NO. 93-210
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
1993
STATE OF MONTANA,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
NEIL TODD.
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Fifth Judicial District,
In and for the County of Madison,
The Honorable Frank M. Davis, Judge presiding.
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For Appellant:
Bob Alsobrook, Bozeman, Montana
For Respondent:
Hon. Joseph P. Mazurek, Attorney General, Paul D.
Johnson, Assistant, Helena, Montana: Loren Tucker,
Madison County Attorney, Robert R. Zenker, Deputy,
Virginia City, Montana
Submitted onBriefs: September 30, 1993
Decided: November 18, 1993
Filed:
Justice Karla M. Gray delivered the Opinion of the Court.
This case presents procedural and jurisdictional issues
relating to when appeals from justice court to district court are
timely filed, the effect of a premature notice of appeal on the
justice court's jurisdiction and which court has jurisdiction to
rule on the timeliness of such an appeal. In affirming the
District Court's dismissal of Neil Todd's appeal from the Justice
Court to District Court, we take this opportunity to clarify the
procedural and substantive standards that surround an appeal from
justice court to district court.
Todd was charged in Madison County Justice Court with
misdemeanor assault as a result of allegedly slapping a high school
basketball referee. A jury subsequently convicted him of the
offense, a sentencing hearing was scheduled and the State filed its
recommendations. On March 18, 1992, Todd filed his sentencing
recommendation. On the same date, he filed a "Notice of Intention
to Appeal" his conviction to the District Court.
The Justice Court proceeded with sentencing on March 23, 1992,
without objection from Todd. It ordered Todd to pay a $250 fine or
perform fifty-nine hours of community service, and to pay
restitution to Madison County for jury costs totalling $603.55. It
also deferred imposition of a six-month sentence. Three months
later, Todd notified the Justice Court that he had fulfilled the
community service requirement. After three more months, the Clerk
of the Justice Court advised Todd that he had not yet reimbursed
the county for the jury costs, a condition of his deferred
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sentence. On the basis of Todd's failure to pay the ordered
reimbursement, the State moved the Justice Court for imposition of
sentence. It also moved that court to dismiss Todd's March 18,
1992, notice of intention to appeal.
Todd responded by requesting the Justice Court to transfer the
record of his case to District Court and to deny the State's motion
to dismiss the appeal. Following a hearing, the Justice Court
granted the State's motion to dismiss Todd's notice of intention to
appeal. Todd subsequently filed a notice of appeal from the
Justice Court's order dismissing his first appeal. After briefing
and oral argument, the District Court concluded that it had no
jurisdiction to review the Justice Court's order and dismissed his
appeal. Todd now appeals to this Court.
Did the District Court err in dismissing Todd's appeal?
We begin our analysis with the filing of Todd's initial notice
of intention to appeal and review the proceedings from that point
forward. As detailed above, Todd filed his first notice of
intention to appeal prior to sentencing by the Justice Court on his
assault conviction. The Justice Court disregarded the notice of
appeal and proceeded to sentence Todd.
The time requirements for filing an appeal to district court
are found in 5 46-17-311(2), MCA, which provides that a defendant
may appeal to the district court by filing written notice of
intention to appeal within ten days after a judgment is rendered
following trial. The statutory definition of l'judgmentl* states
that if a defendant is adjudicated guilty, judgment includes the
3
sentence pronounced by the court. Section 46-l-202(10), MCA.
Thus, a prerequisite for an appeal from justice court to district
court is the imposition of sentence and final judgment. State v.
Wilson (1992), 252 Mont. 264, 266, 827 P.2d 1286, 1287; State v.
Hegeman (1991), 248 Mont. 49, 52, 808 P.2d 509, 511. We note that,
although 5 46-17-311, MCA, was amended in 1993, the amendment does
not relate to or change the validity of Wilson's application of the
time requirements for filing a notice of appeal from justice court.
Under Wilson and the statutes discussed above, it is clear
that Todd's first notice of intention to appeal was filed
prematurely. As we explained in Heqeman, a district court does not
obtain jurisdiction until sentencing and final judgment have been
imposed; similarly, the justice court does not lose jurisdiction
until a timely notice of appeal has been filed pursuant to the
requisites of § 46-17-311, MCA. See Hecieman, 808 P.2d at 511. As
a result, we hold that Todd's notice of appeal from this criminal
action in Justice Court, filed prior to sentencing and final
judgment, was premature as a matter of law and had no effect on the
Justice Court's jurisdiction. Therefore, in this case, the Justice
Court retained jurisdiction over Todd's case and properly proceeded
to Todd's sentencing and final judgment.
However, procedural and jurisdictional errors in this case
were committed thereafter. Nearly seven months after sentencing
and final judgment, the State moved the Justice Court to dismiss
Todd's March 18, 1992, notice of intention to appeal on the basis
that the appeal was premature. In response, Todd asserted that his
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prior appeal was perfected and that a dismissal of his appeal would
be a denial of due process: he requested that the record be
transferred to District Court. The Justice Court held a hearing
and subsequently dismissed Todd's notice of intention to appeal.
Before we address Todd's specific arguments, we clarify a
procedural point relevant to this case to provide future guidance
to the justice courts. The district court, not the justice court,
must address the merits of a motion to dismiss an appeal from
justice court: therefore, it is in the district court that such a
motion must be filed. See, for example, State v. Speith (1990),
244 Mont. 392, 395, 797 P.2d 221, 222; City of Billings v. Seiffert
(1984) r 215 Mont. 381, 383, 697 P.2d 1342, 1343; and State v. Main
(1980), 191 Mont. 304, 307, 623 P.2d 1382, 1384. As is clear from
our discussion above, a motion to dismiss is not necessary if the
notice of appeal is premature as a matter of law: however, if a
motion to dismiss an appeal is otherwise appropriate, the motion
should be filed in the district court.
In Hadford v. Hadford (1980), 189 Mont. 329, 332, 615 P.2d
920, 921, after the appellant filed notice of appeal from a
district court order to the Supreme Court, the respondent moved the
district court to dismiss the appeal because a bond had not been
posted. We held that a district court had no authority to order
the dismissal of an appeal once a notice of appeal has been filed:
such authority is the exclusive province of this Court. Hadford,
615 P.2d at 921. The same principles apply here. The Justice
Court had no authority to rule on a motion to dismiss an appeal to
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the District Court.
Aside from the procedural irregularities, the District Court
ultimately concluded that dismissal of Todd's appeal was
appropriate. Our review of such legal conclusions is plenary. See
Steer, Inc. v. Dep't of Revenue (1990), 245 Mont. 470, 475, 803
P.2d 601, 603. Because we have determined that Todd's first notice
of appeal was filed prematurely and had no legal effect, we turn
our focus to Todd's second notice of appeal.
The District Court concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to
review the Justice Court's order dismissing Todd's appeal because
9 46-17-311, MCA, limited its jurisdiction to a trial de novo.
Because Todd had failed to file his notice of appeal within ten
days of his sentence and final judgment, the court concluded that
its "de nova jurisdiction" was moot.
We conclude that the District Court did not err in dismissing
Todd's second notice of appeal. Section 46-17-311(l), MCA,
provides:
[elxcept for cases in which legal issues are preserved
for appeal pursuant to 46-12-204, all cases on appeal
from a justice's or city court must be tried anew in the
district court . . . .
As the statute makes clear, an appeal to the district court for a
trial de novo is a party's exclusive remedy for review of justice
court proceedings. Adair v. Lake County (1984), 213 Mont. 466,
468, 692 P.2d 13, 14. A district court does not have appellate
jurisdiction to review the correctness of legal conclusions made by
a justice court. State v. Kesler (1987), 228 Mont. 242, 246, 741
P.2d 791, 793. The District Court correctly determined, therefore,
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that it could not review the Justice Court's order dismissing
Todd's appeal.
Todd concedes that a new trial is the exclusive remedy
provided by !j 46-17-311, MCA. He nonetheless asserts that the
Justice Court's hearing on the State's motion to dismiss his appeal
and his asserted "due process violations" constituted a trial
entitling him to an appeal under § 46-17-311, MCA. Todd's argument
is without merit. He cites no applicable authority to support his
assertion that this hearing, and not the trial held March 9, 1992,
to determine his guilt or innocence, was the "trial" from which he
could appeal to District Court. Under the plain wording of 5 46-
17-311, MCA, Todd's "triallV was held on March 9, 1992, and that
trial, not the hearing erroneously held by the Justice Court on the
State's motion to dismiss his initial notice of intention to
appeal, gave rise to his right to appeal to the District Court for
a trial de novo.
Todd also argues that rigid adherence to the time limits set
by 5 46-17-311, MCA, violates his constitutional guarantee of due
process. This argument is equally meritless. We have stated on
many occasions that the right to appeal a criminal conviction from
justice court is purely statutory and that strict compliance with
5 46-17-311, MCA, is necessary to perfect an appeal. Sueith, 797
P.2d at 222; State v. Arthur (1988), 234 Mont. 75,~ 76-77, 761 P.2d
806, 807. Todd simply failed to follow the requirements of § 46-
17-311, MCA, and, therefore, he is not entitled to a new trial in
District Court. No due process violation occurred here.
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In summary, we hold that Todd's first notice of appeal was
premature as a matter of law and that the District Court did not
err in dismissing Todd's second notice of appeal.
Affirmed.
We Concur:
November 18, 1993
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that the following order was sent by United States mail, prepaid, to the
following named:
Bob Alsobrook
Attorney at Law
221 E. Mendenhall
Bozeman, MT 59715
Hon. Joseph P. Mazurek, Attorney General
Paul D. Johnson, Assistant
215 N. Sanders, Justice Bldg.
Helena, MT 59620
Loren Tucker, County Attorney
Robert R. Zenker, Deputy
P.O. Box 36
Virginia City, MT 59755
ED SMITH
CLERK OF THE SUPREME COURT
STATE G?F MONTANA