No. 92-274
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
JOSEPH MARTELLI,
Petitioner and Appellant,
-v-
ANACONDA-DEER LODGE COUNTY,
Defendant/Employer and Respondent.
APPEAL FROM: Workers' Compensation Court
Of the State of Montana
The Honorable Timothy Reardon, Judge presiding.
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For Appellant:
Bernard J. "Ben" Everett, Knight, Dahood, McLean,
Everett & Dayton, Anaconda, Montana
For Respondent:
Leo S. Ward, Browning, Kaleczyc, Berry & Hoven,
Helena, Montana
Submitted on Briefs: December 17, 1992
Decided: May 6, 1993
Filed:
Justice R. C. McDonough delivered the Opinion of the Court.
This is an appeal from an order of the Workers' Compensation
Court, dismissing Martelli's claim for permanent total disability
benefits. We affirm.
The dispositive issue is whether the Workers' Compensation
Court correctly dismissed Martelli's claim. The court dismissed
his claim because he had failed to appeal a previous order of the
Employment Relations Division of the Department of Labor and
Industry (the Division), which concluded that he could return to
work in a suitable related occupation.
On August 10, 1988, Martelli suffered a soft tissue injury to
his neck when another vehicle struck his vehicle from the rear.
The injury occurred in the course and scope of his employment as a
law enforcement officer for Anaconda-Deer Lodge County.
The insurer designated a rehabilitation provider pursuant to
§ 39-71-1015, MCA (1987). The rehabilitation provider determined
that eight full-time occupations were suited to Martelli's
education and skills. Later, the provider determined that Martelli
could return to his previous occupation.
When Martelli did not return to work, the insurer notified the
Division, which had jurisdiction of the matter pursuant to 5 39-71-
1033, MCA (1987), 5 39-71-1018, MCA (1987) and 24.29.207 ARM.
After the parties completed all of the administrative steps within
the Division, the Division granted Martelli's request for a
hearing.
Following a contested hearing, the Division issued a final
order, stating that an appropriate rehabilitation option under 5
39-71-1012, MCA (1987) was for Martelli to return to a related
occupation suited to his education and skills. The Division's
order also stated that "[alny party in interest may appeal this
order to the Workersf Compensation Court within ten (10) working
days after the mailing of this final order as provided in Section
39-71-1018, MCA." Martelli failed to appeal the order. Instead,
over a year later, he filed a petition with the Workers'
Compensation Court seeking permanent total disability benefits.
Acting on a motion by Anaconda-Deer Lodge, the Workers'
Compensation Court dismissed Martelli's petition. The court
concluded that Martellits failure to appeal the Division's final
order precluded him from raising the permanent total disability
issue before the court. This appeal followed.
Our review of the Workers' Compensation Court's conclusions of
law is plenary. We determine whether the court's conclusions are
correct. Steer Inc. v. Dept. of Revenue (lggO), 245 Mont. 470,
474-75, 803 P.2d 601, 603.
Martelli contends that the Workers' Compensation Court erred
in declining to exercise jurisdiction in this case. He argues that
by dismissing his petition for a hearing, the court not only
abandoned its exclusive jurisdiction over the issue of whether he
was entitled to benefits under the Workers' Compensation Act, but
also gave the Division jurisdiction over the matter. See 5 39-71-
2905, MCA (1987) (giving the workers' compensation judge exclusive
jurisdiction over claims for benefits).
Anaconda-Deer Lodge contends that the doctrine of collateral
estoppel bars Martelli from litigating in Workers' Compensation
Court the issue of whether he was permanently and totally disabled.
Anaconda-Deer Lodge argues that because of the interplay between
the issue before the Workers' Compensation Court and the issue
previously litigated before the Division, the court would have to
relitigate the issue decided by the Division to determine whether
Martelli was entitled to permanent total disability benefits. We
agree.
The doctrine of collateral estoppel, also called issue
preclusion, "precludes relitigation of issues actually litigated
and determined in [a] prior suit regardless of whether it was based
on the same cause of action as the second suit." Lawlor v.
National Screen Service (1955), 349 U.S. 322, 326, 75 s.c~.865,
867, 99 L.Ed. 1122, 1127; see also Smith v. Schweigert (1990), 241
Mont. 54, 58, 785 P.2d 195, 197. The three elements of collateral
estoppel are:
1. The issue has been decided in a prior adjudication
and is identical to the one presented.
2. A final judgment on the merits was issued.
3. The party against whom the plea is asserted was
either a party or in privity with a party to the
prior adjudication.
Schweicxert, 785 P.2d at 197.
It is clear and undisputed that the present case meets the
second and third elements of collateral estoppel. The Division
issued an order of final determination which Martelli could have
appealed to the Workersr Compensation Court. See § 39-71-1018, MCA
(1987). Martelli did not appeal the Division's order so it became
a final judgment. Thus, the second element of collateral estoppel
is clearly met. All parties to this cause were also parties to the
litigation before the Division. The third element of collateral
estoppel is therefore satisfied.
The first element, however, is in dispute. To meet the first
element, the precise issue must have been litigated in a prior
action. Marriage of Stout (1985), 216 Mont. 342, 350, 701 P.2d
729, 734.
Martelli contends that the issue before the Division was not
the same as that before the Workers' Compensation Court. He argues
that the issue before the Workerst Compensation Court was whether
he was entitled to benefits for a permanent total disability as
defined in 3 39-7l-l16(15), MCA (l987), whereas the issue before
the Division was to determine which rehabilitation option under 5
39-71-1012, MCA (1987), would be appropriate for him.
Under the circumstances of this case, the two issues are so
intertwined that to decide the issue before it, the Workers'
Compensation Court would have to rehear the precise issue
previously decided by the Division. The definition of permanent
total disability is "a condition resulting from injury as defined
in this chapter after a worker reaches maximum healing, in which a
worker is unable to return to work in the worker's job pool after
exhausting all options set forth in 39-71-1012, MCA." One of the
options set forth in that statute is the precise issue previously
resolved by the Division--whether the worker could "return to a
related occupation suited to the claimant's education and
marketable skills." See 5 39-71-1012(c), MCA (1987).
To rule that Martelli was permanently and totally disabled,
the Workers' Compensation Court would have to determine that
Martelli could not return to a related occupation suited to his
education and skills. See 5 5 39-71-116(15), 39-71-1012 (c), MCA
(1987). As stated above, the Division had previously ruled that
Martelli could return to work in a suitable related occupation and
Martelli did not appeal the Division's order. The doctrine of
collateral estoppel, therefore, precluded the parties from
relitigating the issue before the Workers' Compensation Court. See
Schweisert, 785 P.2d at 197.
Because the parties could not relitigate the issue, the
Workers1 Compensation Court was bound by the Division's
determination that Martelli could return to a related occupation
suited to his education and skills. Because he could work in a
suitable occupation, the Workers' Compensation Court could not
determine that Martelli was permanently and totally disabled.
Thus, the court was correct in dismissing the claim.
Affirmed.
We Concur: A'
Justice Terry N. Trieweiler dissenting.
I dissent from the majority opinion.
The effect of the majority opinion is to amend the Workers'
Compensation Act by eliminating the role of the Workers'
Compensation Court in determining a claimant's right to total
disability benefits.
On January 29, 1992, claimant filed a petition for hearing
before the Workersv Compensation Court in which he asked that court
to find that he was permanently totally disabled and entitled to
permanent total disability benefits.
By statute, the Workers' Compensation Court is given exclusive
jurisdiction to determine the nature and extent of benefits to
which an injured worker is entitled. Section 39-71-2905, MCA
(1987), which was in effect on the date of claimant's injury,
provides as follows:
A claimant or an insurer who has a dispute concerning any
benefits under chapter 71 of this title may petition the
workersv compensation judge for a determination of the
dispute after satisfying dispute resolution requirements
otherwise provided in this chapter. The judge, after a
hearing, shall make a determination of the dispute in
accordance with the law as set forth in chapter 71 of
this title. If the dispute relates to benefits due a
claimant under chapter 71, the judge shall fix and
determine any benefits to be paid and specify the manner
of payment. After parties have satisfied dispute
resolution requirements provided elsewhere in this
chapter, the workers' compensation iudcre has exclusive
iurisdiction to make determinations concerninq disputes
under chapter 71, except as provided in 39-71-317 and
39-71-516. [Emphasis added.]
The claimant in this case did comply with the dispute
resolution requirements provided for in 5 39-71-2401, MCA (1987),
and 5 5 39-71-317 and -516, MCA, are not applicable to this case.
It is our obligation to construe statutes in a way that gives
effect to the substance of the statute, and if several statutes
appear to conflict, to construe them in a way that gives effect to
all of the statutes. Section 1-2-101, MCA (1987), provides:
In the construction of a statute, the office of the judge
is simply to ascertain and declare what is in terms or in
substance contained therein, not to insert what has been
omitted or to omit what has been inserted. Where there
are several provisions or particulars, such a
construction is, if possible, to be adopted as will give
effect to all.
The majority has concluded that when a hearing examiner for
the Division of Workers' Compensation decided claimant's employment
options under Part 10 of the Workers1 Compensation Act which
relates to vocational rehabilitation, that hearing examiner
effectively decided what disability benefits claimant was entitled
to under the Workers1 Compensation Act. To construe the
administrative procedures provided for in Part 10 of the Act in
that manner does not satisfy this Court's statutory obligation to
give effect to all the provisions of the Workers* Compensation Act.
The only way to accomplish that obligation is to conclude that
Part 10 of the Workers1 Compensation Act relates solely to
eligibility for vocational rehabilitation benefits and Part 29 of
the Workers1 Compensation Act relates to the procedure for
determining disability benefits.
Although claimant had a right to appeal to the Workers'
Compensation Court from the final order of the Legal Services
Division of the Department of Labor and Industry, the scope of
review on that appeal would have been limited and would not have
been the equivalent of a hearing before the Workerst Compensation
Court. In State Compensation Mutual Insurance Fund v. Lee Rost Logging ( 1992) ,
252 Mont. 97, 827 P.2d 85, we held that 5 2-4-704(2) (a)(v), MCA, of
the Administrative Procedure Act applied to the Workers'
Compensation Court's review of an agency decision. Therefore, if
claimant had appealed the decision of the Legal Services Division,
the Workers' Compensation Court could only have reversed that
decision if it was Itclearly erroneous in view of the reliable,
probative, and substantial evidence on the whole record." That
limited form of review is not the equivalent of the fact-finding
responsibility given exclusively to the Workerst Compensation Court
by 5 39-71-2905, MCA, when claimant's disability benefits are at
issue. For that reason, the right of appeal provided for in 5 3 9 -
71-1018(4), MCA, was not the equivalent of the hearing guaranteed
in Part 29 of the Act. The majority's decision, therefore,
effectively amends the Workers' Compensation Act by eliminating the
rights and jurisdiction provided for in Part 29.
The statutory scheme enacted by the Legislature in 1987
recognized the need for an independent court to decide the most
important issue that could arise in disputes between injured
workers and the insurer for their employer. For that reason, the
Legislature gave the Workers' Compensation Court exclusive
10
jurisdiction to decide those issues. This Court, by this decision,
has eliminated that procedural safeguard and placed all injured
workers in this state at greater risk in the process. For these
reasons, I dissent from the majority opinion. I would reverse the
judgment of the Workers' Compensation Court.
Justice William E. Hunt, Sr., joins in the foregoing dissent.
May 6, 1993
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that the folIowing order was sent by United States mail, prepaid, to the following
named:
Bernard J. "Ben"Everett
Knight, Dahood, McLean, Everett & Dayton
P. 0, Box 727
Anaconda, MT 59711
Leo S. Ward
Attorney at Law
P. 0. Box 1697
Helena, MT 59624-1697
ED SMITH
CLERK OF THE SUPREME COURT
STATE,OF MONTANA