No. 92-284
NO. 92-451
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
DANIEL L. REMINGTON,
Applicant and Appellant,
THE MONTANA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS
AND HUMAN SERVICES: CURTIS CHISHOLM,
DIRECTOR OF THE MONTANA DEPARTMENT OF
CORRECTIONS AND HUMAN SERV1CES;MONTANA
STATE PRISON; and JACK T. MCCORMICK,
WARDEN OF MONTANA STATE
Respondents and Respondents,
APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Third Judicial District,
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In and for the County of Powell,
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i nvrivrable Ted L. Mizner, Judge presiding.
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COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For Appellant:
Mark P. Yeshe, Donahoe & Yeshe, American Civil
Liberties Cooperating Attorney, Helena, Montana
For Respondent:
James B. Obie, Department of Corrections and Human
Services, Helena, Montana
Submitted on Briefs: October 8, 1992
Decided: December 15, 1992
Filed:
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Justice Fred 3. Weter delivered the Opinion of the Court.
This is an appeal from an order and opinion of the Third
Judicial District Court, Powell County, dismissing Daniel L.
Remington's application for mandamus, habeas corpus, and
declaratory relief. We affirm.
We consider the following issues on appeal:
1. Did the District Court abuse its discretion in dismissing
Remington's petition for declaratory judgment?
2. Should this Court issue a writ of habeas corpus based on an
inmate's liberty interest in prison "good time" credits for
correspondence courses?
Daniel L. Remington (Remington) is currently a parolee from
the Montana State Prison. During his confinement, Remington has
pursued a college degree by engaging in college level extension
courses and numerous correspondence courses from accredited
colleges across the country. For his College of Great Falls
extension courses, Remington has received "good time" credit
pursuant to 5 53-30-105, MCA, and prison policies No. 505 and PD
84-214. This "good time" acts to shorten his term of incarceration
or parole. However, Remington has received no "good time" credit
for the correspondence courses he has successfully completed at
accredited universities such as University of Nevada at Reno,
University of Utah, Eastern Washington University, and the
University of Ohio.
Over a period of years, Remington sought approval from various
prison authorities for "good timew credit to which he claims
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entitlement based on his correspondence courses. This credit has
been denied.
Remington filed a petition for mandamus, habeas corpus, and
declaratory relief with the Third Judicial District Court, Powell
County. The court dismissed Remington's petition in an opinion and
order dated March 31, 1992. Remington appealed. By order dated
November 24, 1992, this Court granted Remington's motion to
consolidate his appeal of denial of his petition for declaratory
judgment and his application to this Court for habeas corpus.
I.
Did the District Court abuse its discretion in dismissing
Remington's petition for declaratory judgment?
The District Court dismissed Remington's petition for writ of
habeas corpus, mandamus and declaratory judgment. Denial of a writ
of habeas corpus is not appealable to this Court. Coble v. Magone
(1987), 229 Mont. 45, 744 P.2d 1244.
We will not address Remingtontspetition for mandamus because
the District Court did not review the petition as a request for
mandamus and Remington has not argued it to this Court.
Dismissal of Remington's petition for declaratory judgment is
reviewable by this Court. When a District Court determines that
declaratory relief is not necessary or proper, we will not disturb
the court's ruling absent an abuse of discretion. Empire Fire and
Marine Ins. Co. v. Goodman (1966), 147 Mont. 396, 412 P.2d 569.
A declaratory judgment is primarily intended to determine the
meaning of a law or a contract and to adjudicate the rights of the
parties therein, but not to determine controverted issues of fact
such as facts which give rise to a claim of denial of procedural
due process. Raynes v. City of Great Falls (1985), 215 Mont. 114,
696 P.2d 423. The resolution of the questions in this case
involves factual determinations prior to any consideration of due
process or equal protection. We conclude, therefore, that
declaratory judgment was not the proper procedure for resolution of
this case.
We hold that the District Court did not abuse its discretion
in dismissing Remington's petition for declaratory judgment.
11.
Should this Court issue a writ of habeas corpus based on an
inmate's liberty interest in prison "good time" credits for
correspondence courses?
Remington filed a second habeas corpus application to this
Court in the event that this Court determined that it could not
review the District Court's denial of his petition. We have
considered Remingtonls arguments and find that he has failed to
prresent facts that warrant habeas corpus.
Remington argues that he has a liberty interest in receiving
"good time" credit and that because the Department of Corrections
and Human Services (Department) has denied him "good time" credit
for his correspondence courses, he is being restrained of liberty
and denied his due process rights and equal protection of the law.
The State argues that Remington does not have a liberty interest in
"good time" credit and, therefore, has not been denied due process
or equal protection of the laws.
The District Court determined that the Montana statute did not
create a liberty interest in good time credit. The court went on
to consider Remington's equal protection argument, finding that he
had not been denied equal protection as no inmate has ever been
given ttgoodtimew credit for correspondence courses. Because of
the consistent administering of the prison policies, the court
determined that the policy was not being arbitrarily applied.
If Remington has a liberty interest in "good timeM credits, as
he argues, due process concerns are raised "to insure that the
state-created right is not arbitrarily abr~gated.'~ Wolff v.
McDonnell (1974), 418 U.S. 539, 557, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 2975, 41
L.Ed.2d 935, 951. A liberty interest is created when the
legislature expressly mandates to an agencythe performance of some
definitions, criteria, and mandated tishalls.m Connecticut Board of
Pardons v. Dumschat (l98l), 452 U.S. 458, 466, 101 S.Ct. 2460,
The enabling statute for the Department of Institutions is 5
53-30-105, MCA. The statute enables the Department to make rules
concerning the dispensation of "good time" credits:
(1) The department of corrections and human services
shall adopt rules providing for the granting of good time
allowance for inmates employed in any prison work or
activity. The good time allowance shall operate as a
credit on his sentence as imposed by the court,
conditioned upon the inmate's good behavior and
compliance with the rules made by the department or the
warden. The rules adopted by the department may not
grant good time allowance to exceed:
(d) 13 days per month for those inmates enrolled in
school who successfully complete the course of study or
who while so enrolled are released from prison by
discharge or parole;
Section 53-30-105, MCA. This statute contains no definitions, no
criteria, and no mandated "shalls" for the rules it directs the
Department to make.
The Department has virtually unfettered discretion in
establishing the rules which will govern the dispensation of "good
time" credits to prisoners. The only applicable limitations placed
upon the Department by the legislature are a thirteen day cap on
the amount of credits given for educational pursuits and that this
credit be conditioned on the inmate's good behavior and compliance
with the Department or the warden's rules.
Considerin9 the enabling legislation, the Department
instituted a basic policy on July 1, 1983, called Policy #505.
This policy established parameters for assessing "good time"
credits for all activities deemed eligible for good time by the
Department. According to Policy #505 and in line with the enabling
statute's cap on "good time" credits for educational pursuits, the
Department allotted thirteen days per month for good time earned by
pursuing educational activities.
Subsequently, in September of 1984, the Department published
the revised PD 84-214 which moutlines and defines the function and
operation of the Education Department at the prison." This
particular directive deals with good time earned through
educational piirsuits. it is a more specific policy. PD 134-214
states unequivocally that "term-based extension services" provided
by approved colleges or universities will receive good time credit.
Also stated unequivocally, is the denial of "good time" credit for
correspondence courses.
PD 84-214 deals with two different kinds of prison educational
programs: extension programs from approved colleges or universities
and correspondence courses. One type of course is approved for
"good time" credits and the other is not.
Nothing in the prison educational policies conflicts with the
enabling statute. Therefore, we conclude the Department has set
these rules in line with the broad directive provided to it by the
enabling statute. Because a liberty interest is created only when
the enabling statute ( 9 53-30-105, MCA) specifically constrains or
limits the discretion of the decision maker (the Department) and
such constraint is absent here, we hold that Remington and the
other inmates of the Montana State Prison do not have a liberty
interest in "good time" credits. Such liberty interest being
absent, Remington has not been denied due process of law because he
has been denied credit for his successfully completed
correspondence courses.
Remington also argues that the enabling statute denies him
equal protection under the law because the prison regulation
infringes on his constitutional rights. He argues that the
regulation forbidding "good timeu credit to inmates taking
correspondence courses is valid only if it is reasonably related to
a legitimate penological interest. Turner v. Safley (1987), 482
U.S. 78, 107 S.Ct. 2254, 96 L.Ed.2d 64. Remington contends that
the Department has not shown a reasonable relationship to a
penological interest.
The record reveals testimony from respondents that
correspondence courses put an unwieldy time pressure on the prison
because prison personnel need to proctor exams. Extension classes
are controlled and staffed by the home college. The record also
suggests that extension courses are structured to guide their
students.
Further, correspondence courses are missing easy access to
instructors and counselors when problems arise. Remington himself
testified at the evidentiary hearing that when he needed to call a
contact person in Ohio or another state that he had to forgo his
aiiotted weekly teiephone call. in addicion to on-site ciasses,
extension programs provide on-site personnel who are available at
regular times to help inmates even if the inmate is involved in a
self-study course more individually tailored to his needs. The
basic difference between these two types of courses is that the
universities control and staff the extension programs while prison
personnel provide the needed time to help with correspondence
courses. Such time required of prison officials is not always
easily found, particularly if many prisoners are enrolled in these
courses from various universities.
The Department has set as its goal for the Education Program
"to educate inmates to render them more knowledgeable, better
socialized, and more employable upon release." The Department has
made a careful assessment that extension programs are more capable
of carrying out this goal. If the Department has applied the
prohibition of "good time" credits to all inmates, as the record
shows, then Remington is not being denied equal protection. Ke
conclude that the Department has a legitimate interest in promoting
inmate education while also preservingthe efficient administration
of the prison. We conclude that the record establishes that the
denial of "good time" credit for correspondence courses has not
been arbitrarily made but is reasonably related to a legitimate
penological interest.
We hold that a writ of habeas corpus is not appropriate
because Remington is not being unconstitutionally restrained of
freedom due to the prison's denial of "good timew credits for his
successfully completed correspondence courses.
Remingtonts application for writ of habeas corpus to this
Court is denied.
We Concur: , '
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