued that the injured worker
should be limited to 37 weeks as provided in the schedule. Spieth
is not persuasive authority for claimant in the present case in
that the statute in effect at the time of Spieth is dramatically
different than the statute before us now. The statute interpreted
in Spieth limited scheduled injuries to a particular dollar amount
of compensation, but did not limit the scheduled injuries as to
duration of compensation, as does the statute in question here.
Had the last sentence of 5 39-71-703(2), MCA (1983), been in effect
at the time of Spieth, the opposite result would have been reached.
Claimant's second argument in support of his contention that
this Court has misinterpreted 5 5 39-71-703 and -705, MCA, in the
past is, in essence, an argument that the sections, as enacted,
were neither fair nor wise. Further, claimant points out that
other jurisdictions have not relied exclusively on such injury
schedules for determining the duration of compensation benefits.
Claimant argues forcefully that the statutes should have provided
an option for injured workers to receive compensation for permanent
partial disability based on impairment of earning capacity. It is
argued that this would result in a fairer determination of the
appropriate duration of compensation benefits than would relying on
an arbitrary schedule of injuries and their corresponding benefits.
Claimant's policy argument may or may not be correct, but in any
event, this Court will not substitute its judgment for that of the
legislature. The legislature adopted the statutes and they are
clear and unambiguous.
[I]t is the province of courts to construe and apply the
law as they find it and to maintain its integrity as it
has been written by a coordinate branch of the state
government. When the terms of the statute are plain,
unambiguous, direct and certain, it speaks for itself and
there is no room for construction.
Bay v. Department of Administration (1984), 212 Mont. 258, 265, 688
ina ally, claimant argues that an eye is not generally
understood to be a "memberffand therefore the second sentence of
§ 39-71-703(2), MCA (1983), does not apply. Regardless of the
various conflicting definitions of what constitutes a gfmember,ll
it
is obvious that loss of an eye is a scheduled injury as set out in
5 39-71-705, MCA (1983).
The decision of the Workers' Compensation Court is affirmed.
Justice
We concur: I
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