No. 92-512
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
1993
STATE OF MONTANA ex rel.,
JAMES C. NELSON, GLACIER COUNTY ATTORNEY,
Relator,
v. - """2
r; ! , ,.' 1 bJ 13
3d
MONTANA NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT,
GLACIER COUNTY, THE HONORABLE
R. D. McPHILLIPS, Presiding Judge,
Respondent.
ORIGINAL PROCEEDING
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
Larry Epstein, Glacier County Attorney,
Thane Johnson (argued), Deputy Glacier County
Attorney, Cut Bank, Montana
For Respondent:
David F. Stufft (argued), Attorney at Law,
Cut Bank, Montana
Amici Curiae:
Wm. Nels Swandal, Attorney at Law, Livingston,
Montana (Montana County Attorneys Association);
Thomas J. Beers, Attorney at Law, Missoula,
Montana (Montana Trial Lawyers Association):
William F. Hooks, Appellate Defendant Office,
Helena, Montana
Submitted: September 3, 1993
Decided: November 18, I 9 9 3
Filed:
~usticeTerry N. Trieweiler delivered the opinion of the Court.
Defendant William V. Hill was charged by information, filed in
the Ninth Judicial District Court in Glacier County, with felony
assault in violation of 5 45-5-202(2)(c), MCA; obstructing a peace
officer in violation of 5 45-7-302(1), MCA; and resisting arrest in
violation of 5 45-7-301(1) (a), MCA. Prior to trial, defendant
formally waived his right to a jury trial and requested a trial of
factual issues before the District Court without a jury. However,
in response, the State demanded a jury trial of all factual issues.
After considering the arguments of the parties, the District Court
concluded that 5 46-16-110(3), MCA, permitted defendant to waive
his right to trial by jury and did not violate Article 11,
Section 26, of the Montana Constitution. On that basis, the
District Court denied the State's demand for a jury trial. The
State petitioned this Court to review the District Court's
decision. We accepted review of this issue pursuant to our
authority to exercise supervisory control. Upon completion of that
review, we affirm the order of the District Court.
The issues presented to this Court for its consideration are:
1. Is this an appropriate case in which to exercise
supervisory control?
2. Does the State of Montana have a right, pursuant to
Article 11, Section 26, of the Montana Constitution, to trial by
jury in criminal cases, or can the right to trial by jury be waived
by defendant, over the State's objection, pursuant to
5 46-16-110(3), MCA?
Is this an appropriate case in which to exercise supervisory
control?
The exercise of supervisory control by the Montana Supreme
Court aver the state's district courts is authorized by
Article VII, Section 2(2), o ' the Montana Constitution, and by
f
Rule 17(a), M.R.App.P.
We have held that assumption of original jurisdiction for the
purpose of exercising supervisory control is appropriate when:
(1) Constitutional issues of major state-wide
importance are involved:
(2) The case involves purely legal questions of
statutory and constitutional construction; and
(3) Urgency and emergency factors exist, making the
normal appeal process inadequate.
In this case, all three bases for the exercise of supervisory
control are present. The right of the State of Montana to demand
trial by jury of criminal issues in the face of a waiver by a
criminal defendant raises the constitutional issue set forth above.
There are no factual issues to consider on appeal. We have been
asked to resolve what the State contends is a conflict between
Article 11, Section 26, of our State Constitution, and
5 46-16-110(3), MCA, as enacted by our Legislature. Furthermore,
if we were to accept the State's position, the appeal process would
be inadequate. Section 46-20-103, MCA, strictly limits the State's
right to appeal from a final judgment in a criminal case to the
statutory grounds provided. Those statutory grounds do not include
denial of the State's demand for trial by jury, Finally, any
appeal from an acquittal of the defendant after trial by the
distri~tcoxrt without a jury would violate defendant's right to be
free from double jeopardy, which is guaranteed by the Fifth
Amendment of the United States Constitution, and Article XI,
Section 25, of Montana's Constitution. StiIfev. Cool (l977), 174 Mont.
99, 568 P.2d 567.
Therefore, we conclude that this is a proper case in which to
exercise original jurisdiction and consider the issue of whether
the State of Montana has a constitutional right to trial by jury in
all criminal cases.
11.
Does the State of Montana have a right, pursuant to
Article 11, Section 26, of the Montana Constitution, to trial by
jury in criminal cases, or can the right to trial by jury be waived
by defendant, over the State's objection, pursuant to
5 46-16-110(3), MCA?
BACKGROUND
The right to trial by jury in federal courts was guaranteed by
Article 111, Section 2, and the Sixth Amendment of the United
States Constitution. In Duncan v. Loukianu (1968), 391 U.S. 145, 88
S. Ct. 1444, 20 L. Ed. 2d 491, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the
right of jury trial for serious offenses is a fundamental right
guaranteed to citizens charged with crimes in state courts pursuant
to the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
In Pationv. Unitedstates ( 1 9 3 0 ) , 281 U.S. 2 7 6 , 5 0 S. Ct. 253, 7 4
L. ~ d .
854, the Supreme Court held that although a right to jury
trial was guaranteed under the Federal Constitution to a defendant
charged with a crime, that right could be waived. In D~tncan, the
court emphasized that that right of waiver would also extend to
state courts.
However, in Singer v. United Stares ( 1 9 6 5 ) , 3 8 0 U.S. 24, 34, 85
S. Ct. 7 8 3 , 790; 13 L. Ed. 2d 630, 638, the court concluded that
"[tlhe ability to waive a constitutional right does not ordinarily
carry with it the right to insist upon the opposite of that right,"
and that, therefore, the government could constitutionally
condition the waiver of jury trial by requiring approval of the
government and the trial court as had been done in Rule 2 3 ( a ) , of
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. In arriving at its
conclusion that there was no constitutional right to a trial
without a jury, and that the federal government's limitation on a
defendant's right to waive a jury trial was constitutional, the
U.S. Supreme Court acknowledged that the various states had
provided for different methods by which waiver of jury trials could
be accomplished. It made the following observation:
We are aware that the States have adopted a variety
of procedures relating to the waiver of jury trials in
state criminal cases. Some have made waiver contingent
on approval by the prosecutor, e.g., California (Cal.
Const. Art. I, S 7 ) , Indiana (Ind. Ann. Stat. S 9-1803
( 1 9 5 6 Repl. vol.), Alldredge v. Indiana, 239 Ind. 256, 1 5 6
N.E.2d 888 (l959)), and Virginia (Va. Const. § 8, Va.
Code Ann. 5 19.1-192 (1950 Repl. vol.) , Boaze v.
Commonwealth, 165 Va. 786, 183 S.E. 263 (1936)) .Others,
while not giving the prosecutor a voice, have made court
apprcval a prerequisite for waiver, e . 8 , Georgia (Ga.
Code Ann. 11 102-106 (l955), Paherv. Stale, 195 Ga. 661, 25
S.E.2d 295 (1943)), and Washington (Wash. Rev. Code §
10.01.060 (1963 Supp.)). Still others have provided that
the question of waiver is a matter solely for the
defendant's informed decision, e g . , Connecticut fconn.
Gen. Stat. Rev. 11 54-82 (1958)), and Illinois (Ill. Ann.
Stat. c. 38, 11 103-6 (Smith-Hurd ed. 1964), Z&oii v. Spegal,
5 Ill. 2d 211, 125, N.E.2d 468 (1955)). However, the
framers of the federal rules were aware of possible
alternatives when they recommended the present rule to
this Court, see Orfield, Trial by Jury in Federal
Criminal Procedure, 1962 Duke L.J. 29, 69-72: this Court
promulgated the rule as recommended; and Congress can be
deemed to have adopted it, I8 US6 S 3771 (1958 ed.).
Singer, 380 U.S. at 36-37.
The Supreme Court in Singer did not hold that, as a matter of
constitutional law, approval by the state or the trial court was
necessary before the right to jury trial could be waived by a
defendant. It simply held that there was no constitutional right
to a trial before the court without a jury and that the method for
waiver chosen by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure which
required approval of the prosecution and the trial court was not
unconstitutional
A more current and comprehensive analysis of how the various
states have chosen to provide for waiver of the right to trial by
jury in criminal cases is set forth in Criminal J L Tnak In Iowa: A Time
~
For Revision, 31 Drake L . Rev. 187 (1982). The author points out in
that article that:
The procedures in state courts can generally be
broken down into three categories: (1) those which adhere
to the principles of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure
23(a) ; (2) those which require at least court approval of
the defendant's request for waiver; and (3) those which
provide for a unilateral waiver by the defendant.
Typically the individual procedure involves a
constitutional provision referring to the "inviolate"
nature of trial by jury, a statute or court rule
establishing the formalities and case history.
[Footnotes omitted].
31 Drake L. Rev. at 199. The appendix to the Drake Law Review
article indicates that in ten states a jury trial can be waived by
the unilateral act of the defendant: nineteen states have followed
the lead of the federal government by requiring court approval and
consent of the government; eight states require only the consent of
the government; twelve states require only court approval; and the
State of North Carolina does not permit waiver under any
circumstances.
Montana's Constitution and statutes have varied on this
subject over the period of our State's history. As originally
provided in Article 111, Section 23, of the 1889 Montana
Constitution, the right to trial by jury could not be waived in
criminal felony cases. Section 23 provided in relevant part that:
The right of trial by jury shall be secured to all,
and remain inviolate, but in all civil cases and in all
criminal cases not amounting to felony, upon default of
appearance or by consent of the parties expressed in such
manner as the law may prescribe, a trial by jury may be
waived ....
Pursuant to the 1889 Constitution, the Legislature enacted
Montana's original statute pertaining to jury trial in criminal
cases in 1895. Section 1991 of the 1895 Penal Code provided that:
Issues of fact must be tried by jury, unless a trial
by jury be waived in criminal cases not amounting to
felony, by the consent of both parties expressed in open
court and entered in its minutes.
The above statute requiring a jury trial in felony cases and
requiring consent by both parties for waiver in misdemeanor cases
remained in the form set forth above until 1967 when, due to
revisions in the code, it was included in 5 95-1901(c), RCM (1947),
which provided that:
Defendants in all criminal cases shall have a right
to trial by jury not to exceed twelve (12) in number.
However, if no capital offense is involved, the parties
may agree in writing, at any time before the verdict,
with the approval of the court that the jury shall
consist of any number less than twelve (12).
In 1972, the State of Montana adopted a new Constitution which
included two provisions relating to the right of trial by jury in
criminal cases. It is these provisions which have given rise to
the issue raised in this case. Article 11, Section 24, of the 1972
Montana Constitution provides in relevant part that:
In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall have
the right to appear and defend in person and by counsel;
to demand the nature and cause of the accusation; to meet
the witnesses against him face to face; to have process
to compel the attendance of witnesses in his behalf; and
a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the county
or district in which the offense is alleged to have been
committed, subject to the right of the state to have a
change of venue for any of the causes for which the
defendant may obtain the same.
Article 11, Section 26, of the 1972 Montana Constitution
provides that:
The right of trial by jury is secured to all and
shall remain inviolate. But upon default of appearance
or by consent of the parties expressed in such manner as
the law may provide, all cases may be tried without a
jury or before fewer than the number of jurors provided
by law. In all civil actions, two-thirds of the jury may
render a verdict, and a verdict so rendered shall have
the same force and effect as if all had concurred
therein. In all criminal actions, the verdict shall be
unanimous.
Pursuant to the change found in Montana's Constitution at
Article 11, Section 26, jury trials were no longer required as a
matter of constitutional law in all felony criminal cases.
Therefore, the method of waiver which had been provided for in
5 95-1901(c), RCM (1947), was also amended when the right to waiver
was recodified in 1973 in the Montana Code Annotated. Section
46-16-102(2), MCA !1973!, provided that vp[u]ponwritten consent of
the parties, a trial by jury may be waived."
In 1991, § 46-16-102, MCA, was renumbered as 5 46-16-110, MCA,
by the Code Commissioner and the Legislature amended that section
in the manEer in which the State contends now g i ~ e srise to a
conflict between Article 11, Section 26, and the statutory
provision for waiver of trial by jury. As amended in 1991,
5 46-16-110(3), MCA, provides that "[ulpon written consent of the
defendant, a trial by jury may be waived." (Emphasis added).
DISCUSSION
The State contends that Article 11, Section 26, of the Montana
Constitution requires that before a jury trial can be waived, both
parties must consent, and therefore, a jury trial cannot be waived
over the objection of the State. In support of its position, the
State relies on the U.S. Supreme Court decisions in put to?^ and Singer,
and on decisions from other jurisdictions which have upheld state
court rules, statutes, or constitutional provisions which require
state approval before waiver of a jury trial is allowed. However,
Singer does not control the issue before us because as previously
pointed out, that decision simply upheld the constitutionality of
Federal Rule 23(a) which required government and court approval of
jury trial waiver. The court in that case made no pronouncement
that similar restraints on the right to waive trial by jury were
required by the Constitution. In fact, it is implicit from that
court's discussion of the procedures in other states that more than
one procedural alternative is permissible.
Neither is Patton authority for the State's position in this
case. The court in that case did hold that in federal courts
consent of the government and the trial court would be required
prior to waiver of trial by jury where federal crimes are charged.
However, the court did not make that holding as a matter of
constitutional law, it did so in its capacity to formulate rules
for the federal courts. We agree with the Supreme Court of Iowa
which, in Statev. Henderson (Iowa 1980), 287 N.W. 2d 583, 586, held that
the Supreme Court's decision in Pattorz simply "formulated a rule for
the federal courts based on common law tradition that 'before any
waiver [of a jury trial] can become effective, the consent of
government counsel and the sanction of the court must be had
. . . .'3" However, the Supreme Court of Iowa held, and we agree,
that "[n]o federal constitutional barrier exists to waiver by a
defendant of his right to jury trial." Hendenon, 287 N.W. 2d at 584.
Furthermore, those decisions from other jurisdictions relied
on by the State of Montana for the proposition that a jury trial
cannot be waived without approval of the state, come from
jurisdictions where the applicable state statute, court rule, or
constitutional provision clearly require the state's consent to the
defendant's waiver of a jury trial or when there is no controlling
statute. See, e.g., People v. Teny (1970), 2 Cal. 3d 362, 85 Cal. Rptr.
409, 466 P.2d 961, cert, denied, 406 U.S. 912, 92 S. Ct. 1619, 32 L.
Ed. 2d 112: Stutev. Thwiltg (S.D. 1969), 172 N.W.2d 277; Tuylorv. Stare
(Wyo. 1980), 612 P.26 851; 37 A.L.R. 4th 304. Therefore, they are
not persuasive authority for reconciliation of our Constitution and
statutory law. Our statute clearly provides for waiver by the
defendant without approval by the prosecutor.
Defendant, nn the other hand, relies on a~thorities from
states where waiver of jury trial by the defendant is clearly
provided by statute and there is no arguable contradiction in the
state's constitutional provision. See, e.g., People v. Spegal (111. 1955),
125 N.E.2d 468; Statev. Henderson (Iowa 1980), 287 N.W.2d 583; Gurcinv.
People (colo. 1980), 615 P.2d 698.
The only decision we have found which appears to include the
combination of constitutional and statutory provisions that exist
in Montana is the decision of the Supreme Court of Minnesota in
Gaulkev. State (Minn. 1971), 184 N.W.2d 599. Article I, Section 4, of
that state's constitution provides:
The right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate, and
shall extend to all cases at law without regard to the
amount in controversy, but a juty trial may be waived by the paflies in
....
all cases in the mannerprescribed by law
Gaulke, 184 N.W.2d 601 n.4.
However, Minnesota Statute 631.01 provides that:
An issue of fact arises upon a plea of not guilty,
or upon a plea of former conviction or acquittal of the
same offense. Excepf where a defeniinrtt waives a jue trial, every
issue of fact shall be tried by jury ....
Gaulke, 184 N.W,2d at 601.
The Minnesota Court in that case did not directly decide the
issue with which we arc presented because it conclucled that it
could not properly be presented in a petition for post-conviction
relief when it had not been presented on appeal. However, after so
concluding, it offered the following advice to the practicing bar
We think an expression of our views concerning
waiver of jury trial in criminal cases, although dictum,
may be of assistance to the bench and bar. Considering
the historical antecedents of our constitution, it is
doubtful that the legislature intended to grant the
accused an absolute right of waiver. Althouerh we
perceive no intent that the waiver be subject to the
consent of the prosecution, it has long been considered
to be subject to the approval of the trial court.
[Emphasis added].
Based on our review of the authorities provided and capably
argued by the State of Montana, the defendant, and the amicus
curiae who have appeared in this case, it is clear that the issue
with which we have been presented is unique to Montana and depends
completely on our construction of Article 11, Section 26, of the
Montana Constitution.
Our analysis must begin with the approach that "[a]
elegislative enactment' is presumed to be constitutional and will
be rrpheld on review except when proven to be unconstit.dtiona1
beyond a reasonable doubt. City o Billiagx v. Luedeke (1991), 247 Mont.
f
151, 154, 805 P.2d 1348, 1349.
To determine the meaning of a constitutional provision, we
have also held that we employ the same rules of construction
employed to construe statutes. State v. Cardwell (1980), 187 Mont. 370,
The intent of the framers of a constitution[al] provision
controls its meaning. Keller, 170 Mont. at 405, 553 P.2d
at 1006. The intent of the framers should be determined
from the plain meaning of the words used. If that is
possible, we apply no other means of int~rpretation:
B k r , 170 Mont. at 405, 553 P.2d at 1006.
Cardwell, 609 P.2d at 1232.
It also follows then, that as with the construction of
statutes where there are several constitutional provisions which
would otherwise be inconsistent, a construction should be adopted,
if possible, which will give effect to all of them. Section
1-2-101, MCA.
Finally, we are guided by the rule that a possible conflict
between statutory law and constitutional provisions should be
reconciled, if possible. 16 Am. Jur. 2d ~ ~ i ~ . ~ t ~ t Law Ogn a ~
~ti 222,
Construction of Article 11, Section 26, is necessary because
of the following language used in that provision:
But upon default of appearance or bv consent of the
parties exwressed in such manner as the law mav wrovide,
all cases may be tried without a jury ....
[Emphasis
added].
The State argues that "consent of the partiesw requires
consent of the State before a jury trial can be waived in criminal
cases. Defendant contends that the language "expressed in such
manner as the law may provide" gives the Legislature authority to
establish the form of waiver, and thereby determines the party or
parties from whom consent is required. Defendant argues that it
did so when it amended 9 46-16-110(3), MCA, in 1991.
Looking first to the intent of the framers of the
Constitution, we find no support for the argument that when the
1972 Convention changed our Const
trial in criminal felony cases it intended to require approval by
the State. On the contrary, the c:hange from the 1889 Constitution
appears to have been intended solely for the benefit of the
defendant. When proposing the changes found in Article 11,
Section 26, Delegate Campbell, from the Bill of Rights Committee,
gave the following explanation:
We have kept it the same except for two changes which we
feel will allow a great deal of flexibility in the law.
. . . Second of all, a jury could be waived by a
defendant. Now, this is important especially in the
smaller counties where a jury trial may come up only
every 6 months. If a person cannot afford bail, he must
remain in the small, often inadequate county jails until
the next jury term. This would allow him to
intelligently waive this right and allow him to be tried
by the judge without a jury. [Emphasis added].
Verbatim Transcript of March 9, 1972, hearing, Montana
Constitutional Convention, 1971-1972, Vol. V, p. 1780.
Later on during the same hearing, Delegate Campbell again
explained the purpose for allowing for waiver of the right to jury
trial in our Constitution, He stated that:
What it does is give the individual the option of
determining, with his attorney, whether or not it would
be in the best behalf of his defense to waive the jury
trial, which may not come up in this county for another
4-5 months while he's still in the jail, or go directly
to the trial judge now, waiving the jury. [Emphasis
added].
Verbatim Transcript of March 9, 1972, hearing, Montana
Constitutional Convention, 1971-1972, Vol. V, p. 1787.
Finally, the Convention Note to Article 11, Section 26,
states:
Revises 1 8 8 9 constitution [Article 111, Section 2 3 1 by
permitting a defendant to waive a jury trial in felony
cases as well as civil and misdemeanor cases and by
requiring all jurors (rather than 2 / 3 ) agree before a
defendant may be convicted of a misdemeanor. [Emphasis
added].
It is clear from the transcript of our 1972 Constitutional
Convention that when Article 11, Section 26, was proposed in a form
that allowed waiver of jury trials in criminal felony cases, it was
the intention of the framers of that provision that the option was
intended for the benefit of defendants who might otherwise be
denied speedy trials in rural areas of Montana. It does not appear
that the framers contemplated that the State would have the right
to object to a defendant's waiver of trial by jury. In fact, such
authority by the State would have been inconsistent with the
framers' stated objective.
We must also construe Article 11, Section 2 6 , of the Montana
constitution in a manner consistent with other provisions in the
Montana Constitution. However, the interpretation advocated by the
State would result in inconsistent provisions in Article 11,
Sections 2 4 and 26. Section 2 4 guarantees the right of trial by
jury in all criminal prosecutions to the "accused." It provides no
comparable right to the State. However, to adopt the Staters
interpretation of Section 2 6 would provide the State with a right
to trial by jury in criminal cases, which is clearly absent from
Section 24. In our interpretation of Section 26, this type of
inconsistency should be avoided, if possible.
Finally, we are guided by the rule that if an asserted
conflict between a statute and a constitution can be reconciled,
the Court must do so, and the statute and constitutional provision
must be harmonized in a way that gives effect to both when this can
be done. 16 Am. Jur. 2d constitutional L a w 5 2 2 2 (1979) .
In construction of Article 11, Section 26, and in particular,
its reference to waiver by the "parties," it must be kept in mind
that Section 2 6 is also the provision in Montana's Constitution
which guarantees the right of trial by jury in civil cases. To
provide a right to waive a jury trial in that context, it was
necessary to refer to the "parties" because to deny one or the
other party in a civil matter an equal right to trial by jury would
violate the constitutional right to equal protection provided for
16
in Article 11, Section 4, Montana Constitution (1972). Therefore,
when construing Section 26 in the context of this case, the fact
that "parties" are referred to is less significant than the fact
that the framers of the Constitution provided that waiver may be
accomplished in ttsuch
manner as the law may provide .... 11
Pursuant to that mandate, the Legislature has provided for one
method of waiver in civil cases ( e Rule 38(d), M.R.Civ.P.)
se and a
different method of waiver in criminal cases ( e 5 46-16-110(3),
se
MCA) . The latter method is consistent with the clear indication in
Article 11, Section 24, that only the "accusedttis guaranteed a
right to trial by jury in criminal cases.
If the framers of the Constitution intended by Section 26 to
require consent by the State before a jury trial could be waived,
it could have so provided in plain language, or it could have
simply added more specific qualifiers, as was done in the
California and Oklahoma Constitutions. Article I, Section 7, of
California's 1973 Constitution provides that "[a] trial by jury may
be waived in all criminal cases bv consent of both parties .... tt
(Emphasis added). Article VII, Section 20, of the 1966 Oklahoma
Constitution provides that "[iln all issues of fact joined in any
court, all parties may waive the right to have the same determined
by jury . . . ." (Emphasis added). Neither constitution provides
that the method of waiver is to be established by the legislature.
As is evident from the minutes of the 1972 Constitutional
Convention, which were referred to previously, the framers of our
constitution did not use such language because they did not intend
to allow the State of Montana to exercise veto power over a
defendant's option to waive trial by jury in criminal cases.
We conclude that a reasonable interpretation of Article 11,
Section 26, which accomplishes the specific purpose for which it
was adopted by the framers of the Constitution, which renders it
consistent with Article 11, Section 24, of the same Constitution,
and which avoids a constitutional conflict with 5 46-16-110(3), MCA
(1991), requires that the District Court be affirmed.
We hold that Article 11, Section 26, of the Montana
Constitution (1972), provides that a jury trial is guaranteed in
all criminal cases unless waived in the manner provided by law.
The Legislature is free to provide the procedure for waiver of
trial by jury in criminal cases, and has done so in § 46-16-110(3),
MCA. That section does not require approval by the State of
Montana, nor the district court, and does not violate the Montana
Constitution.
The order of the District Court dated October 29, 1992, which
allowed defendant to waive trial by jury in this case and denied
the State's demand for trial by jury is affirmed. This matter is
remanded to the District Court for further proceedings consistent
with this opinion.
W e concur:
- -- - .. -. . . 2
.. - - ----- ---
A . ----,
,
sit ing f o r Jdstice Jambs C. Nelson
November 18, i 0 3
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that the following order was sent by United States mail, prepaid, to the
following named:
Glacier County Attorney
P.O. Box 428
Cut Bank, MT 59427
Charles F. Moses
MOSES LAW FIRM
P.O. Box 2533
Billings, MT 59103-2533
MARY JANE McCALLA
Prosecutor
City of Billings
P.O. Box 1178
Rillings, MT 59103
David F. Stufft
Attorney at Law
P.O. Box 1225
Cut Bank, MT 59427
Hon. R. D. McPhillips
District Judge
Toole County Courthouse
Shelby, MT 59474
Wm. NeIs Swandai, Esq.
414 E. Callender
Livingston, MT 59047
William F. Hooks, Attorney at Law
Appellate Defender Office
Capitol Station
Helena, MT 59620
Thomas J. Beers, President
Montana Trial Lawyers Assoc.
P.O. Box 7307
Missoula. MT 59807
ED SMITH
CLERK O F THE SUPREME COURT
STATE O F MONTANA
BY:
Deputy