IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
Docket No. 37600
IN THE MATTER OF JANE DOE, A ) 2010 Opinion No. 52
CHILD UNDER EIGHTEEN YEARS OF )
AGE. ) Filed: August 4, 2010
_______________________________________ )
IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH & ) Stephen W. Kenyon, Clerk
WELFARE, and GUARDIAN AD LITEM, )
)
Petitioners/Respondents, )
)
v. )
)
JANE DOE I, )
)
Respondent/Appellant. )
)
Appeal from the Magistrate Division of the District Court of the Fifth Judicial
District, State of Idaho, Twin Falls County. Hon. Howard D. Smyser, Magistrate.
Order terminating parental rights, affirmed.
Marilyn B. Paul, Twin Falls County Public Defender, Robin M. A. Weeks,
Deputy Public Defender, Twin Falls, for appellant.
Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General; James T. Baird, Deputy Attorney
General, Boise, for respondent, Idaho Department of Health & Welfare.
Jamie A. LaMure, Kimberly, for respondent, guardian ad litem.
________________________________________________
GRATTON, Judge
Jane Doe I (Doe) appeals the magistrate‟s order terminating her parental rights as to her
child, K.Q. We affirm.
I.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On June 5, 2008, Doe gave birth by cesarean section to a girl, K.Q. She was born with
only one kidney, and following her birth was faced with health problems such as breathing and
eating difficulties. Both Doe and her daughter stayed in the hospital for five days. During this
time, the nurses and doctor became concerned with Doe‟s ability to care for K.Q. They observed
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that not only did Doe have difficulty caring for K.Q., such as holding, feeding, and changing her
diapers, Doe resisted these responsibilities and passed them off to others. Doe did not want K.Q.
in her bed, and Doe wanted K.Q. quiet so she could rest. A caseworker and an officer arrived to
investigate following a call from a doctor who was concerned for K.Q. On June 10, 2008, the
officer declared K.Q. to be in immediate danger, and a petition was filed asserting that K.Q. was
neglected under Idaho Code § 16-1602 and should be placed in shelter care, which was granted.
On July 31, 2008, the magistrate approved a case plan that the parties agreed to follow.
Doe and K.Q.‟s father, D.A., had ended their relationship prior to K.Q.‟s birth, but he agreed to
the case plan. Doe lived with her mother, M.A., and her stepfather, B.A. K.Q. stayed in foster
care throughout the life of the case plan, and changed foster parents one time.
On June 22, 2009, the State filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of Doe and
D.A. The trial was held on February 17 and 18, 2010. D.A. consented to the termination of his
parental rights if Doe‟s rights were terminated. On April 1, 2010, the magistrate granted the
State‟s petition and terminated the parental rights. D.A. does not appeal. Doe appeals.
II.
ANALYSIS
In an action to terminate parental rights, due process requires this Court to determine if
the magistrate‟s decision was supported by substantial and competent evidence. State v. Doe,
143 Idaho 343, 345, 144 P.3d 597, 599 (2006). Substantial and competent evidence is such
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Id. at 345-46,
144 P.3d at 599-600. This Court will indulge all reasonable inferences in support of the trial
court‟s judgment when reviewing an order that parental rights be terminated. Doe v. Doe, 148
Idaho 243, 246-47, 220 P.3d 1062, 1064-65 (2009). We conduct an independent review of the
record that was before the magistrate. Doe, 143 Idaho at 346, 144 P.3d at 600.
A parent has a fundamental liberty interest in maintaining a relationship with his or her
child. Doe v. State, 137 Idaho 758, 760, 53 P.3d 341, 343 (2002). See also Quilloin v. Walcott,
434 U.S. 246, 255 (1978). This interest is protected by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United
States Constitution. State v. Doe, 144 Idaho 839, 842, 172 P.3d 1114, 1117 (2007). “Implicit in
[the Termination of Parent and Child Relationship Act] is the philosophy that wherever possible
family life should be strengthened and preserved . . . .” I.C. § 16-2001(2). Therefore, the
requisites of due process must be met when the Department intervenes to terminate the parent-
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child relationship. State v. Doe, 143 Idaho 383, 386, 146 P.3d 649, 652 (2006). Due process
requires that the Department prove grounds for terminating a parent-child relationship by clear
and convincing evidence. Id. Idaho Code § 16-2005 permits the Department to petition the
court for termination of the parent-child relationship when it is in the child‟s best interest and any
one of the following five factors exist: (a) abandonment; (b) neglect or abuse; (c) lack of a
biological relationship between the child and a presumptive parent; (d) the parent is unable to
discharge parental responsibilities for a prolonged period which will be injurious to the health,
morals, or well-being of the child; or (e) the parent is incarcerated and will remain incarcerated
for a substantial period of time. Each statutory ground is an independent basis for termination.
Doe, 144 Idaho at 842, 172 P.3d at 1117.
In this case, the magistrate concluded, among other things, that Doe‟s parental rights
should be terminated for neglect. Idaho Code § 16-2002(3) defines “neglect” as any conduct
included in I.C. § 16-1602(25),1 as well as situations where the “parent(s) has failed to comply
with the court‟s orders in a child protective act case or the case plan, and reunification of the
child with his or her parent(s) has not occurred within the time standards set forth in section 16-
1629(9).” The time standard established by I.C. § 16-1629(9) is defined as when “a child is
placed in the custody of the department and was also placed in out of the home care for a period
not less than fifteen (15) out of the last twenty-two (22) months from the date the child entered
shelter care.”
A. Neglect
Doe argues the magistrate erred in finding Doe neglected K.Q. under I.C. § 16-
2002(3)(b).2 As noted, I.C. § 16-2002(3)(b) provides that neglect is established if the parent fails
to comply with the case plan and reunification of the child with the parent does not occur within
the time limit set by I.C. § 16-1629(9). Doe concedes the magistrate correctly found K.Q. was in
1
Idaho Code § 16-1602(25) provides, in pertinent part, that a child is “neglected” when the
child “is without proper parental care and control, or subsistence, medical or other care or control
necessary for his well-being because of the conduct or omission of his parents, guardian or other
custodian or their neglect or refusal to provide them.”
2
Because the Court affirms on the I.C. § 16-2002(3)(b) grounds, we need not address
Doe‟s argument that the magistrate erred in finding neglect under I.C. § 16-2002(3)(a).
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foster care for more than the time limit set by I.C. § 16-1629(9). On appeal, Doe argues that the
magistrate erred in finding that she did not complete the case plan.
On July 31, 2008, the magistrate adopted the case plan agreed to by the parties. The case
plan identified areas of concern in restoring K.Q. to Doe‟s custody and listed a desired result for
each concern. The plan then delineated specific tasks to achieve the results. In its decision, the
magistrate summarized the evidence as it pertained to each area in the case plan and discussed
the specific tasks that Doe was required to perform. The magistrate found “[Doe] has failed to
comply with the court‟s order on numerous portions of her case plan.”
The magistrate found Doe failed to participate in a psychological evaluation as required
in the case plan. While Doe met with Dr. Tyson and took the tests he offered, the court found
she provided responses that were so deceptive that they invalidated the testing. Dr. Tyson gave
Doe a personality inventory to understand Doe‟s willingness to be forthright with the examiner.
He stated that Doe‟s level of denial was sufficient to invalidate the inventory. Dr. Tyson
explained:
But, her level of denying shortcomings was remarkable. I‟m not saying
that it‟s a reflection of any kind of negative character flaw. I think it was a very
psychologically naïve attempt to keep -- sometimes people attempt to keep people
from learning more about them. The problem was that we needed her to be
forthright in this evaluation and she wasn‟t, but only on the personality inventory.
She was cooperative with the other measures.
Doe contends she did not violate the case plan during her psychological evaluation and was
merely in denial about her personal shortcomings. The purpose of the psychological evaluation
was for the examiner to learn about the patient and make recommendations. Doe‟s lack of
forthright answers prevented the examiners from learning the information needed, and the
magistrate‟s finding that Doe did not fully complete the required psychological testing, is
supported by the evidence.
To achieve the case plan‟s desired result of determining that Doe could financially
provide for K.Q., the case plan required: (1) Doe‟s family to “provide verification of financial
stability to the Department of Health and Welfare”; (2) Doe to “develop a budget to address the
financial needs of herself and her daughter”; and (3) Doe to secure “a safe, stable, sanitary home
for herself and her daughter.” The magistrate found Doe‟s resources, which were limited to
Social Security disability payments of $400 per month, were insufficient for her and K.Q. The
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court recognized that Doe‟s parents provided assistance with housing and bills. The court
considered this help appropriate and found that with combining resources the family had the
necessary financial ability to provide for K.Q. The court emphasized, however, that B.A.‟s
income, the only income other than disability payments, fluctuated based on his employment.
The court stated that the one task Doe could perform, with no prospects for employment to
ensure continued financial stability, was to create and live by a budget and Doe failed to
consistently perform this task. Doe argues that because the magistrate found that Doe and her
parents‟ financial resources were sufficient, all further criticisms related to mere “tangential”
details.
Demonstrating financial stability was a significant issue in the case plan. The case plan
required Doe to provide verification of the family‟s financial stability and to develop a budget
for the needs of her and her daughter. M.A. testified that she refused to provide financial
information to the Department because she did not think it would help Doe obtain custody of
K.Q. Doe admitted that she stopped preparing a budget because she felt it would only be used as
evidence against her. Bristol, Doe‟s second caseworker, testified that none of the reports Doe
submitted satisfied the requirement of preparing a budget, because they did not identify the
amount of income and just included a stack of receipts, which required Bristol to sort through
them. Bristol testified she only received confirmation that Doe was receiving disability benefits
the morning of the trial. The magistrate‟s finding that Doe did not complete the financial aspects
of the case plan is supported by the evidence.
The magistrate found Doe failed to provide a safe and stable home because of concerns
regarding domestic violence. Doe argues that the evidence of domestic violence at trial did not
support a finding that Doe‟s home was neither safe nor stable. Doe asserts that the two cases
cited by the magistrate concerned more egregious domestic violence. See In re Doe, 143 Idaho
343, 144 P.3d 597 (2006); and Doe v. State, Department of Health and Welfare, 122 Idaho 644,
837 P.2d 319 (Ct. App. 1992). It is for the trial court to weigh the evidence regarding domestic
violence, including the circumstances, frequency, and severity in assessing household safety and
stability. The relevant inquiry here is whether Doe failed to provide a safe and stable home, as
the case plan required, because of the threat of domestic violence.
The magistrate was concerned with Doe‟s criminal history that included three battery
convictions. Two offenses occurred while she was a juvenile, and the other was committed in
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September 2008, after the filing of the child protective order and approval of the case plan. The
most recent battery occurred when Doe physically confronted her stepfather. Doe testified that
she fought with her stepfather who called the police, at which time she was arrested. A no-
contact order was entered, which required her to find an alternative living arrangement until the
order expired. Doe had insufficient financial resources to pay for any other living arrangement,
and temporarily moved in with her sister. Doe testified that her sister had a problem with drug
abuse and that K.Q. should not be exposed to her.
The family‟s additional hostile behavior towards the social workers assigned to the case
reinforced the magistrate‟s concern with the safety and stability of Doe‟s home. The
caseworkers that were exposed to Doe and her family at their home testified to hostile and
threatening behavior. In one instance, Burgess, a caseworker that supervised K.Q.‟s visits, called
9-1-1 because she did not feel safe when the family screamed at her, called her names, and
refused to let her take K.Q. After this incident, Doe‟s visits with K.Q. were moved to the
Department office. M.A. acknowledged that there had been approximately eight calls to 9-1-1
over the previous two years from their residence. However, B.A. claimed that the family was not
hostile to Burgess and, instead, Burgess hit Doe. Substantial evidence supports the magistrate‟s
concerns regarding domestic violence.
The case plan required Doe and D.A. to “formally develop a custody agreement to
include visitation.” The court found that this was not completed. On appeal, Doe acknowledges
this task was not completed, but complains the task was only important if she had custody of
K.Q. Doe‟s argument fails to appreciate that the purpose of this task was to resolve disputes
between the parents, in the event custody was returned to them, and set the stage for providing
K.Q. with a stable life. This was an important task in planning for K.Q.‟s future that Doe failed
to complete.
The case plan required Doe to “participate in parenting education provided by South
Central District Health.” Doe instead took parenting programs offered by Magic Valley Ministry
Center. Doe did not obtain the Department‟s approval for substituting the parenting class. Doe
testified South Central District Health did not have a parenting class to take, so she looked for
another. The magistrate found the Magic Valley Ministry Center‟s program was different than
the program Doe was required to take and that she could not use it as a substitute. Bristol
testified that she never received confirmation that Doe had completed the parenting classes she
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was taking at Magic Valley Ministry Center, and that Doe did not incorporate any learned
parenting skills into caring for K.Q. Doe testified she completed the class and gave a certificate
of completion to the Department, but conceded that she never completed the budgeting class
because of an argument with an instructor. “Where there is conflicting evidence, it is the trial
court‟s task to evaluate the credibility of the witnesses and to weigh the evidence presented.”
Total Success Investments, LLC v. Ada County Highway District, 148 Idaho 688, 693, 227 P.3d
942, 947 (2010) (citing Desfosses v. Desfosses, 120 Idaho 354, 356, 815 P.2d 1094, 1096 (Ct.
App. 1991)). In addition, several witnesses testified that any instruction that was given to Doe to
upgrade her parenting skills was either rejected or not adopted in the observed parenting of K.Q.
The magistrate‟s findings that Doe failed to complete the case plan and K.Q. was
neglected as defined by I.C. § 16-2002(3)(b), are supported by substantial and competent
evidence.
B. Best Interest of the Child
“When a judge finds a statutory ground, such as neglect, he or she must then decide if
termination of parental rights is in the best interests of the child[].” Doe v. Department of Health
and Welfare, 141 Idaho 511, 516, 112 P.3d 799, 804 (2005). The magistrate found, by clear and
convincing evidence, that K.Q.‟s best interest was served by terminating Doe‟s parental rights.
First, Doe argues the magistrate erred in its finding that terminating her parental rights
was in the best interests of K.Q., because it is uncontroverted that she loves K.Q. The Idaho
Supreme Court has observed, “a child may not live on parental affection alone.” State ex rel.
Child v. Clouse, 93 Idaho 893, 896, 477 P.2d 834, 837 (1970); see also Department of Health
and Welfare v. Doe, 147 Idaho 353, 355, 209 P.3d 650, 652 (2009) (noting that “while
Appellants love their kids „dearly,‟ their efforts to improve their parenting skills were not
consistent or long-lasting”).
Second, Doe contends the magistrate failed to appreciate that she is disabled and had
access to supportive services. Idaho Code § 16-2005(6) states:
If the parent has a disability, as defined in this chapter, the parent shall
have the right to provide evidence to the court regarding the manner in which the
use of adaptive equipment or supportive services will enable the parent to carry
out the responsibilities of parenting the child. . . .
To establish a court erred in considering the parent‟s disability, a parent must point to evidence
presented of supportive services which will enable the parent to carry out the responsibilities of
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parenting the child. See Idaho Department of Health and Welfare v. Doe, __ Idaho __, __, 233
P.3d 96, 102 (2010). The magistrate held that Doe failed to present evidence that she suffered a
mental impairment that limited a major life activity, or how adaptive equipment or supportive
services would enable her to carry out the responsibilities of parenting K.Q. Doe highlights Dr.
Tyson‟s testimony that she had a learning disability and met the diagnostic threshold for
Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder and his recommendation for full-time supervision to
enable parenting. Doe argues that because she was recently awarded Social Security disability
payments she “will now possibly qualify for specific in-home services which could help [her]
with all the various tasks of her daily life.” However, the evidence Doe points out in the record
is only evidence of Doe collecting payments. Doe did not present evidence of any specific
supportive services that she qualified for, had been approved for, or that those supportive
services could sufficiently aid her in parenting.
Third, Doe argues the magistrate weighed the evidence incorrectly. “This Court will
indulge all reasonable inferences in support of the trial court‟s judgment when reviewing an
order that parental rights be terminated.” Doe v. Doe, 148 Idaho 243, 245-46, 220 P.3d 1062,
1064-65 (2009) (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Matter of Aragon, 120 Idaho 606, 608,
818 P.2d 310, 312 (1991)). After K.Q.‟s birth, Doe had twenty months to prepare to care for her
prior to the trial. Burgess testified that after supervising sixty-four visits between Doe and K.Q.,
Doe was not able to adequately parent. Wallace, a state employee charged with supervising
visitations and teaching parenting skills, testified that while Doe was initially receptive to
learning, Doe became more concerned with dressing K.Q. up, and would become hostile if
redirected to the parenting skills she was supposed to learn. In Wallace‟s opinion, Doe did not
understand K.Q.‟s immediate needs or developmental stages, and Doe never demonstrated she
could feed, burp, or swaddle K.Q. Wallace testified she was concerned for K.Q.‟s safety during
a visit because Doe left K.Q. unattended on a changing table when K.Q. was learning to roll
over. Bristol observed K.Q. in foster care, and during visitation with Doe. Bristol described
K.Q. with Doe as “stoic, serious, discontent, unhappy, and just nonpacified.” Bristol described
K.Q. in foster care as “joyful, silly, exploratory, happy, content baby.” Bristol testified that she
did not feel Doe was capable of safely and effectively parenting K.Q. because she could not
improve her parenting skills over the course of the case plan. She also testified that Doe had not
established a connection with K.Q. and that no purpose would be served with additional time or
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services. The following questioning of Doe shows even she realized that she was not ready to
care for K.Q.:
Q. Okay. Do you feel at this time like you are ready to take care of [K.Q.] if
she went home with you today?
A. Not at this moment.
The goals of permanency, and the needs of K.Q. as a fast-growing child, are not met by
preserving Doe‟s parental rights with the hope she could someday be capable of caring for K.Q.
Substantial evidence supports the magistrate‟s decision that the best interest of K.Q. is served by
termination of Doe‟s parental rights.
III.
CONCLUSION
The record reflects substantial and competent evidence supporting the magistrate‟s
decision to terminate Doe‟s parental rights. The magistrate‟s order terminating Doe‟s parental
rights to K.Q. is, therefore, affirmed. No costs or attorney fees are awarded on appeal.
Judge GUTIERREZ and Judge MELANSON, CONCUR.
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