NO. 91-175
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
1991
LAURA J. McCA",
Respondent and Appellant,
-vs-
TRUSTEES, DODSON SCHOOL DISTRICT,
Petitioner and Respondent.
APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Seventeenth Judicial District,
In and for the County of Phillips,
The Honorable B.W. Thomas, Judge presiding.
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For Appellant:
Emilie Loring; Hilley & Loring, Missoula, Montana.
For Respondent:
Catherine Swift; Erdmann Law Office, Helena,
Montana.
Submitted on briefs: July 16, '991
Chief Justice J. A. Turnage delivered the Opinion of the Court.
The District Court for the Seventeenth Judicial District,
Phillips County, granted summary judgment for the Trustees of
Dodson School District (school district) in this action for
attorney fees pursuant to 5 49-2-505(4), MCA. Laura J. McCann
appeals. We reverse.
The issue is whether the District Court abused its discretion
in awarding attorney fees to the school district as the prevailing
defendant in the underlying discrimination case filed under the
Montana Human Rights Act.
The school district brought this action in District Court to
recover from Laura J. McCann (McCann) its attorney fees incurred
in defending against her complaint of unlawful discrimination.
McCann filed her complaint with the Montana Human Rights Commission
in August 1986. She alleged that the school district, her
employer, had discriminated against her on the basis of race and
sex when she, a Caucasian female, was paid less for her combination
teacher/aide position than was a Native American male for his
comparable position. The Human Rights Commission hearing examiner,
while agreeing that McCann had established a prima facie case of
employment discrimination, nevertheless concluded that a basis
other than gender and race had been shown to explain the salary
differential. The hearing examiner concluded that the school
district was justified in paying the male more because he was
2
available to work as an athletic director and coach, for which he
was also paid an additional stipend. The Human Rights Commission
affirmed the hearing examiner's decision. McCann did not appeal
that final administrative determination.
The school district then initiated a district court action for
attorney fees under 5 49-2-505(4), MCA:
The prevailing party in a hearing under this
section may bring an action in district court
for attorneys' fees. The court in its discre-
tion may allow the prevailing party reasonable
attorneys' fees, . . .
The parties filed and briefed cross-motions for summary judgment.
Concluding that "there is a lack of supporting evidence here,
[McCann] carried on her litigation too long, and her action was not
reasonable,I' and that "[plublic policy is advanced by discouraging
claims of limited merit," the District Court granted the school
district's motion for summary judgment. The parties stipulated to
the amount of attorney fees, just under $5,000. McCann appeals.
Did the District Court abuse its discretion in awarding
attorney fees to the school district as the prevailing defendant
in the underlying discrimination case filed under the Montana Human
Rights Act?
Until now, no standard has been authoritatively set forth to
guide a district court's discretion in deciding whether attorney
fees should be awarded to a successful defendant in an action filed
3
under the Montana Human Rights Act. However, this Court has
affirmed a denial of attorney fees to a prevailing defendant based
on the district court's determination that the case was not
"frivolous or factually baseless. It Breese v. Steel Mountain
Enterprises, Inc. (1986), 220 Mont. 454, 458, 716 P.2d 214, 216.
This Court has stated that the Montana Human Rights Act "is
closely modeled after Title VII, and reference to pertinent federal
case law is both useful and appropriate. 'I Snell v. Montana-Dakota
Utilities Co. (1982), 198 Mont. 56, 62, 643 P.2d 841, 844. Here,
the parties and the District Court cite the standard set forth in
Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC (1978), 434 U.S. 412, 98 S.Ct.
694, 54 L.Ed.2d 648, as appropriate in deciding whether a success-
ful defendant in a Human Rights Act case is entitled to attorney
fees. Christiansburq addressed the question of when attorney fees
should be awarded to a successful defendant in a Title VI1 action.
The Christiansburq standard is that
a plaintiff should not be assessed his op-
ponent's attorney's fees unless a court finds
that his claim was frivolous, unreasonable, or
groundless, or that the plaintiff continued to
litigate after it clearly became so.
Christiansburq, 434 U.S. at 422.
The reasons for the above limitation on the allowance of
attorney fees to successful defendants in Title VI1 actions are
also present in cases decided under the Montana Human Rights Act.
The right to be free from discrimination because of race, creed,
4
religion, color, sex, physical or mental handicap, age, or national
origin is a civil right specifically recognized by law. Section
49-1-102, MCA. Civil rights acts depend upon private individuals
to uphold the public policy set forth in the law. To avoid
discouraging the filing of meritorious claims under the Montana
Human Rights Act, we adopt the standard set forth in Christiansburq
as the measure for whether attorney fees should be granted to
prevailing defendants under 5 49-2-505(4), MCA.
Both parties cite federal circuit court cases decided under
Christiansburq. However, as they acknowledge, none of those cases
control and all are factually distinguishable. We do note that,
in contrast to most cases in which this Court defers to a trial
court's discretion on the grounds that the trial court has the
unique opportunity to observe the demeanor of the parties and
witnesses, this action was decided on summary judgment after ad-
ministrative action. Therefore, the District Court did not have
the opportunity to observe the demeanor of the parties or wit-
nesses.
We conclude that the Christiansburq standard has not been
met here. Based primarily on the hearing examiner's finding that
McCann made a prima facie case, we disagree with the District
Court's statement that there is a lack of supporting evidence and
that McCann's action was not reasonable. "If the plaintiff
established a prima facie case ... this will generally defeat a
5
prevailing defendant's request for fees." Larson, Employment
Discrimination, vol. 3, § 58.12, pp. 11-104 through 11-106.1
(1990). Additionally, we do not accept the District Court's
reasoning that McCann's case is "of limited merit." There is
nothing in the record to indicate that McCann's case was filed or
pursued in bad faith. The school board points to McCann's parallel
pursuit of separate federal administrative proceedings, her
eventual loss of this case, and her apparent refusal of a com-
promise offer from the school district. But we are unwilling to
hold that the pursuit of administrative remedies is grounds for a
ruling of unreasonableness. McCann did not further pursue the
action after being unsuccessful in the administrative proceedings.
Despite the school district's protestation that it is a small
entity and that the attorney fees incurred in defending this case
present a hardship to it, we conclude that, in light of the strong
public policy of encouraging possibly meritorious claims filed
under the Montana Human Rights Act, the school district must pay
its own attorney fees.
Reversed.
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We concur:
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August 13, 1991
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that the following order was sent by United States mail, prepaid, to the
following named:
Emilie Loring
Hilley & Loring
500 Daly Ave.
Missoula, MT 59801
Charles E. Erdmann
Erdmann Law Office
P.O. Box 5418
Helena, MT 59604
Patricia D. Peterman and Kyle A. Gray
Holland & Hart
175 No. 27th St., Ste. 1400
Billings, MT 59101
Bruce W. Moerer
Montana School Boards Assc.
1 S . Montana Ave.
Helena, MT 59601
ED SMITH
CLERK OF THE SUPREME COURT
STATE OF MONTANA