Lambert v. Ryozik

MAURICE LAMBERT and MARCHELLE LAMBERT,
Plaintiffs and Appellants,

SIGMOND RYOZIK, a/k/a SIGMUND RYDZIK,
BOB BOROWSKI, and BOROWSKI HOLDINGS, LTD.,
Defendants and Respondents.

APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Fifteenth Judicial District,
In and for the County of Rcosevelt,
The Honorable M. James Sorte, Judge presiding.

OF RECORD:
For Appellants:

For Respondents:

Robert Hurly, Attorney at Law,
Glasgow, Montana

D Submitted on Briefs: October 13, 1994
Decided: December 6, 1994
Filed:
Justice William E. Hunt, Sr., delivered the opinion of the Court.
Appellants Maurice and Marshelle Lambert appeal from an order
of the Fifteenth Judicial District Court, Roosevelt County,
dismissing their civil action for lack of jurisdiction.
We reverse and remand to the District Court.
We state the issue as follows:
Did the District Court err by dismissing for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction a civil action resulting from an automobile
accident within the exterior boundaries of the Fort Peck
Reservation brought by enrolled members of the Fort Peck Tribe
against non-Indian defendants?
This action arose from an automobile accident which occurred
within the exterior boundaries of the Fort Peck Indian Reservation.
Appellants are enrolled members of the Fort Peck Tribe residing on
the Fort Peck Reservation. Respondents are Canadian citizens.
On February 13, 1987, appellants filed a complaint in the
Fifteenth Judicial District Court alleging injuries sustained in an
automobile accident with respondents within the exterior boundaries
of the Fort Peck Reservation. On May 14, 1993, respondents filed
a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. On
February 25, '1994, seven years after assuming jurisdiction, the
District Court dismissed the action for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction. Appellants appeal.
We review a district court's conclusions of law to determine
whether the district court's interpretation of the law was correct.
In re Marriage of Schara (Mont. 19941, 878 P.Zd 908, 910,

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51 St. Rep. 676, 677; In re Marriage of Barnard (1994), 264 Mont.
103, 106, 870 P.2d 91, 93 (citing In re Marriage of Burris (1993),
258 Mont. 265, 269, 852 P.2d 616, 619).
In granting respondents' motion to dismiss, the District Court
relied on Emerson v. Boyd (19901, 247 Mont. 241, 805 P.2d 587. In
Emerson, the plaintiff secured a default judgment after filing a
breach of contract action in district court against an Indian
defendant who resided on the Fort Peck Reservation. The district
court vacated the judgment on defendant's motion concluding that
the jurisdiction of the tribal court pre-empted the jurisdiction of
the district court. We affirmed and held that before a Montana
Court assumes jurisdiction in an action arising on a reservation to
which an Indian is a party, it must apply the three-prong test of
Iron Bear v. District Court (19731, 162 Mont. 335, 346, 512 P.2d
1292, 1299. The court must determine:
1. Whether federal treaties or statutes exist preempting
state jurisdiction;
2. Whether there is interference with tribal self-
government; and
3. Whether the tribal court exercised jurisdiction or has
exercised jurisdiction in a manner sufficient to preempt state
jurisdiction. We concluded that the third prong of the Iron Bear
test had been met, and as a result, the district court was
prevented from assuming jurisdiction. Applying Emerson to the
present case, the District Court concluded that the Tribal Court of
the Fort Peck Reservation had exercised jurisdiction over the

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matter pursuant to its Comprehensive Code of Justice sufficient to
preempt the jurisdiction of the District Court. We do not agree
with that conclusion.
The present case is distinguishable from.Emerson. In Emerson,
an Indian defendant sought to exercise his right under the Fort
Peck Comprehensive Code of Justice to have a claim against him
litigated in a tribal court which had exercised jurisdiction over
such matters sufficient to preempt state court jurisdiction. We
recognized and addressed the threat to tribal sovereignty and
self-government inherent in forcing an Indian defendant in a civil
action arising on a reservation to defend him or herself in a state
court when the tribal court had previously exercised jurisdiction
overt such matters. By contrast, the Indians in the present case
are the plaintiffs seeking to exercise their constitutional right
as citizens of Montana to invoke the jurisdiction of the district
court to litigate a claim against non-Indian defendants for
injuries sustained on the reservation. We do not find a threat to
tribal sovereignty and self-government when Indian plaintiffs
choose to invoke the jurisdiction of the district court, rather
than tribal court, to litigate a claim against a non-Indian for
injuries arising on a reservation.
We have repeatedly affirmed the right of Indian plaintiffs to
sue non-Indians in state court as a right guaranteed to all Montana
citizens under Article II, Section 16, of the Montana Constitution.
McCrea v. Busch (1974), 164 Mont. 442, 524 P.2d 761; Bad Horse v.
Bad Horse (19741, 163 Mont. 445, 517 P.2d 893; Iron Bear; Bonnet v.

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Seekins (1952), 126 Mont. 24, 243 P.2d 317. Enrolled members of

Indian tribes within Montana are citizens of Montana, and

therefore, are entitled to bring actions in state court against

non-Indian defendants. Bad Horse, 517 P.2d at 895. Failure to

recognize this right would deprive an Indian plaintiff of due

process under Article II, Section 17, of the Montana Constitution,

and equal protection of the law under Article II, Section 4, of the

Montana Constitution. There is nothing in Emerson to suggest such

a result.

We hold that the District Court erred by dismissing for lack

of subject matter jurisdiction a civil action resulting from an
automobile accident within the exterior boundaries of the Fort Peck

Reservation brought by enrolled members of the Fort Peck Tribe

against non-Indian defendants.
Reversed and remanded for further proceedings in accordance

with this opinion.

We concur: