THE QUICKSTEP.
Supreme Court of United States.
*668 Mr. Donohue, for the appellant.
Mr. Carter, contra.
*669 Mr. Justice DAVIS delivered the opinion of the court.
The difficulty of discovering the truth in collision cases, which are mainly trials of fact, grows out of the character of the evidence, which is always more or less conflicting. The court that can see the witnesses, hear their statements, observe their demeanor, and compare their degree of intelligence, is better able than an appellate tribunal to reconcile differences in testimony, or, if that be not possible, to ascertain the real nature of the transaction. The District Court that tries the case in the first instance enjoys this advantage, and the finding of facts by it, if followed by the concurrent judgment of the Circuit Court, is entitled to so much weight in this court, that it will be presumed a correct conclusion was reached, and before the decision will be disturbed it must manifestly appear that it was wrong. The testimony in this case was heard by the district judge, who decided that the damages should be divided, and the Circuit Court, on appeal, affirmed his judgment, and the case, therefore, comes before us with every presumption strongly in favor of the correctness of the decision of the lower courts.
It is unnecessary to travel through the evidence, to a great *670 extent contradictory, in order to vindicate our views concerning it. It would serve no useful purpose to do so, and we shall content ourselves with applying the law to a state of facts which we consider the evidence establishes, without any attempt to discuss it. The libel was not filed to recover damages for the breach of a contract, as is contended, but to obtain compensation for the commission of a tort. It is true it asserts a contract of towage, but this is done by way of inducement to the real grievance complained of, which is the wrong suffered by the libellant in the destruction of his boat by the carelessness and mismanagement of the captain of the Quickstep. It is objected that the libel is too general in its terms, and is defective because it does not state the particular acts of negligence and misconduct on the part of the tug which produced the injury; but if this were necessary, the objection should have been interposed at an earlier stage of the proceedings, and cannot be taken, for the first time, after the cause has reached this court. It is always better to describe the particular circumstances attending the transaction; but in admiralty an omission to state some facts which prove to be material, but which cannot have occasioned any surprise to the opposite party, will not be allowed to work any injury to the libellant, if the court can see there was no design on his part in omitting to state them.[*]
We now pass to the facts of the case.
The inquiry is, who is to blame for what has happened? Clearly not the Citizen, for it does not appear that her conduct in any way contributed to the accident. If the tug, in constructing the tow, used the lines furnished by the different boats, yet as each boat was independent of the other, no responsibility can attach to either for the breaking of the line, which she did not provide, and had nothing to do with making fast. In this case neither the bridle-line nor the line that first parted were supplied by the Citizen, and she ought not to suffer for their insufficiency. It is well settled that canal-boats and barges in tow are considered as being *671 under the control of the tug, and the latter is liable for this collision, unless she can show it was not occasioned by her fault.[*]
It was the duty of the tug, as the captains of the canal-boats had no voice in making up the tow, to see that it was properly constructed, and that the lines were sufficient and securely fastened. This was an equal duty, whether she furnished the lines to the boats, or the boats to her. In the nature of the employment, her officers could tell better than the men on the boats what sort of a line was required to secure the boats together, and to keep them in their positions. If she failed in this duty she was guilty of a maritime fault. The parting of the line connecting the boat in the rear on the port side with the fleet, was the commencement of the difficulty that led to this accident. In the effort to recover this boat the consequences followed which produced the collision. If it was good seamanship on the part of the captain of the tug to back in such an emergency, he was required, before undertaking it, at least to know that his bridle-line would hold. And if the sea was in the condition the captain of the tug says it was, it was bad management to back at all. Whether this be so or not, he was bound, in executing a manuvre to recover the detached boat, to look to it that no other boat in the fleet suffered in consequence of it.
But the claimants of the tug deny that their vessel was in fault, and insist that the disaster occurred by the violence of the storm and gale of wind which prevailed at the time. If this be so, how did it happen that two of the canal-boats that got loose from the fleet survived the perils of that night? One of these boats anchored, and was saved without difficulty; the other, loaded with iron, drifted about and was picked up the next morning without having sustained any damage. The fact that these boats did not experience any bad effects from the severity of this storm explodes the theory advanced by the claimants on the subject.
*672 In our opinion the tug was clearly in fault, and the courts below, in dividing the damages, doubtless came to the conclusion that the men on board the Citizen were also to blame for deserting their boat sooner than good seamanship under the circumstances required. As the libellant did not appeal, and can, therefore, only be heard in support of the decree, we are not required to consider whether the evidence convicts the canal-boat of fault.[*] The appellants have no right to complain, for in any aspect of the case they cannot escape without paying at least half the loss.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED.
NOTES
[*] The Clement, 2 Curtis, 363.
[*] The Express, 1 Blatchford, 365; Steamboat New York v. Rea, 18 Howard, 223.
[*] The William Bagaley, 5 Wallace, 412.